Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Rice's battery was directed to accompany Chalmers's division of cavalry in the advance, and to keep as close to the river as possible, to protect the Undine and Venus from any attack from above. While Morton's battery was ordered to guard the rear, supported by Buford's division of cavalry, and prevent the approach of any gunboats from below. Our naval forces were instructed to move slowly and cautiously up the river, keeping under cover of the land batteries. It was understood that a combined attack would be made by land and water upon Johnsonville.

The announcement of Hood's army crossing the Tennessee river at Florence, Alabama, on his happily conceived, but ill-fated raid into Middle Tennessee, had been received by our command. General Forrest [472] expressed the desire to clear the river of all obstructions with his navy and land batteries, thus facilitating Hood's advance movement.

A steady rain began to fall. The roads, naturally rough and hilly, became miry and difficult to pass with artillery. Frequently, at sudden bends in the river, the road would diverge and throw our land forces some distance out of range, and from cover of the gunboat and transport. Our command encamped the night of the 1st south of the crossing of the Memphis and Clarksville railroad over the Tennessee river, the gunboat and transport anchoring under shelter of our batteries.

The location of General Bell's encampment was some two miles north of Morton's battery, in a large cypress grove, near the river bank. As we subsequently learned, this gallant command, always a favorite with the artillery, had pitched their oil-cloths and blankets — they had no tents — as best they could to protect themselves from the threatening rain. Some were drying themselves before the blazing pine fires, others were preparing their scanty meals, while others, from the fatigue of the march, had fallen asleep, and, no doubt, were dreaming of dear ones at home, or “the girl they left behind them,” when suddenly the roar as of distant thunder was quickly followed by the crashing of the cypress trees above and around, caused by the explosion of thirty-two-pounder shells right in the camp, producing confusion and naturally a first-class panic, not only among the horses, but among the men. Gallant soldiers and otherwise intrepid officers could be seen running in almost every direction, frequently running over one another, carrying with them the first thing they could lay hands upon; one had a saddle, another a camp-kettle, a bridle or a musket, while still others were dashing through the woods on horseback without saddle, and frequently without saddle or bridle, while they themselves were without coats, and often hatless. The advance of these wild men on horses struck the artillery camp, and, arousing the officers and men, declared “the gunboats were right down there in the woods, and moving right into our camp.” Some who had lost their horses and their way out of the dense forest, concealed themselves behind logs and stumps, after awhile crawled back and extinguished the fires, and a dead silence reigned throughout the camp.

Several gunboats, approaching from below, were attracted by the bright camp-fires, and, shelling the woods with great accuracy, caused this amusing incident, which was so often laughed over by the boys.

It rained continually throughout the night, making the roads still more difficult for artillery, especially with half-fed and worn-out horses, so that our fleet steaming ahead of land batteries precipitated an unequaled [473] engagement between Captain Gracey, commanding the Undine, and the Federal gunboats.

For a more minute and interesting description of this engagement we take pleasure in presenting Captain Gracey's account, which we desire to incorporate in full in our paper. The following letter will explain itself:

Clarksville, Tenn., April 29, 1882.
Captain John W. Morton, Nashville, Tenn.:

My Dear Captain,--On the receipt of your letter asking me to relate my adventures during the Johnsonville campaign, I supposed you wished to rub up your recollection, and that you would after reading my letter incorporate into your papers such parts as you considered of sufficient interest. I cannot, therefore, permit my letter to be read before the Society unless you will make this explanation.

Truly your friend,

F. P. Gracey.

Captain Gracey's paper.

Our command encamped the night of the 2d two miles below and across the river from Reynoldsburg, which is about four miles from Johnsonville.

The cold rain up to the morning of the 3d had been incessant. The tramp of the cavalrymen over already muddy and broken roads made them almost impassable for artillery, and we were no doubt stuck fast on some red clay hill when Captain Gracey's boat went down, for we were unable to join General Forrest a half or three-quarters of a mile north of Johnsonville until near noon. In the meantime General Forrest had made a close reconnoissance of the positions along the river bank, above and below Johnsonville. A glance at the map, for which we are indebted to Mr. W. W. Southgate, civil engineer, Nashville, the brief outlines of Johnsonville will be understood.

There was no railroad bridge spanning the stream at that time, the railroad terminating a short distance from the east bank of the river, which here is 500 yards wide. The town attained much importance from its location as a distributing point by river and rail for army supplies and troops during the war.

