Fortification and siege of Port Hudson—Compiled by the Association of defenders of Port Hudson; M. J. Smith, President; James Freret, Secretary.
The village of Port Hudson is situated on a north and south bluff on the east, or left bank of the Mississippi river, about eighty feet above low water, and about thirty miles above Baton Rouge. About two miles above, the river, from a southward course, turns about due east, directly against the village and against the bluff, by which it is suddenly turned south again for about five miles. It then curves again towards the east, dividing into two branches, which form Prophet's Island. The village was built just at the angle formed by the sudden turn of the river above noted. The bluff extended a few hundred yards above the angle, and then went down to a ravine, beyond which was a steep, narrow ridge, cut vertically on the west. A short distance beyond is Sandy creek, crossed by a bridge, from which a road lead under the knoll and bluff to the angle of the river. Westward from this road, and north of the river, was a marsh, extending to the southward branch of the river first above noted. Thomson's creek flowed through this marsh to the river. About a mile and a half below the village, the bluff was cut by a ravine about three hundred yards wide, which came down in a southwesterly direction, with ramifications towards the village in the rear. Eastwardly from the village, the plateau extended into extensive fields, from which roads ran to Jackson, Clinton, Bayou Sara and Baton Rouge. To the north, the ground became suddenly very much broken, densely wooded, and almost impassable, for a few hundred yards, to Sandy creek, a branch of Thomson's creek. A railroad, in very bad working order, ran from Port Hudson to Clinton, thirty-three miles northeast. The following account is compiled from— 1st. Official report of Colonel Steedman, First Alabama regiment, commanding left wing of defences. 2d. Official report of General Miles, Miles's Legion, commanding right wing. 3d. Two official reports of Colonel Marshall J. Smith, commanding heavy artillery. 4th. Narration of the Siege, published by Lieutenant Wright in the New Orleans Weekly True Delta, September 5, 1863. [306] 5th. Narration of James Francis Fitts in The Galaxy for September, 1866—‘A June Day at Port Hudson.’ (Federal.) 6th. Orville J. Victor's History of the War. (Federal.) 7th. Report (official) of Fred. Y. Dabney, First LieutenantEngi-neer Confederate States Navy, Chief Engineer at Port Hudson.The position and occupation.
The occupation of Port Hudson had been determined on in July, 1862, and the attack by General Breckenridge on Baton Rouge, early in the succeeding month, was a preliminary step. Brigadier-General Ruggles was left to commence the work of fortifying the ground. The Essex, an iron-clad gun-boat, being in the river above, heavy guns could not be brought down by boats. The plan of detached works was the one decided upon, and the first lunette was thrown up on the Baton Rouge road, four miles below Port Hudson. This line would have been eight miles in length, and, according to military rule, would have required for its defence a force of 28,000 men, with a reserve of 7,000, making a garrison of 35,000 strong, with at least seventy pieces of artillery. It is not surprising, therefore, that this system was soon abandoned as impracticable.New system of defence.
A change of commanders placed Brigadier-General H. N. R. Beal in charge of Port Hudson. A different system of defence was decided upon, and the work commenced. This was a continuous indented or angular line of parapet and ditch, on a more contracted scope. A line was surveyed, commencing about two miles and a half below Port Hudson, describing a slight curve to a point on Sandy creek, a mile back of the town. For about three-quarters of a mile from the river the line crossed a broken series of ridges, plateaus and ravines, taking advantage of high ground in some places and in others extending down a deep declivity; for the next mile and a quarter it traversed Gibbon's and Slaughter's fields, where a wide, level plain seemed formed on purpose for a battlefield; another quarter of a mile carried it through deep and irregular gullies, and for three quarters of a mile more it led through fields and on hills to a deep gorge, in the bottom of which lay Sandy creek. Thence to the river was about a mile and a half. This was a line four miles and a half long, which, according to all [307] military writers, required fifteen thousand men to hold, with a reserve of from three to five thousand. Work was commenced and lingered on through the summer and fall; the breastworks thrown up were the smallest and weakest allowed in engineering, made in the roughest manner, and reveted with fence rails. A small force of negroes was kept at work on the line in a desultory manner for several months, and then the soldiers were called to help. When General Banks threatened an attack, about the 10th of March, the work was still unfinished. Some little activity now became manifest, so that when the siege really commenced, in May, the line had reached the broken ground to the north, at the Clinton road.The Essex.
Soon after the occupation of Port Hudson the gloomy looking Essex floated down opposite to us, and went up the river again. The water batteries were then in process of excavation. The Essex next got ready to go down, and taking the Anglo-American on her starboard side, ran past at four o'clock in the morning. Besides a few field pieces, we opened on her with two 42-pounders and a 20-pounder Parrott which had just arrived, though without expectation of injuring the ironclad. She replied to our fire, killing one of our horses, and our guns ceased firing as she passed out of their respective range.The river batteries.
During the fall and winter, heavy guns for the river defence occasionally arrived, and they were severally placed in position. A three pit battery was constructed at the water's edge, and two other batteries dug at a height of from fifty to sixty feet, being below the top of the bluff. General Gardner took command on the 27th of December, and immediately ordered changes, particularly as regarded subjects of engineering skill. The whole system of the river defence was altered so as to cluster the heaviest guns together, and bring them all within a more contracted scope, which enabled them to deliver a more concentrated fire, as well as to support each other with more effect. Evidences of awakened energy were seen on every side, and the spirit of the troops never was at a higher pitch. A week before General Gardner came to Port Hudson, Banks's [308] army had landed at Baton Rouge, re-occupying and fortifying the city.General Banks's advance.
