hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Fitzhugh Lee 417 7 Browse Search
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) 407 1 Browse Search
James Longstreet 400 4 Browse Search
Generell Ewell 398 0 Browse Search
Pickett 243 17 Browse Search
A. P. Hill 218 12 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 206 0 Browse Search
Meade 193 25 Browse Search
Edward Johnson 179 3 Browse Search
Rodes 160 10 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 568 total hits in 93 results.

1 2 3 4 5 6 ...
Emmetsburg (Iowa, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
es commonly moved, and he determined to give battle. There is a foot note to this statement as follows: This and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the writer after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign. On pages 340-1, he says: Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank securely posted on the Emmetsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, and by marching towards Frederick could undoubtedly have manceuvered Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation Gen. Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute. To this there is a foot note as follows: The officer named is my authority for this statement. On page 358 t
Baltimore, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
ivisions in the attack made on the 3d. General Lee's statement of his orders in regard to this latter attack would imply that the orders originally given in regard to it were to make it with Longstreet's whole corps, and is therefore corroborative of Colonel Taylor's statement. It is to be observed here that General Longstreet has heretofore denied the authenticity of General Lee's detailed report, first published in the Historical Magazine, New York, then in the Southern Magazine, Baltimore, and lastly among the Southern Historical Society Papers from another copy, which confirms the genuineness of the first. The article now given under the sanction of his name quotes partly from the preliminary report given in the Appendix to Bates' History of the Battle of Gettysburg and partly from the detailed report; but it appears that he thinks the latter was written in a different spirit from that in which the preliminary report was written, and being a somewhat critical --account of
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
printer, an article entitled The campaign of Gettysburg, purporting to be by General James Longstree had made on Gen. Longstreet's operations at Gettysburg, or on any other theatre during the war, precomplaint against me being the remarks about Gettysburg contained in my address which I have given. march back early enough on the 30th to reach Gettysburg in time for the fight on the 1st of July. T battle order on th-, 1st and 2nd of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any od to assume the initiative on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Neither of his divisions had been at the r the night of the 30th, to reach the town of Gettysburg itself, could not have exceeded 15 miles, anfth corps of Meade's army was 23 miles from Gettysburg at the close of the fight on the first day, Cemetery for the Federal soldiers killed at Gettysburg, Edward Everett, in the presence of Presidenhe simple order on the march to move towards Gettysburg, the previous orders being to concentrate at[7 more...]
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 36
te to this statement as follows: This and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the writer after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign. On pages 340-1, he says: Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank securely posted on the Emmetsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, and by marching towards Frederick could undoubtedly have manceuvered Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation Gen. Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute. To this there is a foot note as follows: The officer named is my authority for this statement. On page 358 there is this foot note: The absence of Pickett's division on the day be
Little Roundtop (Washington, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top Hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it. During all the forenoon the bulk of Meade's troops which had arrived were massed on the right (enemy's), as Meade contemplated an attack from that flank-Hancock's corps connected with Howard's, and Sickles was on the left of Hancock, but he did not go into position until the afternoon. On page 405, Hancock says: I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by Gen. Howard) to Round Top Mountain. These arrangements were not made until the morning was considerably advanced. On page 331, Meade after stating his purpose to make an attack from his right says: Major-General Slocum, however, reported that the
Cashtown (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
l Lee's birth, I delivered an address at Washington and Lee University, by invitation of the faculty, and in that address, after speaking of the fight on the 1st at Gettysburg, I said: General Lee had ordered the concentration of his army at Cashtown, and the battle on this day, brought on by the advance of the enemy's cavalry, was unexpected to him. When he ascertained the advantage that had been gained, he determined to press it as soon as the remainder of his army arrived. In a conferencn my Review, I received no orders whatever on that day from either General Ewell or General Lee until after the whole fighting was over, except the simple order on the march to move towards Gettysburg, the previous orders being to concentrate at Cashtown. General Longstreet says, in this connection. General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men. How mistaken General Hays was in making such a remark will abundantly appear from
Frederick, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
This and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the writer after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign. On pages 340-1, he says: Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank securely posted on the Emmetsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, and by marching towards Frederick could undoubtedly have manceuvered Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation Gen. Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute. To this there is a foot note as follows: The officer named is my authority for this statement. On page 358 there is this foot note: The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very l
Winchester, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
ovements he did. It is equally certain that the delay which occurred in making the attack lost us the victory. It was very natural that Longstreet's corps should be selected to assume the initiative on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Neither of his divisions had been at the recent battles at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, except McLaws', and that division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, had not been as heavily engaged there as the other troops. Ewell's corps had captured Winchester and cleared the valley on its advance into Pennsylvania, and two of its divisions, as well as two of Hill's, had been heavily engaged on the first. Can it be that General Longstreet apprehended that if the advantage gained on the first day was promptly and vigorously prosecuted the chief glory of the battle would devolve on the two. corps which had first encountered the enemy and brought him to bay, and hence desired to change the theatre of the battle that was inevitable? A caref
York, Pa. (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
s received on the night of the 28th. If it had not been received until the night of the 29th, it would have been impossible for the order to return to reach me at York by the way of Carlisle in time for me to begin my march back early enough on the 30th to reach Gettysburg in time for the fight on the 1st of July. The fact was that I received the order on the morning of the 29th at York, with the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac and was moving north. The statements of Colonel Taylor and Marshall, and of Gen- Long, as given by General Longstreet, that they knew nothing of an order to attack at sunrise, amount to nothing. They had noll statement contained in my Review, show that two of my brigades were placed, on the afternoon of the 1st, before General Lee came to our part of the line, on the York road, to guard against a flank movement apprehended in that direction. They never were in the line on the 2nd at all, but Gordon's brigade was sent for on the 2nd
Chancellorsville (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 36
as responsible for the remarkable .delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee, for if any one knew the value of promptness and celerity in military movements he did. It is equally certain that the delay which occurred in making the attack lost us the victory. It was very natural that Longstreet's corps should be selected to assume the initiative on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Neither of his divisions had been at the recent battles at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, except McLaws', and that division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, had not been as heavily engaged there as the other troops. Ewell's corps had captured Winchester and cleared the valley on its advance into Pennsylvania, and two of its divisions, as well as two of Hill's, had been heavily engaged on the first. Can it be that General Longstreet apprehended that if the advantage gained on the first day was promptly and vigorously prosecuted the chief gl
1 2 3 4 5 6 ...