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Browsing named entities in a specific section of H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia.. Search the whole document.

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Piedmont (Italy) (search for this): chapter 4
advanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on the Adda and Po, with the fortress of Pizzighettone as the depot of his magazines, he advanced upon the line of the Adige. Pechiera became his next depot, and he now had four fortresses in echelon between him and his first depot of magazines; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing himself on the Po, he advanced against the States of the Church, making Ferrara and then Ancona, his places of depot. From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, he was enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the Austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions. In this campaign of 1797, after securing his base, he fortified Palma-Nuova, Osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications of Klagenfurth, and, as he advanced, established, to use his own words, a good point d'appui at every five or six marches. Afterwards, when the Austr
Wissembourg (France) (search for this): chapter 4
defence will be much the same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of the second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of the country. Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau, Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the several passages of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Befort form a second line; Thionville, Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun a grand central depot. The following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by fortifications on a sea-coast. 1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the navy of the country. 2d. To prevent the ene
Grenoble (France) (search for this): chapter 4
ed. For a frontier of moderate extent there may be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might penetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on two or three points in the great valleys below. Take, for example, the frontier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes of the mountains are secured by the little works of Fort L'Ecluse, Fort Pierre-chatel, Fort Barraux, Briancon, Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes; while Besancon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line; and Lyons a grand central depot. Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the system of defence will be much the same as that of an open land frontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of the second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third line, f
Prague (Czech Republic) (search for this): chapter 4
acter. Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in 1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to the brink of ruin; St. Jean d'acre, in 1799, stopped the successful career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the ascendancy; Strasburg has often been the bulwark of the French against Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the bat
Mississippi (United States) (search for this): chapter 4
arded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the military art. A writer, however, of some pretensions in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the shores of the Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much like building 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the enemy on the Atlantic! In the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed about thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second lines, and opposite the intervals. In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently by Rogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of D'Arcon, but the distance betw
Montrouge (France) (search for this): chapter 4
s not planted there until 1440. This capital was therefore indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During this period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges was successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans besieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged. it in vain. In 1359 Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and retired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In 1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed the armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several
Friedland (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany) (search for this): chapter 4
arrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. Spandau, said be in the 19th Bulletin, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of operations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had not even armed its batteries. The possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit. These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position. The influenc
Marseilles (France) (search for this): chapter 4
tier has Fort Quarre, Fort St. Marguerite, St. Tropez, Brigancon, the forts of Point Man, of l'ertissac, and of Langoustier, Toulon, St. Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, Aigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Chateau de Salces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and Port Vendre. Toulon is the great naval depot for this frontier, and Marseilles the great commercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. The Atlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave. Medoc, Pate, &c., on the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix, Oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the or character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken. Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in 1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621; nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, a
Brest (France) (search for this): chapter 4
a Rochelle, with the forts of the Isle of Re; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon, with Fort Penthievre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne; Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cezembre, La Canchee, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its defensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval depots; and Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of the works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated, nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval depots and commercial seaports of France against the superior naval forces of her neighbor. Omitting for the present all discussion of seacoast defences, let us examine more particularly the ch
Austria (Austria) (search for this): chapter 4
an from that which would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, Spain, Portugal, HNetherlands, effectually checked the waves of Austrian success. Let us now turn to the campaigns of defence. The king of Sardinia, jealous of Austrian influence, had refused to permit the Austrians victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria and Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomhe forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success, Massena, in the fortifications of Geortant points of the country, and cut off the Austrian line of retreat. But even after the victory s forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian aggression in Italy. These works were of greversed Germany and seized upon the capital of Austria. The neglect of the Prussians to place theey effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war. And again inhe campaign, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prev
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