During the months of January and February troops arrived in considerable number. Three brigades were formed; one given to General Beall, composed principally of troops from his own State (Arkansas), and the other commands were assumed by Brigadier-Generals S. B. Maxey and John Gregg, of Texas. In March another brigade arrived commanded by Brigadier-General Rust. The enemy finally exhibited signs of activity, and about the 10th of March it became known that General Banks would make a demonstration of some kind. He did move out of Baton Rouge on the 12th and approached us with his whole force. It was confidently expected that he would attack us with some vigor, and our dispositions were according made on the 13th. General Gregg held the right of our line of intrenchments, General Maxey the centre and General Beall the left. General Rust's brigade was in advance. On the afternoon and during the night of the 14th, Rust's brigade, in the woods before our lines, felt the enemy's advance and tried, but in vain, to draw him on. General Rust sent in requesting permission to make his way around Banks's right flank and rear, while the balance of the troops sallied forth and attacked in front. This permission was refused; in the hope of drawing the enemy into an assault. Meanwhile the fleet moved up as follows:Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall J. Smith's report of the Bat-Tle at Port Hudson on the night of March 14th, 1863.
The mortar fleet kept up a continuous rain of bomb-shells upon our batteries, which, in the absorbing duties and interest of the fight with the ships in front of us, were totally unheeded; not one of them entered a battery nor injured a man. We had one lieutenant slightly wounded in the arm and a private wounded in the foot, both of them by pieces of exploding shells from the fleet. These were our entire casualties. Not a gun was struck or injured in any way. After this, General Banks returned to Baton Rouge and commenced his campaign against General Taylor. [311] The necessity of obtaining a store of provisions now became more apparent; forage, particularly, becoming scarce. But little could be had from the opposite side of the river on account of Banks's invasion, and, to increase the difficulty in that quarter, some of General Dudley's cavalry came up the Pointe Coupee shore and burned a small steamboat we had on False river.
The Grierson raid.
We were collecting a large lot of corn in Mississippi, but transportation was scarcely to be had, and when we were ready to commence bringing it down the Grierson raid was announced, and orders were sent to let it, the corn, remain where it was, lest it might be discovered on its way and destroyed. Nearly all the cavalry at Port Hudson was sent up through Woodville to Liberty, with orders to attack wherever they could find the enemy. Grierson made a movement toward Liberty, and our cavalry formed their line of battle and waited for his attack. This violation of General Gardner's orders enabled Grierson to get a long start on a new track, heading for Greensburg, on the Baton Rouge and Tangipahoa road. When it was learned at Port Hudson that Grierson had escaped our cavalry, two regiments of infantry and a section of artillery were dispatched to occupy the Tangipahoa and Baton Rouge road and intercept him, should he try to get in that way. At night they halted and bivouacked within eight miles of the bridge they were ordered to seize and hold. At Greensburg, Grierson's column was ambuscaded by a company of Wingfield's cavalry, and he lost a lieutenant-colonel, major and some others. News of this affair, and of the route they were taking, reached General Gardner late in the evening, and he at once dispatched a courier to our infantry, with orders, in case they had reached their destination that night, to proceed without loss of time. This dispatch failed to reach its destination, and Grierson's whole column crossed the bridge at daylight, within a few miles of our approaching infantry, and got safely into Baton Rouge.Port Hudson ordered to be evacuated.
Events now began to thicken in the department. The enemy, having successfully passed a fleet by the Vicksburg batteries, were enabled to cross over an army from the opposite bank and threaten Vicksburg from the lower side, its most vulnerable part. General Joseph E. Johnston had come to Jackson to look after affairs in our [312] quarter, and the order came to evacuate Port Hudson and send its garrison to the assistance of Jackson and Vicksburg. Rust's and Buford's brigades were sent off on the 4th of May, Gregg's followed on the 5th, and Maxey's brigade took up its line of march on the 8th. Miles's Legion was the next to follow. The only troops remaining were Beall's brigade and the heavy artillery. These movements were not made without information quickly reaching the enemy, and, in the hope of capturing our rear-guard, or at least of preventing the destruction of our works and heavy guns, a rapid advance on the place was commenced. General Gardner had not got beyond Clinton, Louisiana, when he learned that General Augur had left Baton Rouge with his division to attack Port Hudson, and that General Banks, instantly abandoning his Louisiana campaign, was approaching the Mississippi river at Bayou Sara by forced marches, dispatched to Colonel Miles to return at once with his Legion; and preparations were made to withstand a siege. Some provisions were obtained from the opposite side of the river, and, in presence of the fleet above and below us, three hundred head of beef, four hundred head of sheep, and four hundred bushels of corn crossed the river to Port Hudson up to the night of the 21st May, when the place was finally closed on all sides. The Eleventh Arkansas regiment, Colonel J. L. Logan, were mounted to act as cavalry, and serve outside in harassing the rear of an investing force.The mortar boats open fire.
On the morning of the 8th May their mortar boats were brought up to a position on the left bank, about four and a half miles below the town of Port Hudson, and at 2 o'clock in the afternoon they opened fire for the purpose of getting the range of the river batteries, so as to bombard them during the night. These batteries were eleven in all, numbered from right to left. The shells fell principally around Batteries 10 and 11, which were Lieutenant McDowell's battery of one 32-pounder and Lieutenant Kearney's Parrott gun. The longest range mortars threw some shells up to Lieutenant Rodriguez's battery (9) of one 8-inch howitzer, and a few fell as high up as Captain Coffin's battery (8) of two rifled 24-pounders. During the two hours practice of the mortar boats no damage was done to us. At eleven o'clock that night the mortar fleet commenced the bombardment, which it kept up until the 18th of June.[313]
An attack on the fleet.
On the 9th, Colonel de Gournay sent to Troth's landing one 24-pounder, one 20-pounder Parrott, one 12-pounder and one 6-pounder rifle pieces to fire on the gun-boats. Thirty rounds of ammunition were allowed for the larger guns and fifty for the smaller—Captain L. J. Girard having command of one section. All but the two outer mortar boats were concealed by a neck of woods, but the Essex was lying close up, and the Richmond and a gun-boat were at a short distance. At four o'clock in the morning, by the dim light of a half moon, the fight commenced. At the end of two hours and a half we had fired away all our ammunition, and ceased fire; the enemy followed suit. Our loss was one killed and no one wounded. None of our guns were injured. Our weight of metal was not heavy enough to attack such vessels as the Richmond and Essex, and we could not get a position where we could reach the mortar boats with any effect. On the same night occurred the first loss of life from the bombshells. A soldier, standing on the parapet of Battery No. 9, was struck about the neck by a descending shell, carrying him head foremost through the wooden floor of the battery into the ground beneath, leaving only his feet sticking out. On the afternoon of the 17th of May, a bomb-shell entered near the crest of a parapet, at the lower part of the fortification, burying itself in the ground underneath a spot where four men of Colonel de Gournay's command were sitting. The shell exploding, threw them into the air, killing three and wounding the fourth. Two other soldiers lost legs by being struck with pieces of bursting shells, and this is the entire chapter of casualties caused by forty-three days bombardmentThe fight at Plainss store.