The map will show that it is situated just southward of Trace creek, [480] where a line of rifle pits envelops the main encampment, which also guards the approaches to the town and river landing from the south and east. The river bank rises gently from the water's edge southward and east, in the distance of 300 yards reaching an elevation of about forty feet, and terminating in a hill some seventy-five feet above low water mark, upon which was constructed the lower battery. A ridge diverging eastward and south from this position terminates in a plateau some half mile distant, which is surmounted by a hill overlooking the lower fort and commanding the river for some distance northward and southward. Upon this eminence was constructed an extensive redoubt, armed with heavy ordnance. This was known as the upper fort. The western bank of the river, upon which our positions are marked on the map, is abrupt near the river, about twenty-five feet above the level of the water, and descends, as is usual with all Southern rivers, as it recedes westward. That side of the river was thickly covered with a heavy cypress growth. The trees had been felled immediately in front of Johnsonville, some distance backward to give an open view and range for their guns. The Federal position had many defensive advantages, and rendered an attack upon it hazardous, almost beyond hope of success. Forrest was never daunted in any effort, and soon put on foot a vigorous offensive movement against the position.

Four twelve-pounder Howitzers, which had just joined us with Mabry's brigade from Paris, was directed to position some half or three-quarters of a mile above Johnsonville. The river bank being higher near the water's edge, and receding backward, afforded natural protection. Brigadier-General H. B. Lyon, an accomplished artillery officer and a man of great dash and energy, took immediate supervision of this position and aided Captain J. B. Thrall in preparing redoubts for his guns before Morton's arrival. Chambers were sunk for his guns, and embrasures cut through the solid parapet in his front. This position was perfectly protected from the gunboats, but opened to a direct and plunging fire from both Federal forts, especially from the upper fort.

Colonel E. W. Rucker, who had much experience in locating and planting heavy artillery at Island No.10, on the Mississippi river during the first year of the war, had to cut out similar chambers for Morton's battery, some half mile or three-quarters below Johnsonville, and nearly opposite, but below the mouth of Trace creek. Rice's battery was directed to position near the mouth of Cypress creek, two miles below, to prevent any gunboats from approaching from the north.

On rejoining General Forrest at the positions prepared by Colonel [481] Rucker for Morton's battery, he directed that these guns should be immediately placed in the chambers dug out by Colonel Rucker. Morton requested General Forrest to permit him to inspect the river bank from this position up to where Thrall's battery had been placed. This being granted, with an escort from Colonel Rucker we rode rapidly through the Cypress swamp and slough which runs a little distance, but parallel with the river. When reaching a point directly opposite to Johnsonville, we dismounted and crept up close to the river bank, carefully concealing ourselves behind trees and logs. We could plainly discover and counted two gunboats, eleven steamboats and a number of barges tied up at the landing, and one gunboat was plying in midstream; her guns could be plainly seen through her port-holes, and her cannoneers were noticed moving around. Passengers were idly chatting, smoking and lounging upon the decks of the transports. Some ladies were seen coming down the bank, evidently about to embark on some one or other of the transports, several of which were getting up steam. Laborers were engaged in unloading the steamboats and barges, immense quantities of Government stores lined the river bank, and a large warehouse, extending several hundred yards along the shore, seemed densely packed with army supplies. As we have stated, the river bank being several feet higher, close to the water, and receding gradually for fifty or one hundred yards, gave excellent cover under which to move close up without being observed, and presented natural breastworks, which offered protection from the enemy's sharp-shooters across the river.

We were not long in making up our mind as to the most advantageous position, and, hurrying back, reported to General Forrest that we had selected a position just opposite Johnsonville, and desired to take the four rifle guns of Morton's battery. General Forrest objecting said — we suppose for the first time in his whole career--“No, Captain, the position is too close and hazardous. They will destroy you from their gunboats and from the forts.” We explained to the General that our experience in fighting gunboats had proved that the closer you could get to them the more effective your own shot, and the less danger from theirs, as they invariably shoot too high.

After urging this position for some little while as the most available, General Forrest consented that two of the guns might be carried, while the other two should be left in the works prepared by Colonel Rucker. Briggs's section of Rice's battery was placed in the chambers dug out for these two guns. A detail was readily furnished from Colonel Rucker's command to open a road up the slough, and it was with great [482] difficulty that we could move the guns through this cypress swamp; often had to lift and carry them over fallen timber and driftwood, through water and deep mud, and when nearly opposite the point selected, the horses were detached, and the guns pushed some hundred yards by hand near the crest of the bank, where we were in easy range of the gunboats, steamboats, and the immense accumulation of stores, and almost directly under point blank range from the lower fort. General Forrest was evidently apprehensive for our safety in this, as he thought, exposed position, which he evinced in his order to Captain Thomas H. Sneed, when he directed this trusty officer to take his glasses and crawl to the river bank, conceal himself behind a log, and report the effect of the shot from the forts and gunboats on Morton, when the signal to fire was made known. We learned subsequently from Captain Sneed that General Forrest remarked to him, “I'm afraid they will knock John Morton to pieces up there with their big guns.”

The several commands of cavalry were concealed behind logs and trees and in ravines in easy supporting distance of the batteries, while a detachment of sharpshooters were selected and deployed close to the river bank to oppose similar forces stationed on the opposite side of the river.

