Chapter 29:
- The Army at Harrison's Bar -- Indecision at Washington -- the Harrison's Bar letter -- Army ordered home -- Protests of McClellan -- on the bank of the James river the fate of the Union should be decided -- transportation not provided -- withdrawal of the Army -- transfer to front of Washington.
When the troops reached the James the first want of the men was something to eat and drink, and the next a bath in the river. As I rode among the men they would cry to me for their supper, and upon my assuring them that they should have it they would give their usual cheers and be perfectly content. For two or three days after we reached Harrison's Bar the banks of the river were crowded all day long with the men bathing. It should be understood that in time of action every army reduces itself into two of unequal strength--one, the fighting men, who stick by their colors as long as life and strength last, and are ever ready to meet the enemy; the other consisting of the weaker men, and those prone to straggle, and those not too fond of unnecessary combat. The better the discipline of the army, the larger the first category, and vice versa. It must be confessed that the contingent of stragglers was pretty large on our arrival at the James, but after a day or two all had rejoined their colors and were ready for work again. A very few days sufficed to give the men the necessary rest, and the army was then in condition to make any movement justified by its numbers, and was in an admirable position for an offensive movement. It was at last upon its true line of operations, which I had been unable to adopt at an earlier day in consequence of the Secretary of War's peremptory order of the 18th of May requiring the right wing to be extended to the north of Richmond in order to establish communication with Gen. McDowell. Gen. McDowell was then under orders to advance from Fredericksburg, but never came, because, in spite of his earnest protest, these orders were countermanded from [482] Washington, and he was sent upon a fruitless expedition towards the Shenandoah instead of being permitted to join me, as he could have done, at the time of the affair of Hanover Court-House. I urged in vain that the Army of the Potomac should remain on the line of the James, and that it should resume the offensive as soon as reinforced to the full extent of the means in possession of the government. Had the Army of the Potomac been permitted to remain on the line of the James I would have crossed to the south bank of that river, and, while engaging Lee's attention in front of Malvern, have made a rapid movement in force on Petersburg, having gained which I would have operated against Richmond and its communications from the west, having already gained those from the south. Subsequent events proved that Lee did not move northward from Richmond with his army until assured that the Army of the Potomac was actually on its way to Fort Monroe, and they also found that, so long as the Army of the Potomac was on the James, Washington and Maryland would have been entirely safe under the protection of the fortifications and a comparatively small part of the troops then in that vicinity; so that Burnside's troops and a large part of the Union Army of Virginia might, with entire propriety, have been sent by water to join the army under my command, which — with detachments from the West--could easily have been brought up to more than 100,000 men disposable on the actual field of battle. In spite of my most pressing and oft-repeated entreaties, the order was insisted upon for the abandonment of the Peninsula line and the return of the Army of the Potomac to Washington in order to support Gen. Pope, who was in no danger so long as the Army of the Potomac remained on the James. With a heavy heart I relinquished the position gained at the cost of so much time and blood. As an evidence of my good faith in opposing this movement it should be mentioned that Gen. Halleck had assured me, verbally and in writing, that I was to command all the troops in front of Washington, including those of Gens. Burnside and Pope — a promise which was not carried into effect. On the 1st of July I received the following from the President: [483]
It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to give you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy you must find a place of security and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out.In a despatch from the President to me on the 2d of July he says:
If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of eighteen (18) States offer me a new levy of 300,000, which I accept.On the 2d of July the following was received from Gen. Barnard:
Private.On the 3d of July the following was received from the President:
... Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. . . .On the 4th I sent the following to the President:
To which I received the following reply from the President: [486]
A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of twelve and one P. M. yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself, officers, and men is and for ever will be appreciated. If you can hold your present position we shall have the enemy yet.The following letter was received from his Excellency the President:
The following telegram was sent on the 7th to the President:
As boat is starting, I have only time to acknowledge receipt of despatch by Gen. Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day I shall laugh at them. I have been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-Officer Goldsborough last night; he is confident he can keep river open. He should have all gunboats possible. Will see him again this morning. My men in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again. Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army.[487] While general-in-chief, and directing the operations of all our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regarding the conduct of the war which, in my judgment, were essential to its objects and its success. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country these were so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the commander-in-chief, whom the Constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the government, of the nation. Mr. Lincoln visited me at Harrison's Bar. I handed him myself, on board of the steamer in which he came, the letter of July 7, 1862. He read it in my presence, but made no comments upon it, merely saying, when he had finished it, that he was obliged to me for it, or words to that effect. I do not think that he alluded further to it during his visit, or at any time after that.