On the 20th of May, the approach of General Augur's division was announced by some slight brushes with our cavalry pickets, and the same night General Banks commenced crossing the river with his army at Bayou Sara. On the 21st Colonel Powers, with a body of our cavalry, a few companies of infantry and Abbay's Mississippi battery of light artillery, were skirmishing pretty heavily all the morning near Plains's store with Augur's advance—General Dudley's brigade. To relieve Colonel Powers's cavalry, and enable them to [314] get safely away and join Logan, General Gardner sent an order at noon to Colonel W. R. Miles to take four hundred men with a light battery and reconnoitre the enemy. The infantry marched out, supported by Boone's Louisiana battery. Colonel Miles threw out two companies on the right, under Major James T. Coleman, and three companies on the left, under Lieutenant-Colonel F. B. Brand. Major Coleman, with his two companies, commanded respectively by Captains Dejean and J. B. Turner, made a considerable detour through the wood, almost unobserved by the enemy. There were two pieces of light artillery playing upon us from an open field. Coming out from an apple orchard upon the flank of this section, Major Coleman took the guns, although it was to be done in the face of the whole Federal line, but was immediately driven back by heavier forces, after suffering heavy loss. For about an hour the fight raged with much spirit. Finding that he was outflanked on both sides and likely to be surrounded, Colonel Miles sent Lieutenant Harmanson with a section to outflank the enemy's left. This order was so well obeyed as to break the movement which was about to encircle our small force, and after having picked up and sent from the field all of the wounded he had ambulances for, Colonel Miles fell back in good order, meeting on his return General Beall, who had gone out to his support in case he should be hard pressed. Without further exchange of shots our troops all retired within their intrenchments. On that day Colonel Miles reported a loss of eighty-nine in killed, wounded, and missing. Captain J. B. Turner and Lieutenant Crawford, of St. Tammany, and Lieutenant J. B. Wilson, of New Orleans, were killed. Lieutenant Pearson and four men of Abbay's battery were killed. The gallantry of Major Coleman received deserved praise, as did also the skill and tried courage of Colonel Miles, and the fight was looked upon with extreme satisfaction by all the troops in garrison.General Grover's approach.
On the next day Colonel Wingfield's cavalry commenced skirmishing with the advance of Banks's army, which had been rapidly crossing the river, and were moving down upon us from Bayou Sara, only thirteen miles distant. It had generally been supposed that no attack in force would ever be attempted through the swamp above Port Hudson, nor through the heavy timber back of the town, through which ran Sandy Creek. Fortifications had not been erected [315] there, nor were they considered necessary. But it having become apparent that the enemy preferred to overcome the natural obstacles of the woods rather than the artificial ones in the shape of fortifications, General Gardner had sent a good part of his forces to meet him, giving the command, from the left of our breastworks to the river above, to Colonel J. G. W. Steedman, of the First Alabama regiment, an officer who proved himself fully equal to the responsibility. The troops under his command were the Fifteenth Arkansas, Colonel B. W. Johnson; the Tenth Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughn; First Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel M. B. Locke and Major S. L. Knox; Eighteenth Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Parish; Thirty-ninth Mississippi, Colonel W. B. Shelby, and one company of Wingfield's cavalry, dismounted, under command of Lieutenant O. N. Daliet. The left wing had also Herrod's battery, and a section apiece from Bradford's and the Watson battery. Colonel Steedman, to make his position secure, had rifle-pits hastily thrown up on the ridges and spurs of high ground, but the valleys and gorges had no such protection. They were principally choked, however, with fallen timber.Official report of Colonel J. G. W. Steedman, First Regi-Ment Alabama Volunteers.
[327]
[Reply.]
[328] From eleven o'clock that night until half-past 2 on the morning of the 14th, the mortar boats rained a perfect torrent of shells upon us, and as soon as they ceased fire the land batteries took up the work and poured forth their volleys of destructive missiles, rending the very air with their deafening roar. Just before daylight they were observed to be massing their forces in front of the left of our centre, and shortly afterwards a vigorous assault was made, under a heavy fire from their artillery, upon that portion of our lines. The attack was simultaneous upon the First Mississippi and Forty-ninth Alabama regiments, and the isolated position held by the Fifteenth Arkansas. Against the latter but one charge was made and in it the enemy were completely routed and could not be rallied Four desperate efforts were made against the former, but with no better success. The ground immediately in front being very much broken, afforded facilities for the enemy to form their troops in line of battle protected from our fire, which they accordingly did. Their advanced line was composed of three picked regiments—the Fourth Wisconsin, Eighth New Hampshire and a New York regiment, preceded by two hundred and fifty select men, deployed as skirmishers, and carrying ‘hand grenades’ to throw over our breastworks. These all fought gallantly, but the main body in the rear evidently could not be induced to come up to their support. The enemy at first pressed heavily upon the right, where the Forty-ninth Alabama was stationed, and it became necessary to close our men down in that direction, leaving a portion of the lines almost entirely unprotected, which movement came near proving highly disastrous to us — the smoke was so thick that nothing could be seen more than twenty steps in advance, and before our troops were aware of it the enemy were pouring into the ditches and scaling our breastworks on the left. A rapid counter-movement, however, frustrated their designs, and they were driven back with considerable slaughter. Again and again they rallied, but were each time repulsed, and forced to seek shelter in the ravines behind them, and there reform their shattered ranks. In several instances their skirmishers succeeded in gaining our ditches and hurling their grenades over the parapets, many of which failed to explode, and were thrown back at them by our boys. The engagement lasted from 4 o'clock until 8 o'clock, when the enemy being driven back for the last time, most of them sought shelter in the woods behind them, leaving a large number of dead and wounded on the field. The ground in front of our [329] works was blue with their uniforms, and the weeds and bushes still further forward were strewn with them. At one point in our ditches fourteen dead bodies were counted in a single group. Two attempts were made at different points in that quarter to storm our works, both of which completely failed. Across the road leading to Troth's Landing, and in front of our extreme right, the enemy formed in line of battle in the open field extending from the woods on our extreme right to the ‘gin house’ on the left and came charging on with four regimental colors streaming in the wind. When their line reached the deep and tangled ravine, some three hundred yards in our front, they obliqued to their left so as to rush down the road in column to the creek below. No sooner had they reached this point than a heavy fire of artillery was opened upon them from our advanced work and the batteries to the left, which scattered them in every direction. Simultaneous with this attack another line of battle was formed in front of the left of the right wing, stretching across the lower part of Gibbons's field. Here they made a feeble attempt to charge our works, but did not succeed in approaching within three hundred yards before they, too, were driven back by the fire of our artillery. After this, our ammunition being scarce, the men were not allowed to fire at their inclination, but a few of the best shots in each command were selected to fire at intervals, when good opportunity offered, to the incessant fire we were receiving. Under the direction of the Chief of Artillery, Colonel