TRIBU´NUS
TRIBU´NUS This word seems originally to have
indicated an officer connected with a tribe (
tribus), or who represented a tribe for certain purposes; and
this is indeed the character of the officers who were designated by it in
the earliest times of Rome, and may be traced also in the later officers of
this name. We subjoin an account of all the Roman officers known under this
name.
1.
TRIBUNES OF THE THREE ANCIENT TRIBES. At the time
when all the Roman citizens were contained in the three tribes of the
Ramnnes, Tities, and Luceres, the three divisions of infantry, which
together made up the legion, were commanded by three
tribuni militum (
φύλαρχος,
Dionys. A. R. 2.7;
Dig.
1,
2,
2,
20;
Serv. ad Aen.
5.560). Niebuhr (
Hist. of Rome, i. p. 301) supposes
that the
tribunus celerum was the tribune of the
Ramnes, the oldest and noblest among the three tribes, and in this opinion
he is followed by Göttling (
Gesch. d. Röm.
Staatsverf. p. 166), though it is in direct contradiction to
Dionysius (
2.13) and Pomponius
(
de Orig. Jur.
Dig. 1,
2,
2,
15), according to whom the tribunus
celerum was the commander of the
celeres, the
king's body-guard.
But Mommsen (
Hist. 1.78, note) has shown that
the term
tribuni celerum is used in the plural of
the three commanders of the horsemen (
Dionys.
A. R. 2.64), as contrasted with the three
tribuni militum, and that the view of Pomponius, which
identifies the
tribunus celerum with the Celer
mentioned by Valerius Antias (in
Dionys. A. R.
2.13), the
magister equitum under
the Republic, and the
praefectus praetorio of
the Empire, is due simply to a misconception of the position held by Brutus
in the legend (cf.
Dionys. A. R. 4.71;
Liv. 1.59). The tribunes of the tribes
naturally ceased to exist, when the tribes were done away with in the
changes ascribed to Servius Tullius. There is no ground whatever for
believing that a law was ever passed under the presidency of one of the
tribunes (Mommsen,
Röm. St. 1.189, note 4); but from
the account of Dionysius they appear to have exercised certain priestly
functions on behalf of their respective tribes. (Cf. Praen. Fast. for March
19, p. 315, [
ad stantibus pon]tificibus et trib[unis]
celer[um].）
2.
TRIBUNES OF THE SERVIAN TRIBES. Under the Servian
constitution, each of the four citytribes, and possibly each of the country
pagi, which afterwards developed, in a
manner as to which we have no definite information, into the
[p. 2.871]original 16 country-tribes, had its
curator, or
φύλαρχος, whose duty it was to keep the register of the tribe,
and of the estates belonging to its members, and to collect when necessary
the war-tax (
tributum), as well as the
capitation money (
aes), levied upon
non-citizens (
aerarii). These
curatores tribuum were also called
tribuni aerarii; but whether the body known in the
time of Cicero as
tribuni aerarii were their
successors and representatives is a question much disputed of recent years.
Madvig (
Opusc. Acad. ii. pp. 242-263: cf.
Verfassung
u. Verwaltung, 1.182-185) strongly maintains that they were
quite distinct, and that there is no trustworthy worthy reference to the
tribuni aerarii before the law of Cotta in
B.C. 70, except as an obsolete office, the name of which was then revived.
Mommsen, on the other hand (
Die Römischen Tribus,
pp. 52
sqq.: cf.
Röm. St.
3.189 ff.), maintains that they were identical. Madvig's view is that the
original
tribuni aerarii were not officials of
any kind, much less magistrates, but private persons of substance, who were
made responsible for the pay of individual soldiers, especially the
equites. The chief ancient authorities are an
extract from Cato, ap.
Gel. 6.10, “pignoris
capio ob aes militare, quod aes a tribuno aerario miles accipere
debebat, vocabulum seorsum fit;” and Varro,
L. L.
5.181, “ab eo quoque, quibus attributa erat pecunia ut militi reddant,
tribuni aerarii dicti;” where the past tense
debebat shows that the practice had become obsolete in Cato's
time, and the expression
attributa erat may be
taken to indicate that the quaestors assigned to the several contributories
the sums which they had respectively to pay. Another argument for Madvig's
view is that the
tribuni aerarii must have been
a numerous class to furnish a select body of at least 300 judices, and that
they are represented as fairly numerous, even in unimportant country-places
like Atina (Cic.
pro
Planc. 8, 21), and as an
ordo by
the side of the
equites (cf. Calp.
