Sir: Reports have been and are being widely circulated to the effect that I prevented
General Beauregard from pursuing the enemy after the
battle of Manassas, and had subsequently restrained him from advancing upon
Washington City.
Though such statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that view might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have acquired importance from the fact that they have served to create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass the administration in its further efforts to reinforce the armies of the
Potomac, and generally to provide for the public defence.
For these public considerations I call upon you, as the
commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by me on July 21st and 22d, to say whether I obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory of
Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake.
Very respectfully yours, etc.,
Jefferson Davis.
headquarters,
Centreville, November 10, 1861.
To his
Excellency the
President.
Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d instant, in which you call upon me “as the
commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences held by you on July 21st and 22d, to say whether you obstructed the pursuit after the victory of
Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake?”
To the first question I reply, No; the pursuit was “obstructed” by the enemy's troops at
Centreville, as I have stated in my official report.
In that report I have also said why no advance was made upon the enemy's capital for reasons as follows:
The apparent freshness of the United States troops at
Centreville, which checked our pursuit, the strong forces occupying the works near
Georgetown,
Arlington, and
Alexandria; the certainty, too, that
General Patterson, if needed, would reach
Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation, prevented any serious thought of advancing upon the
Capitol.
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To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible for the army to advance farther than it has done — to the line of Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at
Upton's,
Munson's, and Mason's Hill.
After a conference at Fairfax Court-House with the three
senior general officers, you announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume the offensive.
Upon which I drew it back to its present position.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. Johnston.
my dear Sir: I think you are unjust to yourself in putting your failure to pursue the enemy to
Washington to the account of short supplies of subsistence and transportation.
Under the circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the knowledge since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed.
You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces were moved by you, in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal what has since been reported of the enemy's panic.
Enough was done for glory, and the measure of duty was full.
Let us rather show the untaught that their desires
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are unreasonable, than, by dwelling on the possibilities recently developed, give form and substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge after the event.
With sincere esteem, I am your friend,
Jefferson Davis.
General Beauregard is attacked.
To strike the enemy a decided blow a junction of all your effective force will be needed.
If practicable make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by
Warrenton.
In all the arrangements exercise your discretion.
S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General.
Sir: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper publications, purporting to have been sent from
Manassas, and to be a synopsis of your report of the battle of July 21st, last, and in which it is represented that you have been overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy, south of the
Potomac, for the capture of
Baltimore and
Washington, and the liberation of
Maryland.
I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has been to-day submitted for my inspection.
It appears, by official endorsement, to have been received by the
Adjutant-General on October 18th, though it is dated August 26, 1861.
With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were sustained by the text of your report.
I was surprised, because if we did differ in opinion as to the measure and purposes of contemplated campaigns, such facts could have no appropriate place in the report of a battle; further, because it seemed to be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense; and, especially, because no such plan as that described was submitted to me. It is true that, some time before it was ordered, you expressed a desire for the junction of
General Johnston's
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army with your own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby practicable to make it with safety to the
Valley of Virginia.
Hence I believe was secured the success by which it was attended.
If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you say was submitted to me through
Colonel Chesnut, allow me to request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it.
Very respectfully yours, etc.
Jefferson Davis.
Before entering upon a narration of the general military operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I propose, I hope not unreasonably, first to recite certain events which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently form an essential part of the history of the battle.
Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with a decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage, to attack or to turn my position in this quarter, was immediately impending, I despatched on July 13th one of my staff,
Colonel James Chesnut, of
South Carolina, to submit, for the consideration of the
President, a plan of operations substantially as follows:
I proposed that
General Johnston should unite, as soon as possible, the bulk of the army of the Shenandoah with that of the
Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient force to garrison his strong works at
Winchester, and to guard the five defensive
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passes of the
Blue Ridge, and thus hold
Patterson in check.
At the same time
Brigadier-General Holmes was to march hither with all his command not essential for the defence of the position at
Acquia Creek.
These junctions having been effected at
Manassas, an immediate impetuous attack of our combined armies upon
General McDowell was to follow, as soon as he approached my advanced position at and around Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted, of his complete defeat and the destruction or capture of his army.
This accomplished, the army of the Shenandoah, under
General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces and rejoined, as he returned, by the detachment left to hold the mountain-passes, was to march back rapidly into the
Valley, fall upon and crush
Patterson with a superior force, wheresoever he might be found.
This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved within fifteen days after
General Johnston should march from
Winchester for
Manassas.
Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of the
Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to enable me to enter them with him; or if not, to retire again for a time within the lines of
Bull Run with my main force.
Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then
General Johnston
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would reinforce
General Garnett sufficiently to make him superior to his opponent (
General McClellan), and able to defeat that officer.
This done,
General Garnett was to form an immediate junction with
General Johnston, who was forthwith to cross the
Potomac into
Maryland with his whole force, arouse the people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights and the defence of their homes and families from an offensive invader, and then march to the investment of
Washington, in the rear, while I resumed the offensive in front.
This plan of operations, you are aware, was not acceptable at the time, from considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than counterbalance its proposed advantages.
Informed of these views and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my preparations for the stoutest practicable defence of the line of
Bull Run, the enemy having developed his purpose, by the advance on, and occupation of, Fairfax Court-House, from which my advance brigade had been withdrawn.
The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph, on July 17th, of the movement of
General McDowell,
General Johnston was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps with mine, should
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the movement in his judgment be deemed advisable.
General Holmes was also directed to push forward, with two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry.