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16th (search for this): chapter 16
Generals Schofield and Stanley and General A. J. Smith, strengthened by eight or ten new regiments and all of Wilson's cavalry. You could safely invite Beauregard across the Tennessee River and prevent his ever returning. I still believe, however, that public clamor will force him to turn and follow me, in which event you should cross at Decatur and move directly toward Selma as far as you can transport supplies. . . . You may act . . . on the certainty that I sally from Atlanta on the 16th instant with about 60,000 well provisioned, but expecting to live chiefly on the country. The reason for this sudden and radical change of program is made perfectly clear by Sherman's despatch of November 1 and others: The enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan to destroy my communications and defeat this army. Sherman's defiant spirit, thus aroused, brooked no delay. He would not wait for anything but his own necessary preparations. Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatu
July (search for this): chapter 16
ance, in his despatch to Grant of November 2: If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force. . . . No single army can catch him. War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part III, p.594. Sherman had been catching Hood with a single army all summer, and without the slightest difficulty. What reason had he to conclude that it would be impossible to do so later? As my experience proved, it was as easy to catch him in November, though with a smaller force, as it had been in July and August with a much larger force, and Thomas had the same experience in December. As Sherman knew from his own experience, as well as I, whether the pursuing force was larger or smaller, Hood was about the easiest man in the world to catch, even by a single army. But Sherman had under his command at that time, in Georgia and Tennessee, as he said with great emphasis and confidence, two armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming the largest estimate then made of the strength of Hood's
September 12th (search for this): chapter 16
ary, the result is a drawn battle, the two antagonists, as if by common consent, slowly separate, carrying their heads high, and sharply watching each other. When distance has assured the close of that contest, they severally go to feeding, as if nothing unusual had happened, or else march off to seek some less formidable foe. Neither utters a note of defiance until he is well beyond the other's reach. The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, especially the letters from Grant of September 12, and from Sherman of September 20, both carried by Grant's staff officer, Colonel Horace Porter, show a complete understanding of the situation at that time, and perfect accord in respect to the operations appropriate to that situation. War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part II, pp. 364, 411. Savannah was to be captured, if practicable, by military and naval forces from the east, and Sherman was so to manoeuver in respect to Hood's army as to swing round the latter and thus place himself in po
September 20th (search for this): chapter 16
The correspondence between Grant and Sherman, especially the letters from Grant of September 12, and from Sherman of September 20, both carried by Grant's staff officer, Colonel Horace Porter, show a complete understanding of the situation at that all the advantages and disadvantages of other possible plans. But very soon after Sherman despatched his letter of September 20 by Colonel Porter, Hood commenced his movement to Sherman's rear, and then far to the west, which was designed to and d radically change the military situation in view of which the carefully matured plan described in Sherman's letter of September 20 had been formed. Sherman, as clearly appears from his despatches later than September 20, considered long and apparenSeptember 20, considered long and apparently with great doubt what change ought to be made in his own plans in consequence of the altered situation due to the unexpected movements of his enterprising adversary. That some very important change in Sherman's plans was imperative was a matter
October 1st (search for this): chapter 16
Their correspondence shows this so clearly and fully that there would seem to be no need of my making any special reference to it. I do so only because of the statement in General Grant's Memoirs. Very possibly General Grant may have meant, in his Memoirs, only that he approved the general project, under the condition that sufficient force would be left to take care of Hood and destroy him, not caring to say anything about the fulfilment or nonfulfilment of that condition. From about October 1 till the time Sherman started on his march—six weeks—he seems to have been so intent on the execution of that project, and upon doing it with as large an army as possible, that no question of military principle or of fact could be permitted to stand in his way. He assumed and maintained throughout that the only question was whether he should continue the aggressive, or allow the enemy's movements to put him on the defensive, refusing to consider any other possible plan of aggressive operat
October 11th (search for this): chapter 16
direct operations against Hood by Thomas in Tennessee were very materially more complete than they were in fact, and he so represented the matter to General Grant. It seems quite certain that Grant was laboring under a serious misapprehension in respect to Thomas's condition to cope with Hood, and no doubt Grant's subsequent impatience in respect to Thomas's action was largely due to this fact. This point deserves close consideration. Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on the condition of holding the line of the Tennessee firmly. On October 22 Sherman telegraphed: I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee. Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that Hood ought to be his objective, now that he has gone so far north. At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above quoted, Sherman telegraphed, trusting that General Thomas. . . will be able in a very few days to as
October 22nd (search for this): chapter 16
re complete than they were in fact, and he so represented the matter to General Grant. It seems quite certain that Grant was laboring under a serious misapprehension in respect to Thomas's condition to cope with Hood, and no doubt Grant's subsequent impatience in respect to Thomas's action was largely due to this fact. This point deserves close consideration. Grant's first assent to Sherman's plan was made, October 11, on the condition of holding the line of the Tennessee firmly. On October 22 Sherman telegraphed: I am now perfecting arrangements to put into Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee. Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that Hood ought to be his objective, now that he has gone so far north. At an earlier hour the same day, in the despatch above quoted, Sherman telegraphed, trusting that General Thomas. . . will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive. To this Grant replied November 2: With the force, however
November (search for this): chapter 16
the care of Thomas's inferior force. He said, for instance, in his despatch to Grant of November 2: If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force. . . . No single army can catch him. War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part III, p.594. Sherman had been catching Hood with a single army all summer, and without the slightest difficulty. What reason had he to conclude that it would be impossible to do so later? As my experience proved, it was as easy to catch him in November, though with a smaller force, as it had been in July and August with a much larger force, and Thomas had the same experience in December. As Sherman knew from his own experience, as well as I, whether the pursuing force was larger or smaller, Hood was about the easiest man in the world to catch, even by a single army. But Sherman had under his command at that time, in Georgia and Tennessee, as he said with great emphasis and confidence, two armies, each larger than Hood's, even assuming t
November 1st (search for this): chapter 16
ion of that threat by Forrest's cavalry, referred to in Sherman's despatch of November 1 to Grant, gave a strong reason for Sherman's eager determination to march at dical change in his previous plan. He telegraphed Grant, from Rome, Georgia, November 1, as follows: As you foresaw, and as Jeff. Davis threatened, the enemy is ys to assume the offensive. Sherman's despatch to Thomas of the same date (November 1) instructed him as to the policy then determined on, in lieu of that which hand radical change of program is made perfectly clear by Sherman's despatch of November 1 and others: The enemy is now in the full tide of execution of his grand plan Tennessee a force able to hold the line of the Tennessee. Even as late as November 1, Grant again suggested to Sherman that Hood ought to be his objective, now ths, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. In that despatch of November 1 Sherman had made a statement of the troops Thomas would have, including A. J.
November 2nd (search for this): chapter 16
ry to the care of Thomas's inferior force. He said, for instance, in his despatch to Grant of November 2: If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force. . . . No singt he could not catch Hood with three or four armies? But another despatch from Sherman, dated November 2, seems to show that his estimate of Hood's army was more than 50,000, instead of 30,000; for ita the necessary stores, move as soon as possible. To that despatch General Grant replied, November 2: Your despatch of 9 A. M. yesterday is just received. I despatched you the same date, adving a possible long siege of Nashville, Chattanooga, and Decatur; but he says in a despatch of November 2 to Grant, quoted in his Memoirs: If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lal Thomas. . . will be able in a very few days to assume the offensive. To this Grant replied November 2: With the force, however, you have left with Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and
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