Ecl. 7.29). In
Cic. pro C.
Rab. ad Quir. 9, 27, we have in a reference to B.C.
100, “quid de tribunis aerariis ceterorumque ordinum omnium hominibus
qui turn arma pro communi libertate ceperunt?” Madvig interprets
this to mean young men who afterwards became
tribuni
aerarii when the
ordo was revived
in B.C. 70, but this interpretation is very forced. Although we nowhere have
express authority for identifying the
curatores
tribuum with the
tribuni aerarii of
the earlier time, it seems impossible to explain the use of the term
tribunus except by such an identification;
and the word
curator occurs only later on, so
that at may well be a descriptive title. B.C. 220 the tribes were divided
into centuries, the
curatores centuriarum may
have popularly retained the name of
tribuni
aerarii, their number now being 350. They seem to have been
elected annually, and were often re-elected.
3.
TRIBUNI AERARII. When L. Cotta, the praetor in
B.C. 70, carried a law depriving the senators of the exclusive right of
serving on juries, which had been restored to them by Sulla, after the
reforms of C. Gracchus, he instituted stituted three
decuriae,--one of senators, one of knights, and one of
tribuni aerarii. Of this last body we know
that they were recognised as an
ordo; that they
were a fairly numerous body, not restricted to Rome, but living also in the
municipia; and that they were closely
connected with the equites, and indeed appear to have been sometimes loosely
included under this name (cp.
Cic. Clu. 43,
121;
47,
130). Julius Caesar took away their
judicial function (
Suet. Jul. 41); but
Augustus (Id.
Aug. 32) added to the three
decuriae a fourth, consisting of
ducenarii, i.e. men who had half the equestrian census. From
this last fact it seems highly probable that the
tribuni
aerarii were also required to possess a definite
census, though the amount of this is nowhere
specified. Mommsen supposes that they had the equestrian
census, but not the
equus
publicus (
Röm. St. 3.533); but this is
somewhat doubtful: and Mommsen admits that where they are included among the
equites by Cicero, the “courtesy of the advocate” (ib. 193,
note 2: cf.
pro Font. 16, 36;
pro Flacc. 38,
96) is partly at least responsible. Still in
pro Flacc. 2, 4,
he clearly speaks of two-thirds of the jury as belonging to the
equites (50 out of 75): and Livy (
Ep.
xcvii.) even speaks of the reform of Cotta as giving back the
judicia to the
equites:
“judicia per M. (
sic) Aurelium Cottam
praetorem ad equites Romanos translata sunt.” From
Liv. 24.11,
8, it might
appear that they had a census of 300,000 asses. Herzog (1.533) thinks that
they were ex-officials, but this assumption is needless, if we identify them
with the
curatores of the centuries. (Cf.
Madvig,
Verf. und Verw. 1.182-185; Mommsen,
Röm. St. l.c.; Heitland on Cic.
pro C.
Rabirio ad Quir., App. G; Herzog,
Gesch. d. Röm.
Verfassung, 1.533, 1023-5.)
4.
TRIBUNI MILITUM CONSULARI POTESTATE. From the
earliest times the Roman infantry had been commanded by
tribuni, or “tribe-leaders.” These were
nominated by the king, as commander-in-chief, for the duration of the
campaign, and were originally three in number. But when the old tribes were
divided, each into a
prior and a
posterior, the number of the tribunes came to be
six. At this time
legio was the term applied to
the whole army. When, at some time in the course of the fourth century, a
varying number of legions was raised each year, the practice was still
retained of having six
tribuni militum for each
legion. For their duties and the manner of their appointment, see
EXERCITUS But the term
tribuni militum came also to be used with a
somewhat different application. If the needs of the state required that more
than two armies should be sent out, instead of two consuls a larger number
of commanders was appointed under the title of
tribuni
militum consulari potestate. The first recorded instance of
When in such an appointment is in B.C. 445, when the plebeians were pressing
their claim to be held eligible for the consulship, and the senate in order
to avoid a decision upon the point resolved that consular tribunes should be
elected. (
Liv. 4.6,
8:
“per haec consilia eo deducta est res, ut tribunos militum
consulari potestate promiscue ex patribus ac plebe creari sinerent, de
consulibus creandis nihil mutaretur.” ) But there is no definite
evidence that this was the date of the first institution of such an office;
and the reference to a law permitting it (
Liv.
