hide Sorting

You can sort these results in two ways:

By entity
Chronological order for dates, alphabetical order for places and people.
By position (current method)
As the entities appear in the document.

You are currently sorting in ascending order. Sort in descending order.

hide Most Frequent Entities

The entities that appear most frequently in this document are shown below.

Entity Max. Freq Min. Freq
Robert E. Lee 523 9 Browse Search
United States (United States) 340 0 Browse Search
Joe Hooker 254 0 Browse Search
Fitzhugh Lee 216 2 Browse Search
Jefferson Davis 195 7 Browse Search
Stonewall Jackson 182 0 Browse Search
George B. McClellan 170 0 Browse Search
Sedgwick 168 2 Browse Search
R. E. Lee 160 0 Browse Search
J. A. Early 149 5 Browse Search
View all entities in this document...

Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 14. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

Found 517 total hits in 77 results.

... 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
J. E. B. Stuart (search for this): chapter 20
than 3,000 of his cavalry were on hand to observe the crossing of the Rappahannock and Rapidan. Stuart had not, until Thursday, fully gauged the importance of this movement, and only on Thursday nighthis new march with cheerful alacrity. They could always follow Old Jack with their eyes shut. Stuart's cavalry masked the advance. Jackson did not know that his column would have to pass some openby just such a height, or else to abandon this line of defence. On Sunday morning at daylight Stuart, who succeeded Jackson, ranged his twenty thousand men opposite the Fairview crest, and supportekson for a watchword, and was gallant in the extreme. Anderson pushed in on our left centre, as Stuart did on the right centre, both contending for the Chancellor House, which barred their possessionve been spared from the positions they held. Reynolds could have projected a strong column upon Stuart's left flank, and was eager to render this simple service. From our left, several divisions cou
n did not know that his column would have to pass some open ground in full view of our line at Dowdall's, until too late to have it follow a better concealed route. Early Saturday morning the movem only astride the pike, the rest of Devens's and Schurz's facing south, and Steinwehr massed at Dowdall's. Howard's best brigade was gone, and there was not a man to support him between Dowdall's andDowdall's and Chancellorsville. For this portion of the line under Sickles had been advanced into the woods nearly two miles. On the right flank of this little force lay Jackson's corps of over 20,000 men, whosertridge. Buschbeck's brigade threw itself into some breastworks constructed across the road at Dowdall's and made a desperate resistance. It was here that Howard had asked leave to place his line, night attack was made by Sickles upon Jackson. Sickles's claim that he drove the enemy back to Dowdall's is scarcely substantiated. The attack had no particular result. Sickles regained once more
f our right flank. While he was thus massing his men to take the Army of the Potomac in reverse, Hooker continued to authorize Sickles to deplete the threatened wing by sending a large part of its available strength (Barlow, Birney, Whipple, and Geary in part—some 15,000 men) out into the woods in the hope of capturing the force which had long ago eluded his grasp and was ready to fall upon our rear. Hooker's right flank, of barely 10,000 men, was completely isolated. And yet though scouts, rview was crowned by our artillery and defended by about an equal infantry force on the next ridge below, consisting of the entire Third corps and Williams, of the Twelfth corps. Anderson and McLaws, with seventeen thousand men, still confronted Geary and Hancock with twelve thousand. Reynolds had arrived during the night, but was posted on the extreme right, away from the scene of actual hostilities. No other troops were brought into action. Thus the superior tactics of the enemy enabled
o take the Army of the Potomac in reverse, Hooker continued to authorize Sickles to deplete the threatened wing by sending a large part of its available strength (Barlow, Birney, Whipple, and Geary in part—some 15,000 men) out into the woods in the hope of capturing the force which had long ago eluded his grasp and was ready to famorning. Howard, commanding on the right, misled by Hooker's orders and apathy, held to the retreat theory. He had, on the receipt of the 9:30 order, disposed Barlow's brigade and his reserve artillery so as to resist an attack along the pike, but Barlow had been ordered by Hooker to join Sickles. General Devens made several Barlow had been ordered by Hooker to join Sickles. General Devens made several distinct attempts to impress on Howard the danger of an attack, but the latter took his color, as well as his orders, from the commander of the army. General Carl Schurz, under whom I served that day, also held strongly to the flank-attack theory, and scores of men in the Eleventh corps, after the picket fight of 3:30, fully bel
J. M. Warren (search for this): chapter 20
