Butler's operations on the Southside.
A correspondent of the New York
Times, writing from "near
James river," May 27th, undertakes an explanation of why
Butler was whipped on the 16th ult. He says:
‘
Gen. Butler is cease-fire in your very valuable paper for two reasons: First, because, is neglect of the supposed advice of
Gen. Gillmore, he did not fortify the position he held before the second line of rebel works on the 15th inst; and secondly, because he withdrew his forces after the battle of the 16th had been lost.
I admit that if
Gen. Butler had fortified his position on the 15th he might have withstood the rebel attack on the foggy morning of the 16th, and thus escaped the responsibility of the fearful less sustained by our army; but I contend that even in that case he would have been obliged eventually to abandon the position, and effect a retreat under, perhaps, greater difficulties; as the result shows he had not a sufficient number of men to force his way to
Richmond, and there is no position on the Petersburg and Richmond railroad where he could have fortified himself, in a short time, so that he could have remained with safety more than a day or two--He would have been exposed continually to attack in front and rear and on the left flank.
The fact is, that
General Butler's retreat from
Drewry's Bluff to his fortifications near
Bermuda Hundred was clearly the part of wisdom and prudence, and probably what saved his army from destruction.
Gen. Butler deserves great praise for his firmness in not yielding his better judgment to the wishes of these who urged his stay, and for his foresight and skill in effecting his retreat at the right time and in so successful a manner as he did; but the trouble lies in this, the folly of forcing a body of men of the number of
Gen. Batler's army into such a position.
The army had no business there.
There were no chances of success.--Whatever
Gen. Butler's personal ideas may have been, his army certainly felt perfectly confident of defeat.
Little or no confidence, in fact, was placed in the military ability of most of the
Generals commanding by the inferior officers and rank and file.
’
The disposition of
Gen. Butler's forces the night before the battle was very bad and exceedingly unfortunate, he having a line of battle several miles long, and but one line.
The reserves were also few and badly disposed of. The during the fight were very dilatory, unskillful, and unsatisfactory, and showed that military genius did not stand at the head of affairs.
The enemy manœuvered very skillfully and rapidly, throwing his solid column of troops upon various parts of
Gen. Butler's long and weak line successively beating his army by detail.
He threw his force first upon
Gen. Butler's right flank; then, rapidly as the swoop of an eagle, he struck his centre, and then his left, driving back those parts of
Gen. Butler's line in confusion, and inflicting, but meeting great lost
Gen. Butler's grand mistake consisted in not seizing, in the first instance, upon the great strategic point of our army south of
Richmond — that is,
Petersburg.
This place could have been easily taken immediately after
Gen. Butler's landing at
Bermuda Hundred, and, being on the south side of the Appomation river and the junction of several railroads, would have been a place of vast importance to us.
Petersburg would have been a splendid base for any operations
Gen. Butler wished to make, and his army would have been safe there.
Then he would have cut off a very important channel of supplies to
Lee's army, and from thence, with the assistance of our gunboats, he could have cut off all reinforcements and supplies coming from the
South toward
Richmond.
The statement that the battle of the 16th was only a feint to cover the small cavalry raid of
Kantz, is too contemptibly absurd to need refutation.
No one will be deceived by it.
Gen. Butler's campaign south of
Richmond is ended, and candor must admit, though with regret, that it was a failure, and a failure attended with great loss of human life and limb.