4.31,
11) may refer to that by which the
consulate was substituted for the kingship, as well as to a special law now
passed. Another and perhaps
[p. 2.872]an earlier account
(
Liv. 4.7,
2）
represents military necessity as the sole reason for the change. Certainly
the highest number of consular tribunes was elected in a year (B.C. 405)
when the strain of a continuous siege first came upon the state. The
fasti show that the number varied between
three, four, and six, but there were never five. Where eight are mentioned,
two seem to have acted as censors, not as consuls, and probably were not
strictly speaking tribunes at all. The number five was evidently avoided, as
not admitting of an even division of the
fasces
for the twelve months of the year.
It is pretty plain that the
tribuni militum consulari
potestate were simply the ordinary six tribunes, holding
office with special powers conferred upon them. If the number sometimes fell
below six, this was only because, if an insufficient number were elected
with the consular authority, there was no constitutional means of filling up
the places with others similarly privileged, and those subsequently elected
ranked only as ordinary tribunes.
When in B.C. 367 the Licinian law abolished the office of consular tribune
and threw open the consulate to the plebeians, the immediate result was to
deprive the people of the right of electing the
tribuni
militum, so that the right had to be restored to them by a
special law five years afterwards (
Liv. 7.5: cf.
O. Lorenz,
Das Consulartribunat, Vienna, 1855).
There is no reason to doubt (as has been done by Becker, 2.2, 137; Schwegler,
3.112, and others) that the consular tribunes possessed, as their title
indicates, the full consular powers, including judicial as well as military
functions, and the right of appointing a dictator (
Liv.
4.31). They were elected
auspicato
in the Comitia Centuriata (
Liv. 5.52,
16), and enjoyed all the insignia of the consuls;
but they had no right to triumph, nor did they become
consulares, so that they did not by virtue of their office
enter the higher ranks of the senate. This was the main practical difference
between the consular tribunate and the consulship. The office was definitely
abolished by the Licinian law
ne tribunorum militum
comitia fierent consulumque utique alter ex plebe crearetur
(
Liv. 6.35); and we never hear of it after
this date, except in an abortive suggestion of the tribunes of the commons
in B.C. 53 (
D. C. 40.45). Cf. Mommsen,
Röm. St. 2.173-184: the account given by Becker,
Röm. Alt. 2.2, 136 if., is in some respects
antiquated.
5.
TRIBUNI PLEBIS. There can be little doubt that
the name of these officers of the commons was derived from that of the
tribunes of the soldiers. By the side of the privileged citizens, the
patricii, there was a body, recognised as
belonging to the community, but at first destitute of all political rights,
the
plebs. This body, by the constitution
ascribed to Servius Tullius, acquired the right of serving in the army and
holding positions of command (
tribunatus), and
at the same time of voting in the assembly of the centuries. Their next step
was to constitute themselves into an assembly of their own, the
concilium plebis, presided over by magistrates of
their own, the
tribuni and
aediles plebis. According to the generally received
tradition, this step was the result of a secession of the plebs to the
mons sacer in the district of Crustumeria
in the year B.C. 494. Whatever may be the historical value of the details,
there is no reasonable doubt that about this time the plebs acquired the
right of collective action under leaders of their own choice. At first the,
election was made
comitiis curiatis (
Dionys. A. R. 6.89,
9.41: cf. Cic.
pro Corn.
ap. Ascon. p. 76): this has been generally taken to mean that the
election was made by a purely patrician body; and an attempt has been made
to defend this view by assuming that the plebeians, after settling among
themselves who their candidates should be, nominated these and no others for
the patricians formally to elect, so that they might secure their approval
(cf. Bouché--Leclercq,
Institutions Romaines, p.
69, note). But it is much simpler to suppose that the plebeians alone
assembled by curies for the election (so Mommsen and Willems). The tradition
further asserts that the tribunes were in B.C. 494 recognised as inviolable
by a
lex sacrata (
Liv.
2.33). Here, again, disputes have arisen. Lange, representing the
school of Niebuhr, holds that this was a formal compact, ratified by the
fetiales, between the patricians and the plebeians (cf.
Dionys. A. R. 6.84,
89;
7.40). Mommsen, on the other hand, contends that the
lex sacrata was only a solemn oath, sworn to by the
plebs, that they would regard any wrong done to their tribunes as an
inexpiable offence, and would avenge it accordingly. This view is supported
by the fact that the
plebiscittum of Icilius in B.C.
492 (
Dionys. A. R. 7.22), which assured
to the tribunes freedom of speech and the
jus
auxilii, would have been superfluous if the preceding
lex sacrata had been a compact between the orders.
