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Browsing named entities in Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3.

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Beauregard (search for this): chapter 1
Butler, on Bermuda Hundred, the rebel line was extremely strong, and like that north of the James, was intended to be held with a comparatively small force, until in an emergency reinforcements could arrive; but south and east of Petersburg, Lee kept his main army, and here he relied for defence on men rather than works, though here also the fortifications were elaborate and formidable. When the national forces crossed the James, in June, and Smith advanced against Petersburg, although Beauregard came up in time to save the town, the defences on the south and east were captured. Breastworks were thrown up in the night, in rear of the former position, and these were held until Lee's army arrived; but the original works were never regained. For about a mile and a half the new rebel line followed a ridge a quarter of a mile outside the town, and was made exceedingly strong. At intervals of two or three hundred yards, or more, according to the nature of the ground, were batteries, t
Breckenridge (search for this): chapter 1
y's force had been sent west of the Alleghanies, and Grant meant to lose no opportunity. On the 29th, he ordered Sheridan: If it is ascertained certainly that Breckenridge has been detached to go into Western Virginia, attack the remaining forces vigorously with every man you have; and if successful in routing them, follow up your success with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, and send Crook to meet Breckenridge. But Sheridan replied on the same day: There is not one word of truth in the report of Breckenridge being in West Virginia; and then, with his usual spirit, he added: I believe no troops have yet left the Valley, but I believe they will, and that iBreckenridge being in West Virginia; and then, with his usual spirit, he added: I believe no troops have yet left the Valley, but I believe they will, and that it will be their last campaign in the Shenandoah. They came to invade, and have failed. They must leave, or cross the Potomac. The next day he said: If Early has detached troops for Richmond, I will attack him vigorously. It was with words like these that the chief and the subaltern inspired each other: they were evidently made
George Crook (search for this): chapter 1
with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, and send Crook to meet Breckenridge. But Sheridan replied ons with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, holding Crook's division in reserve, to be used as a turningight, where the Martinsburg road comes in, and Crook was now directed to find the left of the rebeleel of the main line of battle to support him. Crook advanced with spirit, forcing the enemy rapidts of Strasburg, and at once determined to use Crook as a turning column again, and strike the enem of national troops by day could be observed. Crook was therefore concealed in the forest on the 2 Early's rear. Before daylight on the 22nd, Crook marched to Little North mountain, the western ttracted, and when a general firing had begun, Crook suddenly burst from the woods on the hillside,vement, first Ricketts swinging in and joining Crook, and then the remainder of the Sixth and Ninessing, but this does not include the losses in Crook's command or the cavalry. Early wrote to Lee
October 9th (search for this): chapter 1
rywhere carried, and the rout of the enemy was complete. Many of the rebels threw down their arms, abandoning their artillery. Sixteen guns and eleven hundred prisoners fell into the national hands, and Early reported two hundred and forty killed and wounded in the infantry and artillery. Sheridan lost less than a thousand men. Sheridan's return shows 85 killed, 677 wounded, and 9 missing, but this does not include the losses in Crook's command or the cavalry. Early wrote to Lee on October 9th: The loss in the infantry and artillery was 30 killed, 210 wounded, and 995 missing; total, 1,235. I have been able to get no report of the loss in the cavalry, but it was slight. If this is true, the demoralization of the rebels must have been extreme: for an army of the size of Early's to yield after a loss of only 240 killed and wounded is disgraceful beyond anything in the war. Beaten commanders, however, are often willing to sacrifice the reputation of their troops in order to save
David Hunter (search for this): chapter 1
had been no apprehension in any quarter of an invasion of the North. Nor was the movement against Petersburg at all in contravention of the original design; for Hunter's campaign in the Shenandoah and Sheridan's co-operative march towards Charlottesville were conceived with the express object of destroying the rebel communications north of Richmond, and rendering it impossible for Lee to throw any large force in the direction of the Potomac. Hunter, it is true, had moved on Lexington instead of towards Charlottesville, and Sheridan, thus left unsupported, was obliged to return to Grant; while afterwards, when repelled from Lynchburg, Hunter retreated Hunter retreated entirely away from the Valley, leaving the route to Washington absolutely open to the enemy. Nevertheless, the invasion of Early had failed, for the very reason which Grant had foreseen. Lee had been so crippled by his losses in the Wilderness that he could not detach a force large enough to endanger Washington without risking h
