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Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
ct rear and train guards, and we see that General Meade's statement is borne out. Does Dr. Bates think it credible that the Federal army, between June 10th and July 1st, without any severe battles or marches, while it was slowly swinging around Washington and Baltimore as a pivot, so as to present a front to General Lee in his Northward march, and while every effort was being made to recruit it and hurry up to the front the absentees, dwindled from 100,000 to 72,000 effectives? Again, Generaled by other information. 1. In the Historical Magazine of August, 1867, is re-published an article from the New York Tribune, containing what purports to be a copy of the returns of the Confederate armies, taken from the captured archives at Washington. Where the returns were defective, the author (Mr. Swinton) has interpolated his own estimates. These are very inaccurate, but the copied returns contain valuable information. In this paper the whole force for duty in the Department of North
Baltimore, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
ield, on June 10th 76,255. Between that date and the battle, he states, new commands joined General Meade, which added 9,500 infantry to his army. Add the cavalry at Dr. Bates' estimate of 12,000, and we have nearly 100,000 men. Deduct rear and train guards, and we see that General Meade's statement is borne out. Does Dr. Bates think it credible that the Federal army, between June 10th and July 1st, without any severe battles or marches, while it was slowly swinging around Washington and Baltimore as a pivot, so as to present a front to General Lee in his Northward march, and while every effort was being made to recruit it and hurry up to the front the absentees, dwindled from 100,000 to 72,000 effectives? Again, General Meade's official report, as quoted by Dr. Bates, of his losses at Gettysburg, makes them in the aggregate 23,186. The estimates of the Federal infantry corps commanders on July 4th, the day after the battle, give 51,514 (see General Butterfield's testimony) as t
Winchester, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
s great waste of blood for General Meade to fight at all. Had he allowed General Lee to march about in Pennsylvania for a month longer the whole Confederate army would have melted away, and all the advantages of Gettysburg been won without the sacrifices. The truth is this: General Lee left Culpeper on his march northward, June 10th, with not over 60,000 effective troops of all arms. He had some severe cavalry fighting east of the Blue Ridge, and dispersed or captured Milroy's force at Winchester. At this last place he was joined by a small body of cavalry, a battalion of infantry and a battery. This addition did not compensate for the losses in battle, the detachment left to guard the prisoners taken from Milroy, and to protect communication to the Potomac. So that General Lee crossed the Potomac with under 60,000 men, including his cavalry. From 55,000 to 58,000 (counting all the cavalry) of this number were probably at Gettysburg. The foregoing accords with General Lee's
Gettysburg (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
Meade's official report, as quoted by Dr. Bates, of his losses at Gettysburg, makes them in the aggregate 23,186. The estimates of the Federafacts which prevented General Meade from attacking General Lee at Gettysburg, and induced the Federal council of war to vote with only two disdealt unfairly with the Federal reports of strength and losess at Gettysburg, he has hardly deigned to notice the Confederate sources of infor Swinton, reports General Longstreet as saying that there were at Gettysburg 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms. The only attempt a the Potomac with the main army) and Imboden's small command — at Gettysburg; and yet under these circumstances was, according to Dr. Bates, aonfederate army would have melted away, and all the advantages of Gettysburg been won without the sacrifices. The truth is this: General Le58,000 (counting all the cavalry) of this number were probably at Gettysburg. The foregoing accords with General Lee's statement to the wri
Culpeper, Va. (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
— at Gettysburg; and yet under these circumstances was, according to Dr. Bates, able to thinks the Confederate commander lost the use of over 20,000 men in this time by straggling! At this rate it was great waste of blood for General Meade to fight at all. Had he allowed General Lee to march about in Pennsylvania for a month longer the whole Confederate army would have melted away, and all the advantages of Gettysburg been won without the sacrifices. The truth is this: General Lee left Culpeper on his march northward, June 10th, with not over 60,000 effective troops of all arms. He had some severe cavalry fighting east of the Blue Ridge, and dispersed or captured Milroy's force at Winchester. At this last place he was joined by a small body of cavalry, a battalion of infantry and a battery. This addition did not compensate for the losses in battle, the detachment left to guard the prisoners taken from Milroy, and to protect communication to the Potomac. So that General Lee cro
Maryland (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
tes' history of the battle of Gettysburg, we intimated a purpose of returning to the subject again. The following letter from Colonel Wm. Allan, late Chief of Ordnance of Second Corps, Army of Northern Virginia, spares us any further trouble. We happen to know that Colonel Allan is thoroughly familiar with the history of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that some of the most valuable military criticisms that have appeared in late years, have been from his facile pen.] McDonough school, Maryland, April 1, 1876. Rev. J. W. Jones, Secretary Southern Historical Society: It is to be regretted that at this time, more than ten years after the close of the war, the feelings that were natural enough during its progress have still sufficient force to discolor the facts of history. The book of Dr. Bates, recently published, possesses merit as a clear and readable account of the battle of Gettysburg, and shows labor and research in its compilation, but is wide of the truth in many of its
Seneca, Md. (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
, according to Dr. Bates: With regard to the enemy's force, I had reliable information. Two Union men had counted them as they passed through Hagerstown, and in order that there might be no mistake, they compared notes every night, and if their counts differed, they were satisfactorily adjusted by compromise. In round numbers, Lee had 91,000 infantry and 280 pieces of artillery; marching with that column were about 6,000 cavalry. He adds that Stuart's cavalry, which crossed the Potomac at Seneca, numbered about 5,000 men. Such information as this may have been useful to a commander before a battle, who was very anxious not to underrate his enemy, but is altogether valueless to the historian. General Meade's estimate given above, puts General Lee's force at nearly the same. In addition to these estimates, which he assumes as true, Dr. Bates, on the authority of Swinton, reports General Longstreet as saying that there were at Gettysburg 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms.
Pennsylvania (Pennsylvania, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
neighborhood of 76,300. General Lee had crossed the Potomac but ten days before; had marched unopposed and at his leisure through a hostile country into central Pennsylvania; had concentrated his entire force — except Stuart's cavalry (which did not cross the Potomac with the main army) and Imboden's small command — at Gettysbu0,000 men in this time by straggling! At this rate it was great waste of blood for General Meade to fight at all. Had he allowed General Lee to march about in Pennsylvania for a month longer the whole Confederate army would have melted away, and all the advantages of Gettysburg been won without the sacrifices. The truth is thiApril, 1874) is — total killed, wounded and missing (including loss in artillery attached to the corps), 7,515, General Ewell reports his total losses while in Pennsylvania (Southern Magazine, June, 1873) at 6,094 aggregate. General Hill's report has not been published (so far as I know), but as his corps did not suffer more than<
Hagerstown (Maryland, United States) (search for this): chapter 5.27
rned to duty. It was undoubtedly this state of facts which prevented General Meade from attacking General Lee at Gettysburg, and induced the Federal council of war to vote with only two dissenting voices, on July 12th, against attacking him at Hagerstown, where he had an impassable river behind him. But if Dr. Bates has dealt unfairly with the Federal reports of strength and losess at Gettysburg, he has hardly deigned to notice the Confederate sources of information at all. His estimate of Gral Lee's force is derived entirely from the guesses of Generals Hooker and Meade. General Hooker says, according to Dr. Bates: With regard to the enemy's force, I had reliable information. Two Union men had counted them as they passed through Hagerstown, and in order that there might be no mistake, they compared notes every night, and if their counts differed, they were satisfactorily adjusted by compromise. In round numbers, Lee had 91,000 infantry and 280 pieces of artillery; marching with
J. D. Imboden (search for this): chapter 5.27
1st, he applies the same arithmetic to Lee's army, and states that we may therefore fairly conclude that Lee crossed the Potomac with something over 100,000 men, and actually had upon the field in the neighborhood of 76,300. General Lee had crossed the Potomac but ten days before; had marched unopposed and at his leisure through a hostile country into central Pennsylvania; had concentrated his entire force — except Stuart's cavalry (which did not cross the Potomac with the main army) and Imboden's small command — at Gettysburg; and yet under these circumstances was, according to Dr. Bates, able to thinks the Confederate commander lost the use of over 20,000 men in this time by straggling! At this rate it was great waste of blood for General Meade to fight at all. Had he allowed General Lee to march about in Pennsylvania for a month longer the whole Confederate army would have melted away, and all the advantages of Gettysburg been won without the sacrifices. The truth is this: G
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