This view is also in harmony with the definition of
sacrosanctus given by Festus, s. v. There is a further
discussion as to the number of the original tribunes. The tradition is that
they were at first two in number, afterwards raised to five, and then again
to ten. But while the oldest authorities speak of B.C. 471 as the date at
which the number was raised to five, others represent the two first elected
as at once co-opting three others. The increase from five to ten (two from
each class) is placed by Livy and Dionysius in B.C. 457 (
Liv. 3.30;
Dionys. A. R.
10.30), though the former carelessly speaks of ten tribunes in B.C.
480 (2.44, 6), and Die Cassius (cf. Zonaras,
7.15) gives a different account. These statements are open to much
doubt, especially that as to the classes from which the tribunes were taken:
such a provision would be quite unexampled, and there seems to, have been no
reason for it. Probably it was only an illegitimate inference from the
number of the tribunes. It seems most probable that there were originally
two tribunes and two aediles of the plebs, answering to the two consuls and
two quaestors of the community. It is certain that after the decemvirate
there were always ten tribunes (
Liv. 3.54,
11, &c.)
The
tribuni plebis were naturally always
plebeians; the only case of a patrician holding the office is when two were
co-opted in B.C. 448 (
Liv. 3.65); and this seems
doubtful (cf. Mommsen,
Röm. St. 2.265, 4). They were
elected, perhaps when chosen by the curies, and certainly when chosen by the
tribes, under the, presidency of the outgoing tribunes. At first, if the
number of tribunes elected was not equal
[p. 2.873]to the
vacancies, the one or more elected had the power of co-optation; but in B.C.
448 this was done away with by the law of Trebonius (
Liv. 3.65), which enacted that the election should be continued
until the full number had been chosen. There was no interregnum allowed, as
in the case of the consuls: the plebs was never to be left without its
tribunes (
Liv. 3.55; cf. 64, 9). The office was
held only for a year; and just as in the case of the consulship, all the
tribunes were colleagues, in the sense that each separately could exercise
the full power of the office, but could be prevented from acting by the
interposition of any of the others.
The functions of the tribunes varied with the legal position of the plebs, of
which they were the representatives. Originally the plebs was only a
voluntary combination of unenfranchised citizens, and so had no political
rights. During this period, of which we have no trustworthy accounts, the
tribunes were
non populi sed plebis
magistratus: any powers conceded to them were possessed simply as
attaching to the organs of popular force. Next the plebs was recognised as
an organised body within the community, and the magistrates of the community
were bound by certain restrictions in their action towards the
representatives of the commons: that is to say, the tribunes acquired the
right of veto, and all that followed from it. Finally, the plebs was so far
identified with the community, that its action was regarded legally as the
action of the community. This is the stage reached in the Hortensian law of
B.C. 287. The tribunes now become magistrates of the community, with
positive as well as negative powers, and especially with the right to
transact business directly with the senate.
As the tribunes did not originate as magistrates of the community, they had
none of the insignia of magistracy, no lictors, fasces, or purple border to
their togas; nor had they the curule chair. They had, however, the right of
sitting on the
subsellium, which became a kind
of token of their office. As not being magistrates they further had no right
of consulting the gods (
auspicia impetrativa) on
behalf of the Roman people, though there may have been a kind of
quasi-private plebeian auspices, so that the place where the plebs met was
called a
templum (
Liv.
2.56,
10;
3.17,
1;--Cic.
pro
Sest. 29, 62; 35, 75). But the plebeian magistrates were all
created
inauspicato (
Liv.
6.41,
5), at least after they were
elected by the tribes, and
a plebiscitum was a
lex inauspicata. On the other hand, they
were not at liberty to neglect omens sent by the gods (
auspicia oblativa), and a storm broke up a
concilium plebis as much as the Comitia: hence, too, the
obnuntiatio held good in the case of plebeian
assemblies. But perhaps the latter doctrine was put forward only for the
political convenience of the nobles, and never really admitted by the
commons (cf. Mommsen,
Röm. St. 2.275).
The tribune's duties, again, never included what was understood by the
imperium: he never had either military
command or civil jurisdiction; and his powers did not extend beyond the
first milestone from the city. If we distinguish the time before the
Hortensian law from that which followed it, we find that for the former the
tribunician power consisted essentially in three functions.
- 1. They had the right to summon meetings of the plebs, and to take
votes on resolutions proposed to them. Mommsen finds the basis of
their power to lie in the plebiscitum passed
by Icilius in 472, which was a general oath that they would tolerate
no interference with this; right on the part of the magistrates.
