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was not less than 1,000 men; of whom nearly 300 were killed outright, and more than 500, including the wounded, taken prisoners.
1
Meantime,
Gen. Stone had directed
Gen. Gorman to throw across the river at Edwards's Ferry a small force, which made a cautious reconnoissance for about three miles on the road to
Leesburg, when, coming suddenly upon a Mississippi regiment, it exchanged volleys and returned.
Gen. Gorman's entire brigade was thrown over at this point during the day; but, as it did not advance, its mere presence on the
Virginia side of the
Potomac, so far from the scene of actual combat, subserved no purpose.
After the disaster was complete,
Gen. Stone, about 10 P. M., arrived on the ground from which our ill-starred advance was made; as did
Gen. Banks at 3 next morning, and
Gen. McClellan on the evening of that day. But it was now too late.
No relief was sent while relief could have availed.
Even
McCall retired from
Dranesville southward on the day of the fatal fight.
Col. Baker has been widely blamed for rashness in this conflict, and even for disregard of orders — it would seem most unjustly.
The following orders, found in his hat after his death, deeply stained with his life-blood, are all the foundation for this charge:
Colonel: In case of heavy firing in front of
Harrison's Island, you will advance the
California regiment of your brigade, or retire the regiments under
Cols. Lee and
Devens, now on the [almost rendered illegible with blood]
Virginia side of the river, at your discretion — assuming command on arrival.
Very respectfully,
Colonel, your most obedient servant,
The second order was received on the battle-field, by the hand of
Col. Cogswell, an hour before the death of
Col. Baker, who had put it in his hat without reading it. It is as follows:
Headquarters Corps of observation, Edwards's Ferry, Oct. 22d, 11.50.
E. D. Baker, Commanding brigade:
: I am informed that the force of the enemy is about 4,000, all told.
If you can push them, you may do so as far as to have a strong position near
Leesburg, if you can keep them before you, avoiding their batteries.
If they pass
Leesburg and take the
Gum Spring road, you will not follow far, but seize the first good position to cover that road.
Their desire is to draw us on, if they are obliged to retreat, as far as
Goose Creek, where they can be reenforced from
Manassas, and have a strong position.
Report frequently, so that, when they are pushed,
Gorman can come up on their flank.
Yours, respectfully and truly,
How
Stone expected
Baker to “push” 4,000 men with 1,900, in an advanced and unsupported position, where the 4,000 might at any moment be increased to 10,000 or to 20,000, is not obvious.
And why was not
Gorman sent forward to come up on their flank, at any rate; without waiting for 1,900 men to “push” 4,000 beyond
Leesburg to a good point for covering that place?
As to
Col. Baker's reading or not reading this dispatch, it must be considered that he was at that moment engaged with a superior force, and