August 16th (search for this): chapter 1
portunity of appealing to the popular impatience of the war, and bringing it to a close on terms acceptable to the great mass of the Southern people.—Pollard's Lost Cause, pp. 556 and 557. With this view they redoubled their efforts, and with this view the Democrats continued theirs, while a chorus of foreign aristocrats assisted to proclaim the downfall of the republic which they naturally hated and feared. Grant, however, appreciated the situation as fully as his opponents. On the 16th of August, he wrote: I have no doubt the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter-revolution. They hope the election of a Peace candidate. Accordingly, he renewed his preparations for a vigorous and, if necessary, protracted series of campaigns. But the enlistment of the Volunteers had been for three years only, and the term of many of the men was now expiring. It was necessary to provide at once for
Butler (search for this): chapter 1
ure, sometimes in barbette, and connected by rifletrench. These works were not extended to the southern bank until after Butler's attack on Drury's Bluff in May, 1864, when the rebels, fearing another advance from the same direction, completed the lded south-westerly to the Weldon road, when they turned to the north, and completed the circuit of the town. In front of Butler, on Bermuda Hundred, the rebel line was extremely strong, and like that north of the James, was intended to be held with part of the defences of Richmond; and, confronted from the middle of June by the entire army of the Potomac and a part of Butler's force, it acquired that character which the presence of a large body of defenders alone made practicable. Forts with vget that his forces on the Shenandoah were co-operating with those on the Potomac and the James. On the 21st, he said to Butler: Further news from Sheridan is better than the first we had. In pursuing the enemy up the Valley, they may be induced to
Hancock (search for this): chapter 1
nce of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of Burnside had left an impression that could not easily be effaced, and all the subsequent manoeuvres on the right and left were, to the multitude, unintelligible. It was only perceived that Hancock had twice been moved to the north bank of the James, and twice withdrawn. Not only was the fact unnoticed that by these manoeuvres the extension on the left had been made practicable; but that extension itself was looked upon as of no especial consequence. Hancock's check at Ream's station more than balanced, in the public mind, all the advantages of Warren's advance. In the same way Sheridan as yet appeared to have accomplished nothing in the Valley; in fact he had retired, and Early had followed him; so that on the Potomac also, the prospect was gloomy. Even Sherman's success, gratifying as it was, seemed isolated; the country had no idea that it had been facilitated by the very movements at the East which were deemed so unfort
A. A. Humphreys (search for this): chapter 1
eld. In my account of the works around Richmond and Petersburg, I have made free use of papers by Major-General Wright, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, and Lieutenant-Colonel Michie, also of the Engineers, published in the Report on the Defences of Washington, by Major-General Barnard, of the same corps; as well as of a paper on the Fortifications of Petersburg, by Lieutenant Featherstonaugh, of the Royal (British) Engineers. I am also indebted for valuable assistance to Major-General Humphreys, late Chief of Engineers, United States Army. The people of the North entirely failed to appreciate the importance of the seizure of the Weldon road. The disaster of Burnside had left an impression that could not easily be effaced, and all the subsequent manoeuvres on the right and left were, to the multitude, unintelligible. It was only perceived that Hancock had twice been moved to the north bank of the James, and twice withdrawn. Not only was the fact unnoticed that by these m
October 31st, 1864 AD (search for this): chapter 1
ls by batteries having a flanking fire to the right and left, while in front was a ditch with several rows of abatis. For months the two armies thus confronted each other on the banks of the Appomattox, like mailed champions armed to the teeth, while Richmond, the prize of the struggle, waited apart, till her fate should be decided. The map of the battle of Five Forks shows the fortifications around Petersburg, and that of the Appomattox campaign those around Richmond. On the 31st of October, 1864, there were one hundred and fifty-three pieces in position on the national lines, of which twenty were field artillery; and at the fall of Richmond, in April, 1865, one hundred and seventy-five guns were captured, of which forty-one were either 6 or 12 pounders. This does not include the artillery found in the city, nor that taken in the field. In my account of the works around Richmond and Petersburg, I have made free use of papers by Major-General Wright, Chief of Engineers, Uni
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