Marshall J. Smith, the Columbiads were so arranged as to shell the enemy on the land line over the heads of our own troops, and for several nights we dropped our eight and ten-inch shells among them, until reliable fuses became exhausted. Two weeks of this kind of work passed away without rest to our men, either by night or by day, on account of the nightly shelling of the land and water forces; and the continued exposure to the sun, rain, and night dews brought on much sickness, materially reducing our effective strength. Our stock of medicines proved to be even shorter than our stock of provisions, and with a large and constantly increasing list of chills and fever cases the quinine was exhausted. Ipecac was resorted to in its place, but that also came to an end, and finally there was nothing to be had to check fever except a decoction of indigenous barks, which did not effect any wonderful cures so far as heard from. Several batteries were built by the enemy right in the face of our works, enfilading portions of our line. An 8-inch gun, which had [330] such a position, fired shells with a reduced charge of powder, so as to roll them slowly, as a ball in a bowling alley, for some distance right in the rear of our parapet. About the 5th of June, the enemy planted a battery of rifled guns on a commanding position opposite to the slaughter-pen, and kept up a most annoying fire during the day, and frequently during the night. It was only about four hundred yards from our battery at Bennett's House. The enemy's fire was so destructive to our guns, the cannoneers so much exposed to sharpshooters, and our ammunition so scarce, that our guns were rarely fired except in cases of emergency or necessity. Pits were dug in rear of the platforms, in which the guns were placed from under fire until required for an emergency. About the 10th of June the enemy planted four mortars in position near their battery opposite Bennett's House. These mortars gave us great annoyance; they were fired day and night, to the very great disturbance of our troops; yet few were killed by these shells. The enemy rapidly completed a line of rifle pits immediately confronting our lines; being in the edge of the woods, gave them great advantage. Their rifle-pits confronted ours at every point, at distances varying from one hundred to four hundred yards. On the extreme left the nature of the country did not admit of an advance except by one route; this was guarded by the advanced ridge spoken of in Colonel Shelby's report. The enemy erected a series of rifle-pits, with the view of capturing this hill; but, owing to the extreme vigilance and energy displayed by the troops from Colonel Shelby's regiment, who defended it, no progress was ever made. On the night of the 12th, the troops were changed, so as to occupy permanent positions for the remainder of the siege. The following was the disposition of my command under this arrangement, from right to left: Fifteenth Arkansas, Colonel Ben. Johnson; First Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel Locke; Eighteenth Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Parish; Tenth Arkansas, Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan; Wingfield's (or the Company of Ninth Louisiana battalion cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Daliet); Thirty-ninth Mississippi regiment, Colonel W. B. Shelby. The artillery consisted of ten pieces—scattered as circumstances demanded—two Blakely 12-pounder rifles, Lieutenant Cook (First Lieutenant artillery); six pieces Herrod's battery and two pieces [331] Watson's battery, Lieutenant Toledano; two pieces in Colonel Johnson's position having been dismantled on May 27.
A June day at Port Hudson.
* * A sheltered road had been cut around the base of the hill upon which the angle we were to assault was built, and we should be able to rush from shelter directly upon the works. The Seventy-fifth New York were to advance as skirmishers; the Ninety-first New York were to close in rapidly with hand-grenades and drive the Rebels back from the angle; the Twenty-fourth Connecticut were next to rush forward and fill up the ditch with cotton bags; and then the balance of Weitzel's old brigade. The Eighth Vermont, the One-hundred-and-fifteenth and One-hundred-and-sixtieth New York, must scale the works, attack with the bayonet, and fight vigorously, till the whole division could be poured in the bridge. The column plunged into a thick wood, traversed it, and emerged upon the other side in view of the Rebel position. Daylight was hardly with us yet. * * I consulted my watch. The hour was just 5 o'clock. The sunken road, referred to in a previous paragraph, was cut closely around the hill, whose base we had reached, and wound in a semi-circle up toward the summit. It must have been two hundred yards in length, and was excavated to a depth of seven feet. There had been a brief halt at the edge of the wood for some purpose, but the column now moved rapidly forward, and as my regiment entered the shelter of the road, I heard the clear voice of the General shouting the order: ‘Fix bayonets.’ The road was quite narrow—a group of fours filled it from side to side. Struggling to urge forward the men in front of us, we tried in vain to press on. Step by step, little by little, the column struggled upward. Two human currents were setting past each other—one strong and vigorous, the other feeble and halting—limping back to the rear in a ghastly procession, which warned us of the reception with which we were to meet. General Weitzel's aides were endeavoring to make their way on foot through the dense mass, now up towards the front, and again back to the rear. It must have been more than half an hour from the time that my regiment entered the sunken road until it emerged from the other extremity under fire. The sides of the cut began to [332] slope toward the level of our feet; two rods more and we were out of the covered way. There was an abrupt ascent, then a small area of rough, uneven ground, then a ditch seven feet deep and quite as wide, while beyond all rose a perpendicular earthwork, not less than twelve feet above the ditch, built in the form of a retreating angle. There was not sufficient ground to allow a regiment to deploy to advantage; as fast as they were unmasked from the cut the companies rushed with a shout up the ascent, across the intervening ground, and into the ditch. From the parapet of the Rebel works came a continued flash of rifles, not in volleys, but in an irregular burst, which never ceased while the attack lasted. The Rebels were entirely protected behind their defences—hardly a head was to be seen above the parapet. The open space before the work was strewn with soldiers in blue, dead, dying, and severely wounded; they lay among the bushes on the hillside, and covered the bottom of that awful ditch, yawning like a grave, at the foot of the work. For a whole hour there was a continued repetition of this scene; a yell, a rush, shouts, musket shots, cries and groans. The ditch was at last filled with the living and the dead; the former striving within six yards of the muzzles of the Rebel rifles to climb the face of the earthwork, and continually dropping back with bullet holes perforated clear through their bodies. The hand-grenades, upon which much reliance had been placed, exploded harmlessly against the face of the work. Wounded men were killed while trying to crawl beyond the range of the fire, or lay helpless under it unable to hazard the attempt. The contracted space before the ditch was swept with rifle balls and buckshot; every repetition of the assault was met by the same murderous discharge, covering the ground thickly with its victims, and adding to the horror of the scene The close of the first hour, when the east was reddening with sunrise, found the regiments scattered and broken up in hopeless confusion. Charge after charge had been made and repulsed; the ditch was an obstacle which could not be overcome, and most of those who reached it unhurt, were shot down in the attempt to return. Of my own regiment, one-third was placed hors de combat; three officers, including the colonel, were mortally wounded, and four others severely hurt, and other regiments suffered proportionately. Our losses, in killed and wounded, were not less than twelve hundred; [333] those of the rebels were slight, owing to their protected situation, and it is supposed that less than one hundred fell inside their works.Another flag of truce.
