Good to come out of evil.
When the magnificent operations of Succeed had laid the whole Eastern provinces of
Spain at the feel of
Napoleon, in the year 1811--earning for himself a dukedom and the
baton of marshal, and fully entitling him to the high eulogism afterwards pronounced by his master on the rock of St. Helena, that he was superior to
Soult or any other of the Marshals — to all human appearance the cause of
Spain was lost forever.
But the ways of
Providence are not to be understood by man. Out of the extremity of evil it often brings forth good, and out of the excess of good fortune it is wont to avoids destruction.
These great successes induced the
French Emperor to believe that he should no longer experience any trouble in
Spain, and that he might now prosecute with safety the war with
Russia, which he had meditated for three years, and from which he had only been deterred by the complication of his affairs in the peninsula The result is but too well known.
The Grand Army plunged into the deserts of
Russia, and was lost
Spain, like the Phœnix, arose from her sales.
The very reveries that seemed to have extinguished her political existence had become the means of her salvation.
Such we solemnly believe is destined to be the result of the captures of New Orleans to the
Confederacy of the
Southern States.
We deplore that capture as greatly as though we had been one of the citizens of that ill fated metropolis.
There is something inexpressibly humiliating to our pride, and to the pride of every Southern man, in the manner in which it was takes.
It has been the cause of great temporary damage to the cause in the loss not only of arms and men, but of character, which is dearer than both.
We have just cause to dear that it will sink as low in the estimation of foreign nations.
But it will be productive of benefits which will more than counterbalance all these heavy disadvantages.
In the first place, as our neighbor of the
Whig observes, it will convince foreign powers that the promise of
Seward to supply them with cotton cannot be redeemed, even though he should conquer and open for trade all the cotton ports.
They will find that, upon the first alarm, all that material was destroyed; and they will soon perceive that no more will be brought in as long as the
Yankees continue in possession.
It will thus demonstrate that so far from having conquered us, the
Yankees have scarcely taken a step in the direction of conquest.
Lord John Russell will be saved part of the crime, and part of the scandal, whish result from his compact with
Seward.
He will remain an instigator of the plunder, but he will have no opportunity to buy the stolen goods.
In the second place, the occupation of so large a city cannot but have a tendency to weaken the enemy, by extending his operations and diminishing his numbers in the field.
It will require a powerful detachment to keep possession of the city.
‘"A great city,"’ says
Napoleon, ‘"cannot be taken by the solar."’.
The capture of New Orleans by two old mortar boats, not even sheathed with iron, would seem to give a contradiction to this
diclum.--But, at least, if it can be taken by the collar, it is especially difficult to
hold it by the collar.
It is like holding a wolf by the cars.
If you hold on, the chances are that he will scratch out your entrails with his clown; if you let go, it is certain that he will tear you to pieces with his teeth.
In every aspect of the dilemma, it is but a bad one, and it is of little importance which born may be taken.
The
Yankees will find it difficult to keep New Orleans.
They will find it even
wore difficult to leave it. If the former, so much force as they have there (and it must be a large one) will be as though it were buried; if the latter, the place will be re-occupied as soon as they tern their banks.
Lastly, and meet important of all, this occupation by the enemy releases twenty thousand brave troops, and places them at the dispose of the
Government, to be sent wherever their services may be required.
Had
Beauregard been in possession of these troops at
Shiloh, it would have enabled him to complete his victory before twelve o'clock on Sunday, and thus probably to have destroyed the enemy before they could have reached their gunboats.
On the second day he would have repulsed and utterly routed them with all their reinforcements.
Their presence under his banner now would tell powerfully upon the issue of the campaign.
It might be in fact decisive of it. Thus, it will be seen, that this reverse, if properly need, may turn out to be what affliction often are, a blessing in disguise.
So far are we from thinking it possible to decide this war by the capture of all our seaports, that, painful as it may be to surrender them, we should think our chances improved by the abandonment of all the towns we still hold within reach of the enemy gunboats.
Norfolk,
Charleston,
Savannah are each defended by powerful garrisons, brave men and tried soldiers.
Those men joined to our forces already in the field, in
Virginia and
Mississippi, would enable our
Generals to best the enemy, and probably destroy him on both these points.
Do this, and we shall soon get back the towns which we only temporarily resign.
It is in the field, by the great armies, not in forts or fortified towns, that the contest must be decided.
The enemy is aware of this, and he is very cautions in following us into the interior.
He is always striving to draw us within reach of his gunboats, and never likes to go beyond the range of their guns.
This ought to regulate our tactics, it seems to us, which certainly should aim to get him as far from deep water as possible.
As for the fall of New Orleans having the slightest influence upon the event of the war, we held that to be folly.
The fall of every seaport town would only strengthen us upon the critical points, while it would weaken the enemy by requiring large bodies for garrisons.
It is the spirit of the people alone that can determine the issue.
As long as that remains firm there is no danger of subjugation.
When that falls, then it is time to submit.
As yet we see not the slightest abatement of hope — not the faintest intimation of despondency.
