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There exists, I think, much misapprehension in the public mind concerning the first attack on
Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the
Cape Fear by National land and naval forces, late in December, 1864.
I was an eye and ear witness of that event, and several months afterwards I visited the ruined for with a citizen of
Wilmington, who was familiar with the facts on the
Confederate side.
Wilmington, on the
Cape Fear river, almost thirty miles from the sea, was, for a long time, the chief goal of the British blockade-runners, which brought supplies for the
Confederates.
These were swift-moving steam-vessels, of medium size, with raking smoke-stacks, and painted a pale gray, or fog-color.
They were almost invisible, even in a slight mist on the ocean, and they continually eluded the vigilance and the power of the active and watchful blockading squadron on the coast of
North Carolina.
To protect these supply-ships, and to prevent National vessels from entering the
Cape Fear river, forts and batteries had been constructed by the
Confederates on the borders of the sea, at the mouth of that stream.
The chief of these defenses was
Fort Fisher, a formidable earthwork of an irregular quadrilateral trace, with exterior sides, of an average of about two hundred and fifty yards. Its northeastern angle, which was nearest the sea, approached high-water mark within one hundred yards. From that salient to the water was a strong stockade, or wooden palisade.
The land-face of the fort occupied the whole width of the cape, known as
Federal Point.
It mounted twenty-six guns, nineteen of which were in a position
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to sweep the narrow, sandy cape, on which it stood.
These being exposed to an enfilading fire from ships on the sea, were heavily traversed with sand; the tops of the traverses rising full six feet above the general line of the interior crests, and affording bombproof shelters for the garrison.
At a distance, these traverses had the appearance of a series of mounds.
The slopes of the parapet were well secured by blocks of thick marsh-sods.
The quarters of the men were wooden shanties, just outside the works, and to the north of it. All along the land-front of the fort, and across the cape from the ocean to the river, was a stockade, and on the beach, along the sea-front, were the wrecks of several blockade-runners.
Many torpedoes were planted near each front of the fort.
Near the end of
Federal Point was an artificial hill of sand, about fifty feet in height, called Mound Battery.
On this two heavy columbiads were mounted.
Between
Fort Fisher and this lofty battery was a line of intrenchments, on which were mounted sixteen heavy guns.
These intrenchments ran parallel with the beach.
Back of these, and extending across to the
Cape Fear river, was a line of rifle-pits; and on the shore of the stream, across from Mound Battery, was another artificial sand-hill, thirty feet in height, with four cannon upon it, and named Battery Buchanan.
These constituted the defenses on
Federal Point, and commanded the entrance to the
Cape Fear river by
New Inlet.
About seven miles southwest from
Fort Fisher, at
Smithville, on the right of the old entrance to the
Cape Fear, was
Fort Johnson; and about a mile south of that was
Fort Caswell.
The latter and
Fort Fisher were the principal guardians of the port of
Wilmington.
At Baldhead Point, on
Smith's Island, was Battery Holmes.
These were the works which the government proposed to turn or assail after
Farragut had effectually closed the port of
Mobile, in August, 1864.
Wilmington was then the only refuge for blockade-runners on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts.
The National Government considered several plans for capturing and holding the city of
Wilmington. One, submitted by
Frederic Kidder, of
Boston, seemed most promising of success.
Mr. Kidder proposed to have a fleet of flat-bottomed steamers rendezvous at
Beaufort, fifty or sixty miles up the coast, on which should be placed about twelve thousand soldiers under a competent commander.
These were to be suddenly landed on the main at Masonboroa Inlet and marched directly upon
Wilmington.
At the same time a strong cavalry force should move rapidly from
Newbern, tear up the railway between
Wilmington and Goldsboroa, and, if possible, destroy the bridge over the Cape
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Fear river, ten miles above the first-named town.
