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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government. Search the whole document.

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1 2 3 4
June 30th, 1787 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
3-45 opinions of John Quincy Adams necessity for secession. From the earliest period, it was foreseen by the wisest of our statesmen that a danger to the perpetuity of the Union would arise from the conflicting interests of different sections, and every effort was made to secure each of these classes of interests against aggression by the other. As a proof of this may be cited the following extract from Madison's report of a speech made by himself in the Philadelphia convention on June 30, 1787: He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class of citizens or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought to be given a constitutional power of defense. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests, not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having
1006 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
interests, not by their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the United States. It did not lie between the large and small States; it lay between the Northern and Southern; and, if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these two interests. Madison Papers, p. 1006. Rufus King, a distinguished member of the convention from Massachusetts, a few days afterward said, to the same effect: He was fully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great and small States, but between the Southern and Eastern. For this reason he had been ready to yield something, in the proportion of representatives, for the security of the Southern. . . . He was not averse to giving them a st
December 24th, 1798 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
that this Government, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress. In the Virginia resolutions, drawn by Madison, adopted on December 24, 1798, and reaffirmed in 1799, the General Assembly of that state declares that it views the powers of the Federal Government as resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States,
November (search for this): chapter 2.23
and human ambition. That they did so is to be found in the debates both of the general and the state conventions, where state interposition was often declared to be the bulwark against usurpation. At an early period in the history of the federal government, the states of Kentucky and Virginia found reason to reassert this right of state interposition. In the first of the famous resolutions drawn by Jefferson in 1798, and with some modification adopted by the legislature of Kentucky in November of that year, it is declared that, whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party; that this Government, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases o
1803 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
reignty of states and of regard for the limitations of the Constitution—to prevent a conflict of arms. The compromise of 1833 was adopted, which South Carolina agreed to accept, the principle for which she contended being virtually conceded. Meantime there had been no lack, as we have already seen, of assertions of the sovereign rights of the states from other quarters. The declaration of these rights by the New England states and their representatives, on the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, on the admission of the state of that name in 1811-12, and on the question of the annexation of Texas in 1843-45, have been referred to in another place. Among the resolutions of the Massachusetts legislature, in relation to the proposed annexation of Texas, adopted in February, 1845, were the following: 2. Resolved, That there has hitherto been no precedent of the admission of a foreign state or foreign territory into the Union by legislation, granted in the Constitution of the United
1839 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
manner as the people shall hereafter designate and appoint. Congressional Globe, Vol. XIV, p. 299. To these stanch declarations of principles—with regard to which (leaving out of consideration the particular occasion that called them forth) my only doubt would be whether they do not express too decided a doctrine of nullification—may be added the avowal of one of the most distinguished sons of Massachusetts, John Quincy Adams, in his discourse before the New York Historical Society, in 1839: Nations acknowledge no judge between them upon earth; and their governments, from necessity, must, in their intercourse with each other, decide when the failure of one party to a contract to perform its obligations absolves the other from the reciprocal fulfillment of its own. But this last of earthly powers is not necessary to the freedom or independence of States connected together by the immedate action of the people of whom they consist. To the people alone is there reserved as well
February, 1845 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
e have already seen, of assertions of the sovereign rights of the states from other quarters. The declaration of these rights by the New England states and their representatives, on the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, on the admission of the state of that name in 1811-12, and on the question of the annexation of Texas in 1843-45, have been referred to in another place. Among the resolutions of the Massachusetts legislature, in relation to the proposed annexation of Texas, adopted in February, 1845, were the following: 2. Resolved, That there has hitherto been no precedent of the admission of a foreign state or foreign territory into the Union by legislation, granted in the Constitution of the United States to Congress, do not embrace a case of the admission of a foreign state or foreign territory, by legislation, into the Union, such an act of admission would have no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts. 3. Resolved, That the power, never having been grante
1058 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
a few days afterward said, to the same effect: He was fully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great and small States, but between the Southern and Eastern. For this reason he had been ready to yield something, in the proportion of representatives, for the security of the Southern. . . . He was not averse to giving them a still greater security, but did not see how it could be done. Ibid., pp. 1057, 1058. The wise men who formed the Constitution were not seeking to bind the states together by the material power of a majority; nor were they so blind to the influences of passion and interest as to believe that paper barriers would suffice to restrain a majority actuated by either or both of these motives. They endeavored, therefore, to prevent the conflicts inevitable from the ascendancy of a sectional or party majority, by so distributing the powers of government that each interest might
1828 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
d by adding the construction of them contained in the report of Madison to the Virginia legislature in 1799, was at the election of Buchanan—the last President chosen by vote of a party that could with any propriety be styled national, in contradistinction to sectional. At a critical and memorable period, that pure spirit, luminous intellect, and devoted adherent of the Constitution, the great statesman of South Carolina, invoked this remedy of state interposition against the Tariff Act of 1828, which was deemed injurious and oppressive to his state. No purpose was then declared to coerce the state, as such, but measures were taken to break the protective shield of her authority and enforce the laws of Congress upon her citizens, by compelling them to pay outside of her ports the duties on imports, which the state had declared unconstitutional and had forbidden to be collected in her ports. There remained at that day enough of the spirit in which the Union had been founded—enoug
1833 AD (search for this): chapter 2.23
eak the protective shield of her authority and enforce the laws of Congress upon her citizens, by compelling them to pay outside of her ports the duties on imports, which the state had declared unconstitutional and had forbidden to be collected in her ports. There remained at that day enough of the spirit in which the Union had been founded—enough of respect for the sovereignty of states and of regard for the limitations of the Constitution—to prevent a conflict of arms. The compromise of 1833 was adopted, which South Carolina agreed to accept, the principle for which she contended being virtually conceded. Meantime there had been no lack, as we have already seen, of assertions of the sovereign rights of the states from other quarters. The declaration of these rights by the New England states and their representatives, on the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, on the admission of the state of that name in 1811-12, and on the question of the annexation of Texas in 1843-45, have b
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