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Browsing named entities in a specific section of Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1. Search the whole document.

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report to Sherman. Delays were occasioned by the destruction of bridges across the Elk river, and long detours were made; for there was not time either to ferry, or to build new bridges; and, on the 5th, Grant again dispatched to Sherman: Leave Dodge's command (of Hurlbut's corps) at Athens, until further orders, and come with the remainder of your command to Stevenson, or until you receive other instructions. Again, on the 7th: The enemy have moved a great part of their force from this frone. There are more cars now on the West Tennessee roads than are required. But all this was not sufficient, and, on the 4th, Grant declared: The road from Nashville to Decatur will have to be put in running order. Sherman was ordered to leave Dodge's division, of Hurlbut's command, at Athens. have given directions for putting the railroad from Nashville to Decatur in running order. That road is now only guarded to Columbia, and the force left by you will have to guard the balance, with th
Howard, and a portion of the Twelfth corps, under Brigadier-General Geary. He took up his line of march along the railroad,s it was necessary to hold both the roads to Kelly's ferry, Geary was encamped at Wauhatchie, about three miles from the pos. The battle began at one o'clock, with a fierce assault on Geary, at Wauhatchie. Howard was at once directed to move his nearest division to the support of Geary. He moved promptly; but, before reaching Geary, found a rebel force strongly posted oGeary, found a rebel force strongly posted on a range of hills on the left, which commanded his line of march. His second division soon came up, and an assault was madet, evidently intending to hold the position permanently. Geary, meanwhile, had been fighting for three hours, without assing of musketry from every quarter, alarmed the teamsters of Geary's wagon-train, who deserted their mules, and in the darknes killed and wounded; he took more than a hundred prisoners. Geary buried one hundred and fifty-three rebels, on his front alo
Gordon Granger (search for this): chapter 12
ragg, but got his forces together at Chickamauga creek by the 19th of September, although with infinite difficulty. Here Bragg attacked, and after two days fighting, succeeded in piercing the national centre, and demolishing the right wing of the army. Rosecrans himself hurried to Chattanooga, to prepare for its defence, and McCook and Crittenden also left the field. But Thomas held on, and although the whole bulk of the rebel army was now precipitated upon his single corps, Major-General Gordon Granger came upon the field with a division of about five thousand men, during the battle, and went at once, without orders, to the critical point, where his troops were of great use in resisting the onslaught of the rebels. His numbers are included in the estimate of forty-five thousand men as Rosecrans's strength in this fight. in the hope of getting between him and Chattanooga, Bragg was unable to accomplish this object, and finally abandoned the attempt. In the battle of Chickamauga
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 12
t into East Tennessee difficulties of supply Grant starts for Chattanooga directions to his thre situation of Burnside anxiety of government Grant's calmness Longstreet moves against Burnside rations Halleck still anxious about Burnside Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding out before the Ninth corps was returned to him by Grant, Burnside had taken the field, moving by threed unsafe even for couriers. The next morning, Grant rode out in company with Thomas and Brigadier had failed; while, in case of another effort, Grant had a shorter line by which to reenforce his o Nashville was thus opened in five days after Grant's arrival at the front, and the command rescuemovement having actually begun the day before, Grant said to Burnside: I will endeavor, from here, ntire corps from his army, in the very face of Grant; and Grant, beholding this blunder, could not immediate trouble. On the 13th, he informed Grant that Longstreet was certainly on the Tennessee[74 more...]
Henry W. Halleck (search for this): chapter 12
of Grant's armies extent of his operations Halleck still anxious about Burnside Grant impressesthe evacuation of Corinth, in May, 1862, when Halleck sent Buell, with more than forty thousand menn numbers, Rosecrans refused to budge. See Halleck's report, as general-in-chief, for 1863. When Halleck gave him orders to advance, he held a council of war, and replied that it was a military mr, immediately after the defeat of Rosecrans, Halleck detached the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from lf-past 9 P. M. on the 23d, he telegraphed to Halleck: Have just arrived. I will write tomorrow. ou should go to Nashville, as foreshadowed by Halleck, and chiefly as you can harmonize all conflicntly proceeded to obey. In compliance with Halleck's previous instructions, Blair had been advan Cleveland and Sweetwater. At the same time, Halleck, who had always felt the greatest uneasiness . The dispatches from the President and from Halleck alike indicate the greatest alarm, lest Burns[16 more...]