On the 15th, an unusual quiet reigned, apparently from the exhaustion consequent upon such severe exertion. In the evening, General Banks sent in a flag of truce to ask General Gardner to receive medicines and delicacies for the wounded Federal soldiers in our hands. General Gardner replied that he would receive all such articles, and have them used as purposed. He also took occasion to express surprise at the fact that no cessation of hostilities had yet been asked for by the enemy for the purpose of removing their dead and wounded, who had been lying on an open field—a number of them — under a hot sun, for two days. The medicines were sent in, but still no request was made of us for a truce to remove the dead and wounded, although the enemy had been engaged during the night in carrying off their wounded as well as they might under our fire. A party of our men had gone out to succor a soldier whose appeals for water were painful to their ears, but they were fired upon by the enemy's skirmishers, and had to return without accomplishing their charitable object. On the 16th, the effluvia from the decomposing bodies having become very offensive at our line, Brigadier-General Beall sent a flag of truce to the division commander in front of him, proposing to deliver his dead to him for burial. This offer was accepted, and a truce declared on that part of the lines. Our men collected and delivered one hundred and sixty-seven corpses, besides which they found one poor fellow able to speak though desperately wounded, who was parched with the dreadful pangs of thirst, and whose face, neck and hands had been completely fly-blown. On the evening of the 16th, a feeble attempt was made against the extreme left. The siege had now, on the 16th of June continued forty days since the commencement of the bombardment by the fleet, twenty-seven days of constant fighting on every side, and twenty-four days since the investment defacto had begun. It was now left to engineering skill alone to try its schemes for reducing the place. Three points of our line were selected by the enemy's engineers as the weakest and most easily reduced by their regular approaches. These were Fort Desperate, the position of which has been heretofore described; an acute salient angle on the [334] left of our line of fortifications, defended by the First Mississippi regiment, and a projecting work extending far out on the river bluff below the town, on the right of our fortifications, called by us Battery No. 11, and by the enemy the ‘Citadel.’ A rifle-pit was constructed by the enemy along the crest of the bluff opposite to Battery No. 11, running down to the river bank, which was in advance of their marine battery, the most formidable fortification opposed to us, and from which we anticipated considerable annoyance. About the same time they commenced their approaches, with zigzag ditches, in front of Fort Desperate and the position held by the First Mississippi. Lieutenant Dabney and our engineers immediately perceived these operations, and commenced to meet them with counter operations, and oppose engineering against engineering. Colonel Johnson had galleries dug under his breastworks, through which his men could crawl into the outer ditch and sharpshoot from that, while he also built an upper work on the top of his parapet to give a commanding position to his marksmen, enabling them to shoot down into the enemy ditches so soon as they should approach near enough. Captain L. J. Girard of the ordnance, prepared some 13-inch shells to plant outside of these threatened points, and he himself placed some of them in the night, buried a short distance beneath the surface of the ground, having friction primers in the vent holes with wires attached, leading within our fortifications, so that they could be exploded under the feet of an advancing column. On the 18th June the mortar boats brought their bombardment to a close. After the 24th of May they had adopted a slow and regular system of throwing shells, each boat firing in its turn, except on certain occasions of extra exertion, but now they gave it up altogether. An informal kind of truce was arranged between the men of both sides on our extreme right on the 16th, which lasted about a week, during which both sides stopped sharpshooting; in some cases soldiers would meet each other half way between the hostile lines and make exchanges, in which the Federals showed much liberality, making presents of tobacco, coffee, and newspapers, at times getting small quantities of sugar and molasses in return. As soon as this came to the knowledge of our superior officers it was stopped, although the informal armistice was not interfered with for awhile on account of shortness of ammunition. During this time we strengthened our work on the point (Battery 11) considerably, our men working during the day in full view of the enemy, who were also busily engaged in constructing their marine battery opposite. The [335] men who were working would occasionally exchange words with each other regarding their respective avocations as amicably and jovially as if the siege was only a joke and the contending parties were the best of friends. At three o'clock on the morning of the 20th, Lieutenant Bankston, of Miles's Legion, went out with fifty men, and, deploying them to the right and left in front of our fortifications, drove in the enemy's skirmishers. At the same hour on the morning of the 23d, two of the enemy's regiments attempted to approach our right centre at the sally port of the Plains's Store road, but were discovered and driven back. The enemy were now bringing their approaches very close to us in front of the First Mississippi position, and every preparation was made to meet an expected onslaught there. In front of the salient angle of our line, Lieutenant Dabney planted a large number of stakes, slightly inclining outward, the points of which were sharpened with a draw knife. Among these wires were stretched at the height of a foot and a half from the ground, so as to trip an advancing line of men, and torpedoes were also placed at proper positions. The enemy were digging their approaches under cover of cotton bales, which they rolled over in front of them as they advanced. On the 25th of June, Corporal Skelton, of the First Mississippi, volunteered to go out and destroy this cotton. The first time he made the attempt he reached the cotton, but could not fire it with a burning brand which he carried. He, therefore, returned within the lines, and getting a port fire from the artillery went forth again, set the cotton bales in a blaze and returned unhurt. For this courage and devotion he was complimented by General Gardner in an order of the day. About dusk next evening, Lieutenant McKennon, of the Sixteenth Arkansas, with thirty men of his regiment, who volunteered to accompany him, went out and captured, at the point of the bayonet, an earthwork on the Clinton road, which was being made at some distance from our lines. They took an officer and several men prisoners, and brought them safely within our works with their guns and a number of sand bags, out of which they had emptied the earth.Running the gauntlet.