Morton's orders from General Forrest were to open with these two guns as soon as in position, which would be the signal to open along the line. We directed the pieces to be loaded and moved cautiously by hand to the river bank, when both guns were trained upon the gunboat plying in mid-stream almost within a stone's-throw of us, they little suspecting the lurking danger so close at hand. This signal being understood by the several battery commanders and the cavalry supports, we gave Zarring the order to “fire,” which sent two rifled solid shots crashing through the sides of the gunboat, when immediately our guns from above and below were heard. Two more shots from Zarring's guns in quick succession were directed on the gunboat. It was then discovered that steam was escaping from her ports and her crew deserting her by jumping into the river, as she headed ashore. Now followed round after round from Thrall on the right, Brown and Briggs on the left and Zarring in the center. The troops joined in the din with their rifles, and in five minutes the enemy were running to and fro in the wildest confusion. Some ladies just approaching the transports were seen to rush frantically up the hillside toward the fort. The transports rang their bells and sounded their whistles, the gunboats opened and the heavy guns from the forts burst forth with a storm of shells, which [483] went screaming through the cypress trees, tearing the limbs like a tempest. The sky seemed darkened with the deadly missiles flying from fifty guns. The striking of our shot and shell against the enemy's boat could be distinctly heard. Tree-tops were pierced by the enemy's shell and dropped upon our guns, but were quickly removed and the firing resumed. The big guns from the forts bore down heavily upon Thrall, shivering the rammer staffs in the hands of his men, but sunk deep into the loose soil and exploded without harm. Soon the agonizing screams of the wounded and scalded were heard across the broad river, when we called the attention of Colonel Rucker to a gunboat in flames. The Colonel, waving aloft his sword, cried out, “Three cheers for Morton's Artillery!” Quickly other boats were afire. Generals Forrest, Buford and Bell now came up to our position, puffing and blowing bringing with them by hand the section of Morton's battery--Lieutenant Brown commanding — from the works below, and all full of enthusiasm. General Forrest now acted as gunner, General Buford, No. 1, loaded the piece and General Bell, No. 4, fired it. They took the greatest delight in their novel work. We had a distinguished lot of cannoneers, though awkward in the “step.”

General Forrest would cry out, “Load, ready, fire!” with the vim of an old artillerist. As the gun was discharged he would call out to Major Tom Allison, of his staff, to “note the effect of the shot.” Once the Major sang out, “Too short, General,” when Forrest replid, “Good shot, boys! ricochet; it will go right through her!” and as he would strike too high, to use his own phrase, would “elevate the breech of the gun lower.” At each discharge the gun would recoil some distance, as it was on an inclined plane. Forrest would cry out, “Run her up, boys!” when Buford and Bell, assisted by the cannoneers, would run the gun by hand into position.

In the meantime Morton ordered Zarring to turn his guns upon the upper fort, and soon he was exploding his shells within its walls, though more than a mile distant and elevated at least one hundred feet above his level.

Thrall's guns were turned upon two transports lying a short distance above the landing, and soon succeeded in setting them afire; their cables burning, they drifted with the current, and, coming in contact with other transports and the barges tied up at the landing, they, too, were speedily in flames. In about two hours from the firing of the signal gun every transport and barge was on fire. We now directed our batteries to the destruction of the warehouses and supplies ashore. [484] Observing a large pile of hay, a few well-directed shells from Brown's guns kindled it into a consuming fire that soon spread to vast heaps of bacon, flour and corn adjoining. Lieutenant Briggs discovered a large pile of barrels under tarpaulins nearly opposite his position. A few well-trained shots from his James rifles, with percussion shells, had the happiest results; for soon a blue blaze, unmistakably whiskey, was quickly seen to dart from under the tarpaulins. As this was observed along the line a loud shout went forth, though many doubtless envied the flames as they swallowed up the fluid which was rare to the boys. Soon the barrels began to burst with loud explosions, and the “red” liquor ran in torrents of living flame down the hillside, spreading the conflagration in its course toward the river, and filling the air with the blended yet distinctly recognizable fumes of burning spirits, sugar, coffee, and meat. The Confederates had been on short rations all day, yet some of them declared at night that the fumes from this enormous alcoholic roast made them feel like the traveller in “Gil Blas,” as if they had been eating heartily.

Meantime all the warehouses and buildings were ignited, and the noise from the explosion of the vast quantity of ordnance stores reminded one of a desperate conflict at a distance between contending armies. The night was made almost as luminous by the conflagration as the day, under which our troops were enabled to move out of the dense forest to the main Lexington road, some two miles distant, where the train was established to feed our forces, and encamp for the night. Briggs's section, Rice's battery, Brown's section, and Morton's battery were left on the river, supported by Rucker's brigade, throughout the night.