It was known that no formidable defenses near
Wilmington would oppose a force coming over from the sea. This plan was submitted by
Mr. Kidder, early in 1864, to
General Burnside, who was then recruiting men in New York and
New England to fill up his corps — the Ninth.
That energetic officer was so pleased and interested in the plan that he submitted it to the government, and received from the War Department full permission to carry it out. For that purpose he collected a large force at
Annapolis, and was almost ready to go forward in the execution of the plan, when the campaigns in
Virginia and
Georgia were arranged by
General Grant, and
Burnside and the Ninth Corps were called to the Army of the Potomac.
The expedition against
Wilmington was abandoned, and its capture was postponed for nearly a year.
In the summer of 1864,
General Charles K. Graham submitted a plan for the seizure of
Wilmington.
It was suggested by
Kidder's plan.
It proposed to have a force of cavalry and infantry, a thousand strong, collectively, and a section of artillery, go out from
Newbern (then held by the
National forces) and strike the railway between
Wilmington and Goldsboroa with destructive energy, while two picked squadrons of cavalry and two thousand infantry, with a good battery, should land at
Snead's ferry, at the mouth of
New river, forty-one miles from
Wilmington.
This force should then march on that city, while another, composed of twenty-five hundred infantry, with ten pieces of artillery, should land at Masonboroa Inlet and push on toward
Wilmington.
It was believed that the menaces of these several bodies of troops would so distract and divide the
Confederates that the capture of
Wilmington would be an easy task.
Circumstances prevented an attempt to execute
General Graham's plan.
Meanwhile, arrangements had been made by the government for an attack, by land and water, on the forts at the entrance to
Mobile Bay, which were crowned with success.
Similar arrangements were made to assail the forts at the entrance to the
Cape Fear river.
So early as August, 1864, armored and unarmored gunboats began to gather in
Hampton Roads.
Full fifty of these were there in October, under the command of
Admiral David D. Porter, who had performed signal services on the
Mississippi and other inland waters in the
Southwest.
Among them were several vessels of the “Monitor” class and the “New Ironsides,” a powerful vessel, built at
Philadelphia, having a wooden hull covered with iron plates four inches in thickness, and at her bow an immense wrought iron beak,
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constituting her the most formidable “ram” in existence.
She carried sixteen eleven-inch
Dahlgren guns, two two hundred-pound Parrott guns, and four twenty-four-pound howitzers, making her aggregate weight of metal two hundred and eighty-four thousand eight hundred pounds. She was propelled by a screw moved by two horizontal engines, and was furnished with sails and completely bark-rigged.
This was the most formidable vessel in
Porter's fleet, and fought
Fort Fisher gallantly without receiving a wound.
After that she returned to the place of her nativity, where she was dismantled and allowed to repose at League Island, just below
Philadelphia, until accidentally destroyed by fire on Sunday, about the middle of December, 1866.
While this naval armament was gathering in
Hampton Roads,
Governor Andrews, of
Massachusetts, had laid
Mr. Kidder's plan before the government, and it was again approved.
The proponent was sent for, and he accompanied
Admiral Porter from the
National Capital to
Hampton Roads.
At
Fortress Monroe, they had an interview with
Lieutenant General Grant, who also approved the plan, and agreed to send the bulk of
Sheridan's army, then in the Shenandoah Valley, to execute it. Again the supreme necessities of the service interfered.
The movements of the
Confederates in the
Valley detained
Sheridan there; and, as no competent force of cavalry could be had to make the co-operating movement from
Newbern with forces at Masonboroa Inlet, the plan was again abandoned.
Then measures for making a direct attack upon the
Cape Fear defenses were pressed with energy.
In September,
Generals Godfrey Weitzel and
Charles K. Graham had made a reconnoissance of
Fort Fisher by means of the blockading squadron.
Rumors of this movement had reached the
Confederates.
On the fall of the
Mobile forts, they perceived that their only hopes of receiving supplies from the sea rested on their ability to keep open the port of
Wilmington to blockade-runners.
