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ion on my staff—the chief-of-staff, Major-General Butterfield. Now, indulging in the utmost charity towards General Butterfield, and believing that he is sincere in what he says, I want to explain how it is possible that such an extraordinary idea could have got into his head. I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of men shall be made known—I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one instant, to withdraw that army unless the military contingencies which the future should develop during the course of the day might render it a matter of necessity that the army should be withdrawn. I base this denial not only upon my own assertion and my own veracity, but I shall also show to the committee, from documentary evidence, the dispatches and orders issued by me at different periods during that day, that if I did intend any such operation, I was at the same time doing things totally i
eneral Warren, my chief engineer, who will tell you that he was with me the whole of that day, in constant intercourse and communication with me; and that, instead of intending to withdraw my army, I was talking about other matters. All these officers will corroborate what I say, that I never mentioned any such purpose to any of them. General Butterfield remained at Taneytown on the night of the 1st of July, and did not join me on the field until about 9 or 10 o'clock in the morning of the 2d, I having arrived there at 1 o'clock. Soon after he arrived I did direct him to familiarize himself with the topography of the ground, and I directed him to send out staff officers to learn all the roads. As I have already mentioned in my previous testimony here, I had never before been at Gettysburg, and did not know how many roads ran from our position, or what directions they ran. My orders to General Butterfield were similar to this: General Butterfield, neither I nor any man can tell
ikewise directed General Howard, in the centre, to push into Gettysburg, to see whether the enemy still occupied that town. I found, from the reports of those officers, that the enemy had retired from the circular position which they had occupied around us, and had assumed a position about parallel to my left and left centre. It rained very violently during portions of this day, so violently as to interrupt any very active operations if I had designed making them. During the night of the 4th, the enemy, as I ascertained on the 5th, retired through the Cashtown and Fairfield passes. So soon as I was positively satisfied, from the reports of my officers, that the enemy had actually retired, I directed General Sedgwick, in command of the 6th corps, which corps had been comparatively unengaged during the battle, and was in full force and strength, to advance on the Fairfield road and pursue the enemy vigorously. At the same time I despatched a cavalry force to follow the retreating
centre, to push into Gettysburg, to see whether the enemy still occupied that town. I found, from the reports of those officers, that the enemy had retired from the circular position which they had occupied around us, and had assumed a position about parallel to my left and left centre. It rained very violently during portions of this day, so violently as to interrupt any very active operations if I had designed making them. During the night of the 4th, the enemy, as I ascertained on the 5th, retired through the Cashtown and Fairfield passes. So soon as I was positively satisfied, from the reports of my officers, that the enemy had actually retired, I directed General Sedgwick, in command of the 6th corps, which corps had been comparatively unengaged during the battle, and was in full force and strength, to advance on the Fairfield road and pursue the enemy vigorously. At the same time I despatched a cavalry force to follow the retreating column on the Cashtown road, believing
he flank through the Boonsboroa Pass, than to attempt to follow the enemy on the road which he himself had taken. I therefore directed that orders should be prepared, but not issued, for the movement of the various corps by way of Middletown and South mountain towards Hagerstown. This was, I think, the 6th of July. The 5th of July, I think, was occupied, after the retreat of the enemy, in burying our dead and attending to the wounded, of which we had a large number. During this day, the 6th, I received reports from General Sedgwick that he was following the enemy's rear guard as rapidly as he could, but that he had reason to believe, from reports of prisoners, or from other information (which I do not recollect) that the main body of the enemy was around and in the vicinity of Fairfield Pass, and that it was not impossible that another engagement might be had with the enemy in those mountains. Under those circumstances, as a matter of security, and also willing to meet such a m
. It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer—that when I came into his immediate neighborhood some manoeuvres might be made by me with a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be secured by him. On the morning of the 29th of June the army was put in motion. On the night of the 30th, after the army had made two days marches, I had become satisfied, from information which I had received from different sources, that the enemy was apprised of my movement; that he had relinquished his hold on the Susquehanna; that he was concentrating his forces, and that I might expect to come in contact with him in a very short time; when and where, I could not at that moment tell. Under those circumstances, I instructed my engineers with such information as we had in our possession, from
I relieved General Hooker. Question: Will you give a statement, in your own way, of the battle of Gettysburg, and the disposition of your troops there? Answer: When I assumed the command of the army of the Potomac, on the morning of the 28th of June, it was mostly around Frederick, Maryland; some portions of it, I think, were at that time at Middletown; one or two corps were the other side of a range of mountains between Frederick and Middletown. I had no information concerning the enemytion with Harper's Ferry and prevent them from being supplied, and not knowing how long a time the campaign I was entering on might last, I yielded to the suggestions made to me to evacuate Harper's Ferry entirely; and late on the night of the 28th of June I ordered 4,000 men previously ordered to remain there to garrison the place, to collect all the canal-boats that they could, load them with the public property at Harper's Ferry, so that nothing should be destroyed, and proceed with them down
old on the Susquehanna and meet me in battle at some point. It was my firm determination, never for an instant deviated from, to give battle wherever and as soon as I could possibly find the enemy, modified, of course, by such general considerations as govern every general officer—that when I came into his immediate neighborhood some manoeuvres might be made by me with a view to secure advantages on my side in that battle, and not allow them to be secured by him. On the morning of the 29th of June the army was put in motion. On the night of the 30th, after the army had made two days marches, I had become satisfied, from information which I had received from different sources, that the enemy was apprised of my movement; that he had relinquished his hold on the Susquehanna; that he was concentrating his forces, and that I might expect to come in contact with him in a very short time; when and where, I could not at that moment tell. Under those circumstances, I instructed my enginee
take such a position, how they might move their corps and what their positions should be along this line. This order was issued, I think, on the night of the 30th of June, possibly on the morning of the 1st of July, certainly before any positive information had reached me that the enemy had crossed the mountain and were in confltitute, in lieu of the rough draught of the preliminary order which I left here when I gave my testimony, a series of orders and circulars issued by me on the 30th of June and the 1st of July, a careful perusal of which, I am sure, will satisfy every member of this committee that there was no intention on my part to withdraw my a all of these orders—only enough to substantiate the point I have here made. The papers herewith submitted, marked A, B, and C, are the orders issued on the 30th of June, together with the information from General Buford, in command of the cavalry. The information from General Buford, C, was not received, however, until pretty
of which passed through Strasburg, and that he had conducted his retreat with so much rapidity that the force we had encountered at Front Royal the day previously was his rear-guard. Having failed in this attempt to cut off his retreat, I then retired through Manassas gap and proceeded to the Rappahannock, General Lee, in the meantime, retiring to Culpeper and taking up a position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. Upon my arrival at the Rappahannock, which was towards the close of July, I communicated my views to the government, in which I expressed the opinion that the further pursuit of General Lee should be continued at that time, inasmuch as I believed that our relative forces were more favorable to us than they would be at any subsequent time if we gave him time to recuperate. It was thought proper, however, by the general-in-chief to direct me to take up a threatening attitude upon the Rappahannock, but not to advance. Question: About what time was that? Answer
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