[18]
And, indeed, virtue in general may be
said to consist almost wholly in three properties:
the first is [Wisdom,] the ability to perceive what in
any given instance is true and real, what its relations
are, its consequences, and its causes; the second is
[Temperance,] the ability to restrain the passions
(which the Greeks call πάθη) and make the impulses
(ὁρμαί) obedient to reason; and the third is [Justice,] the skill to treat with consideration and
wisdom those with whom we are associated, in order
that we may through their co-operation have our
natural wants supplied in full and overflowing measure, that we may ward off any impending trouble,
avenge ourselves upon those who have attempted to
[p. 187]
injure us, and visit them with such retribution as
justice and humanity will permit.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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