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Richmond (search for this): chapter 1.18
His losses fully equaled and probably exceeded Grant's. Lee's bloody assaults at Beaver Dam Creek and at Malvern Hill were even more unjustifiable by any apparent military necessity than Grant's assaults at Cold Harbor, and they were just as costly in human blood. Every man he lost at Antietam was a waste of life, because he had no need to fight that battle. Yet no man has risen up to stigmatize the brilliant Confederate leader as a butcher. It is true that Lee had temporarily relieved Richmond, beaten Pope, captured Harper's Ferry, and made a good fight at Antietam—all brilliant episodes doubtless, as they added greatly to his military reputation. But summing all up after his forced retreat across the Potomac, who can point out any real, tangible advantage attained for his cause by all these bloody sacrifices? His victories over McClellan and Pope were disappointing, but they did not shake the determination of the North, or for one moment unsettle its purpose to crush the rebe
Joseph E. Johnston (search for this): chapter 1.18
e Union army, yet seemingly the troops charged the Confederate breastworks at Cold Harbor, with Richmond in sight, as bravely as they did those at Spotsylvania. Grant never abandoned the offensive from first to last, and was constantly feeling for the weak spot in his adversary's armor. Now for my parallel. The distinguished Confederate leader, General R. E. Lee, was appointed to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia after the battle of Fair Oaks, where his predecessor, General Joseph E. Johnston, was wounded. For the purpose of loosening McClellan's hold on Richmond General Lee began a series of operations on the 25th of June, 1862, known as the Seven Days battles, in which he succeeded in driving off the Union general and relieving Richmond from the menace of immediate attack. In these battles the Confederates acted on the offensive, and were precipitated against the Union positions by their commander day after day with a persistent energy bordering on desperation. The
Longstreet (search for this): chapter 1.18
etely reversed. True, Lee was largely outnumbered, but not so largely as at Chancellorsville. It is not likely that many favorable openings were afforded by General Grant for promising attack, but in the numberless movements at Spotsylvania of corps back and forth, it seems strange that Lee did not make an opportunity with his old-time skill to strike effectively, but here he preferred a strict defensive, a policy in marked contrast with the bold advance at the Wilderness on May 5, and Longstreet's attack on the 6th. Grant's style of fighting was a new sensation on this front. The partisans of defunct Federal generals previously cleaned out by Lee, who prognosticated disaster, were silenced by Grant's advance; opposition journals and the supporters of McClellan, who had declared that the war was a failure, spread exaggerated lists of killed before the country for political purposes. Through such agencies there was created a popular impression that Grant's warfare was utterly d
Robert E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1.18
thesda Church to take the offensive were easily repulsed, and with considerable loss. In short, in this campaign the Union army was handled with a boldness and confidence unknown in its previous history, and with a success in the presence of R. E. Lee which surprised those to whom his name had been a terror for three years. All expectation of out-manoeuvering and defeating the superior Federal army in the open had evidently been put aside, though it is plain Lee had confidence that he could ht, as bravely as they did those at Spotsylvania. Grant never abandoned the offensive from first to last, and was constantly feeling for the weak spot in his adversary's armor. Now for my parallel. The distinguished Confederate leader, General R. E. Lee, was appointed to the command of the Army of Northern Virginia after the battle of Fair Oaks, where his predecessor, General Joseph E. Johnston, was wounded. For the purpose of loosening McClellan's hold on Richmond General Lee began a ser
Georgiana McCall (search for this): chapter 1.18
Union positions by their commander day after day with a persistent energy bordering on desperation. Their losses were frightful. In the first battle at Beaver Dam Creek on the 26th of June, some 18,000 Confederates charged a strong line held by McCall's single division and were repulsed with ease, with a loss of about 3,000 men, killed and wounded, McCall's killed and wounded amounting to less than 400, all told. The battle of Gaines' Mill followed on the 27th, the Confederates attacking a stMcCall's killed and wounded amounting to less than 400, all told. The battle of Gaines' Mill followed on the 27th, the Confederates attacking a strong line and eventually winning a victory, but at great cost of bloodshed. Other battles followed, McClellan retreating to the James, where again the Confederates made desperate efforts to break the Union lines at Malvern Hill, but were signally repulsed, with a loss of not less than 6,000 killed and wounded, the Union army suffering not half as much. After this series of bloody battles, in which Lee lost 19,739 men, killed and wounded, to McClellan's 9,796, Lee marched toward the Rappahann