On the following morning Morton accompanied General Forrest back to the river, and viewed the immense destruction of property and subsistence at the time with eager satisfaction — the lonely forts gloomily surmounting and silently guarding with their wide-mouthed guns broad heaps of ashes and charred, smoking ruins. Gunboats, transports, and barges all had gone down in flame. The extensive warehouses filled with supplies, and other buildings, had ceased to be, as well as the immense piles of stores that covered acres of the surrounding slope the day before.

We now ordered Brown and Briggs to withdraw their guns and rejoin their batteries. As this was being done, a regiment of colored troops dashed out from their works and displayed themselves in wild and amusing antics. Throwing off their coats and hats, with sleeves [485] rolled up and clenched fists presented at the despised “rebs,” who had caused such complete destruction, they made the morning air ring with oaths and offensive epithets. One round from the artillery and a volley from Rucker's troopers scattered the howling crowd and sent them hastily away in the wildest confusion.

As results of this raid we recount the destruction at Johnsonville of three gunboats, eleven transports, many of them new, and on their first trip, and some eighteen barges; and of buildings, quartermasters' and commissary's stores, according to Federal estimate, to the value of over eight millions of dollars. The gunboat, Undine, had been previously captured and destroyed, as well as the transports, Cheesman and Mazeppa, and three barges, from which a large amount of subsistence, blankets and shoes, as already stated, had been secured. This had been accomplished with the loss of two twenty-pounder “Parrotts,” which were captured with the Venus upon her recapture. These guns, however, had been captured by Forrest's cavalry from the enemy at Fort Pillow. Two men from the artillery were slightly wounded, and two men killed, and two from the cavalry.

The following is an incomplete list of the officers and men who took part in this raid:

Lieutenant S. K. Watkins, Ordnance Officer, and R. K. Blakemore, Adjutant, rendered valuable service.

We regret not being able to furnish a list of the names of the non-commissioned officers and men of the several batteries who took part in this engagement, especially the names of those who acted with conspicuous gallantry. No list could be had except Morton's battery.

This account of the operations of Forrest's command at Johnsonville was written at the suggestion and request of Captain W. 0. Dodd, President of the Louisville Branch Southern Historical Society, to vindicate the truth of history and supply omissions and correct the errors of the work entitled Campaigns of Lieutenant-General N. B. Forrest, written by Jordan and Pryor. This book gives the credit of the management of the artillery to that gallant soldier and personal friend, Colonel Rucker, who would not deprive a brother officer, subaltern or private of anything due them, and fails to mention the fact that Captain Morton was chief of artillery or was present during the fight, and is utterly silent on the subject, and accredits various things to others than the right parties.

An utter indifference, so far as personal mention was concerned, to what was thus erroneously written, as well as the explanation given the writer of this article by General Forrest, has prevented any attempt to set the matter right. General Forrest said the error was made in cutting down matter from two volumes to one, and that the omission was not noticed until after the publication of the work. [488]

In this work it is stated (page 601): “Colonel Rucker, who had great difficulty in getting his pieces into position,” etc., etc. The facts are as hereinbefore set forth. The guns were Morton's guns, under his immediate orders and control. Colonel Rucker did just what is set out in this paper; furnished escort and working details; accompanied Morton to the central position which Morton alone had selected, and supported the guns with his command of cavalry.

On page 601 occurs this statement: “Seeing that daylight would be upon them before their work could be completed,” etc., etc. This statement, following the one above quoted, makes the impression that Morton's battery was placed in position on the night of November 2d by Colonel Rucker. The fact is, Morton reached the field with his old battery at noon on the 3d, and two guns were placed in the redoubt prepared by Rucker, and two carried to the position selected by Morton in person between 2 and 3 o'clock P. M.

On page 602 this statement is made: “Forrest then, having the watches of his several subordinate commanders compared and set uniformly, ordered that his batteries should open fire simultaneously and precisely at 2 P. M.” * * * * * “Meantime General Forrest anxiously surveyed the scene with his glasses until the moment of action had come, then, aiming with his own eye and hand a piece in Morton's battery at the appointed instant, ten pieces carefully trained upon the gunboats at the landing were discharged with such harmony that it could not be discerned there was more than one report--one heavy gun,” etc., etc., etc.

Now, the fact is, when Morton selected the new position and opened the fight, that was the signal for the opening of fire from the right and left batteries. Forrest did not aim the piece “with his own eye and hand.” He was one-half or three-quarters of a mile down the river, and did not reach Morton's position until the transports and gunboats were afire, when he brought the two other guns of Morton's battery and took position alongside of Zarring's section.

The full record of honorable and heroic deeds done by Forrest and Rucker does not need any adventitious aids from fulsome eulogy, or the wrongful appropriation of the acts of others.

Yours, respectfully,