Private-persons also interrupting a tribune while speaking were
liable to punishment (V. Max. 9.5,
2; Plin.
Ep. 1.23, 2).
- 2. The right of intercessio, or
“veto,” as it is called (by a term which has little
or no ancient authority), was a right within due limits assigned to
every magistrate in relation to a colleague or an inferior
magistrate. But it acquired an importance in practice with the
tribunes, which transcended anything to be found elsewhere. It is
very doubtful whether it can have been acquired in its full extent
all at once, and the common opinion that it was at first limited to
the jus auxilii is not based on any
good authority. It seems more probable that it was only the outcome
of a series of struggles, which our materials do not allow us to
trace in detail. But it. acquired special importance in the case of
the tribunes, partly because they were so destitute of more active
functions, and partly because circumstances tended to call forth the
exercise of the veto by the tribunes, rather than by any other
magistrates. Undoubtedly it was mainly employed for auxilium, i. e.
for the protection of any citizen (patrician as well as plebeian:
Liv. 3.13, 9; 56, 5; 8.33, 7; 9.26, 16) against a magistrate's sentence. To secure that this
should be always accessible, the tribunes were forbidden to sleep
out of the city during their time of office (the Latin feast alone
being an exception), and required to leave their house-doors open
night and day. But we find one or two instances where tribunes were
exempted from this law by the senate, and sent on special business
of importance to generals in the field (Liv.
9.36, 14; 29.20). Their official duties were always discharged in
public, and at a later time the regular place for them was the
Porcia Basilica. But the right of veto extended also to proposals
brought before the people in the Comitia, as well as to those
brought before the plebs. In the latter case this was merely an
application of the right to stop a colleague's action: the
former seems more surprising, but it probably arose from the
need of hindering resolutions which would have interfered with
the rights of the commons. We find it employed in a consular
election as early as B.C. 483 (Dionys. A. R. 8.90), and in a prosecution by the
quaestors in B.C. 459 (Liv. 3.24,
7). The right of vetoing a
resolution of the senate, or rather the action of the magistrate
needful for its passing, is mentioned first in B.C. 445 (Liv. 4.6, 6),
but not as any new thing. At this time the tribunes. had no
right to enter the senate, but sat on their subsellia before the
doorways, and did not; interfere in the debate, but only during
or after the voting. The veto can hardly have been exercised so
long as the resolution of the senate was in theory simply advice
to the magistrates as to their action. It is probable therefore
that [p. 2.874]it was not employed until the
senatus auctoritas became
constitutionally necessary, in order that a resolution of the
commons should be binding on the whole community. If a tribune
vetoed the act of any magistrate beforehand, and it was still
done, it was not therefore invalidated, but the magistrate was
liable to punishment; but if the act was vetoed afterwards, it
became legally of no effect. One tribune could impose the veto,
and all the others could not remove it; but any one of the
tribunes by his veto could stop a colleague from carrying out
any threatened punishment for disregard of the veto.
The threat of punishment could naturally only be directed against
private persons when discharging some public function (Cic. Clu. 27, 74; cf. Sall. Jug. 34). We find,
however, numerous instances in which the tribunes summoned
persons to appear before a contio,
and there answer questions (Cic. in Phil. vi.;
ad Att. 1.14, 1; 14.20, 5; in
Vet. 10, 24: cf. Gel. 13.12,
6).
- 3. The right of intercessio would
have been meaningless without the support given to it by the right
of coercitio, or enforcing obedience,
and the latter was a necessary result of the claim of the commons to
self-defence. Every action, which was regarded as threatening to the
commons or their representatives the tribunes, was exposed to
punishment by fine, by seizure of goods, or even by death. The only
limits set to this power of the tribunes were those resulting from
the interposition of another colleague or from an appeal to the
people (provocatio). At first the
appeal lay solely to the commons; but as it was manifestly unfair
that a patrician should have to appeal to a body of which he was not
a member (cf. Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. 1.209), the
Twelve Tables provided that in capital cases the tribunes should
prosecute a citizen before the centuries; and that it should be only
in cases of fine that the tribes should hear the appeal. If we are
right in regarding, with Mommsen, the sacrosancta
potestas of the tribunes as based upon a revolutionary
movement of self-defence, it ought properly to have ceased when the
tribuneship, after the fall of the decemvirs, was recognised as a
permanent part of the constitution by the Valerio-Horatian law. As a
matter of fact both law and oath were employed (Liv. 3.55) in the re-establishment of the tribuneship;
and the two conceptions of “legitimate” and
“sacrosanct” power continued to exist side by side,
so that both Julius and Augustus were able to make use of the latter
for their own purposes.
