27.
In this very cause, O judges, if we do not succeed in establishing this point, that a man is
driven away,—if it is evident that he has been repelled and put to flight with
violence by armed Caecina will not lose his property, which, however, he would bear the loss
of with a brave spirit, if the occasion required it; he will only not be restored to the
possession of it immediately; nothing more.
[76]
But the cause
of the Roman people, the laws of the state, all the property, fortune, and possessions of
every one will again become uncertain and doubtful. This will be established, this will be
settled by your authority; that, if you hereafter have a dispute with any one about ownership,
if you drive him away when he has once entered on his property, you must make restitution; but
if, as he is coming to enter, you meet him with an armed multitude and repel him, put him to
flight, and heat him off while still only on his road, then you shall not make restitution.
Then you will establish this principle as law and justice, that violence can only exist where
there is murder, that it has nothing to do with the intention or the will; that, unless blood
be spilt, there has been no violence offered; that it is wrong to say that a man has been
driven away, who has been prevented from entering; that no man can be driven away except from
a place where he has planted his footsteps.
[77]
Decide
therefore now, whether it is of the greatest importance for the spirit of the law to be
adhered to, and for equity to prevail, or for all laws to be twisted according to their
literal expressions. Do you, I say, O judges, now decide which of these things appears to you
the most desirable. While speaking of this, it happens very conveniently that Caius Aquillius,
that most accomplished man, is not here now, who was here a little while ago, and who has
frequently been present during this trial; (for if he were present, I should be more afraid to
speak of his virtue and prudence; because he himself would feel a degree of modesty at hearing
his own praises, and a similar kind of modesty would cramp me while praising a man to his
face;) and whose authority, it has been said, ought not to be too much deferred to in this
cause.
[78]
I am not afraid of saying more in praise of such a
man than you yourselves either feel, or are willing to hear expressed before you. Wherefore I
will say this, that too much weight cannot be given to the authority of that man whose
prudence the Roman people has seen proved in taking precautions, not in deceiving men; who has
never made a distinction between the principles of civil law and equity; who for so many years
has given the Roman people the benefit of his abilities, his industry, and his good faith,
which have been always ready and at their service; who is so just and virtuous a man, that he
appears to be a lawyer by nature, not by education; so skillful and prudent a man, that not
only some learning, but that even goodness appears to be the offspring of civil law; whose
abilities are so great, whose good faith is so pure, that, whatever you draw from thence, you
feel you are drawing in a pure and clear state.
[79]
So that you
are entitled to great gratitude from us when you say that that man is the author of our
defence. But I marvel why you, when you say that any one has formed an opinion unfavourable to
me, produce the man who is my authority for my arguments, but say nothing of him who is yours.
But, however, what does the man on whom you rely say? “In whatever terms a law is
framed and drawn up
***”
***”