at once dispatched to sustain Wilcox. These troops arrived at Salem church by 2 P. M. Brooks and Newton shortly came upon the field, and endeavored to capture the position they had taken up, but though fifteen hundred men were lost in the attempt, our troops finally recoiled. A pontoon bridge was now thrown across at Banks's ford, and nearer communication was opened with headquarters. Up to this time, be it noted, Hooker in nowise reflected on Sedgwick's tardiness, though aware, through Warren, who had been his representative with Sedgwick, of all the Sixth corps had done or failed to do. His dispatches to Sedgwick are plainly couched in terms of approval. During Sunday night Lee concluded that he must permanently dispose of Sedgwick before he could again assault Hooker's lines. Early had recaptured the Fredericksburg heights. Gibbon had recrossed the river. The balance of Anderson's force now joined Mc-Laws. With Anderson, McLaws and Early, some twenty-five thousand men, L
east and west, and to hold a footing on the plank-road. Substantially, Newton faced west, Brooks south, Howe east. Lee, after some hours' preparation, made ready to push in Sedgwick's centre. It is worth while, perhaps, to note the fact that Lee's delay in attacking Sedgwick was fully as great as Sedgwick's in forcing Marye's Heights. And yet his haste was quite as pressing, for at any moment Hooker might decide to move toward his lieutenant. Many dispatches passed between Hooker and Sedwick at this time. Sedgwick must, of course, be judged by the time of their receipt. At 4 P. M. of this day, Monday, he received word to look well to the safety of his corps, and to cross at Banks's ford to the north side, if desirable. These dispatches he answered, but he could not be sure that the answers reached Hooker. Later, Hooker ordered him to hold on to Banks's ford, if possible. Then, again, on receiving Sedgwick's report of the insecurity of his position, Hooker ordered him to w
April 30th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 20
many of his more efficient brothers in arms. The troops accepted Hooker with the utmost heartiness. He had been identified with their history. He was bone of their bone. He seemed the very type and harbinger of success. Men and officers alike joined in the work of rehabilitation. Under well digested orders—for Hooker was a good organizer—the lamentable laxity of discipline soon disappeared; eagerness succeeded apathy, and the Army of the Potomac once again held high its head. On April 30, 1863, the morning report showed, for duty equipped, 131,491 officers and men, and nearly 400 guns in the camp near Falmouth. Confronting this overwhelming body of men lay the weather-beaten Army of Northern Virginia, numbering some 60,000 men and 170 guns. This force was posted from Banks's ford above, to Skenker's Neck below Fredericksburg, a distance of some fifteen miles. Every inch of this line was strongly and intelligently fortified. The morale of the Confederate army could not be fi
ained credence. His course renders necessary a critical examination of the campaign. But be it remembered that every word of censure is uttered with the consciousness that Hooker's memory lies embalmed in our mausoleum of dead heroes, and that in lesser commands his career was patriotic and useful. The disaster at Fredericksburg, in December, 1862, had left its mark upon the ever faithful Army of the Potomac. It had lost confidence in its chief, but not in itself. Burnside retired in January to the satisfaction of all, but carrying away their affectionate regard. Hooker succeeded to the command. His sobriquet of Fighting Joe aptly but superficially characterized him. Few men could handle a division—perhaps a corps—to better advantage under definite orders. None gloried in the act of war more than he. Lacking not conduct, yet the dramatic side of the art-military was dearest to him, and his ubiquity and handsome bearing made him better known to the army at large than many of
December, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 20
t of intimating that they were braggarts, who would not fight. Particularly Howard and Sedgwick were his scapegoats, and for some years Hooker's views gained credence. His course renders necessary a critical examination of the campaign. But be it remembered that every word of censure is uttered with the consciousness that Hooker's memory lies embalmed in our mausoleum of dead heroes, and that in lesser commands his career was patriotic and useful. The disaster at Fredericksburg, in December, 1862, had left its mark upon the ever faithful Army of the Potomac. It had lost confidence in its chief, but not in itself. Burnside retired in January to the satisfaction of all, but carrying away their affectionate regard. Hooker succeeded to the command. His sobriquet of Fighting Joe aptly but superficially characterized him. Few men could handle a division—perhaps a corps—to better advantage under definite orders. None gloried in the act of war more than he. Lacking not conduct, yet
rce he might fall in with on the road. This order was received by Sedgwick at 11 P. M., when he was intent on pursuit in the opposite direction. Sedgwick sent out his orders to change these dispositions within fifteen minutes after receipt of Hooker's dispatch, but it was after midnight before he could get his command faced about and fairly headed in the new direction. The Fredericksburg heights were held by Early and Barksdale with eighty-five hundred men, and plenty of artillery. In December a few brigades had here defeated the entire Army of the Potomac. Hooker himself, with his battle worn veterans, had then pronounced the task impossible. It was after midnight, Sedgwick had fifteen miles to march, after capturing this almost impregnable position, and all this to be done before daylight—that is, within three hours, if he was to carry out his orders. So soon as his head of column reached the town four regiments were sent against the rifle-pits, but were speedily repulsed,
... 2 3 4 5 6 7 8