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IX.
the Gettysburg campaign.
June—July, 1863.
I. Theory of the Confederate invasion.
In the minds of that group of able and sagacious men that at
Richmond controlled the course of the mighty experiment of war, there had early grown up a theory of military conduct that was undoubtedly the best adapted to the circumstances, and, indeed, is the only theory on which a defensive war can be maintained with any hope of success.
It is now generally conceded that a Power that either voluntarily or by compulsion allows itself to be reduced to a purely defensive attitude is certain to be compelled, sooner or later, to succumb.
On the other hand, military history affords many memorable illustrations of the marvellous results that may be accomplished by nations that, forced to the defensive by the superiority of the assailant, are yet able at the opportune moment to assume the offensive, and inflict blows as well as receive them.
It was by acting on this principle that Frederick the
Great, in that everlasting model of a defensive campaign, the Seven Years War, was able to make head against the seemingly overwhelming combination brought against him; and that
Napoleon, in 1814, in that other bright exemplar of the defence of a country by boldly taking the offensive, was able to confront the invading Allies, and at length make them pay so dearly for the capture of his capital.
