On the night of June 30th,
Rodes's division, which I accompanied, was at
Heidlersburg,
Early three miles off on the road to
Berlin, and
Johnson's division with
Colonel Brown's reserve artillery between Green Village and
Scotland.
At
Heidlersburg I received orders from the
General commanding to proceed to
Cashtown or
Gettysburg, as circumstances might dictate, and a note from
General A. P. Hill, saying he was at
Cashtown.
Next morning I moved with
Rodes's division to. wards
Cashtown, ordering
Early to follow by
Hunterstown.
Before reaching
Middletown I received notice from
General Hill that he was advancing upon
Gettysburg, and turned the head of
Rodes's column towards that place by the
Middletown road, sending word to
Early to
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advance directly on the
Heidlersburg road.
I notified the
General commanding of my movement, and was informed that in case we found the enemy's force very large, he did not want a general engagement brought on till the rest of the army came up. By the time that this message reached me,
General A. P. Hill had already been warmly engaged, and had been repulsed, and
Carter's artilley battalion of
Rodes's division had opened on the flank of the enemy with fine effect.
The enemy were rapidly preparing to attack me, while fresh masses were moving into position in my front.
It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up. I determined to push the attack vigorously.
General Rodes had drawn up his division with
Iverson's brigade on the right,
Rodes's old brigade (
Colonel O'Neil) in the centre (these two on the ridge leading to the west of
Gettysburg), and
Doles on the left in the plain.
The Fifth Alabama regiment was kept by
General Rodes to guard the wide gap left between
O'Neil and
Doles.
Daniel and
Ramseur were in reserve.
He at once moved forward, and after advancing for some distance in line, he came in sight of the enemy, and
O'Neil and
Iverson were ordered to attack,
Daniel advancing in line 200 yards in rear of
Iverson to protect that flank.
At this time only desultory artillery firing was going on in
Hill's front;
Carter was warmly engaged.
O'Neil's brigade, advancing in some disorder in a different direction from that indicated by
Major-General Rodes in person to
Colonel O'Neil, and with only three regiments (the Third Alabama by some mistake being left with
Daniel's brigade), was soon forced to fall back, although the Fifth Alabama was sent to its support.
Iverson's brigade was thus exposed, but the gallant troops obstinately stood their ground till the greater part of three regiments had fallen where they stood in line of battle.
A few of them being entirely surrounded, were taken prisoners; a few escaped.
The unfortunate mistake of
General Iverson at this critical juncture in sending word to
Major-General Rodes that one of his regiments had raised the white flag and gone over to the enemy, might have produced the most disastrous results.
The Twelfth North Carolinia, being on the right of his brigade, suffered least.
A slight change of
Iverson's advance had uncovered the whole of
Daniel's front, and he found himself opposed to heavy bodies of infantry, whom he attacked and drove before him till he reached a railroad cut extending diagonally across his front and past his right flank, which checked his advance.
A battery of the enemy beyond this cut, near a barn, enfiladed his line, and fresh bodies of infantry poured
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across the cut a destructive fire, enfilade and reverse.
Seeing some troops of the Third Corps lying down beyond the railroad in front of the enemy, who were on his right flank,
General Daniel sent an officer to get them to advance.
As they would not, he was obliged (leaving the Forty-Fifth North Carolina and Second North Carolina battalion to hold his line) to change the front of the rest of his brigade to the rear and throw them across the railroad beyond the cut, where having formed line directly in front of the troops of
Hill's corps already mentioned, he ordered an advance of his whole brigade, and gallantly swept the field, capturing several hundred prisoners in the cut. About the time of his final charge,
Ramseur, with his own and
Rodes's brigades and remnants of
Iverson's, under
Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. G. of the brigade (who had rallied the brigade and assumed command), had restored the line in the centre.
Meantime, an attempt by the enemy to push a column into the interval between
Doles and
O'Neil had been handsomely repulsed by
Doles, who changed front with his two right regiments and took them in flank, driving them in disorder towards the town.
