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Edgefield (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
animals with which General Burnside had gone into East Tennessee, scarcely 1000 remained fit for service; while his army of over 25,000 men had been reduced to not more than 7000 fit for duty and effective for service in the field. Such was the result of the siege of Knoxville, and such the Army of the Ohio when I became its commander. But the splendid victory gained a short time before at Chattanooga had raised the blockade upon our line of supply, and the railroad to Chattanooga and Nashville was soon opened, so that our starving and naked troops could begin to get supplies of food and clothing. The movement of the first train of cars was reported by telegraph from every station, and was eagerly awaited by the entire army. When the locomotive whistle announced its approach, everybody turned out to welcome it with shouts of joy. It proved to consist of ten car-loads of horse and mule shoes for the dead animals which strewed the plains! Fortunately the disgust produced by this
Spring Hill (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
nasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain that, however large his force might have been, he could have put troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it could not be done at all. So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was Thomas's plan to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise of success, and therefore ought to have been tried. It is at least probable that Johnston's view of the case (see his
New Market (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
of a bateau bridge which had been commenced, in the meantime using the bateaux already constructed to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire force was grouped about that strong position. The object of this movement having been accomplished without loss, our troops retired to New Market to await the arrival of the troops to be sent by General Thomas, the completion of the railroad bridge, and other necessary preparations for the expected campaign. On March 12 another reconnaissance was made as far as Bull's Gap, which was found to be still occupied by the enemy, although reliable information indicated that Longstreet was preparing for, and had perhaps already begun, his movement toward Virginia. Although his force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determ
Morristown, Tenn. (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
ure of a hostile movement reported in that direction. Upon our advance, Longstreet's troops withdrew across the Holston and French Broad and retreated toward Morristown. His advance had evidently been intended only to cover an attempted cavalry raid upon our rear, which the high water in the Little Tennessee rendered impracticad been commenced, in the meantime using the bateaux already constructed to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire Although his force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determined to endeavor to take advantage of his movement to attack his rear. My advance held Morristown; all the troops were ordered forward to that place, and preparations made for an attack, when, on the 15th, orders came from General Grant to send the Ninth Cor
Duck River (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
f McPherson had not held the entire natural position as far east as the Connasauga River, Johnston could have passed round him in the night. It seems to me certain that McPherson's force was too small to have taken and held that position. Indeed it does not seem at all certain that, however large his force might have been, he could have put troops enough in position before night to accomplish the object of cutting off Johnston's retreat. The case was analogous to that of Hood's crossing Duck River in November of that year, and trying to cut off our retreat at Spring Hill. There was simply not time enough to do it in that one day, and if not done in one day it could not be done at all. So that it does not seem at all certain that this, which was Thomas's plan to throw the entire Army of the Cumberland on the road in Johnston's rear and thus cut off his retreat, would have succeeded any better than Sherman's, yet it gave greater promise of success, and therefore ought to have been
Bull's Gap (Tennessee, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
eady constructed to ferry the troops across the river. In this manner we were able to advance as far as Morristown by February 29 with sufficient force to reconnoiter Longstreet's position. This reconnaissance demonstrated that the enemy held Bull's Gap, and that his entire force was grouped about that strong position. The object of this movement having been accomplished without loss, our troops retired to New Market to await the arrival of the troops to be sent by General Thomas, the completion of the railroad bridge, and other necessary preparations for the expected campaign. On March 12 another reconnaissance was made as far as Bull's Gap, which was found to be still occupied by the enemy, although reliable information indicated that Longstreet was preparing for, and had perhaps already begun, his movement toward Virginia. Although his force, if concentrated, was much superior to mine, I determined to endeavor to take advantage of his movement to attack his rear. My advance
West Point (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
al moment McPherson seems to have been a little timid. I believe the error was Sherman's, not McPherson's; that McPherson was correct in his judgment, which certainly was mine (after passing over the same ground and fighting the battle of Resaca), that his force was entirely too small for the work assigned it. I had not the same opportunity General Sherman had of judging of McPherson's qualities as a commander; but I knew him well and intimately, having sat upon the same bench with him at West Point for four years, and been his room-mate for a year and a half. His was the most completely balanced mind and character with which I have ever been intimately acquainted, although he did not possess in a very high degree the power of invention or originality of thought. His personal courage seemed to amount to unconsciousness of danger, while his care of his troops cannot, I believe, be justly characterized otherwise than as wise prudence. I consider this to be only a just tribute to the
Tilton (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
of the army, he might, with a corps of Thomas's army in close support, have felt strong enough to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it was, Thomas should have followed close upon his rear through Snake Creek Gap, with two corps. The distance between the two wings of the army would have been so short and the ground between them so impassable to the enemy as to give us practically a continuous line of battle, and Thomas's two corps in the valley of the Connasauga near Tilton would have been in far better position to strike the retreating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. Impartial history must, I believe, hold Sherman himself mainly responsible for the failure to realize his expectations in the first movement against Johnston. It seems at least probable that at the beginning of the movement against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the character of the enemy's position; for his plan clearly a
Resaca (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
could have been put upon the railroad between Resaca and Dalton. The result would then, in all pro occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it was, Thomas should have followed closely retreated before him to the new position at Resaca. The result would have been essentially the sSherman thinks McPherson ought to have done at Resaca; and, as Sherman says, such an opportunity doed in his orders. If McPherson had assaulted Resaca, it is possible, but only possible, that he miate with the extent of the line, like those at Resaca, were successfully assaulted. It is true thastly superior to the single brigade that held Resaca that day, but that practically amounts to nothlt such as would have been required to capture Resaca on May 9, 1864. Clearly, such an assault shoun. The only chance of success was to invest Resaca on the west and north, and put between the inveated any possible attempt to cut him off from Resaca. To illustrate the faulty system of organiz[6 more...]
Dalton, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 7
e equipment, newly clad, from Knoxville toward Dalton. My next thought was to win the respect andfforded in the delicate operations in front of Dalton. The result may perhaps be fairly expressed ithe Atlanta campaign were the operations about Dalton and Resaca. Here I have always thought Genera been put upon the railroad between Resaca and Dalton. The result would then, in all probability, hg enough to occupy and hold a position between Dalton and Resaca. As it was, Thomas should have folating enemy when he was compelled to let go of Dalton, than they were in front of Rocky-face Ridge. that at the beginning of the movement against Dalton, Sherman did not fully understand the charactean would have found in the enemy's trenches at Dalton only a skirmish-line which would have leisurel seize and hold a point on the road in rear of Dalton, and not to break the road and fall back as Mc north, and put between the investing line and Dalton troops enough to hold their ground against the[3 more...]
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