hat day, he issued positive orders for the movement. Smith was instructed to make all necessary arrangements for the expedition which was to effect a lodgment at Brown's ferry. Four thousand men were detailed, and the force to throw the bridge was organized on the 24th, the day of Grant's reconnoissance; the pontoon bridge was ready in two days more; and Smith, meanwhile, examined the ground with hrs brigade commanders, and gave the requisite orders. Eighteen hundred men, under Brigadier-General Hazen, were to embark in boats, and pass down the river about nine miles, seven of which would be under fire of the rebel pickets. This risk was taken rather than launch the pontoons near the ferry, because the boats would move more rapidly than intelligence could be carried by the infantry pickets of the enemy; and, although the rebels might be alarmed, they could not know where the landing was to be attempted, and therefore could not concentrate with certainty against the landing.
out valley seizure of Brown's ferry March of Hooker from Bridgeport battle of Wauhatchie repulseand sent them by rail, under command of Major-General Hooker, to protect Rosecrans's railroad line o the heights on the southern side, thus giving Hooker an open road to Chattanooga, when his forces s mountain. Accordingly, Grant directed that Hooker should cross, at Bridgeport, to the south sidetanooga valley. On the morning of the 26th, Hooker crossed the Tennessee, by the pontoon bridge a, however, caused no serious interruption; and Hooker kept on down the valley. He met no further reossession of the vital point. The night after Hooker's arrival, Longstreet's corps attacked him in e loss of the enemy is not certainly known. Hooker estimates Longstreet's loss at fifteen hundredtion made secure against any further assault. Hooker, thereafter, remained undisturbed. Flanked asomas supporting, from here. In the mean time, Hooker will attack Lookout, and carry it if possible.[10 more...]
bridge at Bridgeport, with the greater part of the Eleventh corps, under Major-General Howard, and a portion of the Twelfth corps, under Brigadier-General Geary. He d was halted for the night, and went into camp within a mile of Brown's ferry. Howard had the advance, and, as it was necessary to hold both the roads to Kelly's ferry was encamped at Wauhatchie, about three miles from the position occupied by Howard's corps. The rebels, however, were fully aware of the condition of affairs ihe battle began at one o'clock, with a fierce assault on Geary, at Wauhatchie. Howard was at once directed to move his nearest division to the support of Geary. He They were steep and wooded, and entirely unknown to the national soldiers; but Howard scaled them under a heavy fire, and carried them by storm, capturing many priso no means of verifying or disputing this. The heights which had been carried by Howard were fortified at once, and the entire position made secure against any further
f September, and arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October. It was then his duty to conduct the Fifteenth army corps, and such other troops as could be spared from Hurlbut's command, to the support of Rosecrans, marching by way of Corinth, Tuscumbia, and Decatur, to Athens, Alabama. During this long and tedious march, he was to loo detours were made; for there was not time either to ferry, or to build new bridges; and, on the 5th, Grant again dispatched to Sherman: Leave Dodge's command (of Hurlbut's corps) at Athens, until further orders, and come with the remainder of your command to Stevenson, or until you receive other instructions. Again, on the 7th: Tient, and, on the 4th, Grant declared: The road from Nashville to Decatur will have to be put in running order. Sherman was ordered to leave Dodge's division, of Hurlbut's command, at Athens. have given directions for putting the railroad from Nashville to Decatur in running order. That road is now only guarded to Columbia, and
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 12
Grant was operating behind Vicksburg, he had urged that Rosecrans should be directed to make some movement in his favor, to distract the enemy, and at least prevent the troops of Bragg, who was in front of Rosecrans, from being sent to reenforce Johnston. See page 227. But, although he was greatly superior to Bragg in numbers, Rosecrans refused to budge. See Halleck's report, as general-in-chief, for 1863. When Halleck gave him orders to advance, he held a council of war, and replied that it was a military maxim not to fight two decisive battles at the same time. So Bragg was depleted and Johnston reenforced, and the siege of Vicksburg prolonged. When Vicksburg fell, the rebels of course brought back to Bragg the troops that they were no longer able to use in front of Grant. The fact of these movements was shown conclusively at the time, by the reports of prisoners, as well as by scouts and spies from the various national armies. They were good strategists. Having fewer for
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