hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
U. S. Grant 1,568 10 Browse Search
William T. Sherman 896 4 Browse Search
George H. Thomas 766 2 Browse Search
Warren Sheridan 712 0 Browse Search
Hood 687 5 Browse Search
P. H. Sheridan 606 2 Browse Search
Meade 460 16 Browse Search
Robert E. Lee 411 9 Browse Search
John Sherman 356 0 Browse Search
G. K. Warren 347 1 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2. Search the whole document.

Found 618 total hits in 118 results.

... 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
15th (search for this): chapter 1
Sheridan had moved from Halltown on the 10th of August, and Early at once fell back as far as Strasburg, to which point he was followed by the national army, both forces arriving at Cedar creek on the 12th. On the 13th, Early retired a few miles further, to Fisher's Hill. Anderson meanwhile had arrived at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set out with his whole command, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap, arrived on the 15th, at Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasburg. The road between was held by Sheridan; but Masanutten mountain also intervened, and concealed the presence of Anderson. FitzLee therefore rode across the mountain in person to communicate with Early, and preparations were made for a combined attack on Sheridan. A plan of battle was actually arranged. But Sheridan had been already warned: for Grant's opportune despatch of the 12th had arrived, announcing the addition to the enemy's force
13th (search for this): chapter 1
o far as I can learn, was to send a column direct from Culpeper to the Potomac, and Early to advance at the same time from Martinsburg. This was frustrated by Early being compelled to fall back, and your operations on the north side of the James.—Sheridan to Grant, August, 20. Sheridan had moved from Halltown on the 10th of August, and Early at once fell back as far as Strasburg, to which point he was followed by the national army, both forces arriving at Cedar creek on the 12th. On the 13th, Early retired a few miles further, to Fisher's Hill. Anderson meanwhile had arrived at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set out with his whole command, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap, arrived on the 15th, at Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasburg. The road between was held by Sheridan; but Masanutten mountain also intervened, and concealed the presence of Anderson. FitzLee therefore rode across the mountain i
12th (search for this): chapter 1
e intention, so far as I can learn, was to send a column direct from Culpeper to the Potomac, and Early to advance at the same time from Martinsburg. This was frustrated by Early being compelled to fall back, and your operations on the north side of the James.—Sheridan to Grant, August, 20. Sheridan had moved from Halltown on the 10th of August, and Early at once fell back as far as Strasburg, to which point he was followed by the national army, both forces arriving at Cedar creek on the 12th. On the 13th, Early retired a few miles further, to Fisher's Hill. Anderson meanwhile had arrived at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set out with his whole command, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap, arrived on the 15th, at Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasburg. The road between was held by Sheridan; but Masanutten mountain also intervened, and concealed the presence of Anderson. FitzLee therefore rode across
10th (search for this): chapter 1
had fallen, the Weldon road was carried, and Early's exit from the Valley had been barred, but the end was not yet. A long and tedious prospect still stretched out before the national commander. Hood's army was not destroyed, the rebels were in force in Sheridan's front, and Lee had not abandoned Richmond. Grant looked the situation full in the face, and lost no time in adapting his plans to the actual emergencies. On the 8th of September, Sherman had entered Atlanta in person, and on the 10th, he was instructed: As soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed till the close of the war. To Sheridan Grant said: If this war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste; and to Meade: I do not want to give up the Weldon road, if it can be avoided, until we get Richmond. That may be months yet. Accordingly he ordered a
9th (search for this): chapter 1
e there. This is not intended to urge an attack, because I believe you will allow no chance to escape which promises success. But Anderson still remained in the Valley, and Sheridan telegraphed: Early's infantry force and mine number about the same. I have not deemed it best to attack him, but have watched closely to press him hard, so soon as he commences to detach troops for Richmond. This was the tenor of your despatch to me after I took up the defensive. To this Grant replied, on the 9th: I would not have you make an attack with the advantage against you, but would prefer the course you seem to be pursuing; that is, press closely upon the enemy, and when he moves, follow him up, being ready at all times to pounce upon him, if he detaches any considerable force. Meanwhile, the enemies at home were making the most of the delay and proclaiming Sheridan to be another failure. Not only the loyal people, but the government, were anxious; the continuous threat of invasion was in
