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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 5. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones). Search the whole document.

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William N. Pendleton (search for this): chapter 3.25
Republican, from General Longstreet, which has been referred to. That communication contained a bitter tirade of denunciation against General Fitz Lee, General William N. Pendleton, the Rev. J. William Jones, and myself, the greater part of it being directed against me. Thus originated the tom-tom warfare, in which the leading parwhich he states, and which I have shown to be entirely unsatisfactory. This is his whole proof on the question as to the order. On the other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee trances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstre
knows very well that there are a number of officers and men who entirely lost their right arms in the war, and are yet able to write with great facility; and it is hardly to be presumed that he suggested that appeal of the old soldier for sympathy. My suggestion had no reference to the mere mechanical task of writing, or the employment of another as his amanuensis, for if he had but done the latter he would only have followed the example of many very able writers, and among them Homer and Milton, whose blindness rendered it necessary for them to use the services of others in transferring the grandest productions. of their brains to paper. So if General Longstreet had merely employed another to commit to paper his own ideas, or to correct and render more perspicuous their expression, there would have been no impropriety in that. The objection is that the views, speculations, and criticisms of a professional newspaper writer, without military experience, should be palmed on the pub
Gederal Meade (search for this): chapter 3.25
th corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupyended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examon. It was in the morning that he reported to Meade his apprehension of an attack on that flank, as shown by Meade's testimony, and yet no arrangements were made for transferring troops to meet sucMeade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occupied very we would have had to make a wide circuit, and Meade, having the inner and shorter line, would haveThe consequence, therefore, must have been, if Meade had pursued what would have been his very obvirated General Longstreet's brain. He thinks Meade would certainly have attacked us at once, if w All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then positio ensued. There is no reason to suppose that Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in po[15 more...]
et given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half-past 4 o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank — the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's. division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreating. On the next day, though there was skirmishing and fighting in Jackson's front all day, General Longstreet was not ready to go into action until after 3 P. M. What caused this delay he does not pretend to explain, but gives his operations on that day as follows: The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle
nd his men had not been of the stuff to withstand the shock of more than three times their numbers, for the long hours it took Longstreet to get ready? It must be borne in mind that General Lee wanted to make the attack on the enemy the day before, according to Longstreet's own statement, and wanted him to begin it, bqt he demurred and asked permission to take time to reconnoitre. It was twenty-seven hours after his arrival on the field before he was ready to begin, and if the troops of McClellan, the junction of which with Pope's Army Jackson's movement had been intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place! Is it to be credited that, when General Lee was anxious for Longstreet to begin the attack as soon as his troops arrived on the 29th, he said nothing to him, nor gave him any orders on the 30th, until, as Longstreet says, after 3 P. M. a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for him to hurry to the a
James Longstreet (search for this): chapter 3.25
tion in the New Orleans Republican, from General Longstreet, which has been referred to. That communlose of the first day's fight, when he said: Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in posit time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official rof the battle-and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against h whole credit for that battle was due to General Longstreet, and General Lee had very little to do w merely withstood the enemy's attacks, while Longstreet was getting ready; and the question comes ins their numbers, for the long hours it took Longstreet to get ready? It must be borne in mind that It may be observed here, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to hhat the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him, and had which is marvellous. The idea is, that, if Longstreet's columns had gone to the attack at sunrise,[66 more...]
Abraham Lincoln (search for this): chapter 3.25
at he was wholly incompetent to the command of the large army under him, or that he was weak enough to yield to a senseless clamor in opposition to his own judgment. He would have had to wait but a very few days, if he had pursued his true policy, to vindicate its wisdom and put to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 32,104 well-equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the same call, as shown by the final report of the Provost-Marshal General, page 53, (Documents 1865-‘6). Other troops were on their way from North Carolina and the Virginia Peninsula. The greater part of all these troops, and probably a considerable portion of the troops still in the defenses of Washington, especially south of the Potomac, would have been added to Meade's army, before he
Stephen D. Lee (search for this): chapter 3.25
eral Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line, of great strength, moved up to support the first, but, in doing so, came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S. D. Lee, under their well-directed fire the supporting lines were broken and fell back in confusion. Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired. General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command agains
Will Longstreet never begin ? Is it to be wondered that General Lee had come to the conclusion that Longstreet was very slowe Times, says that General Jackson did not pursue, while General Lee says: Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, aecond Manassas, to show the official relations between. General Lee and himself, General Longstreet gives two letters, one from Colonel Taylor and the other from General Lee, to show the kindly personal relations that existed between himself and GenGeneral Lee and his staff, a matter which no one will pretend to controvert, but which all will say ought to have prevented Gene, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to him, written since the war, to show their kindly perse other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given torder for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman referred to by General Fitz L
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 3.25
ature, in the New Orleans Republican of the 27th of February, 1876, General Longstreet, referring to his letter to his uncle, said: His [Longstreet's] letter was published owing to its corroborative and sympathetic relations to one of General R. E. Lee written two weeks later. The publication was made following the publication of General R. E. Lee's, so that the facts might be known and noted in their proper connection, not in attack or defence of any one. The letter of General Lee hGeneral R. E. Lee's, so that the facts might be known and noted in their proper connection, not in attack or defence of any one. The letter of General Lee here referred to is the one to the President from which the foregoing extract is made, and the only part of it to which Longstreet's could bear the remotest corroborative and sympathetic relations is the passage given — that is, Longstreet's letter was corroborative of the opinion that a younger and abler leader for the army could have been obtained, and sympathetic with it in pointing out who that leader should have been — to wit: General James Longstreet. Accompanying the publication of the
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