[490] I telegraphed the President on the 11th: “We are very strong here now, so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits.” Telegrams were sent to the President on the 12th, 17th, and 18th:
The following was telegraphed to Gen. Halleck on the 28th:
My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defence of Washington, and that I should be at once reinforced by all available troops to enable me to advance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that.On the 30th to Gen. Halleck:
I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that the decision may be to reinforce it at once. We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadly needed.[491] About half an hour after midnight on the morning of Aug. 1 the enemy brought some light batteries to Coggins's Point and the Coles House, on the right bank of James river directly opposite Harrison's Landing, and opened a heavy fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when they were driven back by the fire of our guns. To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to insure a debouch on the south bank of the James, it became necessary to occupy Coggins's Point, which was done on the 3d, and the enemy driven back towards Petersburg. On the 1st of Aug. I received the following despatches from Gen. Halleck:
It is clear that the general-in-chief attached some weight to the report received from Gen. Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the order in regard to removing the sick contemplated an offensive movement rather than a retreat, as I had no other data than the telegrams just given from which to form an opinion as to the intentions of the government. The following telegram from him strengthened me in that belief:
In occupying Coggins's Point I was influenced by the necessity of possessing a secure debouch on the south of the James, in order to enable me to move on the communications of Richmond [492] in that direction, as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonades. To carry out Gen. Halleck's first order, of July 30, it was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the enemy, apparently in some little force, and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its temporary occupation at least was equally necessary in the event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even the abandonment of the Peninsula. Gen. Hooker, with his own division and Pleasonton's cavalry, was therefore directed to gain possession of Malvern Hill on the night of the 2d of Aug. He failed to do so on account of the incompetency of guides. On the 4th Gen. Hooker was reinforced by Gen. Sedgmick's division, and, having obtained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern Hill and driving the enemy back towards Richmond. The following is my report of this affair at the time:
On the same day I telegraphed to Gen. Halleck:
Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one direction [493] and seventeen in another towards Richmond to-day. We have secured a strong position at Coggins's Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps. I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about six miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river; what their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp lookout on their movements. I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders to push reconnoissances towards the rebel capital, and hope soon to find out whether the reports regarding the abandonment of that place are true.To the despatch of one P. M., Aug. 5, the following answer was received Aug. 6:
And soon after the following, also from Gen. Halleck:
You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Acquia creek. It is reported that Jackson is moving north with a very large force.On the 4th I had received Gen. Halleck's order of the 3d (which appears below), directing me to withdraw the army to Acquia, and on the same day sent an earnest protest against it. A few hours before this Gen. Hooker had informed me that his cavalry pickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them in, and that he would probably be attacked at daybreak. Under these circumstances I had determined to support him; but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon, I concluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the general-in-chief, to withdraw Gen. Hooker, that there might be the least possible delay in conforming to Gen. Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to Gen. Hooker:
. . . Under advices I have received from Washington, I think it necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight.[494] Five batteries, with their horses and equipments complete, were embarked on the 7th and 8th. Simultaneously with Gen. Hooker's operations upon Malvern I despatched a cavalry force under Col. Averill towards Savage's Station to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements towards our left flank. He found a rebel cavalry regiment near the White Oak Swamp bridge, and completely routed it, pursuing well towards Savage's Station. These important preliminary operations assisted my preparations for the removal of the army to Acquia creek, and the sending off our sick and supplies was pushed both day and night as rapidly as the means of transportation permitted. On the subject of the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's Landing the following correspondence passed between the general-in-chief and myself while the reconnoissances towards Richmond were in progress. On the 2d of Aug. I received the following from Gen. Halleck:
You have not answered my telegram [of July 30, 8 P. M.] about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible, and telegraph me when they will be out of your way. The President wishes an answer as early as possible.To which I sent this reply:
[495] The moment I received the instructions for removing the sick I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying them out. With the small amount of transportation at hand the removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take several days, and, in the meantime, I desired information to determine what I should do with the others. The order required me to send them away as quickly as possible, and to notify the general-in-chief when they were removed. Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 2d of Aug., not having been advised of what the army under my command was expected to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the following despatch to Gen. Halleck:
