[236] the assurances so often given were well or ill founded. To this the Secreetary returned answer in writing: “Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see.” This was on April 7.1 The very next day (the 8th) the following official notification (without date or signature) was read to Governor Pickens of South Carolina, and General Beauregard, in Charleston, by Chew, an official of the State Department (Seward's) in Washington, who said—as did a Captain or Lieutenant Talbot, who accompanied him —that it was from the President of the United States, and delivered by him to Chew on the 6th—the day before Mr. Seward's assurance of “faith fully kept.”
I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only; and that, if such an attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, will be made, without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort.2Thus disappeared the last vestige of the plighted faith and pacific pledges of the Federal government. In order fully to appreciate the significance of this communication, and of the time and circumstances of its delivery, it must be borne in mind that the naval expedition which had been secretly in preparation for some time at New York, under direction of Captain Fox, was now ready to sail, and might reasonably be expected to be at Charleston almost immediately after the notification was delivered to Governor Pickens, and before preparation could be made to receive it. Owing to cross-purposes or misunderstandings in the Washington cabinet, however, and then to the delay caused by a severe storm at sea, this expectation was disappointed, and the Confederate commander at Charleston had opportunity to communicate with Montgomery and receive instructions for his guidance before the arrival of the fleet, which had been intended to be a surprise. In publications made since the war by members of Lincoln's cabinet, it has been represented that during the period of the disgraceful transactions above detailed, there were dissensions and divisions in the cabinet—certain members of it urging measures of prompt and decided coercion; the Secretary of State favoring a pacific or at least a dilatory policy; the President vacillating for a time between the two, but eventually adopting the views of the coercionists. In these statements it is