An event of great note among the besieged was the arrival, during the night of the 26th, of Captain R. S. Pruyn, of the Fourth Louisiana regiment, with dispatches from General Johnston to General Gardner, [336] and full news from the outer world for the garrison, the latter being immediately published in newspaper form and circulated among our men. Captain Pruyn was one of those who had been sent out with dispatches by General Gardner during the siege, and the only one of them who returned. He had floated down the river supported by a dozen canteens well corked and tied together to form a life preserver, with his dispatches secured in an India rubber army pillow. As he passed the Richmond, the current carried him uncomfortably close to her, and he distinctly heard a voice, probably that of the officer of the watch to one of the sailors, exclaim: ‘Look out sharp for that object and see what it is.’ In returning, Captain Pruyn took a somewhat similar route. After getting into Pointe Coupee he made his way through the enemy's position on the river opposite Port Hudson, crawling on his hands and knees nearly a quarter of a mile through an open space, where he saw them all around him, and then taking to the water he swam across and was picked up in front of one of our batteries.Hot work at the point.
The marine battery having been finished, the enemy started to dig a ditch straight up to our bluff on the extreme right, by running it along the river bank. This was discovered as early as the 22d, but the enemy did not make much progress, although from our position we could not materially interrupt them in the prosecution of their work. At four o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th of June, a terrific fire was concentrated on this point, which was kept up until dark, the fleet taking a prominent part. The Richmond came up and poured in her broadsides two or three times, but did not maintain her position. During the firing our flag was shot down four times, the staff being shattered to pieces every time, and the bunting torn to shreds. Each time it was raised by Lieutenant Schirmer, of de Gournay's artillery, who was himself killed at the last attempt to replace it.At Battery eleven.
The enemy now paid their special attention to our lower point where stood Battery 11, which could hardly be termed a ‘citadel,’ as it was an ordinary breastwork and enclosure of earth. From the 25th to 30th the concentration of fire on this place was fearful, [337] though our loss was not as heavy as could have been expected, because we kept there no more men than were actually required to hold it, in the event of an assault, until reinforcements could be thrown in. Our parapet there was breached every day, but our men would repair the damage every night, although under constant fire of shells, grape, and cannister. While superintending these repairs, Lieutenant James Freret, of the engineer corps was badly wounded. The enemy worked their way steadily up until they had effected a lodgment on the end of the same bluff with us, and not more than thirty yards from our work. Their sharpshooters were crowded around this battery, keeping up a constant fire even when they could see no one to shoot at. Holding this extreme point at Battery No. 11, under such tremendous fire, was extremely exhausting to the men there. Captain J. Watts Kearney had defended the post until the muzzle of his piece had been split and a trunnion shot off. The companies of Miles's Legion, the three of Maxey's brigade, under Captain C. W. Cushman, and a detached company under Lieutenant Wilkins, had all done severe duty here and lost heavily in officers and men. The detached company from Natchez, Mississippi, was left without an officer, Lieutenants Wilkins and Chase being killed, and their only other officer wounded. Captain Charles R. Purdy, of the Fourth Louisiana, also lost his life here. On the night of the 28th General Gardner sent Colonel O. R. Lyle to hold the position with one hundred men of the Eighteenth and Twenty-third Arkansas regiments, which they did for several days until they were again relieved by Captain Cushman, who volunteered to perform the service with his three companies. Colonel Lyle's men succeeded on the 29th in burning the cotton bales which the enemy were using as sap-rollers to protect their approach. On the same evening they attempted to storm our works here and got up very close, throwing hand-grenades among us by scores, but they were driven back to their ditch. We had a small detachment of men from Colonel de Gournay's command who were provided with 12-pounder and 24-pounder shells to use as hand-grenades. The fuse had to be lighted while in the hand, and the shell then immediately hurled over the parapet. A wooden gutter was put outside our work during the night, to enable us to roll heavy shells down among the foe. The interchange of these compliments was kept up with considerable spirit. As it was expected that the enemy were undermining the point, no [338] more men were kept in the work there than were considered sufficient to hold it, in case of an assault, until we could throw in reinforcements, which were held in readiness close at hand during night and day. At six o'clock on the evening of the 30th the enemy made a very determined effort to carry our work by assault. While our men were eating their supper, with their guns lying beside them, a storming column swarmed out of the enemy's ditch only a short distance from our position, and made a dash upon us, gaining our exterior ditch, from which they drove the few men who were surprised there. A detachment of the Eighth Wisconsin, Fourth Wisconsin, and Fifth Michigan undertook to scale the parapet, but the first six men who got inside paid their lives as the entrance fee, and our men held their own until our reinforcements, coming in at a full run, attacked the troops in our ditch with such fury and impetuosity that they were immediately driven out. We kept a large force in the battery that night, but the attack not being resumed, as we anticipated, the reserve was withdrawn before daylight. The engineers having decided that the point would undoubtedly be blown up by the enemy, the line of our fortifications was continued across to the river behind Battery 11, so that when that was destroyed the enemy would find as strong a work still confronting them. The exterior lunette, commanding a projecting ridge to the left of Battery 11, was also made the object of a concentrated fire, which razed to the ground a rifle-pit in front of it. This position was held at the time by Major Merchant, with a section of Boone's battery, and a detachment from Colonel de Gournay's command acting as infantry, the latter being afterwards relieved by Miles's Legion. All this while the enemy were making slow but steady approach toward Colonel Johnson's position and that of the First Mississippi; at the latter place, expecting the point of the salient angle to be undermined and blown up, Lieutenant Dabney built a rifle-pit across the base of the angle, so as to present a new line of defence if the outer one was lost. As a counter-mine, a gallery was run out at some depth under ground, the prosecution of which was voluntarily assumed by Captain Girard. After working his gallery about half-way to the enemy's ditch, he could distinctly hear their workmen making slow progress with a gallery toward us. On account of the close proximity of their [339] shaft, Captain Girard was obliged to work with great caution and silence, and the enemy kept quietly on. Getting immediately underneath their ditch our gallery was extended a short distance. Shortly after midnight of the 3d of July, our train was fired, and a tremendous explosion followed, apparently, however, without loss of life. At the same time the approaches to Fort Desperate were checked by the fire of the Arkansas marksmen there, who, perched up in their sharpshooting tower, could fire down into every part of the enemy's ditch.Eating mule-meat.