The reconnoissance implied a meditated attempt to close it. Their suspicions were confirmed by the gathering of the formidable naval force in
Hampton Roads.
Then they hastened to strengthen
Fort Fisher and its dependencies, by erecting new military works and increasing its garrison.
The skilful engineer and judicious commander,
General W. H. C. Whiting, was in charge of the Confederate forces in that region, in the absence of
General Braxton Bragg, who had gone to
Georgia with a greater portion of the
Confederate troops at and around
Wilmington, to oppose
General Sherman's march from
Atlanta to the sea. The fact that
General Bragg had gone to
Georgia,
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with most of the troops in
Eastern North Carolina, was communicated to
General Grant at the close of November, and he considered it important to strike the blow at
Fort Fisher in the absence of that general.
Grant had held a consultation with
Admiral Porter in
Hampton Roads, and it was agreed that the
lieutenant general should provide 6,500 troops from the Army of the James, then under the command of
General Benjamin F. Butler, to co-operate with the fleet.
The immediate command of the troops was given to
General Weitzel.
Orders were issued for the soldiers and transports to be put in readiness at
Bermuda Hundred (at the junction of the
Appomattox and
James rivers), to move as speedily as possible; and in the instructions given to
General Butler (who accompanied the expedition), on the 6th of December, it was stated that the first object of the effort was to close the port of
Wilmington, and the second was the capture of that city.
He was instructed to debark the troops between the
Cape Fear river and the sea, north of the north entrance (or
New Inlet) to the river.
Should the landing be effected while the
Confederates still held
Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, the troops were to intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of these places, when the navy could enter the river, and the port of
Wilmington would be sealed.
General Butler was further instructed that, “Should the troops under
General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near
Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against
Richmond, without delay.”
A part of the plan of the operations against
Fort Fisher was the explosion of a floating mine, containing between two and three hundred tons of gunpowder, so near the works that they might be destroyed, or the garrison be so paralyzed by the shock as to make the conquest an easy task.
General Butler had proposed this expedient, having read of the destructive effects, at a considerable distance, of the explosion of a large quantity of gunpowder in
England.
He made the suggestion to the government, just as he was about to depart for the
city of New York to preserve order during the Presidential election.
It was submitted to experts.
Among these was the late
Richard Delafield, then
Chief Engineer of the Army, who made an elaborate report, in which he showed that experience had taught the impossibility of very serious injury being done, in a lateral direction, by the explosion of unconfined gunpowder.
He fortified his opinion by diagrams, showing the form of
Fort Fisher and the other defenses, and concluded that the experiment would certainly result in failure.
Captain Henry A. Wise,
Chief of the
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Ordnance Bureau, gave it as his opinion that no serious damage would be done beyond five hundred yards from the point of explosion.
At a consultation of experts, at the house of
Captain Wise, who had been summoned by
Mr. Fox, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the subject was fully discussed, and it was concluded that it would be worth while to try the experiment, with a hope that the explosion might be effectual.
When
General Butler returned from New York, he found that the powder experiment was to be tried, and that preparations for it were being made.
This matter caused some delay in the movements of the navy, and the expedition was not ready to sail before the 13th of December.
At this juncture I arrived at
Hampton, accompanied by two
Philadelphia friends (
Ferdinand J. Dreer and
Edward Greble), on my way to the headquarters of the army at
City Point.
While breakfasting at a restaurant I beard a person say,. “The general is here.”
“What general?”
I inquired.
“
General Butler,” he answered.
“He is at
Fort Monroe.”
I had a private letter of introduction to
General Butler, and letters from the
Secretaries of War and Navy, and from
President Lincoln, requesting officers of the
United States service, who should read them, to give me every facility consistent with the rules of the service for obtaining historical materials.
We went to the fort; I sent in my credentials to
General Butler, and we were invited to his quarters, where we were introduced to his wife and daughter.
Turning to me the
General asked, “Did you ever see a naval fight?”
