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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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June (search for this): chapter 9
of the armies of Generals Lee and Grant, in which is embodied, on pafe 16, a table of returns of the forces in the Department of Northern Virginia at the end of each month from February, 1862, to February, 1865, inclusive, except for the months of June anmd August, 1862, April and June, 1863, and May and September, 1864. This table was made out by Mr. Swinton, author of the History of the Army of the Potomac, from the Confederate returns in the Archive Office at Washington, and is indisputably odied in Mr. Jones' Personal Reminiscences, a separate copy of which I now send you. Gen. Lee's force against Mc-Clellan, in June, 1862, was between 75,000 and 80,000-a fact I think I have demonstrated in a communication which you will find in the June number of the Society Papers for 1876, page 413. The table before referred to shows the force for duty in the Department of Northern Virginia, at the close of July, 1862, just before the commencement of the campaign against Pope, was 69,559, and t
1860 AD (search for this): chapter 9
the beginning, and seeks with great care to find out why it did not succeed. The solution to this point, in my judgment, is summed up in the simple sentence: Paucity of men and of resources. Other considerations are involved in a determination of the question, could the war have been further prolonged? but given an earnest determination on the part of a united North to prosecute the war to a successful issue; and ultimate success was certain. Consider the census of the United States, 1860. Excluding Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, the States that entered the Confederacy had a white population of a little over 5,000,000; whereas those that sustained the United States government had 19,000,000. Then reflect that the South had no navy; its ports were blockaded, and intercourse with the outside world interdicted. Under such circumstances it is remarkable that the South maintained itself so long as it did. ---- asserts that the Army of Northern Virginia when it invaded Pennsylv
3rd (search for this): chapter 9
ll that would have ensured us tle victory. Again: On the 3d the attack from our right was to have been made at a very easition, that The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d, should never have been attempted, may now appear very plaint, promptly attacked the enemy's right on the morning of the 3d, with Johnson's division of his corps, reinforced with two o intervals from the night of the 1st to the afternoon of the 3d, and defended by an army outnumbering ours by some 30,000 sor army, and fighting the enemy's cavalry in my front on the third. My personal knowledge of these events, which I fear I ort with his entire army. He urged concert of action on the 3d; but Johnson's division fought and suffered in the morning aim. 4th. Had Longstreet and Hill attacked early on the third, as was first designed, while Ewell was engaged. 5th. of success. He was ordered to renew the fight early on the 3d; Ewell was to co-operate. Ewell ordered Johnson to attack a
1862 AD (search for this): chapter 9
but the loss in disabled cavalry horses, which were left behind in exchange for useless Dutch farm horses, was not compensated by any damage to the enemy. So, Morgan's celebrated raid across the Ohio proved disastrous to his command, without the possibility of any compensating damage to the enemy. Most of the raids undertaken by the Federal cavalry also proved disastrous to the commands engaged in them. It is true that Stuart's raid around McClellan, when he was on the Chickahominy in 1862, resulted in obtaining valuable information for Gea. Lee, but it also served to convince McClellan of the necessity of a change of his base to James river, which for us was the most dangerous position for him to occupy. Some of Forrest's raids also, in the west, were attended with valuable results in the destruction of stores and the interruption of the enemy's lines of communication; but, as a general thing, the raids, unless when undertaken with a specific object, as for the purpose of obt
March 5th, 1877 AD (search for this): chapter 9
e again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet. After proceeding about a mile, we discovered Hood's division at a halt; it was said, waiting for MecLaws, whose division had taken a wrong direction. It was four o'clock before Longstreet was in position to attack. I here conclude a brief and I hope impartial statement, from which you may make your own deductions. Very respectfully, &c., (Signed) A. L. L. Long. Letter from General Fitz. Lee. Richland, Stafford co., Va., March 5th, 1877. Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary Southern Historical Society: My dear Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing a copy of a communication from --in which he requests information to be used in a forthcoming work, upcn certain points connected with the battle of Gettysburg. Upon them he expresses his convictions as follows: At present, as far as my studies of this period go, my opinion on the question is this: The mistakes which brought upon the C
