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Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Oldport days, with ten heliotype illustrations from views taken in Newport, R. I., expressly for this work., Oldport wharves. (search)
some people whom it would be pleasant to colonize in that way; but meanwhile the unchanged southern side of the pier seems pleasanter, with its boat-builders' shops, all facing sunward,--a cheerful haunt upon a winter's day. On the early maps this wharf appears as Queen-Hithe, a name more graceful than its present cognomen. Hithe or Hythe signifies a small harbor, and is the final syllable of many English names, as of Lambeth. Hythe is also one of those Cinque-Ports of which the Duke of Wellington was warden. This wharf was probably still familiarly called Queen-Hithe in 1781, when Washington and Rochambeau walked its length bareheaded between the ranks of French soldiers; and it doubtless bore that name when Dean Berkeley arrived in 1729, and the Rev. Mr. Honyman and all his flock closed hastily their prayer-books, and hastened to the landing to receive their guest. But it had lost this name ere the days, yet remembered by aged men, when the Long Wharf became a market. Beeves we
William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, chapter 11 (search)
s action; and, upon taking into his hand the baton, he resolved upon a gigantic aggressive system that should embrace simultaneous blows throughout the whole continental theatre of war. His theory of action looked to the employment of the maximum of force against the armies of the Confederates, to such a direction of this power as would engage the entire force of the enemy at one and the same time, and to delivering a series of heavy and uninterrupted blows in the style of what the Duke of Wellington used to call hard pounding, and of what General Grant has designated as continuous hammering. The armed force of the Confederacy was at this time mainly included in the two great armies of Johnston and Lee—the former occupying an intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, the latter ensconced within the lines of the Rapidan. These bodies were still almost as powerful in numbers as any the South had ever had in the field. Their intrinsic weakness lay in the fact that those reservoirs of
James Russell Lowell, Among my books, Wordsworth. (search)
ctions, and he felt, if he were ordered to the West Indies, his talents would not save him from the yellow-fever, and he gave that up. (Memoirs, II. 466.) It is curious to fancy Wordsworth a soldier. Certain points of likeness between him and Wellington have often struck me. They resemble each other in practical good sense, fidelity to duty, courage, and also in a kind of precise uprightness which made their personal character somewhat uninteresting. But what was decorum in Wellington was piety in Wordsworth, and the entire absence of imagination (the great point of dissimilarity) perhaps helped as much as anything to make Wellington a great commander. the prescient muse guided the hand of Raisley Calvert while he wrote the poet's name in his will for a legacy of £ 900. By the death of Calvert, in 1795, this timely help came to Wordsworth at the turning-point of his life, and made it honest for him to write poems that will never die, instead of theatrical critiques as ephemeral as
Hon. J. L. M. Curry , LL.D., William Robertson Garrett , A. M. , Ph.D., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 1.1, Legal Justification of the South in secession, The South as a factor in the territorial expansion of the United States (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), The South as a factor in the territorial expansion of the United States. (search)
rritory and resources, the United States was now threatened with domestic revolt. The Emperor Napoleon, her only ally, was overthrown. The nations of Europe were in consultation at Vienna, engaged in the work of readjusting the relations of the world. If they should decide to hurl against America the powerful combination which had crushed Napoleon, what could avert the destruction of republican institutions? Great Britain, relieved from European war, had sent to America a detachment of Wellington's best troops under the command of his favorite general, and the fall of New Orleans was hourly expected. The illustrious chief magistrate, who had borne so many trials with equanimity, and had conducted the national affairs with such signal firmness and ability, awaiting at this dangerous crisis the visit of the New England commissioners on their cruel and unpatriotic mission, was oppressed with a painful anxiety which he could not conceal. But his hour of triumph was near. The hand
Hon. J. L. M. Curry , LL.D., William Robertson Garrett , A. M. , Ph.D., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 1.1, Legal Justification of the South in secession, The South as a factor in the territorial expansion of the United States (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Biographical: officers of civil and military organizations. (search)
es, marching to compass the fields. This Valley campaign of 1862 was never excelled, according to the opinions expressed by military men of high rank and long experience in war. It is told by Dr. Mc-Guire, the chief surgeon of Jackson's command, that with swelling heart he had heard some of the first soldiers and military students of England declare that within the past two hundred years the English speaking race has produced but five soldiers of the first rank—Marlborough, Washington, Wellington, Lee and Stonewall Jackson, and that this campaign in the valley was superior to either of those made by Napoleon in Italy. One British officer, who teaches strategy in a great European college, told Surgeon McGuire that he used this campaign as a model of strategy and tactics, dwelling upon it for several months in his lectures; that it was taught in the schools of Germany, and that Von Moltke, the great strategist, declared it was without a rival in the world's history. After this br
Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 3, Virginia (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 21: (search)
ieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, professor of strategy in the British Staff college, contributed to the Life of Jackson, by his wife, he wrote: When Jackson fell at Chancellorsville, his military career had only just begun, and the question, what place he takes in history, is hardly so pertinent as the question, what place he could have taken had he been spared. So far as his opportunities had permitted, he had shown himself in no way inferior to the greatest generals of the century, to Wellington, to Napoleon, or to Lee. That Jackson was equal to the highest demands of strategy his deeds and conceptions show; that he was equal to the task of handling a large army on the field of battle must be left to conjecture; but throughout the whole of his soldier's life he was never intrusted with any detached mission which he failed to execute with complete success. No general made fewer mistakes. No general so persistently outwitted his opponents. No general better understood the use of
John D. Billings, The history of the Tenth Massachusetts battery of light artillery in the war of the rebellion, Chapter 15: (search)
issons cannot come up with more, for every horse not already disabled would be sacrificed in attempting it. The only way to get a supply is for cannoneers to creep along inside the works, and reaching a point less exposed, run the gauntlet to the rear and provide themselves with a few rounds. One man from each piece makes the trip, and returns in safety. The stillness grows more and more oppressive. We chafe like caged lions, for we feel that the worst is yet to come, and wish, as did Wellington at Waterloo, that either Blucher or night would come to relieve us from impending calamity. This calmness, we know, forebodes an attack respecting whose result we are, not unreasonably, fearful, for the line is thin and our support unreliable, and if a determined assault is made the chances are strongly against us. There is no retreat for the artillery—certainly not for Sleeper's Tenth Massachusetts—and we have but a few rounds of ammunition left, not an encouraging outlook, truly. So w
John Dimitry , A. M., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 10.1, Louisiana (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 14: (search)
our left and right, confused the Thirteenth army corps which had so steadily borne the day's brunt. Their soldier ranks began to shiver; their firm battle line swayed in weakness. In vain did the Thirteenth take advantage of the wooded ridges, so common in the country. As soon as formed, every line was swept away as by a flood. Every gun was captured as soon as placed for action. The slaughter of the men was keeping pace with the capture of the guns. The decisive moment that came to Wellington at Waterloo, when he shut up his field glasses; that certitude which came to Napoleon at Austerlitz, when he took snuff, had now come to Taylor at Mansfield. The Thirteenth army corps, breaking at last, fled wildly. For miles it was driven without intermission by a pressure that neither knew halt nor permitted rest. During the fight the Thirteenth army corps lost guns, prisoners, stands of colors. Four miles from the scene of the defeat of the Thirteenth, the Nineteenth army corps was
Col. John M. Harrell, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 10.2, Arkansas (ed. Clement Anselm Evans), Chapter 10: (search)
a successful leader of military campaigns. Undoubtedly General Smith gave evidence of the possession of great military capacity. His strategic moves were usually good, and admitting that his overconfidence at Jenkins' ferry cost him dearly, he had a right to rely on assistance there. One practical lesson most thoroughly impressed in experience of actual war is that a most trivial accident may thwart a grand combination, and cause disappointment to a heartfelt wish like that expressed by Wellington: Would that night or Blucher would come. There was only one Stonewall Jackson, and but one Lee, in the course of centuries. As it resulted, the Western campaign proposed for the spring of 1865, after much preparation and thought, was never fought. It may be well, in reaching the closing days of a great endeavor, to repeat the old adage: Man proposes, and God disposes. The Confederacy ceased to exist when its military resources were exhausted. The dispersion of the Confederates in
Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1, Chapter 8: (search)
strength had ever been undertaken by the great European captains, unless the assaulting party outnumbered the defenders by at least three to one. In the great sieges of the Peninsular war, the disproportion was even greater still. At Badajos, Wellington had fifty-one thousand men, eighteen thousand of whom were in the final assault, while the entire French garrison numbered only five thousand; the British loss, in the assault alone, was thirty-five hundred. At Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington had tWellington had thirty-five thousand men, and the French, less than two thousand, not seventeen hundred being able to bear arms; the British loss was twelve hundred and ninety, seven hundred and ten of these at the breaches; while only three hundred Frenchmen fell. But Badajos and Rodrigo were carried. In the second assault on Vicksburg, Grant had, in his various columns, about thirty thousand men engaged; of these, he lost probably three thousand, in killed and wounded. He, however, was met by an army, ins
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