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October 23rd (search for this): chapter 123
Price had driven General Curtis' troops, under General Blunt, that morning. I pushed on the next day to the Little Blue, engaged Price's troops, captured two pieces of cannon, and drover them back to the Big Blue, through Independence. While this was going on, General Price with part of his force attacked Major-General Curtis, who had a force of twenty thousand men and thirty-two pieces of artillery, and drove him to Westport, in Kansas, Curtis losing one of his guns. On the twenty-third of October I attacked Price in position on the Big Blue, drove him from his position toward the south, and took a number of prisoners. Price then moved rapidly in retreat. At this time Major-General S. R. Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, joined me, and proposed, as my command had done so much hard fighting, that he should take the advance. To this I assented, when Curtis, after marching for a day in front, on finding Price had halted on the Osage river, in position to give battle,
October 24th (search for this): chapter 123
etreat. At this time Major-General S. R. Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, joined me, and proposed, as my command had done so much hard fighting, that he should take the advance. To this I assented, when Curtis, after marching for a day in front, on finding Price had halted on the Osage river, in position to give battle, requested me to take the advance and attack Price. I, therefore, moved immediately with my command to the front, and continued my march all night of the twenty-fourth of October, and at daylight on the morning of the twenty-fifth, I surprised Price in his camp, and drove him from it, and by a series of heavy engagements throughout the day, captured eight pieces of artillery, several standards, one majorgeneral, one brigadier-general, four colonels, and many subordinate officers, and fifteen hundred men. besides a large number of wagons, beefcattle, sheep, &c., Price's force becoming demoralized and retreating rapidly, throwing away their arms and other prop
1861 AD (search for this): chapter 123
, I submit for the consideration of your honorable Committee on the Conduct of the War, some of the prominent facts that came under my observation during the campaigns in which I was engaged in the late war of rebellion, and which had any bearing on their success or failure. The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-62. It was most unfortunate, that with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies. The highest military authorities have laid down, that in the proper organization of an army, the cavalry should form one fourth to one sixth of the infantry which compose it. This relation of the cavalry to the infantry is so important, in consequence of the necess
October, 1861 AD (search for this): chapter 123
e rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring, before our army had started in pursuit. Does any one now assert that those obstacles could not have been removed by twenty thousand cavalry, properly supported by that army? So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry, that it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy. I served with the Army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and from what has since been done I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring; in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect
1862 AD (search for this): chapter 123
s were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-62. It was most unfortunate, that with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should uld only be borne by thrice their numbers. With eighty thousand cavalry on the payrolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doin since been done I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring; in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad cond not have been thrown away. Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The rebel force was then divided. Longstreet, and A. P. Hill, with their corps, being at Culpepper, while Stonewall Jac
August 5th, 1862 AD (search for this): chapter 123
nning The Government should now decide this question; and if responded to in the affirmative, make the necessary corrections to prevent similar evils in our military system hereafter. campaign of the Peninsula. In the campaign of the Peninsula I commanded the Second regiment of United States cavalry, until the Army arrived at Harrison's landing, when 1 was made a Brigadier-General of volunteers, and commanded a brigade of cavalry in the second action at Malvern Hill, on the fifth of August, 1862, and also covered the withdrawal of the Army from the Peninsula. Thronghout this campaign there was a decided want of vigor in the conduct of the Army, and the first great mistake was made in permitting the rebels to occupy and reinforce Yorktown, before taking possession of it. Some thirty days delay occurred in laying siege to Yorktown, when it might have been taken by assault the first few days after the Army arrived before it. At all events the importance of time at that period
1863 AD (search for this): chapter 123
er, General Meade, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General Meade, caused the army to fall back from Culpepper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of generalship, and the Mine Run campaign showed so plainly that General Meade was deficient in the qualities required for a cowith a surplus of artillery, and its numerous and efficient cavalry kept its commander well informed of our movements; but when the casualties of war reduced this cavalry faster than they could replace them — which was the case in the campaigns of 1863-the Army was soon thrown upon the defensive, from which it was never after able to recover. We, then deduce the following facts: that the Army of the Potomao was better organized in the later periods of the war than at the beginning; while the re
April 30th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 123
the First cavalry division of the Army of the Potomac, the First brigade of which, during the battle, was with General Stoneman on his raid toward Richmond, in rear of Lee's army. With one brigade, I preceded the Eleventh and Twelfth corps as far as Chancellorsville. The movements of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were very fine and masterly, and were executed with such secrecy that the enemy were not aware of them. For, on the thirtieth of April, 1863, I captured a courier from General Lee, commanding the rebel army, bearing a despatch from General Lee to General Anderson, and written only one hour before, stating to General Anderson he had just been informed we had crossed in force, when, in fact, our three corps had been south of the Rapidan river the night previous, and were then only five miles from Chancellorsville. The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression, gave General Hooker an un
May 2nd, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 123
d. If General Hooker had not been injured at the commencement of the final battle, I am not certain his splendid fighting qualities would not have won for him the victory. It was in this battle that, with three regiments of cavalry and twenty-two pieces of artillery, I checked the attack of the rebel General Stonewall Jackson, after he had routed the Eleventh corps. Jackson had been moving his corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men through the woods throughout the day of the second of May, 1863, from the left to the right of our army, and about six o'clock in the evening he struck the right and rear of the Eleventh corps with one of those characteristic attacks that made the rebel army so terrible when he was with it, and which was lost to them in his death. In a very short time he doubled up the Eleventh corps into a disordered mass, which soon sought safety in flight. My command of three cavalry regiments and one battery of six guns happened to be near this scene, and
June 9th, 1863 AD (search for this): chapter 123
occurred, for the position fought for by him commanded and enfiladed our whole army; and had he won it on the rout of the Eleventh corps, the disaster to us would have been irreparable. campaign of Gettysburg. I was placed in command of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, and made a Major-General of volunteers, after the battle of Chancellorsville, and the campaign of Gettysburg began by my attacking the rebel cavalry at Beverly ford on the Rappahannock river, on the ninth of June, 1863. The rebels were defeated, and very important information was obtained relative to their proposed invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which General Hooker acted immediately, and moved his army toward Maryland. On the seventeenth, the nineteenth and the twenty-first of June, 1863, I attacked the rebels at Aldie, at Middleburg and Upperville, with such success, that General Lee abandoned his design of crossing the Potomac at Poolesville, and moved the bulk of his army to Hagerstown, by the
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