All the troops of
General Rodes were now engaged, the enemy were moving large bodies of troops from the town against his left, and affairs were in a very critical condition, when
Major-General Early, coming up on the
Heidlersburg road, opened a brisk artillery fire upon large columns moving against
Doles's left, and ordered forward
Gordon's brigade to the left of
Doles, which, after an obstinate contest, broke
Barlow's division, captured
General Barlow and drove the whole back on a second line, when it was halted, and
General Early ordered up
Hays's and
Hoke's brigades on
Gordon's left, and then drove the enemy precipitately towards and through the town, just as
Ramseur broke those in his front.
General Gordon mentions that 300 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground passed over by his brigade.
The enemy had entirely abandoned the north end of the town, and
Early entering by the York railroad at the same time that
Rodes came in on the
Cashtown road, they together captured over 4,000 prisoners and three pieces of artillery, two of which fell into the hands of
Early's division.
As far as I can learn, no other troops than those of this corps entered the town at all.
The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as “
Cemetery Hill,” south of
Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there.
On entering the town I received a message from the
commanding General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage.
I
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could not bring artillery to bear on it: all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours marching and fighting, and I was notified that
General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged,
Anderson's division of the Third Corps having been halted to let them pass.
Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with
Johnson's division to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding
Cemetery Hill.
Before
Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to our left flank-our extreme left-and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction.
Before this report could be investigated by
Lieutenant T. T. Turner, of my staff, and
Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and
Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.
I received orders soon after dark to draw my corps to the right in case it could not be used to advantage where it was, that the commanding General thought from the nature of the ground that the position for attack was a good one on that side.
I represented to the
commanding General that the hill above referred to was unoccupied by the enemy at dark, as reported by
Lieutenants Turner and
Early, who had gone upon it, and that it commanded their position and made it untenable, so far as I could judge.
He decided to let me remain, and on my return to my headquarters, after 12 o'clock at night, I sent orders to
Johnson by
Lieutenant and
T. T. Turner, A. D. C., to take possession of this hill, if he had not already done so.
General Johnson stated in reply to this order that after forming his line of battle this side of the wooded hill in question, he had sent a reconnoitering party to the hill, with orders to report as to the position of the enemy in reference to it. This party, on nearing the summit, was met by a superior force of the enemy, which succeeded in capturing a portion of the reconnoitering party, the rest of it making its escape.
During this conversation with
General Johnson a man arrived, bringing a despatch dated at 12 mid-night, and taken from a Federal courier making his way from
General Sykes to
General Slocum, in which the former stated that his corps was then halted four miles from
Gettysburg, and would resume its march at 4 A. M.
Lieutenant Turner brought this despatch to my headquarters, and at the same time stated that
General Johnson would refrain from attacking the position until I had received notice of the fact that the enemy were in possession of the hill, and had sent him further orders.
Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of place.
Meantime orders had come from the
General commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard
General Longstreet's guns open on the
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right.
Lieutenant Turner at once returned to
General Johnson and delivered these instructions, directing him to be ready to attack;
Early being already in line on the left, and
Rhodes on the right of the main street of the town,
Rodes' right extending out on the
Fairfield road.
Early in the morning I received a communication from the
General commanding, the tenor of which was that he intended the main attack to be made by the First Corps, on our right, and wished me, as soon as their guns opened, to make a diversion in their favor, to be converted into a real attack if an opportunity offered.
I made the necessary arrangements preparatory, and about 5 P. M., when
General Longstreet's guns opened,
General Johnson commenced a heavy cannonade from
Andrews' battalion and
Graham's battery, the whole under
Major Latimer, against the “
Cemetery Hill,” and got his infantry into position to assault the wooded hill.
After an hour's firing, finding that his guns were overpowered by the greater number and superior position of the enemy's batteries,
Major Latimer withdrew all but one battery, which he kept to repel any infantry advance.
While with this battery, this gallant young officer received, from almost the last shell fired, the wound which has since resulted in his death.
Colonel Brown says justly of that calamity : “No greater loss could have befallen the artillery of this corps.”
