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Farm should be held or levelled. Sheridan, for want of supplies, if there should be no other reason, will be forced to fall back. The enemy may take advantage of such an occurrence to bring the remnants of Early's force here, relying upon his ability to get it back to the Valley before Sheridan could fit up and return. In such case he would fall upon either flank as now exposed, and inflict great damage. Again, on the 3rd, he said: A despatch is just received from Sheridan up to the 1st instant. The enemy have entirely left his front and gone to Charlottesville or Gordonsville. Early was driven out of the Valley, and only saved himself by getting through Brown's Gap in the night, and has probably taken position at Charlottesville, and will probably fortify, holding Waynesboroa and Rockfish Gap.—Sheridan to Halleck, Oct. 1. This information afterwards proved incorrect, but it was the foundation for the despatch quoted in the text. He cannot reach them there, so that we may now
the 1st of October, he said to Butler: The strong works about Chapin's Farm should be held or levelled. Sheridan, for want of supplies, if there should be no other reason, will be forced to fall back. The enemy may take advantage of such an occurrence to bring the remnants of Early's force here, relying upon his ability to get it back to the Valley before Sheridan could fit up and return. In such case he would fall upon either flank as now exposed, and inflict great damage. Again, on the 3rd, he said: A despatch is just received from Sheridan up to the 1st instant. The enemy have entirely left his front and gone to Charlottesville or Gordonsville. Early was driven out of the Valley, and only saved himself by getting through Brown's Gap in the night, and has probably taken position at Charlottesville, and will probably fortify, holding Waynesboroa and Rockfish Gap.—Sheridan to Halleck, Oct. 1. This information afterwards proved incorrect, but it was the foundation for the despa
sity of clearing out that country, so that it will not support Mosby's gang, and the question is whether it is not better that the people should save what they can.—Grant to Sheridan, November 9. but so long as the war lasts, he said, they must be prevented from raising another crop. Sheridan obeyed his orders to the letter. On the 1st of October, he wrote, from Harrisonburg: What we have destroyed and can destroy in this Valley is worth millions of dollars to the rebel government; on the 7th, he said, from Woodstock: In moving back to this point, the whole country, from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain, has been made untenable for a rebel army; and still later: I will continue the destruction of wheat, forage, etc., down to Fisher's Hill. When this is completed, the Valley, from Winchester up to Staunton, ninety-two miles, will have little in it for man or beast. Early also is a witness to the success of the policy. On the 9th of October, he complained bitterly to Lee: Sh
th of October, Sheridan began his retrograde movement, stretching the cavalry across the Valley from the Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with directions to burn all forage and drive off all stock, as they moved to the rear. This was in compliance with Grant's orders to leave nothing for the subsistence of an army on any ground abandoned to the enemy. The most positive orders were given, however, not to burn dwellings. Early followed at a respectful distance, but on the 8th, his cavalry under Rosser, came up with Sheridan near Woodstock, and harassed Custer's division as far as Tom's Brook, three or four miles south of Fisher's Hill. That night Torbert, in command of the national horse, was ordered to engage the rebel cavalry at daybreak, and notified that the infantry would halt until after the defeat of the enemy. At an early hour on the 9th, the heads of the opposing columns came in contact, and after a short but severe engagement, the rebels were complet
ost positive orders were given, however, not to burn dwellings. Early followed at a respectful distance, but on the 8th, his cavalry under Rosser, came up with Sheridan near Woodstock, and harassed Custer's division as far as Tom's Brook, three or four miles south of Fisher's Hill. That night Torbert, in command of the national horse, was ordered to engage the rebel cavalry at daybreak, and notified that the infantry would halt until after the defeat of the enemy. At an early hour on the 9th, the heads of the opposing columns came in contact, and after a short but severe engagement, the rebels were completely routed, losing eleven guns, together with caissons, battery forges, Headquarters' wagons, and everything else that was carried on wheels. Three hundred and thirty prisoners were captured. Sheridan's casualties did not exceed sixty. He reported the battle in his usual vigorous style: The enemy, after being charged by our gallant cavalry, were broken, and ran; they were fol
stimate of Fitz-Lee or Lomax's strength, and says not a word of Breckenridge or the reserves; but declares that these reinforcements about made up my losses at Winchester and Fisher's Hill. The returns, however, tell a different tale. The latest from these commands, prior to Sept. 27, were as follows:— July 10Fitz-Lee1,706 effective. Aug. 31Kershaw3,445 effective. Sept. 10Lomax3,568 effective. Breckenridge succeeded late in September to the command in South-West Virginia, and on the 13th of that month, Echols, his predecessor, reported 3,904 effective men. I can find no return of Rosser's force, nor of the reserves; but Grant telegraphed to Halleck, Sept. 30: Rosser's brigade of cavalry has gone to Early. The brigade numbered 1,400 men. It has already been shown that the rebels never include the reserves in any statement of their strength, although these were always put into battle, and fought as well as any. Early speaks, page 97 of his Memoir, of two companies of reserv
nd provisioned. Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited for all purposes. Colonel Alexander, of the engineers, will be sent to consult with you. Grant had said nothing about fortifying, or provisioning, or about Manassas Gap, or consulting with engineers. He left all these details entirely to Sheridan, in whose independent judgment Halleck even yet appeared to have but little confidence. Sheridan still objected to the plan as it was proposed to him; and on the 14th, Grant telegraphed: What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary
est thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. On the 13th of October, Sheridan was summoned to Washington by the Secretary of War, who telegraphed direct: If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremely desirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see you first. On the evening of the 15th, accordingly, Sheridan set out for the capital. There seemed no prospect of an immediate movement of the enemy, and the entire cavalry force accompanied him as far as Front Royal; for, like a good soldier, he intended to push Torbert through Chester Gap as far as Charlottesville, in accordance with Grant's views, although he disagreed with them. On the night of the 16th, he arrived at Front Royal, but there received a despatch from Wright, who had been left at Cedar Creek, in command of the
ints is extremely desirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see you first. On the evening of the 15th, accordingly, Sheridan set out for the capital. There seemed no prospect of an immediate movement of the enemy, and the entire cavalry force accompanied him as far as Front Royal; for, like a good soldier, he intended to push Torbert through Chester Gap as far as Charlottesville, in accordance with Grant's views, although he disagreed with them. On the night of the 16th, he arrived at Front Royal, but there received a despatch from Wright, who had been left at Cedar Creek, in command of the army. A message to Early had been intercepted; it was in these words: Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan. —Longstreet. This information was contrary to any possessed by either Grant or Sheridan. Longstreet was believed to be at Richmond, and no rebel force existed either in or near the Valley, except that which Early himself comm
artillery was now brought up and opened fire, and Getty fell back to the north of Middletown, where he again made a stand. Custer and Merritt were at this time transferred to the left of the line, to protect the road to Winchester, which Lomax had not seized; and a general retreat was ordered. The condition of the troops was still deplorable, and the whole army fell back to a point six or seven miles in rear of its first position in the morning. Sheridan had arrived at Washington on the 17th, and at noon the next day he set out to return. On the 18th, he slept at Winchester, twenty miles from his command. At an early hour on the 19th, an officer on picket reported artillery firing, but a reconnoissance had been ordered for that morning, and no attention was paid to the news. At nine o'clock Sheridan rode out of Winchester, still unconscious of the danger of his army. But the sounds of heavy battle soon became unmistakable; and half a mile from the town the head of the fugitiv
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