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| Stephen A. Hurlbut. |
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The only hope of salvation seemed to be in the co-operation of the gunboats, which now might give them aid in fighting, or the help of Buell's vanguard, then on the opposite shore, or the advent of Lewis Wallace with his fine division,1 who had been anxiously expected all the afternoon.
As the columns were pushed back from one position to another, Grant anxiously listened for the noise of Wallace's cannon thundering on the flank of the Confederates.
Early in the morning he had sent him word to hold his troops in readiness to march at a moment's warning, “certainly not later than eleven o'clock.”
At half-past 11 Wallace received an order from his chief to move up and
take position “on the right of the army, and form a line of battle at a right angle with the river.”
Time passed on; the Confederates were pressing hard; the disorganized brigades were in great confusion and falling back toward the river's brink.
Yet Wallace did not come, Grant sent one of his staff to hurry him up. He did not come.
Then he sent his adjutant-general (Captain Rawlins) to urge him forward, and yet he did not appear.
Night had fallen, and the discomfited army lay huddled in great peril on the banks of the Tennessee, when the seemingly tardy General arrived.
He was afterward censured for the delay, for the impression went abroad that, had he promptly responded to Grant's call, victory for the National army might have been achieved on that day, for he was a skillful commander, and his men, fresh and spirited, had been well tried, and found sufficient in all things.
A few words of explanation, afterward given, made the record of that prompt and gallant officer clear to the apprehension of his chief and the people, and showed that the whole delay had occurred in consequence of a blunder of omission committed by Grant's messenger who bore the order for his advance.2
1 Wallace's division was composed of three brigades, stationed on the road from Crump's Landing to Purdy, the first at the Landing, the second two miles out, and the third two miles and a half farther, at Adamsville. Owing to the pushing back of an Ohio brigade, that had been sent out to reconnoiter in the direction of Purdy, his division marched as far as Adamsville in a drenching rain, on Friday night (April 4), and there a brigade was left. The first brigade, commanded by Colonel Morgan L. Smith, was composed of the Eleventh and Twenty-fourth Indiana and Eighth Missouri. The second, commanded by Colonel John M. Thayer, was composed of the First Nebraska, Twenty-third Indiana, and the Fifty-sixth and Fifty-eighth Ohio. The third brigade, under Colonel Charles Whittlesy, was composed of the Twentieth, Sixty-eighth, Seventy-sixth, and Seventy-eighth Ohio. To the division were attached Thurber's Missouri and Thompson's Indiana Batteries; also the third battalion of the Fifth Ohio, and third battalion of the Eleventh Illinois cavalry.
2 General Grant, as we have seen, had ordered General Wallace to place his division “on the right of the army.” That position in the morning was about four miles from Pittsburg Landing. The messenger who bore the order not only omitted to inform Wallace that the “right” had been beaten back, and was thus much nearer Pittsburg Landing, but had told him (as he doubtless supposed truly) that the Confederates were being repulsed at all points. Believing it to be yet in its morning position at the right of Shiloh Meeting-house, Wallace promptly put his whole division (excepting two regiments left at Crump's Landing) in motion half an hour after receiving the order, by the nearest route to the supposed “right of the army.” When he had proceeded, as rapidly as the miry roads would allow. for about six miles, the roar of battle quickening the steps of his soldiers, he was overtaken by Captain Rawlins and another, and from them first learned that the National troops had been beaten back toward the river. His route would take him to an isolated and dangerous position in the rear of the Confederates, so he retraced his steps, crossed over to the river road near Snake Creek, by the nearest possible route, passed that stream over a bridge, and took his assigned position on the right of the army. He had marched and countermarched, in consequence of misinformation and lack of information, about sixteen miles, which had consumed the whole afternoon.
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