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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3. Search the whole document.

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Martinsburg Early (search for this): chapter 1
olumn direct from Culpeper to the Potomac, and Early to advance at the same time from Martinsburg. at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set o Meanwhile, there were rumors that a part of Early's force had been sent west of the Alleghanies,r cross the Potomac. The next day he said: If Early has detached troops for Richmond, I will attac-chief said to Sheridan: If you want to attack Early, you might reinforce largely from Washington. andsome style, without cover; but by this time Early's two divisions from Martinsburg had come uponrling. It would, indeed, have been better for Early if Sheridan had been cashiered before the battercept the enemy at Newmarket, twenty miles in Early's rear. Before daylight on the 22nd, Crook thought it possible, though not probable, that Early might turn north, or send his cavalry north; aand wagons and caissons burned or abandoned by Early in his flight; but he captured many unhurt sol[31 more...]
Featherstonaugh (search for this): chapter 1
re either 6 or 12 pounders. This does not include the artillery found in the city, nor that taken in the field. In my account of the works around Richmond and Petersburg, I have made free use of papers by Major-General Wright, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michie, also of the Engineers, published in the Report on the Defences of Washington, by Major-General Barnard, of the same corps; as well as of a paper on the Fortifications of Petersburg, by Lieutenant Featherstonaugh, of the Royal (British) Engineers. I am also indebted for valuable assistance to Major-General Humphreys, late Chief of Engineers, United States Army. The people of the North entirely failed to appreciate the importance of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of Burnside had left an impression that could not easily be effaced, and all the subsequent manoeuvres on the right and left were, to the multitude, unintelligible. It was only perceived that Hancock had twice been
of Halltown. The rebels pressed forward, and on the 25th, seized Shepardstown, on the Potomac, twelve miles above Halltown; upon which Sheridan telegraphed: I will not give up this place, and hope to be able to strike the enemy divided . On the 26th, however, the rebels fell back from his front, and returned to their former position. Early had crossed the Potomac once, and notwithstanding his orders, had no desire to try the chances again. This day Grant said to Sheridan: I now think it likn the vicinity of Staunton was retained for the use of Early's army. All in the upper part of the Valley was shipped to Richmond, for the use of Lee's army. The country from here to Staunton was abundantly supplied with forage and grain. On the 26th, Grant telegraphed to Sherman: I have evidence that Sheridan's victory has created the greatest consternation and alarm for the safety of the city. In fact, everything showed the moral effect of these successes on the enemy. Sheridan not only
dan fell back as far as Halltown. My position, he said, in front of Charlestown at best was a bad one, and so much being dependent on this army, I withdrew . . . and took up a new line in front of Halltown. The rebels pressed forward, and on the 25th, seized Shepardstown, on the Potomac, twelve miles above Halltown; upon which Sheridan telegraphed: I will not give up this place, and hope to be able to strike the enemy divided . On the 26th, however, the rebels fell back from his front, and reins, where a small rebel force was able for a while to hold his two divisions. Had he succeeded in reaching Newmarket in time to intercept the broken and flying fragments of Early's command, the whole rebel army must have been destroyed. On the 25th, Early abandoned the main Valley road to his victor, and fell back by Port Republic to Brown's Gap, one of the south-eastern exits from the Blue Ridge. The national infantry advanced as far as Harrisonburg, and the cavalry was sent to Port Republ
in the Blue Ridge. Sheridan pursued them during the night, only halting at Woodstock, to rest his men and issue rations. On the 23rd, he drove the enemy to Mount Jackson, and found the country and small towns filled with their wounded; on the 24th, he followed Early to a point six miles beyond Newmarket, but without being able to bring on an engagement. The rebels moved fast, and Torbert had not arrived with the cavalry in time to check them. He had been detained at a gorge in the mountailated him and his army, but gave no detailed orders. On the 23rd, he said: I have just received the news of your second great victory, and ordered a hundred guns in honor of it. Keep on, and your good work will cause the fall of Richmond. On the 24th, however, Sheridan reported: I am now eighty miles from Martinsburg, and find it exceedingly difficult to supply this army. The engagements of Winchester and Fisher's Hill broke up my original plan of pushing up the Valley with a certain amount o