Major Latimer served with me from March, 1862, to the
second battle of Manassas (August 28th, 30th, 1862). I was particularly struck at
Winchester (25th May, 1862), his first warm engagement, by his coolness, self-possession and bravery under a very heavy artillery fire, showing, when most needed, the full possession of all his faculties.
Though not twenty-one when he fell, his soldierly qualities had impressed me as deeply as those of any officer in my command.
Immediately after the artillery firing ceased, which was just before sundown,
General Johnson ordered forward his division to attack the wooded hill in his front, and about dusk the attack was made.
The enemy were found strongly entrenched on the side of a very steep mountain, beyond a creek with steep banks, only passable here and there.
Brigadier-General J. M. Jones was wounded soon after the attack began, and his brigade, which was on the right, with
Nichols' Louisiana brigade (under
Colonel Williams), was forced back, but
Steuart on the left took part of the enemy's breastworks, and held them until ordered out at noon next day.
As soon as information reached them that
Johnson's attack had commenced,
General Early, who held the centre of my corps, moved
Hays's and
Hoke's brigades forward against “
Cemetery Hill.”
Charging over
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a hill into a ravine, where they broke a line of the enemy's infantry posted behind a stone wall, up the steep face of another hill and over two lines of breastworks, these brigades captured several batteries of artillery, and held them until finding that no attack was made on the right, and that heavy masses of the enemy were advancing against their front and flank, they reluctantly fell back, bringing away seventy-five to one hundred prisoners, and four stands of captured colors.
Major-General Rodes did not advance for reasons given in his report.
Before beginning my advance I had sent a staff-officer to the division of the Third corps on my right, which proved to be
General Pender's, to find out what they were to do. He reported the division under command of
General Lane (who succeeded
Pender, wounded), and who sent word back that the only order he had received from
General Pender was to attack if a favorable opportunity presented.
I then wrote to him that I was about attacking with my corps, and requesting that he would co operate.
To this I received no answer, nor do I believe that any advance was made.
The want of co-operation on the right made it more difficult for
Rodes's division to attack, though had it been otherwise I have every reason to believe from the eminent success attending the assault of
Hays and
Avery1 that the enemy's lines would have been carried.
I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as
Johnson's position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by
Smith's brigade of
Early's division, and
Daniel's and
Rodes's (old) brigades of
Rodes's division.
Half an hour after
Johnson attacked (on Friday morning), and when too late to recall him, I received notice that
General Longstreet would not attack until ten o'clock; but as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after two o'clock. Just before the time fixed for
General Johnson's advance, the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by
Steuart the evening before.
They were repulsed with very heavy loss, and he attacked in turn, pushing the enemy almost to the top of the mountain, where the precipitous nature of the hill and an abattis of logs and stones, with a very heavy work on the crest of the hill, stopped his further advance.
In
Johnson's attack the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder, and as they ran across an open space to another work, were exposed to the fire of
Daniel's brigade, at sixty or seventy yards. Our men were at this time under fire of no consequence,
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their aim was accurate, and
General Daniel thinks that he killed here, in half an hour, more than in all the rest of the fighting.
Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy was moving heavy columns of infantry to turn
General Johnson's left, at last caused him, about 1 P. M., to evacuate the works already gained.
These reports reached me also, and I sent
Captain Brown, of my staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation, and
General Johnson finally took up a position about three hundred yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark.
At midnight my corps fell back, as ordered, to the range of hills west of the town taken by us on Wednesday, where we remained until and during the fourth, unmolested.
The behavior of my troops throughout this campaign was beyond praise, whether the point considered be their alacrity and willing endurance of the long marches, their orderly and exemplary conduct in the enemy's country, their bearing in action, or their patient endurance of hunger, fatigue and exposure during our retreat.
The lists of killed and wounded, as well as the results gained, will show the desperate character of the fighting.
In the infantry,
Daniel's brigade of
Rodes's division, and in the artillery,
Andrews's battalion of
Johnson's division, suffered most loss.
The Second North Carolina battalion of
Daniel's brigade loss two hundred out of two hundred and forty men, killed and wounded, without yielding an inch of ground at any time.