The facts about the fall of
Fort Fisher are gradually coming to light.
The Raleigh
Confederate publishes the following statement from a gentleman who, it says, is as accurately informed concerning the affair as any one else:
‘
"The movement of the enemy was sudden, as we all know.
After the previous failure it was not anticipated that so quick a repetition of the effort would be made.
General Hoke had been withdrawn towards
Wilmington, or above it. On Saturday,
a Mr. McMillan--as our informant heard — discovered, from near
Topsail sound, the approach of the enemy, and sought to communicate by telegraph to
General Bragg the fact; but the operator was not in a condition to send the dispatch, and it became necessary to transmit the news by a messenger.
In two hours after the intelligence was received,
General Hoke was on the march to confront the enemy at his point of landing.
’
On Friday, the enemy landed, under cover of his fleet, near battery
Gatlin, about nine miles from
Fort Fisher.--While he was landing,
General Hoke appeared and drew up in line parallel, to watch his movements, and intercept them when possible to do so. It was not possible to prevent the landing, owing to the situation of the point chosen.
The enemy landed on the banks, just above the neck of the sound, thus interposing a small surface of water between them and an attacking force; or compelling such force to circle around the lower extreme of the sound — either of which movements would have to be done under the fire of the whole fleet.
When
General Hoke found this to be the situation, he established a line facing the sea, and threw out what cavalry he required (if he had it) on his right flank, towards Battery Anderson, which was down the beach, towards
Fort Fisher, about four miles. The intervening country here is broken; and the low places are grown up with thick bushes, and are marshy.
The purpose of this cavalry was to observe the movements, and give the signal of the first advance of the enemy towards establishing a line across the neck of land to the river, it being the order and purpose of
General Bragg to have
General Hoke attack him as soon as he advanced.
In this condition matters rested until Friday night. During the night the enemy, passing between the cavalry, and threading their way through the thick, marshy undergrowth, made their way to the river, and on Saturday morning
General Hoke found an entrenched line on his right flank, extending across the peninsula, from the sea to, or near to, the river.
He succeeded, however, in maintaining his base at
Sugarloaf, immediately changed his line, and informed
General Bragg of the
status. Then
General Bragg gave the order to charge the enemy in their works.
In the meantime,
General Hoke had made a close reconnaissance, under the fire of the enemy, and discovered the strength of their force and position.
On receiving the order to charge, he communicated the result of his observations, and asked
General Bragg to reconnoitre in person, which he did; and both of these officers concurred that it was not proper to assault the lines.
It was then determined to reinforce the fort; and steps were taken which, but for a natural, but, as far as we can see, unblamable miscarriage, ought to have succeeded, failed to a great extent.
By this time, the enemy, four thousand strong, were secure behind their works; and the fleet proceeded to bombard
Fort Fisher, which was done uninterruptedly until Sunday about 6 P. M.
On Sunday, the column of assault, numbering about four thousand, moved from the enemy's lines, and as they advanced, they were plainly visible from
Fort Fisher.
But her beleaguered garrison was kept close confined within the bomb proofs, by the concentrated and continued fire of seven hundred guns pouring torrents of shells and missiles on every spot.
On the land side of
Fort Fisher, we had seventeen guns — sufficient, could they have been used, to make it impossible that any force could have advanced under their fire.
But, as the line of assailants got nearer to the fort, the whole fleet concentrated the fire, in ricochet shot, on the land side, and speedily dismounted every gun; and this unintermittent "
fou d'enfor"--or, in plain
English,
hell fire--was kept up until the enemy's line was in sixty yards of the works.
Then it ceased, and with a rush and yell the charge was made.--
Captain Braddy, it is said, commanded the company guarding the sally-port.
On him the hope of the garrison bung to keep the assailants out until the men and officers, who had been packed in the bomb proofs for fifty-six hours, could get out and make ready.
Instead of making defence, this officer and his command, it is said, surrendered, and the enemy entered the open gate.
Our men were benumbed and exhausted, and the thing was the work of a moment.--They were obliged to fall back in order to rally.
Colonel Lamb, with that cool precision which distinguishes him as an officer of great merit, brought his men into line near headquarters,
General Whiting being present, encouraging and cheering on the troops and creating enthusiasm by his ardent and whole-souled heroism.
Under these inspiring influences, our men were brought to the charge.
The numbers were against them in the proportion of four thousand, aided by two thousand marines, to two thousand, but they forced the enemy back to the mound, and a hand-to-hand fight, of unmitigated desperation and fury, ensued, continuing from seven to about ten o'clock, when bravery, endurance and devotion failed to overcome numbers.--Our men were overpowered, and the work of assault was accomplished; but not until the enemy had paid dearly for his prize.
He had not lost a man until he entered the fort.