If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe it was important that it should be unencumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond from the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured and the patients returned to duty. As the service of every man would be important in the event of a forward offensive movement, I considered it to be of the utmost consequence that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch of eleven P. M. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram from Gen. Halleck:
I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its communications had, by the co-operation of the gunboats, been rendered perfectly secure, would at that time have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities in the following telegram:
Soon after sending this telegram I received the following from Gen. Halleck in reply to mine of eleven P. M. of the 3d:
My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future operations; it was expected that you would have sent off your sick, as directed, without waiting to know what were or would be the intentions of the government respecting future movements. The President expects that the instructions which were sent you yesterday, with his approval, will be carried out with all possible despatch and caution. The quartermaster-general is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can collect.To which the following is my reply:
Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried out as promptly as possible. With the means at my command no human power could have moved the sick in the time you say you expected them to be moved. . . .My efforts for bringing about a change of policy were unsuccessful. On the 7th I received the following telegram from Gen. Halleck:
You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order; the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal; that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control.To which I made this reply:
The report of my chief-quartermaster upon the subject is as follows:
On the 9th I received this despatch from Gen. Halleck:
I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Gens. Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send reinforcements instantly to Acquia creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity.To which I sent the following reply:
Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Burnside took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert — not an hour's — but everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders.The following report, made on the same day by the officer then in charge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the despatch of the general-in-chief, that, “considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory” :
Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were very limited, admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermaster's departments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied, day and night, in embarking and sending off the sick men, troops, and material. Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the general-in-chief that such were the facts, on the 10th I received the following from Gen. Halleck:
The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting Gen. Pope to-day; there must be no further delay in your movements. That which has already occurred was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops.To which I sent this reply:
Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure you again that there has not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders. You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation available here. I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick and the troops you ordered to Burnside. Col. Ingalls has more than once informed the quartermaster-general of the condition of our water-transportation. From the [502] fact that you directed me to keep the order secret I took it for granted that you would take the steps necessary to provide the requisite transportation. A large number of transports for all arms of service and for wagons should at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed. The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to-night. Ten steamers were required for the purpose. 1,258 sick loaded to-day and to-night. Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some 500 cases of slight sickness. The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference in my official action.On the 11th this report was made:
The embarkation of 850 cavalry and one brigade of infantry will be completed by two o'clock in the morning; 500 sick were embarked to-day; another vessel arrived to-night, and 600 more sick are now being embarked. I still have some 4,000 sick to dispose of. You have been grossly misled as to the amount of transportation at my disposal. Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indispensable for service here, have been reported to you as available for carrying sick and well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe, to have them return here. I repeat that I have lost no time in carrying out your orders.On the 12th I received the following from Gen. Halleck:
The quartermaster-general informs me that nearly every available steam-vessel in the country is now under your control. It was supposed that 8,000 or 10,000 of your men could be transported daily. In addition to steamers there is a large fleet of sailing-vessels which could be used as transports. The bulk of your material on shore, it was thought, could be sent to Fort Monroe covered by that part of the army which could not get water-transportation. Such were the views of the government here. Perhaps me were misinformed as to the facts; if so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intentionally harsh or unjust; but the delay was so unexpected that an explanation was required. There has been and is the most [503] urgent necessity for despatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington.I telegraphed the following reply at eleven P. M.:
