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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. Search the whole document.

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July (search for this): chapter 1
ly had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking his position at Richmond; and when Early reached the capital he found troops assembled there sufficient to repel him. But had Grant moved his army in May by way of the James instead of from Culpeper, the rebels would doubtless at that time have threatened Washington far more seriously than in July. The very danger which was now averted was a justification of the strategy which had prevented its occurrence at a time when relief might have been more difficult to secure. At this juncture, however, Lee could have had but little hope of capturing Washington, though he doubtless believed that Grant might be compelled to weaken himself in front of Richmond, and perhaps to raise the siege. McCabe's Life and Campaigns of General Lee; a work containing more trustworthy information from re
July 18th (search for this): chapter 1
ubt the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter-revolution. They hope the election of a Peace candidate. Accordingly, he renewed his preparations for a vigorous and, if necessary, protracted series of campaigns. But the enlistment of the Volunteers had been for three years only, and the term of many of the men was now expiring. It was necessary to provide at once for this emergency. On the 18th of July, Grant telegraphed to the President, direct: There ought to be an immediate call for, say, three hundred thousand men, to be put in the field in the shortest possible time. . . The enemy have their last man in the field. Every depletion of their army is an irreparable loss. Desertions from it now rapid. With the prospect of large additions to our force their desertions would increase. The greater number of men we have, the shorter and less sanguinary will be the war. These representa
August 10th (search for this): chapter 1
it that he was foiled. This plan, however, had been frustrated by Sheridan's prompt advance into the Valley, and Grant's operations north of the James. The intention, so far as I can learn, was to send a column direct from Culpeper to the Potomac, and Early to advance at the same time from Martinsburg. This was frustrated by Early being compelled to fall back, and your operations on the north side of the James.—Sheridan to Grant, August, 20. Sheridan had moved from Halltown on the 10th of August, and Early at once fell back as far as Strasburg, to which point he was followed by the national army, both forces arriving at Cedar creek on the 12th. On the 13th, Early retired a few miles further, to Fisher's Hill. Anderson meanwhile had arrived at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set out with his whole command, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap, arrived on the 15th, at Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasbu
August 16th (search for this): chapter 1
portunity of appealing to the popular impatience of the war, and bringing it to a close on terms acceptable to the great mass of the Southern people.—Pollard's Lost Cause, pp. 556 and 557. With this view they redoubled their efforts, and with this view the Democrats continued theirs, while a chorus of foreign aristocrats assisted to proclaim the downfall of the republic which they naturally hated and feared. Grant, however, appreciated the situation as fully as his opponents. On the 16th of August, he wrote: I have no doubt the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter-revolution. They hope the election of a Peace candidate. Accordingly, he renewed his preparations for a vigorous and, if necessary, protracted series of campaigns. But the enlistment of the Volunteers had been for three years only, and the term of many of the men was now expiring. It was necessary to provide at once for
August 20th (search for this): chapter 1
But all this was now to end. Grant had directed Sheridan: Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock of all descriptions, and negroes, to prevent further planting; and the orders were carried out to the letter. On the 20th of August, Sheridan reported: I have destroyed everything that was eatable south of Winchester, and they will have to haul supplies from well up to Staunton. His orders were to seize all mules, horses, and cattle that might be useful, and destroy all mportant movement made by Sheridan was either ordered or approved by Grant. I have taken up a position, said Sheridan, near Berryville, which will enable me to get in their rear, if they should get strong enough to push north. Again, on the 20th of August, he telegraphed: Troops passing from Culpeper into the Valley. I have taken the defensive till their strength is more fully developed. . . If they cross the Potomac, they will expose their rear, and I will pitch into them. To this Grant rep
August 26th (search for this): chapter 1
tanding his orders, had no desire to try the chances again. This day Grant said to Sheridan: I now think it likely that all troops will be ordered back from the Valley, except what they think the minimum necessary to detain you. . . Yielding up the Weldon road seems to be a blow the enemy cannot stand. . . Watch closely, and if you find this theory correct, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it is possible to follow to the Virginia Central road—follow that far. On the 26th of August, Lee made his last attempt, at Ream's station, to regain possession of the Weldon road. Unsuccessful there, and finding his plans frustrated in the Valley, he at once, as Grant had foreseen, directed the return of Anderson. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: If you are so situated as to feel the enemy strongly without compromising the safety of your position, I think it advisable to do so. I do not know positively that any troops have yet returned from the Valley, but think yo
September (search for this): chapter 1
he Democratic party are doing all in their power to bring about this result. The evidence of this has increased very much within the last few days. It is probably thought that such a thing will have its effect upon the next election by showing the inability of the present administration to carry on the war with an armed opposition in the loyal states.—Halleck to Grant, August, 1864. and, naturally enough, was dreaded by the government. Grant, however, remained urgent, and on the l3th of September, he wrote to Stanton: We ought to have the whole number of men called for by the President, in the shortest possible time. Prompt action in filling up our armies will have more effect upon the enemy than a victory. They profess to believe, and make their men believe, there is such a party in favor of recognizing Southern independence that the draft cannot be enforced. Let them be undeceived. Deserters come into our lines daily, who tell us that the men are nearly universally tired of t
September 1st (search for this): chapter 1
nk the lines ran parallel with the rebel works across Bermuda Hundred, from the James to the Appomattox river. Beyond the Appomattox, starting at a point opposite the rebel left, they followed the defences of Petersburg, and until they struck the Jerusalem plank road, ran extremely close to the enemy's works, approaching at times within a few hundred yards. At the Jerusalem road they diverged to the left, and the distance between the entrenchments widened to more than two miles. On the 1st of September, the national left rested on the Weldon railroad, Warren's skirmishers reaching to the Vaughan and Squirrel level roads; but before long the main works extended to these roads; then running south about a mile and a half, they turned to the east and completely encircled the national camps, striking the Blackwater river, in the rear of Meade's right wing. There were also strong entrenched works at City Point, to protect the base of the army, and batteries were established at intervals on
September 3rd (search for this): chapter 1
d then, with his usual spirit, he added: I believe no troops have yet left the Valley, but I believe they will, and that it will be their last campaign in the Shenandoah. They came to invade, and have failed. They must leave, or cross the Potomac. The next day he said: If Early has detached troops for Richmond, I will attack him vigorously. It was with words like these that the chief and the subaltern inspired each other: they were evidently made of similar stuff. At last, on the 3rd of September, Anderson started for Richmond; but towards night he blundered upon Sheridan's lines, and was vigorously attacked, and driven back towards the Opequan after dark. For a while he was in imminent danger, and the next day Early came up to his support. The rebels, however, had no idea of attacking Sheridan, and the whole command executed a rapid retreat to the west bank of the Opequan; but had Sheridan been aware of Anderson's intention, he would doubtless have facilitated, rather than i
September 8th (search for this): chapter 1
alley censures of Lee disappointment in Richmond. Atlanta had fallen, the Weldon road was carried, and Early's exit from the Valley had been barred, but the end was not yet. A long and tedious prospect still stretched out before the national commander. Hood's army was not destroyed, the rebels were in force in Sheridan's front, and Lee had not abandoned Richmond. Grant looked the situation full in the face, and lost no time in adapting his plans to the actual emergencies. On the 8th of September, Sherman had entered Atlanta in person, and on the 10th, he was instructed: As soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed till the close of the war. To Sheridan Grant said: If this war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste; and to Meade: I do not want to give up the Weldon road, if it can be avoided, until we ge
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