The cessation of all strife between the orders, to which the Hortensian law
bore witness, marked the stage at which the tribunes became
magistrates of the community. From this time down to
the end of the Republic their power was practically always on the increase,
except for a very short period. In B.C. 81 Sulla greatly reduced it by
depriving them of all power of proposing laws, and by enacting that any one
who had held the tribuneship should thereby be disqualified from standing
for any other office, so excluding all men of energy and ambition (Liv.
Ep. lxxxix.; Veil. 2.30; Appian,
App. BC 1.100,
2.29). But in B.C. 70 Pompeius restored to the tribunes all their
old powers and. rights (Liv.
Ep. 97, &c.). Their
right of addressing the centuries remained limited to the cases where they
appeared as prosecutors, but their freedom of action in relation to the
tribes was unrestricted. Their right of veto was restricted only in a few
cases, as by the law of Gaius Gracchus in B.C. 123 in relation to the
consular provinces, and in trials by the
quaestiones
perpetuae (cf. Mommsen,
Röm. St.
1.262); practically it became a mere implement of political warfare, as
often used against as in the interests of the popular party. It was a result
of their magisterial position that they now frequently presided at the
election of magistrates, especially in the case of extraordinary
appointments. Whether the consul or the tribune presided was doubtless
generally determined by the law under which the appointment was made. With
regard to their legislative powers, after the Hortensian law there was
nothing to prevent legislation upon any matter being brought forward before
the tribes by the tribunes, though usage left some questions, especially
that of declaring war, to the centuries. Now, too, the
plebiscitum was described as
lex sive id plebi
scitum est, whence it came naturally to be often called simply
a
lex, as we see from the fragments of the
lex de repetundis and
de
agris dividundis. As for their power of
coercitio, this developed into a general right to prosecute
for offences against the community, especially in the case of offending
magistrates upon the expiry of their term of office (cf.
Liv. 9.26,
12;
41.7,
10). Most of the numerous
instances of their action which are recorded, have to do with consuls,
prosecuted for neglect of their duties in the field, or for gross instances
of misuse of their powers. But there are cases of the prosecution of private
citizens for offences against the state. When the law imposed upon the
magistrates the duty of punishing by fine a definite offence, it is
generally the aediles, not the tribunes, who take action. Sulla took away
from the tribunes their power of prosecuting, and conferred it upon the
quaestio majestatis: and this continued to
exist after the tribunes had had their powers restored to them, so that
after this date their action occurs rarely and exceptionally. Finally, as
magistrates, the tribunes acquired the right not only of sitting and
speaking in the senate, but also of convening and consulting it. But when
and how this came to be the practice, we cannot definitely determine. The
authorities are inconsistent and self-contra-dictory. Dionysius (
10.31) represents Icilius as attempting
to summon the senate in B.C. 456, but he nowhere indicates that the tribunes
really had this power. Livy represents a tribune as present in the senate in
B.C. 462 (3.9, 11), and as speaking there in B.C. 420 (4.44, 7). But the
first trustworthy instance is in B.C. 216 (
Liv.
22.61); and it is most reasonable to suppose that the power of
independent legislation given by the Hortensian law was accompanied by the
right to consult the senate beforehand as to proposed measures. It never,
however, became usual for a tribune to convene the senate instead of the
consuls or the praetor urbanus. Under the Empire the right was retained
(
Tac. Ann. 6.18), but rarely exercised.
Besides these definite powers, the tribunes often appear as joining in the
common action of the magistrates in times of national danger, or meeting
special emergencies
[p. 2.875]by their independent authority
(cf.
Cic. in Verr. 2.41, 100;
de Off. 3.20, 80;
Tac. Hist.
2.91;
Plin. Ep. 9.13,
19).
Under the Empire the tribuneship became a mere shadow of its former self, the
emperor exercising all its functions by virtue of his
tribunicia potestas. Pliny (
Plin.
Ep. 1.23) gives a very interesting account of the manner in which
it was regarded in his own day. It appears on the roll of magistracies in
the early part of the third century; but disappears after Alexander Severus
allowed candidates to proceed from the quaestorship to the praetorship. The
name is only retained in the superscription of formal addresses to the
senate as late as A.D. 423. Perhaps the title was still formally conferred
on a certain number of the senators. (Cf. Mommsen,
Röm.
Staatsrecht, 2.261-318.)
[
A.S.W]