I replied in the negative.
“If you will go with me,” he said, “I will show you one of the greatest naval contests on record.”
“Of course, I cannot ask
where it will occur,” I answered; “but I will inquire about how long we shall be gone?”
“A week or ten days,” the
General replied.
I guessed the destination to be
Fort Fisher. “I will go,” I said; but, recalling the words, remarked, “I cannot leave these gentlemen, who are traveling with me.”
“Invite them to go along,” said the
General.
We consulted a few moments, and agreed to go. In the afternoon we accompanied
General Butler on a visit to
Admiral Porter, in his flag-ship, the “
Malvern,” lying in the
Roads.
On our return we were directed to be on board the
Ben Deford,
Butler's headquarters' ship, at eight o'clock the next morning.
The vessel did not sail that day, and we visited the battle-field at
Bethel, a few miles up the
Virginia Peninsula, where the gallant son of
Mr. Greble was slain at the beginning of the war.
The troops that composed the expedition against
Fort Fisher were the divisions of
Generals Ames and
Paine, of the Army of the
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James.
Those of the latter were colored troops.
They arrived at
Hampton Roads in transports from
Bermuda Hundred, on the morning of the 9th of December, when
General Butler notified the
Admiral that his troops were in readiness, and his transports were coaled and watered for only ten days. The
Admiral said he would not leave before the 13th, and must go into Beaufort harbor, on the
North Carolina coast, to obtain ammunition for his “monitors.”
The 13th being the day fixed for the departure of the fleet, at three o'clock in the morning of that day
General Butler sent all the transports but his own ship up the
Potomac some distance, where they remained all day. This was to mislead the
Confederates, and divert their attention from his real designs.
At night they returned and anchored under the lee of
Cape Charles.
On the following morning the
Ben Deford left her moorings at
Hampton, joined the fleet of transports, and all went out to sea. As we moved from the wharf a solitary cannon at
Fortress Monroe fired a parting salute, and ladies on the ramparts, standing near the great
Rodman gun that dwarfed them into dolls, waved an adieu with fluttering white handkerchiefs.
The
Ben Deford bore
Generals Butler,
Weitzel and
Graham, and their respective staff officers, and
Colonel Comstock of
General Grant's staff, as his representative.
The atmosphere was cloudless and serene; and all the afternoon the white beach and a continuous fringe of an almost unbroken pine forest along the
North Carolina coast was visible.
The transports dotted the sea at wide intervals; and when, at past midnight, we passed “Stormy
Cape Hatteras,” in the light of the waning moon, the heaving bosom of the ocean was as unruffled as a lake on a calm summer's day. On the evening of the 15th, we reached the appointed rendezvous, twenty-five miles at sea east of
Fort Fisher, and out of reach of discovery by the
Confederates on the shore.
The rest of the transports soon gathered around us, and constituted a social community in the watery waste.
There we waited three days for the arrival of the vessels of war, which had gone to sea the day before the departure of the transport-ships.
The weather was delightful.
There was a dreamy repose in the air like that of the delicious Indian summer, and the mercury rose to seventy-five degrees in the shade on the deck of the
Ben Deford.
This continued until the 18th.
Meanwhile, all eyes had been turned anxiously northward to catch a glimpse of the expected war fleet, but disappointment came with each morning and evening.
Never was the sea more favorable for landing troops on the beach, and executing the details of the expedition, than during those
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three calm days.
Delay caused the golden opportunity to be lost.
On Sunday afternoon, the 18th, a chilling breeze came from the southeast, bringing with it a slight mist, the harbinger of an approaching storm.
White-caps soon garnished the bosom of the ocean, and the wind constantly freshened.
Toward sunset, the shadowy forms of vessels appeared on the hazy northern horizon.
They were the heralds of
Porter's magnificent fleet of warriors-the most formidable naval armament ever put afloat on the sea. There were fifty-eight strongly-armed vessels, fully manned, and four of them were “monitors.”
