[
279]
leaves nothing to be said in commendation of the courage and fortitude of both officers and men. The accompanying reports of the medical director will show the number of our killed and wounded.
Among them will be found the names of many valuable and distinguished officers, who bravely and faithfully discharged their duty, and, with the gallant soldiers who fell with them, have nobly deserved the love and gratitude of their country-men.
The reports of the several commanding officers must necessarily be referred to for the names of those whose services were most conspicuous.
The list is too long for enumeration here.
During all these operations the cavalry under
General Stuart, consisting of the brigades of
Generals Robertson and
Fitz-Hugh Lee, rendered most important and valuable service.
It guarded the flanks of the army, protected its trains, and gave information of the enemy's movements.
Besides engaging the cavalry of the enemy on several occasions, with uniform success, a detachment under the gallant and lamented
Major Patrick, assisted by Stuart's horse artillery, under
Major Pelham, effectually protected
General Jackson's trains against a body of the enemy who penetrated to his rear on the twenty-ninth, before the arrival of
General Longstreet.
Toward the close of the action on the thirtieth,
General Robertson, with the Second Virginia regiment, under
Colonel Munford, supported by the Seventh and Twelfth, made a brilliant charge upon a brigade of the enemy's cavalry,
Colonel Munford leading with great gallantry and completely routing it. Many of the enemy were killed and wounded, more than three hundred prisoners were captured, and the remainder pursued beyond
Bull Run.
The reports of
General Stuart and the officers under his command, as well as that of
General Jackson, are referred to for more complete details of these and other services of the cavalry.
The enemy having retired to the protection of the fortifications around
Washington and
Alexandria, the army marched, on the third September, toward
Leesburgh.
The armies of
Generals McClellan and
Pope had now been brought back to the point from which they set out on the campaigns of the
spring and
summer.
The objects of those campaigns had been frustrated, and the designs of the enemy on the coast of
North-Carolina and in
Western Virginia thwarted by the withdrawal of the main body of his forces from those regions.
North-eastern Virginia was freed from the presence of Federal soldiers up to the intrenchments of
Washington, and soon after the arrival of the army at
Leesburgh, information was received that the troops which had occupied
Winchester had retired to
Harper's Ferry and
Martinsburgh.
The war was thus transferred from the interior to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts made accessible to our army.
To prolong a state of affairs in every way desirable, and not to permit the season for active operations to pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be the transfer of the army into
Maryland.
Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much of the material of war, and feeble in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them destitute of shoes, it was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the enemy upon the northern frontier until the approach of winter should render his advance into
Virginia difficult if not impracticable.
The condition of
Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the
Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend.
At the same time it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of
Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.
The difficulties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just fears of the
Washington Government, than from any active demonstration on the part of the people, unless success should enable us to give them assurance of continued protection.
Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion.
D. H. Hill's division, which had joined us on the second, being in advance, and, between the fourth and seventh of September, crossed the
Potomac at the ford near
Leesburgh, and encamped in the vicinity of
Fredericktown.
It was decided to cross the
Potomac east of the
Blue Ridge, in order, by threatening
Washington and
Baltimore, to cause the enemy to withdraw from the south bank, where his presence endangered our communications and the safety of those engaged in the removal of our wounded and the captured property from the late battle-field.
Having accomplished this result, it was proposed to move the army into
Western Maryland, establish our communications with
Richmond, through the
valley of the Shenandoah, and by threatening
Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies.
It had been supposed that the advance upon
Fredericktown would lead to the evacuation of
Martinsburgh and
Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the
Valley.
This not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from those positions before concentrating the army west of the mountains.
To accomplish this with the least delay,
General Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to
Martinsburgh, and, after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the south side of the
Potomac upon
Harper's Ferry.
General