Your despatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the fact that no more men could have embarked hence than have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred . . . . I am sure that you have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot use heavily loaded supply-vessels for troops or animals; and such constitute the mass of those here, which have been represented to you as capable of transporting this army. . . There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state these difficulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross-purposes, because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know — the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Acquia. Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it if me are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments the result might be the loss of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph-office to-morrow morning.It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of the foregoing despatch that in order to have a more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the condition of affairs in the army than I could by sending a single despatch by steamer to the nearest telegraph-office at Jamestown island, some seventy miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a reply, I proposed to go in person to the office. This I did. On my arrival at Jamestown island there was an interruption in the electric current, which rendered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort Monroe, and across the Chesapeake bay to Cherry Stone inlet, on the “Eastern shore,” where I arrived late in the evening, and immediately sent the two annexed despatches:
To which the following reply was received:
Before I had time to decipher and reply to this despatch, the telegraph operator in Washington informed me that Gen. Halleck had gone out of the office immediately after writing this despatch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for me or waiting for any further information as to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other communication with him at that time, I sent the following despatch and returned to Harrison's Landing:
On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to embark all our sick men, two army corps were put in motion towards Fort Monroe. This was reported in the annexed despatch:
The phrase “movement has commenced,” it need not be remarked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, etc. [505] The perversion of the term to which the general-in-chief saw fit to give currency, in a letter to the Secretary of War, should have been here rendered impossible by the despatches which precede this of the 14th, which show that the movement really began immediately after the receipt of the order of Aug. 4.2 After the commencement of the movement it was continued with the utmost rapidity until all the troops and material were en route, both by land and water, on the morning of the 16th. Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the grand Army of the Potomac, bidding farewell to the scene still covered with the marks of its presence, and to be for ever memorable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits. Previous to the departure of the troops I had directed Capt. Duane, of the engineer corps, to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that point a pontoon-bridge. This was executed promptly and satisfactorily, under the cover of gunboats, and an excellent bridge of about 2,000 feet in length was ready for the first arrival of troops. The greater part of the army, with its artillery, wagon-trains, etc., crossed it rapidly, and in perfect order and safety, so that on the night of the 17th everything was across the Chickahominy, except the rear-guard, which crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when the pontoon-bridge was immediately removed. Gen. Porter's corps, which was the first to march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Williamsburg, where I had directed him to halt until the entire army was across the Chickahominy. On his arrival at Williamsburg, however, he received an intercepted letter, which led to the belief that Gen. Pope would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his front. Gen. Porter, therefore, very properly took the responsibility of continuing his march directly on to Newport News, which place he reached on the morning of the 18th of August, having marched [506] his corps sixty miles in the short period of three days and one night, halting one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy. The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, and on the 20th it had all sailed for Acquia creek from Barrett's Ferry. On the 18th and 19th our march was continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fortress Monroe, and Newport News. From the commencement to the termination of this most arduous campaign the Army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal, and alacrity in the performance of all the duties required of it. The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of entrenchments, roads, bridges, etc., was enormous; yet all the work was performed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the service. During the campaign ten severely contested and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides numerous smaller engagements, in which the troops exhibited the most determined enthusiasm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death, without a murmur. Indeed, they had become veterans in their country's cause and richly deserved the warm commendation of the government. It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an appropriate occasion for the general-in-chief to give, in general orders, some appreciative expression of the services of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th I sent him the following despatch:
As no reply was received to this communication, and no order was issued by the general-in-chief, I conclude that the suggestion did not meet with his approbation. All the personnel and material of the army had been transferred from Harrison's Landing to the different points of embarkation in the very brief period of five days without the slightest loss or damage. Porter's troops sailed from Newport News on the 19th and 20th. Heintzelman's corps sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On that day I received the following telegram from the general-in-chief:
Leave such garrisons in Fortress Monroe, Yorktown, etc., as you may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as possible. The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. . . .