They gathered around us at twilight; and when the night set in, dark and lowering, their numerous lights on deck, and in the rigging, some white, and some colored, gave the pleasing impression of a floating city on the bosom of the great deep; and so it was. Very soon there was brisk signaling, with blazing torches, between the
Ben Deford and the “
Malvern;” and, at eight o'clock,
General Butler departed for the latter in his gig to confer with
Admiral Porter.
On his return, he announced that it was intended to explode the floating mine, near
Fort Fisher, at one o'clock in the morning, and to land the troops for attack, if possible, soon after the dawn of day.
The floating mine, or powder-ship, was a propeller of two hundred and ninety-five tons burden, named “
Louisiana.”
She was disguised as a blockade-runner, in form and color, with two raking smoke-stacks-one real, the other a sham.
A light deck above the water-line contained two hundred and fifteen tons (four hundred and thirty thousand pounds) of gunpowder, placed first in a row of barrels standing on their ends, the upper ones open, and the remainder in bags, each containing sixty pounds. The latter were stowed in tiers above the barrels.
To communicate fire to the whole mass simultaneously, four separate threads of the Gomez fuse were woven through it, passing through each separate barrel and bag. At the stern, and under the powder-charged deck, was placed a heap of pine wood and other combustible materials, which were to be fired by the crew, when they were to escape in a swift little steamer employed for the purpose.
Clock-work, by which a percussion-cap might be exploded, and ignite the fuse; short spermaceti candles, which would burn down, and fire the fuse, and a slow match, that would work in time with the candles, were all employed.
The plan was to choose a favorable state of the weather for landing troops in launches on the beach, explode the powder-ship after midnight, and debark the troops at dawn, to take advantage of the effects of the explosion on the fort and garrison.
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Warned that the explosion would take place in the “small hours” of the morning, we watched on deck until far past midnight, and were disappointed.
The vessels had moved, in the darkness, to a point about twelve miles from
Fort Fisher.
Ignorant of what might be the effect of the explosion in the air at that distance, the engineers of the vessels caused the steam to be much lowered, to avoid a possible explosion of the boilers, in case of a sudden relief from atmospheric pressure.
But the grand spectacle was not exhibited.
It was evident that the water was too rough for troops to land, and the attack was postponed.
The wind increased in violence the next day, and toward evening assumed the aspects of a gale.
The low-decked “monitors” were frequently submerged, only their revolving turrets being visible.
The transports had been coaled and watered, as we have observed, for only ten days, and that time had now been consumed in waiting for warriors and voyaging; and, by the advice of
Admiral Porter, the unarmed fleet went to
Beaufort, seventy miles up the coast, for a new supply.
We were before the furious gale all night, and, with difficulty, threaded .the sinuous channel into Beaufort harbor the next morning, just in time to escape the severest portion of the tempest, the heaviest, our pilot told us, that had been experienced on that coast in thirty years. There we remained until Saturday, the 24th.
On Friday, when the ships were replenished, and the storm had passed by,
General Butler sent one of his aides (
Captain Clark), in an armed tug, to inform
Porter that the transports, with the troops, would be at the rendezvous, off
Fort Fisher, at six o'clock in the evening the next day.
Clark returned at sunrise on Saturday, and reported that
Porter had determined to explode the powder-ship at one o'clock that morning, and begin the attack without waiting for the troops.
Butler could not believe the report to be correct, because the presence of the troops to co-operate in the attack would be essential to the success of the costly experiment of the powder-ship.
We departed for the rendezvous on Saturday morning. Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, when we were off Masonboroa Inlet, and while standing on the bow of the
Ben Deford with
General Weitzel, I called his attention to small white flacculent clouds that appeared and disappeared at irregular intervals near the southern horizon.
“
Porter is at work,” he said.
“The “clouds” are the smoke of exploding bombshells.”