re the battle ended, but the rebels continued their flight through Woodstock, and as far as Narrow Passage, a gorge in the Blue Ridge. Sheridan pursued them during the night, only halting at Woodstock, to rest his men and issue rations. On the 23rd, he drove the enemy to Mount Jackson, and found the country and small towns filled with their wounded; on the 24th, he followed Early to a point six miles beyond Newmarket, but without being able to bring on an engagement. The rebels moved fast, l be safe to send all new organizations here. Sheridan himself Grant left at first entirely to his own resources, to reap the harvest of his own victory. After each battle he congratulated him and his army, but gave no detailed orders. On the 23rd, he said: I have just received the news of your second great victory, and ordered a hundred guns in honor of it. Keep on, and your good work will cause the fall of Richmond. On the 24th, however, Sheridan reported: I am now eighty miles from Mart
n of Anderson. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: If you are so situated as to feel the enemy strongly without compromising the safety of your position, I think it advisable to do so. I do not know positively that any troops have yet returned from the Valley, but think you will find the enemy in your immediate front weaker than you are. Meanwhile, there were rumors that a part of Early's force had been sent west of the Alleghanies, and Grant meant to lose no opportunity. On the 29th, he ordered Sheridan: If it is ascertained certainly that Breckenridge has been detached to go into Western Virginia, attack the remaining forces vigorously with every man you have; and if successful in routing them, follow up your success with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, and send Crook to meet Breckenridge. But Sheridan replied on the same day: There is not one word of truth in the report of Breckenridge being in West Virginia; and then, with his usual spirit, he added: I believe no tro
August 10th (search for this): chapter 1
it that he was foiled. This plan, however, had been frustrated by Sheridan's prompt advance into the Valley, and Grant's operations north of the James. The intention, so far as I can learn, was to send a column direct from Culpeper to the Potomac, and Early to advance at the same time from Martinsburg. This was frustrated by Early being compelled to fall back, and your operations on the north side of the James.—Sheridan to Grant, August, 20. Sheridan had moved from Halltown on the 10th of August, and Early at once fell back as far as Strasburg, to which point he was followed by the national army, both forces arriving at Cedar creek on the 12th. On the 13th, Early retired a few miles further, to Fisher's Hill. Anderson meanwhile had arrived at Culpeper, where he received a despatch from Early, calling for reinforcements. He at once set out with his whole command, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester's Gap, arrived on the 15th, at Front Royal, about ten miles east of Strasbu
September 8th (search for this): chapter 1
alley censures of Lee disappointment in Richmond. Atlanta had fallen, the Weldon road was carried, and Early's exit from the Valley had been barred, but the end was not yet. A long and tedious prospect still stretched out before the national commander. Hood's army was not destroyed, the rebels were in force in Sheridan's front, and Lee had not abandoned Richmond. Grant looked the situation full in the face, and lost no time in adapting his plans to the actual emergencies. On the 8th of September, Sherman had entered Atlanta in person, and on the 10th, he was instructed: As soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy constantly pressed till the close of the war. To Sheridan Grant said: If this war is to last another year, we want the Shenandoah Valley to remain a barren waste; and to Meade: I do not want to give up the Weldon road, if it can be avoided, until we ge
up the Weldon road seems to be a blow the enemy cannot stand. . . Watch closely, and if you find this theory correct, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it is possible to follow to the Virginia Central road—follow that far. On the 26th of August, Lee made his last attempt, at Ream's station, to regain possession of the Weldon road. Unsuccessful there, and finding his plans frustrated in the Valley, he at once, as Grant had foreseen, directed the return of Anderson. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Sheridan: If you are so situated as to feel the enemy strongly without compromising the safety of your position, I think it advisable to do so. I do not know positively that any troops have yet returned from the Valley, but think you will find the enemy in your immediate front weaker than you are. Meanwhile, there were rumors that a part of Early's force had been sent west of the Alleghanies, and Grant meant to lose no opportunity. On the 29th, he ordered Sheridan:
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