The last quarter ration of beef had been given out to the troops on the 29th of June. On the 1st of July, at the request of many officers, a wounded mule was killed and cut up for experimental eating. The flesh of mules is of a darker color than beef, of a finer grain, quite tender and juicy, and has a flavor something between that of beef and venison. Some horses were slaughtered, and their flesh was found to be very good eating, but not equal to mule. Rats, of which there were plenty about the deserted camps, were also caught by many officers and men, and were found to be quite a luxury. Mule meat was regularly served out in rations to the troops from and after the 4th of July. The stock of corn was getting very low, and besides that nothing was left but peas, sugar, molasses and salt. That a large quantity of peas was left on hand was probably accounted for by the fact that most of the troops would not have them on any consideration. The sugar and molasses were put to good use by the troops in making a weak description of beer, which was constantly kept at the lines by the barrel full, and drank by the soldiers in preference to the miserable water with which they were generally supplied. On the 1st of July, some of the splendid Parrott guns of the Indiana regiment were taken across the river and put in battery there. They now maintained a constant fire upon our batteries every day, to which we occasionally replied, and at times with effect. They dismounted altogether three of our guns, splitting a rifled 32-pounder on the 5th of July; knocking off the trunnion of an 8-inch howitzer [340] on the morning of the 6th, and permanently disabling a rifled 24-pounder on the evening of the same day. This artillery practice was probably equal, if not superior, to anything which has ever been accomplished of the kind, the distance being from one thousand to fourteen hundred yards. Our guns on the river side were now reduced to seven, and the lower batteries were screened with brush, while the upper guns only engaged the Parrotts. We had been obliged to mask most of our guns on the land side for some time back, so many of them having been disabled. Every extra gun-carriage in the place had been used up, and those in service were all patched and repaired as much as they could be. There were a number of broken guns or pieces of ordnance without carriages, which were fastened upon blocks and put in masked positions where they could be used in cases of emergency. Most of them were crammed with bags containing a motley assortment of old bullets, nails, pieces of horseshoes, bits of iron chain, etc., which were to be fired in the face of a storming party, it being of little consequence whether the disabled guns were good for another discharge or not. On the evening of the 3d of July, a long line of troops was discovered bivouacking in line of battle opposite our left centre, and every one was confident that before daylight we would be attacked on every side, but the day wore on and everything was going on as usual, the sharpshooting commencing as soon as the fog lifted.An approaching struggle.
The approach of the enemy to Battery 11 was slow enough to cause us to doubt, at last, our previous suppositions that they intended to blow up the point. They had been engaged since the 3d on a work of which, at first, we could not understand the nature, but as it gradually rose in height it became evident to us that it was to be an elevated mound—was to be used as a tower for their sharpshooters to fire down into our work. This point of land, running out beyond our natural line of defence to within one hundred yards of a high ridge held by the enemy, flanked on its weaker side by the fleet, and almost entirely unsupported by any other fortification, had always been considered a weak point with us, and it could not be permanently held without a loss that would be severely felt by our weakened garrison.[341]
The fall of Vicksburg.
During the forenoon, on the 7th of July, the Federals called out to our men in many places that Vicksburg had been surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July, with its garrison. To give us greater assurance of the truth of their assertions, there was sent in to General Gardner, throught some of the pickets, an official copy of General Grant's dispatch to General Banks, announcing the capitulation of Vicksburg.A Council of war.