Very soon we met an ammunition-box; then a dozen, and then an acre of them, floating in the sea. The testimony of these mute witnesses of a combat was soon confirmed by the sullen roar of artillery that fell upon the ear. We arrived
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at the scene of conflict just as it had ceased.
A heavy pall of sulphurous smoke, made blood-red by the setting sun behind it, hung in the still air over
Fort Fisher.
Porter had, indeed, caused the “
Louisiana,” under the command of the intrepid
Captain Rhind, to follow in the wake of a blockade-runner, at midnight, to within three hundred yards of the northeast salient of
Fort Fisher.
There she was anchored, and at two o'clock in the morning the powder was exploded without any sensible effect upon the fort or the garrison.
The shock was felt like a slight earthquake at
Newbern and
Beaufort, but the garrison of
Fort Fisher thought it was the effect of the bursting of the boiler of a blockade-runner.
Probably not one-tenth of the powder was ignited.
The fort seemed untouched by the explosion, for the edges of the parapet remained as sharply defined as ever.
Ten hours later
Admiral Porter opened his heavy artillery on
Fort Fisher and Mound Battery, and in the course of a few hours he hurled eight thousand shells upon them.
The brief and feeble responses made by the guns of these defenses deceived the
Admiral, and he believed he had disabled them all. At the middle of the afternoon he sent a dispatch to the
Secretary of the Navy, in which he said that in half an hour after getting the ships in position he silenced
Fort Fisher, but there
were no troops to take possession, and he was “merely firing at it to keep up practice.”
“The forts,” he said, “are nearly demolished, and as soon as troops come we can take possession.”
He added: “All that is wanted now is troops to land to go into them.”
How utterly deceived and mistaken the
Admiral was appears from a statement of
General Whiting, who said that no damage was done to
Fort Fisher; that only one man was killed, and three were severely and nineteen were slightly wounded, and that only five gun-carriages were disabled and not a gun was bruised.
The complaint of the absence of troops, by
Admiral Porter, seems disingenuous and ungracious under the circumstances, and was unjust to the army, which, as we have seen, had waited for the motions of the fleet already six days. And had the
Admiral waited a few hours for the troops, which, he, had been informed, would be there that day, he would have had them in full co-operation with him. As it was, he had defeated the intentions of both branches of the service concerning the powder-vessel, by causing it to be exploded when the army, in consequence of waiting for the navy, was, by the advice of the
Admiral, seventy miles from the scene of action.
Butler and
Porter made arrangements to renew the attack the next morning at eight o'clock. Orders were given for us all to breakfast at six.
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Preparations for the next day's serious work were completed at an early hour, and the young staff officers, who generally kept the deck merry with songs and jokes and conundrums until midnight, retired soberly at nine o'clock on that, to them, momentous Christmas eve.
The morning dawned brightly.
It was the
Christian Sabbath and the recurring birthday of the
Prince of Peace.
The fleet was not ready before ten o'clock, when the conflict was begun by light-draft gunboats shelling batteries on the shore, to clear the way for landing troops on the beach.
Very soon the larger vessels began to hurl heavy missiles upon the. main works.
For several hours the bombardment continued without intermission.
At a little past noon the transports were moved within eight hundred yards of the beach.
A few shells sent from the land batteries exploded near us, and one passed directly through one of the smaller gunboats.
Finally, these batteries were silenced by broadsides from the “
Brooklyn,” whose one hundred-pound guns were effective.
Soon afterward the launches were prepared and filled with a part of
Ames' Division (about one-third of all the troops present) and moved for the shore.
General Curtis was the first to make the beach.
We saw his tall, commanding figure bear forward the Stars and Stripes and plant them on a deserted battery.
The act was greeted by loud cheers from the transports, and the bands struck up “
Yankee Doodle.”
It was then about three o'clock. The “
Malvern” passed near the
Ben Deford, and
Admiral Porter, standing on the wheel-house, called out to
General Butler, saying: “There is not a rebel within five miles of the fort.