Robert Randolph (search for this): chapter 1.18
long, unceasing strain of battle, with its harassments and its killings, had brought his once formidable army to so low a state of morale and discipline that there was well-grounded fear of its total dissolution by wholesale desertion and straggling after Antietam, if we may believe General Lee's own statements and those of D. H. Hill and others. September 22d, five days after the battle, his total infantry force present for duty was officially stated at only 35,757. Lee telegraphed Secretary Randolph September 23d, that unless something is done the army will melt away. In short, at this time the Confederate outlook was gloomy. The fortunes of the Confederacy were then at a lower ebb, in my opinion, than at any other period of its existence, except during the last few months prior to the final collapse in 1865. Its army was reduced to a frazzle by its frightful losses, and other causes far more more dangerous to its existence; the object of its chief general's campaign had been
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 1.18
A parallel for Grant's action. [from the Philadelphia times, March 14, 1896.] here is a compar Perry's interesting argument. When General Grant, having been made lieutenant-general, came which, after the first trial of strength with Grant, the heretofore bold and dashing Confederates attle. While safely covering his own capital, Grant still menaced the enemy's, for he held the roa May 5, and Longstreet's attack on the 6th. Grant's style of fighting was a new sensation on thias bravely as they did those at Spotsylvania. Grant never abandoned the offensive from first to lahe same tenacity of purpose that characterized Grant's operations from the Vilderness to the James.His losses fully equaled and probably exceeded Grant's. Lee's bloody assaults at Beaver Dam Creek afiable by any apparent military necessity than Grant's assaults at Cold Harbor, and they were just men and gained no permanent advantage, whereas Grant, after losses not exceeding the other's, perma[12 more...]
Pope (search for this): chapter 1.18
uch. After this series of bloody battles, in which Lee lost 19,739 men, killed and wounded, to McClellan's 9,796, Lee marched toward the Rappahannock, attacking Pope at Cedar Mountain, again at Bull Run and Chantilly, and finally pressing the Union army back into the fortifications about Washington. He then invaded Maryland, that battle. Yet no man has risen up to stigmatize the brilliant Confederate leader as a butcher. It is true that Lee had temporarily relieved Richmond, beaten Pope, captured Harper's Ferry, and made a good fight at Antietam—all brilliant episodes doubtless, as they added greatly to his military reputation. But summing all upretreat across the Potomac, who can point out any real, tangible advantage attained for his cause by all these bloody sacrifices? His victories over McClellan and Pope were disappointing, but they did not shake the determination of the North, or for one moment unsettle its purpose to crush the rebellion. He had inflicted on th
Spotsylvania Hancock (search for this): chapter 1.18
n the Union army that Lee was absolutely infallible and that the Rapidan was a sort of Chinese wall which could not be successfully passed while Lee defended it. This was a victory in itself. Just one year previously Lee had boldly attacked Hooker on this same ground and disastrously defeated and driven him back across the Rappahannock. Hooker's forces in the Chancellorsville campaign were greater by 20,000 than Grant's in the Wilderness, while Lee's were about the same in both. At Spotsylvania Hancock broke through the Confederate breastworks and captured many prisoners. Feeble attempts of the Confederates at Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Bethesda Church to take the offensive were easily repulsed, and with considerable loss. In short, in this campaign the Union army was handled with a boldness and confidence unknown in its previous history, and with a success in the presence of R. E. Lee which surprised those to whom his name had been a terror for three years. All expectation o
R. E. Lee (search for this): chapter 1.18
ate army, Grant inaugurated a campaign against Lee which involved a succession of bloody battles h a victory in itself. Just one year previously Lee had boldly attacked Hooker on this same ground of 1862-3 were now completely reversed. True, Lee was largely outnumbered, but not so largely as e of loosening McClellan's hold on Richmond General Lee began a series of operations on the 25th of After this series of bloody battles, in which Lee lost 19,739 men, killed and wounded, to McClellf. It is demonstrated that the total losses of Lee in these campaigns were not less than 45,000 meays battles are undisputed. Around Richmond, Lee, like Grant, forced the fighting against a partnfederate leader as a butcher. It is true that Lee had temporarily relieved Richmond, beaten Pope,defensive. And what was worse, notwithstanding Lee's apparent successes, which had set the South dhomes. Mere stupidity largely contributed to Lee's principal successes, whereas in Grant's advan[24 more...]
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