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Selma (Alabama, United States) (search for this): article 4
is reason to believe that Gen. Sherman expected when he marched out of Vicksburg to reach Selma, in Alabama. The heavy column of cavalry that started from Memphis, and constituted an important partnot designed to draw him in that direction, Sherman would have occupied Meridian, Demopolis, and Selma, and thus have rendered his escape impossible, and the fall of Mobile, from lack of provisions and without a blow, a matter of absolute certainty. The possession of Mobile and Selma would have given the Federal commander two important water bases, the one on the Mississippi at Vicksburg the otblished in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position to move upon Mobile without exposing his flanks and rear to ruinous assaults, or to march upon Selma and Montgomery, except after a delay and a series of engagements on the Tombigbee, and Alabama,
Fortress Monroe (Virginia, United States) (search for this): article 4
communicating with the latter — the Alabama and Tombigbee, and two railways ready to hand, viz: the Mobile and Ohio and the Vicksburg and Jackson roads. Once in possession of these important points, and his army firmly established in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Indeed, a successful lodgment in this fertile region of Alabama would not only have carried with it the fall of Mobile and Montgomery, and secured to the enemy points of great material and strategic importance, but it would have been equivalent to the removal of the Mississippi river, it such a thing were physically possible, from Vicksburg and New Orleans to Montgomery and Mobile. Nay, more — it would have been a grand flank movement, as it was designed to be, against Gen. Johnston,
Alabama river (Alabama, United States) (search for this): article 4
blow, a matter of absolute certainty. The possession of Mobile and Selma would have given the Federal commander two important water bases, the one on the Mississippi at Vicksburg the other at Mobile on the Gulf, two navigable rivers communicating with the latter — the Alabama and Tombigbee, and two railways ready to hand, viz: the Mobile and Ohio and the Vicksburg and Jackson roads. Once in possession of these important points, and his army firmly established in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Indeed, a successful lodgment in this fertile region of Alabama would not only have carried with it the fall of Mobile and Montgomery, and secured to the enemy points of great material and strategic importance, but it would have been equivalent to the re
Meridian (Mississippi, United States) (search for this): article 4
point at which the enemy aimed was, beyond all doubt, the great railway centre of the Confederacy; and the naval attack upon Mobile, the advance of Sherman upon Meridian, and the forward movement upon Dalton, were all parts of the plan by which that point was to be reached. The scheme was a bold one, and showed great originalityPolk retreated upon Mobile, the attack upon which by the Federal fleets was calculated if not designed to draw him in that direction, Sherman would have occupied Meridian, Demopolis, and Selma, and thus have rendered his escape impossible, and the fall of Mobile, from lack of provisions and without a blow, a matter of absolute cerimportant points, and his army firmly established in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Ind
Demopolis (Alabama, United States) (search for this): article 4
m down towards Mobile, while Sherman rushed upon him in front. Had Gen. Polk retreated upon Mobile, the attack upon which by the Federal fleets was calculated if not designed to draw him in that direction, Sherman would have occupied Meridian, Demopolis, and Selma, and thus have rendered his escape impossible, and the fall of Mobile, from lack of provisions and without a blow, a matter of absolute certainty. The possession of Mobile and Selma would have given the Federal commander two importa hand, viz: the Mobile and Ohio and the Vicksburg and Jackson roads. Once in possession of these important points, and his army firmly established in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Indeed, a successful lodgment in this fertile region of Alabama would not
Tombigbee River (United States) (search for this): article 4
of absolute certainty. The possession of Mobile and Selma would have given the Federal commander two important water bases, the one on the Mississippi at Vicksburg the other at Mobile on the Gulf, two navigable rivers communicating with the latter — the Alabama and Tombigbee, and two railways ready to hand, viz: the Mobile and Ohio and the Vicksburg and Jackson roads. Once in possession of these important points, and his army firmly established in the triangle formed by the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Indeed, a successful lodgment in this fertile region of Alabama would not only have carried with it the fall of Mobile and Montgomery, and secured to the enemy points of great material and strategic importance, but it would have been equivalent to the removal of the Miss
Mississippi (United States) (search for this): article 4
ers and the railroad leading from Selma to Demopolis and Meridian, and we should no more have been able to dislodge him from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Indeed, a successful lodgment in this fertile region of Alabama would not only have carried with it the fall of Mobile and Montgomery, and secured to the enemy points of great material and strategic importance, but it would have been equivalent to the removal of the Mississippi river, it such a thing were physically possible, from Vicksburg and New Orleans to Montgomery and Mobile. Nay, more — it would have been a grand flank movement, as it was designed to be, against Gen. Johnston, which, if successful, would have resulted, as has already been intimated, in the fall of Atlanta and the occupancy by the legions of the enemy of the Northern half of the great State of Georgia. Every man we might have sent to Mobile would only have enhanced the victory of our foes a
Atlanta (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 4
ht. The advance of Sherman's army was full of danger, as in the event of success he would have been in a position to derange all our plans and render the fell of Atlanta only a question of time; but this, like many previous combinations of the enemy, failed because too much was attempted. The objective point at which the enemy ai a grand flank movement, as it was designed to be, against Gen. Johnston, which, if successful, would have resulted, as has already been intimated, in the fall of Atlanta and the occupancy by the legions of the enemy of the Northern half of the great State of Georgia. Every man we might have sent to Mobile would only have enhancedston should send reinforcements to the scene of action, as it was doubtless expected he would do, then Grant would fall upon him at Dalton and force him back upon Atlanta, against which it was finally hoped Sherman would be able to advance from the west, while Grant pressed down from the north — indeed, the telegraphic wires inform
Alabama (Alabama, United States) (search for this): article 4
a, in Alabama. The heavy column of cavalry that started from Memphis, and constituted an important part of his forces, was to move rapidly across Mississippi and Alabama, cut the interior railway lines, destroy the bridges and Government work-shops, lay waste the country, and gain the rear of Gen Polk, harass and delay his retreatim from his position than we have been to drive the enemy from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe. Indeed, a successful lodgment in this fertile region of Alabama would not only have carried with it the fall of Mobile and Montgomery, and secured to the enemy points of great material and strategic importance, but it would haut exposing his flanks and rear to ruinous assaults, or to march upon Selma and Montgomery, except after a delay and a series of engagements on the Tombigbee, and Alabama, which would have been equally fatal to his designs. Nor should we fall to make grateful acknowledgment of that kind Providence which delayed the attack of the e
Dalton, Ga. (Georgia, United States) (search for this): article 4
yond all doubt, the great railway centre of the Confederacy; and the naval attack upon Mobile, the advance of Sherman upon Meridian, and the forward movement upon Dalton, were all parts of the plan by which that point was to be reached. The scheme was a bold one, and showed great originality if not soundness of judgment Gen. Grang up from New Orleans. If Johnston should send reinforcements to the scene of action, as it was doubtless expected he would do, then Grant would fall upon him at Dalton and force him back upon Atlanta, against which it was finally hoped Sherman would be able to advance from the west, while Grant pressed down from the north — indeed, the telegraphic wires inform us that Grant has already moved out from Chattanooga, and that a battle is imminent at Dalton; but when he hears, as he must in the course of a few hours, that Sherman has been failed, he will probably retire to Chattanooga, as the latter has to Vicksburg. But how was this formidable combinati
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