That night a council of war was held at General Gardner's headquarters, which was protracted until 2 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. The situation of Port Hudson was well worthy of serious consideration by the chief officers of its garrison. It was sixty-one days since the commencement of the bombardment by the fleet; forty-eight days since the virtual beginning of the siege, and there had been forty-five days of actual investment, comprising two grand attacks, and twenty-four charges or attempts to storm our lines. A fortified position, constructed for a garrison of twenty thousand men, after its abandonment had been ordered, had been held by less than one-third that force for a much longer period than could have been expected by our forces outside. At 2 o'clock, on the morning of the 8th of July, General Gardner sent to General Banks, by flag of truce, for confirmation of the fall of Vicksburg, which was accorded him. (And yet General Banks in his report, page 149, says that Gardner stated that the surrender was not on account of the fall of Vicksburg.) About 9 o'clock, the same morning, he dispatched Colonels J. G. W. Steedman and W. R. Miles, and Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall J. Smith as commissioners, to treat for the surrender of the post. They did not return until afternoon, and then announced that the following unconditional surrender of the place and garrison had been agreed upon: Articles of capitulation proposed between the commissioners on the part of the garrison of Port Hudson, Louisiana, and the forces of the United States before said place, July 8th, 1863. Article I: Major-General F. Gardner to surrender to the United States forces, under Major-General Banks, the place of Port Hudson and its dependencies with its garrison, armament, munitions, public [342] funds, and material of war, in the condition, as nearly as may be, in which they were at the hour of cessation of hostilities, viz: 6 o'clock A. M., July 8, 1863 Article II: The surrender, stipulated in Article I, is qualified by no condition save that the officers and enlisted men composing the garrison shall receive the treatment due to prisoners of war according to the usage of civilized warfare. Article III: All private property of officers and enlisted men shall be respected and left to their respective owners. Article IV: The position of Port Hudson shall be occupied tomorrow, at 7 o'clock A. M., by the forces of the United States, and its garrison received as prisoners of war by such general officer of the United States service as may be designated by Major General Banks, with the ordinary formalities of rendition. The Confederate troops will be drawn up in line, officers in their position, the right of the line resting on the edge of the prairie south of the railroad depot, the left extending in the direction of the village of Port Hudson; the arms and colors will be conveniently piled, and will be received by the officers of the United States. Article V: The sick and wounded of the garrison will be cared for by the authorities of the United States, assisted, if desired by either party, by the medical officers of the garrison. Approved: W. R. Miles, Commanding right wing. J. G. W. Steedman, Commanding left wing. Marshall J. Smith, Lieutenant—Colonel Heavy Artillery. Charles P. Stone, Brigadier—General. W. Dwight, Brigadier-General. Henry W. Birg, Colonel Commanding Third Brigade, Grover's Division. Approved: Frank Gardner, Major-General. Approved: N. P. Banks, Major-General.Combatants Fraternizing.
Soldiers swarmed from their places of concealment on either side and met each other in the most cordial and fraternal spirit. Here you would see a group of Federal soldiers escorted round our works and shown the effects of their shots, and entertained with accounts of such part of the siege operations as they could not have learned before. [343] In the same way our men went into the Federal lines and gazed with curiosity upon the work which had been giving them so much trouble, escorted by Federal soldiers who vied with each other in courtesy and a display of magnanimous spirit. Not a single case occurred in which the enemy, either officers or privates, exhibited a disposition to exult over their victory, but, on the contrary, whenever the subject came up in conversation, it elicited from them only compliments upon the skill and bravery of the defence. One of their surgeons came in during a heavy rain storm and brought medicines for our sick, repeating his visit the next morning, and bringing a large quantity of quinine, which he dosed out to the fever patients. During the afternoon and evening of the 8th a large number of Federals were within our lines visiting at our camps, whither most of our men had repaired to pack up their little stock of clothing preparatory to an expected departure on the morrow. The following order was published:[344] Shortly after dark a train of wagons brought in a liberal supply of provisions for the garrison from the enemy's commissariat. They were isued to the troops during the night-time, and early the next morning our men enjoyed the first good meal they had partaken of for a long time. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th, our line was formed in the field back of the railroad depot, near the landing, every man not too sick to be confined in the hospital being in the ranks. As General Gardner rode along the line, with his staff, he was enthusiastically cheered by the men who had served so faithfully under him, and whose affection and confidence he had permanently gained during days and weeks of trial. The enemy's column, marching down the road to the landing, approached the right of our line, preceded by General Andrews and staff. When Brigadier-General Andrews approached, General Gardner advanced with his sword drawn and presented the hilt to General Andrews with the following words: ‘Having thoroughly defended this position as long as I deemed it necessary, I now surrender to you my sword, and with it this post and its garrison.’ To which General Andrews replied: ‘I return your sword as a proper compliment to the gallant commander of such gallant troops—conduct that would be heroic in another cause.’ To which General Gardner replied as he returned his sword, with emphasis, into the scabbard: ‘This is neither the time nor place to discuss the cause.’ The order was given along our line to ground arms, which was obeyed, and our men stood in line while the enemy had marched from right to left until they had formed in line before us, when they hoisted their flag upon the bluff, fired a salute, and the ceremony was over. It was now announced to our men that they would be paroled—news that was received by them with great satisfaction, particularly as they had made up their minds already to a term of imprisonment.
[345]
Roster of Confederate forces engaged in the defence of Port Hudson, May 21st to July 8, 1863.
Major-General Frank Gardner commanding. Staff—Major T. Friend Wilson, Adjutant-General; Captains Jackson and Lanier, Assistant Adjutant-Generals; Major Spratley, Chief Quartermaster; Captain Geo. Simpson, Inspector-General; Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall J. Smith, Chief of Heavy Artillery; Lieutenant-Colonel Jas. P. Parker, Chief of Light Artillery; Captain L. J. Girard, Chief of Ordnance; Lieutenant F. Y. Dabney, Chief Engineer; Colonel J. A. Jacquess, Captain A. Dupree, Aides-de-Camp. Engineers—Fred. Y. Dabney, First Lieutenant and Chief Engineer; Stork and Jas. Freret, Second Lieutenants, Engineers; Butler, Assistant Engineer.River Batteries—Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall J. Smith commanding right wing in front of the village of Port Hudson.
I.—One 30-pound Parrott, one 12-pound brass-rifled (removed), First Alabama regiment, Captain J. F. Whitfield. II.—One 42-smooth, two 24-rifled siege, First Alabama regiment, Captain J. D. Meadows. III.—One 42-smooth, one 32-rifled, First Alabama regiment, Captain R. H. Riley. IV.—One 8-inch Columbiad, one 10-inch Columbiad, Twelfth Louisiana battalion artillery, Captain Seawell. V.—One 10-inch Columbiad, one 42-smooth, one 32-smooth, First Alabama, Captain D. W. Ramsey. VI.—Two 24-pound rifled, 12th Louisiana battalion, Captain Kean. Vii—Two 24-pound smooth and hot shot, First Tennessee battalion, Captain Waller; moved to land lines at Clinton road, Captain Lahey.Left Wing—Lieutenant-Colonel de Gournay commanding.
Viii—Two rifled 24-pound siege, Twelfth Louisiana battalion—one moved to land lines at Slaughter's field—Captain Coffin. Ix—One 8-inch howitzer (Paixon), Lieutenant Rodriguez. X—One 32 pound smooth, Lieutenant McDowell. Xi—One 20-pound Parrott, Lieutenant Watts Kearney and twenty-two men (Miles's Legion).[346]