Plato, Charmides

True.

And to apprehend what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the lyre-master's or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly, is most honorable?

Yes.

Well, and in the searchings of the soul, and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, or he who deliberates and discovers with difficulty, that is held worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly. [160b] That is so, he said.

Then in all, I said, Charmides, that concerns either our soul or our body, actions of quickness and nimbleness are found to be more honorable than those of slowness and quietness?

It looks like it, he said.

So temperance cannot be a sort of quietness, nor can the temperate life be quiet, by this argument at least; since, being temperate, it must be honorable. [160c] For we have these two alternatives: either in no cases, or I should think in very few, can we find that the quiet actions in life are more honorable than the quick and vigorous ones; or at all events, my friend, if of the more honorable actions there are absolutely as many quiet ones as forcible and quick, not even so will temperance be acting quietly any more than acting forcibly and quickly, either in walking or in talking or in any other sphere; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet; since [160d] in our argument we assumed that temperance is an honorable thing, and have found that quick things are just as honorable as quiet things.

Your statement, he said, Socrates, seems to me to be correct.

Once more then, I went on, Charmides, attend more closely and look into yourself; reflect on the quality that is given you by the presence of temperance, and what quality it must have to work this effect on you. Take stock of all this and tell me, like a good, brave fellow, what it appears to you to be. [160e] He paused a little, and after a quite manly effort of self-examination: Well, I think, he said, that temperance makes men ashamed or bashful, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

Well now, I asked, did you not admit a moment ago that temperance is honorable?

Certainly I did, he said.

And temperate men are also good?

Yes.

Well, can that be good which does not produce good men?

No, indeed.

And we conclude that it is not only honorable, but good also.