You have nothing to do but march in and take it.”
This was another grave mistake, and led the
Admiral to make most unkind reflections upon the
military commander in his report two days afterward.
At that moment, according to the testimony of
General Whiting, there were two hundred and fifty more men in
Fort Fisher than on the previous day, and behind its uninjured sand walls were
nine hundred effective men, in good spirits, who, secure in their bomb-proofs, kept up a lazy response to the bombardment from the sea-front all day. The guns on the land-front were drawn back behind the traverses, and so excessively enfilading was the fire of the fleet, that not one of the nineteen cannons was seriously injured.
General Weitzel, the immediate commander of the
National troops, accompanied by
General Graham and
Colonel Comstock, pushed a reconnoitering party to within five hundred yards of
Fort Fisher, accepting the surrender, on the way, of the garrison of Flag Pond Hill Battery, consisting of sixty-two men, who were sent to
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the fleet.
The skirmishers went within seventy-five yards of the fort, where nearly a dozen were wounded by the bursting of shells from the fleet.
One soldier ran forward to the ditch and captured a flag, which the shells had cut from the parapet; and
Lieutenant Walling, of the One Hundred and Forty-second New York Regiment, seeing a courier leave the sally-port, near the
Cape Fear, rushed forward, shot the messenger, took his pistols from the holsters and a paper from his pocket, and, mounting the dead man's mule, rode back to the lines.
The paper contained an order from
Colonel Lamb, the immediate commander of the fort, for some powder to be sent in.
General Butler did not go on shore, but in the tug
Chamberlain he moved to
Fort Fisher, abreast the troops, and kept up communication with
Weitzel by signals.
Meanwhile, the remainder of
Ames' Division had captured over two hundred North Carolinians, with ten commissioned officers, from whom
Butler learned that
Hoke's Division had been detached from the Confederate army at
Petersburg for the defense of
Wilmington; that two brigades were then within two miles of
Fort Fisher, and that others were pressing on. The weather was now murky, and a heavy surf was beginning to roll in, making it impossible to land any more troops.
Weitzel, who had thoroughly reconnoitred the fort, reported to
Butler that in his judgment, and that of the officers with him, a successful assault upon it, with the troops at hand, would be impossible, for the moment the fleet should cease firing, the parapets would be fully manned and its nineteen heavy guns would sweep the land.
It was also evident that the
Confederate force outside of
Fort Fisher, and near it, was much larger than that of the Nationals.
Considering all of these things,
Butler ordered the troops to withdraw and re-embark.
While doing so, at twilight, the guns of the navy ceased work, when those of
Fort Fisher sent a storm of grape and canister-shot after the retiring troops.
It was impossible to get them on board that night, and it was thirty-six hours before they were rescued from their perilous position.
On the following day the transports departed for
Hampton Roads, leaving the fleet lying off
Fort Fisher, with its ammunition nearly exhausted.
The National loss, in this attack, was about fifty men killed and wounded, nearly all by the bursting of six heavy Parrott guns of the fleet.
The Confederate loss was three killed, fifty-five wounded, and three hundred made prisoners.
The failure to capture
Fort Fisher produced keen disappointment, and
Admiral Porter's misleading report caused widespread
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indignation.
Experts say, in the light of facts revealed, that the army officers acted wisely in not attacking.
It seems to me that the chief cause of our failure may be found in the lack of co-operation with the land forces at the beginning.
During the delay caused by the first day's waiting for the fleet at the rendezvous, and the succeeding gale, the
Confederates were apprised of the expedition, and took sufficient measures to meet and frustrate it.
Wilmington was denuded of troops, and the army was waiting for the fleet off
Fort Fisher on the middle of December.
At that time the garrison of the fort consisted of only six hundred and sixty-seven men. When
Weitzel stood before it on Christmas day, it was nine hundred strong, and at least seven thousand men were within forty-eight hours march of it.