September (search for this): chapter 1
he Democratic party are doing all in their power to bring about this result. The evidence of this has increased very much within the last few days. It is probably thought that such a thing will have its effect upon the next election by showing the inability of the present administration to carry on the war with an armed opposition in the loyal states.—Halleck to Grant, August, 1864. and, naturally enough, was dreaded by the government. Grant, however, remained urgent, and on the l3th of September, he wrote to Stanton: We ought to have the whole number of men called for by the President, in the shortest possible time. Prompt action in filling up our armies will have more effect upon the enemy than a victory. They profess to believe, and make their men believe, there is such a party in favor of recognizing Southern independence that the draft cannot be enforced. Let them be undeceived. Deserters come into our lines daily, who tell us that the men are nearly universally tired of t
8th (search for this): chapter 1
attacking Sheridan, and the whole command executed a rapid retreat to the west bank of the Opequan; but had Sheridan been aware of Anderson's intention, he would doubtless have facilitated, rather than interrupted, his march. As it was, he waited now to be certain that troops had started for Richmond. Indeed, for a fortnight this was the whole policy of Grant; but of course the country could not be apprised of the plan, and failing to understand the delay, became impatient again. On the 8th, the general-in-chief said to Sheridan: If you want to attack Early, you might reinforce largely from Washington. Whilst you are close in front of the enemy, there is no necessity for a large force there. This is not intended to urge an attack, because I believe you will allow no chance to escape which promises success. But Anderson still remained in the Valley, and Sheridan telegraphed: Early's infantry force and mine number about the same. I have not deemed it best to attack him, but ha
October 9th (search for this): chapter 1
rywhere carried, and the rout of the enemy was complete. Many of the rebels threw down their arms, abandoning their artillery. Sixteen guns and eleven hundred prisoners fell into the national hands, and Early reported two hundred and forty killed and wounded in the infantry and artillery. Sheridan lost less than a thousand men. Sheridan's return shows 85 killed, 677 wounded, and 9 missing, but this does not include the losses in Crook's command or the cavalry. Early wrote to Lee on October 9th: The loss in the infantry and artillery was 30 killed, 210 wounded, and 995 missing; total, 1,235. I have been able to get no report of the loss in the cavalry, but it was slight. If this is true, the demoralization of the rebels must have been extreme: for an army of the size of Early's to yield after a loss of only 240 killed and wounded is disgraceful beyond anything in the war. Beaten commanders, however, are often willing to sacrifice the reputation of their troops in order to save
July (search for this): chapter 1
ly had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking his position at Richmond; and when Early reached the capital he found troops assembled there sufficient to repel him. But had Grant moved his army in May by way of the James instead of from Culpeper, the rebels would doubtless at that time have threatened Washington far more seriously than in July. The very danger which was now averted was a justification of the strategy which had prevented its occurrence at a time when relief might have been more difficult to secure. At this juncture, however, Lee could have had but little hope of capturing Washington, though he doubtless believed that Grant might be compelled to weaken himself in front of Richmond, and perhaps to raise the siege. McCabe's Life and Campaigns of General Lee; a work containing more trustworthy information from re
May (search for this): chapter 1
Hunter retreated entirely away from the Valley, leaving the route to Washington absolutely open to the enemy. Nevertheless, the invasion of Early had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking his position at Richmond; and when Early reached the capital he found troops assembled there sufficient to repel him. But had Grant moved his army in May by way of the James instead of from Culpeper, the rebels would doubtless at that time have threatened Washington far more seriously than in July. The very danger which was now averted was a justification of the strategy which had prevented its occurrence at a time when relief might have been more difficult to secure. At this juncture, however, Lee could have had but little hope of capturing Washington, though he doubtless believed that Grant might be compelled to weaken himself in front o
... 6 7 8 9 10 11 12