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George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Major-General United States Army (ed. George Gordon Meade) 96 0 Browse Search
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 3. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.) 72 0 Browse Search
Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3. 46 0 Browse Search
Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 7. (ed. Frank Moore) 29 1 Browse Search
Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, major general , United States army : volume 1 22 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 37. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 22 0 Browse Search
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones) 14 0 Browse Search
Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3. 14 0 Browse Search
General James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox 12 0 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee, General Lee 11 1 Browse Search
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Browsing named entities in Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). You can also browse the collection for Taneytown (Maryland, United States) or search for Taneytown (Maryland, United States) in all documents.

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Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee's Army at the battle of Gettysburg-opinions of leading Confederate soldiers. (search)
us been on the line of our communications. If we had moved on Washington, we would have been followed on our heels, and while we had the strong fortifications of that city in our front, we would have had Meade's army in our rear. In any event, we would have been in a most hazardous position, with no prospect of escape in case of a defeat, for we could not have gotten near enough to Meade's line of communications to endanger them without crossing the Monocacy and goirig at least as far as Taneytown; where we would have been out of reach of the passes of South mountain. This idea about our being able to threaten Meade's communications by extending our right on the Emmettsburg road, has grown out of an entire misapprehension of the topography of the country. Your fifth proposition, that The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d, should never have been attempted, may now appear very plain in the light of what actually happened. We have in our country a homely saying of so
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg. (search)
all disposed to exaggerate the forces on his side, says that division numbered 3,000 or 4,000. We may, therefore, assume that it was fully 4,000 strong. Bates, the State historian of Pennsylvania, says: When Howard came up he left one division under Gen. Alex. von Steinwehr upon this hill, with directions to have it posted most advantageously to hold the position, and to cover retiring troops. Around the base of this hill were low stone walls, tier above tier, extending from the Taneytown road around to the westerly extremity of Wolf's Hill. These afforded excellent protection to infantry, and behind which the soldiers, weary with the long march and covered with dust, threw themselves for rest. Von Steinwehr was an accomplished soldier, having been thoroughly schooled in the practice of the Prussian army. His military eye was delighted with this position, and thither he drew his heavy pieces, and planted them at the utmost verge towards the town. There was no time to