Browsing named entities in Elias Nason, McClellan's Own Story: the war for the union, the soldiers who fought it, the civilians who directed it, and his relations to them.. You can also browse the collection for E. M. Stanton or search for E. M. Stanton in all documents.

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de, so we can do what we please. I have secured opening road. George B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. On the same day I telegraphed to Gen. Lander as follows: We hold Charlestown. As soon as possible please occupy Bunker Hill and communicate with Banks at Charlestown. Scout well towards Winchester. Push the repairs of the railway rapidly. Get free of this business. I want. you with me in another direction. George B. McClellan. Maj.-Gen. Commanding. It was a part of Mr. Stanton's policy — only too well carried out — to prevent frequent personal interviews between the President and myself; he was thus enabled to say one thing to the President and exactly the opposite to me. A few days later, on the 8th of March, the President sent for me at an early hour in the morning, about half-past 7, and I found him in his office. He appeared much concerned about something, and soon said that he wished to talk with me about a very ugly matter. I asked what it was; and, as
ession; and that, much as I should dislike sparing him, I would give up Franklin for the place. The secretary replied that Wadsworth had been selected because it was necessary, for political reasons, to conciliate the agricultural interests of New York, and that it was useless to discuss the matter, because it would in no event be changed. When Gen. Wadsworth parted from me at Fairfax he professed the greatest devotion and friendship for me, but at once became an enemy, probably because Stanton informed him of the objections I had made to his appointment, without giving him the real grounds of my opposition. My memorandum of Aug. 2, 1861, shows that even then I regarded Virginia as the most important portion of the immense theatre of operations. Gen. Scott differed from me, and thought the valley of the Mississippi more vital. While fully recognizing the importance and necessity of operations in the valley of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers, and of coast exp
exact parallel to the expedition of Hooker's to capture the Potomac batteries, and where he would have got captured himself; or, more truly, to the last plan, to make a campaign merely to take batteries as preliminary to a campaign. I just saw Stanton, and was must gratified by what he said. It was: Gen. McClellan has no firmer friend than myself; but I may not be where I am long. I think Gen, McClellan ought not to move till he is fully ready. I told him that the Mystic would be in Hamu before you go. I am perfectly willing that you should have Ingalls and Beckwith, merely remembering the special duty Ingalls is doing. See Heintzelman about Richardson. He will explain to the President. G. B. McClellan. McClellan to Stanton.headquarters, Army of the Potomac, March 16, 1862. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War: Sir: In order to carry out the proposed object of this army it has now become necessary that its commander should have the entire control of affairs around Fo
Chapter 15: The Peninsular campaign Landing at Fortress Monroe that place removed from his command Secretary Stanton stops all recruiting advance on Richmond columns under fire first corps withdrawn from the army. In the coursee a delay of many days; I therefore determined to advance on the 4th of April. The following telegram of April 3 to Mr. Stanton requires no explanation: I expect to move from here to-morrow morning on Yorktown, where a force of some 15,000 ofher a desire for the failure of the campaign or entire incompetence. Between the horns of this dilemma the friends of Mr. Stanton must take their choice. During the preceding autumn I advocated a system of drafting, but was not listened to. Had absurdly and recklessly managed than the whole system of recruiting, drafting, and organization under the regime of Secretary Stanton. When his actions are coolly criticised, apart from the influence of party feeling, his administration will be reg
lose Franklin and his division. On the same day, at ten P. M., I sent the following to Secretary Stanton: Since Gen. Woodbury's brigade of volunteer engineer troops was only temporarily attacin and his division may be restored to my command. I received the following reply from Secretary Stanton: The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been received. Gen. SuThe telegram referred to in my despatch to the President was the following, of April 7, to Secretary Stanton: Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent examining the enemy's righng now to my utmost. Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, corps was charged with the operations against Yorktown itself. The following despatch to Secretary Stanton shows the condition of affairs at its date, April 11: The reconnoissances of to-day pr
. M. to-day; a large quantity of Confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning. In reply to which the following was received from the President: Your despatch as to the South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan and his army for their seizure. On the 30th I sent the following to Secretary Stanton: From the tone of your despatches and the President's I do not think that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces; taken over 750 prisoners; killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and in its results. Porter h
, without extending the miserable record of Mr. Stanton's falsehood and shame, to show his continuoent in Jan., 1862, came the hostility of Secretary Stanton to McClellan, then general-in-chief. s bestowed on him by Halleck, by uniting with Stanton and Gen. Scott in advising that McClellan shochmond, and his own imprudent letter, enabled Stanton to get rid of McClellan at headquarters. ( Potomac. The War Department, and especially Stanton and Halleck, became greatly alarmed. On the upon me with a protest, signed by himself and Stanton, denouncing the conduct of McClellan and demaom Richmond, therein differing from Chase and Stanton. The object in bringing that army back to Warumors sent out by the Secretary of War. Both Stanton and Halleck were, however, filled with appreh On Aug. 30 Mr. Chase states that he and Mr. Stanton prepared and signed a paper expressing theiept. 2 to appeal to McClellan to save them, Mr. Stanton openly declared, says Mr. Blair, that he wo[7 more...]
nforcements. The state of affairs is concealed in Washington to hide their own blunders, and the country will not respond to the crisis unless it is known. We need 200,000 more men to fill up the ranks and form new regiments. A large part of Halleck's force, all that can be withdrawn, should come from the West. There is no use in writing. Should you not send at once an officer who will not be afraid to speak? And though such a messenger does not open his lips except to Lincoln and Stanton, the public will soon know that there is something concealed. It should be done by all means. To-day we must get ourselves enough out to save being shut in. There is no use in entrenching a line of no real utility, and what Duane can do to-day will only wear out his men for nothing. It is troops alone that can help us to-day. By to-morrow we will be able to know where to entrench. We must have fresh troops immediately in large numbers, and I would, if necessary, abandon Norfolk a