[514]
even, to be inactive.
I look to attack in last resort, but rely on your resources of generalship to suggest less desperate modes of relief.
I can scarce dare to suggest, but might it not be possible to strike Banks first, and unite the garrison of Port Hudson with you, or to secure sufficient cooperation from General Smith, or to practically besiege Grant by operations with artillery from the swamps, now dry, on the north side of the Yazoo, below Haynes's Bluff?
I rely on you for all possible means to save Vicksburg.
J. A. Seddon.
Your two dispatches of 21st received.
There has been no voluntary inaction.
When I came, all military materials of the department were in Vicksburg and Port Hudson.
Artillery had to be brought from the East-horses for it, and all field transportation, procured in an exhausted country; much from Georgia, and brought over wretched railroads, and provision collected.
I have not had the means of moving.
We cannot contend with the enemy north of the Yazoo.
He can place a large force there in a few hours; we, a small one in ten or twelve days. We cannot relieve Port Hudson without giving up Jackson, by which we should lose Mississippi....
J. E. Johnston.
After full examination of all the correspondence between you and myself and the War-Office, including the dispatches referred to in your telegram of the 20th instant, I am still at a loss to account for your strange error in stating to the Secretary of War that your right to draw reinforcements from Bragg's army had been restricted by the Executive, or that your command over the Army of Tennessee had been withdrawn.
Jefferson Davis.