1863 AD (search for this): chapter 9
Va., March 12th, 1877. A copy of your letter to Mr. Jones, the Secretary of the Southern Historical Society, in which you express a desire to have my opinion upon certain propositions suggested by you in regard to the Pennsylvania campaign of 1863, and the battle of Gettysburg, has been forwarded to me, and I take pleasure in giving my views on the several mooted questions. In the first place, I must say that you are mistaken in assuming that the Army of Northern Virginia was more powerhave procured a copy of the Review, corrected the errors and missprints, and sent it to---, through the address in Philadelphia you gave me. I will add a few notes here: 1st. ---- thinks it was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all in 1863. There were undoubted evils in such a course as --- clearly states, but he leaves out of view the fact that only a choice of evils existed for an army greatly inferior in numbers and resources in the presence of a powerful adversary — an adversar
1st (search for this): chapter 9
ramatic speeches and ejaculations in time of battle as about real bayonet charges. Our failure to carry the position at Gettysburg was not due so much to the superior fighting of Meade's army in position as to the failure to support according to General Lee's instruction the several attacks made on the 2d and 3d, and the delay in making those attacks. Meade did not select the position at Gettysburg; but that position was forced on him by the engagement which took place unexpectedly on the 1st. He had previously selected another position, behind Pipe creek, for his battle-ground, and even on the 2d, after his arrival at Gettysburg, deliberated about withdrawing to the former position, and was probably prevented from doing so by the attack on our part.-See the testimony of himself and others before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, contained in the 1st vol. (2d series) of its report. Your third proposition, that the way in which the fights of the 2d of July
April, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 9
Lee and Grant, in which is embodied, on pafe 16, a table of returns of the forces in the Department of Northern Virginia at the end of each month from February, 1862, to February, 1865, inclusive, except for the months of June anmd August, 1862, April and June, 1863, and May and September, 1864. This table was made out by Mr. Swinton, author of the History of the Army of the Potomac, from the Confederate returns in the Archive Office at Washington, and is indisputably correct, except where, iat the close of July, 1862, just before the commencement of the campaign against Pope, was 69,559, and the force for duty at the close of November, 1862, just before the battle of Fredericksburg, was 73,554. There is no return at the close of April, 1863, just before Chancellorsville, for the enemy had then begun his movement by crossing the river in our front, and the steps necessary to oppose him rendered it impracticable to make returns. The force present, however, was not as large as it w
February (search for this): chapter 9
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee's Army at the battle of Gettysburg-opinions of leading Confederate soldiers. In February last the Secretary received a letter from a distinguished foreign military critic propounding a series of questions as to the causes of the failure of the Confederate army to win the battle of Gettysburg, and requesting us to obtain the opinions of leading Confederates who were participants in that great battle. We at once had twenty copies of the letter made, and sent them to representatives of every corps and division and every arm of the service of the Army of Northern Virginia. We have received a number of replies, and have the promise of several others, and we are sure that our readers will agree with us that the series of papers form the most valuable contribution to the history of that great campaign which has yet been published. As the letter of our distinguished correspondent was not intended for publication, we suppress both the letter and the n
1864 AD (search for this): chapter 9
ct may worry and enrage a huge bull, without doing him any serious hurt. Really they did a vast deal more damage to our own cause, by the demoralization caused in the army from a desire upon the part of many to share in the captures, which the partisan corps appropriated to their own use, which induced quite a number to desert their colors for the sake of plunder. I have been struck with the force of a remark contained in Gen. Sheridan's report of his operations in the Valley of Virginia in 1864, where, in speaking of the partisan corps, which he calls guerrilla bands, he says: I had constantly refused to operate against these bands, believing them to be, substantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry. He is here speaking of the principal corps of that kind that operated in Virginia. I am of opinion that mere raiding parties
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