This order deserves to be exhumed from the oblivion into which it seems to have fallen, and is in strong contrast with the subsequent practice under Butler, Pope, Milroy, Hunter, Sheridan, Sherman, etc. This war order of McDowell's might well have been commended to the consideration of military satraps set, to rule over the people of the South in a time of “peace.” It did not prevent the burning of the entire village of Germantown, a few miles from Fairfax Court-House, but the citizens agreed that McDowell had made an honest effort to prevent depredations by his troops; and it gives me pleasure to make the statement, as it is the last time I will have occasion to make a similar one in regard to any of the Federal commanders who followed him. Pursuit of the enemy was not made after the battle in order to capture Washington or cross the Potomac, and as this omission has been the subject of much comment and criticism, I will make some observations on that head. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that our generals were inexperienced in command. In the next place, it must be conceded that a commanding general knows more about the condition of his troops and the obstacles in his way than any other can know; and for very obvious reasons he is debarred from making public at the time the reasons and conditions which govern his course. It must also be considered that he cannot know beforehand as much as the critics who form their judgment from the light of after events. Those, therefore, who ascertained some days after the battle what was the
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