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X. A campaign of manoeuvres.
July, 18-march, 1864
I. The march to the Rapidan.
The safe retreat of
Lee from
Maryland into
Virginia imposed upon
General Meade the necessity of an immediate pursuit.
This he undertook with a promptitude that was very creditable, considering the trying campaign that had just closed.
On recrossing the
Potomac,
Lee fell back into the Shenandoah Valley, placing his force on the line of
Opequan Creek— the same position he had held during the autumn after his retreat from
Antietam.
Meade's plan of advance into
Virginia was confessedly modelled on that of
McClellan in November, 1862; and it was probably the best that could have been adopted.
As a problem in that branch of the art of war which is named logistics, or the supplying of armies, it was not considered practicable to subsist a force of the magnitude of the Army of the Potomac by the means available in a direct advance up the Shenandoah Valley.
It remained, therefore, to march by the route of the
London Valley; and by hugging the
Blue Ridge closely,
Meade hoped, by vigorous action, to bring the
Confederate
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force to battle under advantageous conditions before it should break through the mountains.
1
The army crossed the
Potomac on ponton-bridges at
Harper's Ferry and
Berlin on the 17th and 18th July, and followed southward, skirting the
Blue Ridge; while
Lee, conforming to this manoeuvre, fell back up the Shenandoah Valley.
The movement of
Meade was made with much vigor—indeed with so much vigor that, on reaching Union, on the 20th of June, he was compelled to halt a day, lest by further advance he should dangerously uncover his right; but even with this delay, the army, on reaching Manassas Gap on the 22d, was so well up with the enemy, that it gained that point while the long Confederate column was still passing on the other side of the mountains.
This, therefore, seemed an excellent opening for a flank attack, and it was fully appreciated by
Meade, who directed five corps on Manassas Gap—the Third Corps, now under command of
General French, being in advance.
The selection of the leader for an enterprise demanding the most energetic qualities of mind—seeing that it was necessary to force
Lee to battle under circumstances in which he would naturally wish to avoid it—was very unfortunate; and by his mismanagement
General French succeeded in depriving the army of one of the few really advantageous opportunities it ever had to strike a decisive blow.
A slight observing force had been left at the
Gap, but this was expelled, and the corps passed through on the evening of the 22d, prepared to advance on
Front Royal in the morning.
But, on moving forward to strike the enemy's line of retreat, the corps-commander acted with such feebleness,
2 as to allow the rear-guard to delay him
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the whole day, so that it was evening before he penetrated to the
Confederate line of battle at
Front Royal.
Next morning, when
Meade hoped to give battle,
Lee had made good his retreat.
3 Upon this, as nothing was now to be hoped from the movement on hand, the march was conducted leisurely towards the
Rappahannock, and
Lee retired to the vicinity of
Culpepper.
In this position a considerable period of repose followed; and this inaction was imposed not more by the necessity of resting and recruiting the army, than because both sides found it necessary to draw detachments from the armies in
Virginia for other needs.
From the army of
Meade a considerable body was taken to send to
South Carolina, and a large force withdrawn to dispatch to New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft, the attempted execution of which, some time before, had given rise to extensive riots in that city.
On the other hand, the severe pressure that
Rosecrans was bringing to bear upon the central army of the
Confederacy under
General Bragg, in
Tennessee, prompted the detachment from
Lee's army of the corps of
Longstreet, for the purpose of throwing it into the scale as a make-weight against the
Union force.
This withdrawal took place early in September, and necessarily reduced the
Confederates to a purely defensive attitude in
Virginia.
Soon afterwards,
General Meade became aware of
Longstreet's departure, and he then sent his cavalry across the
Rappahannock, drove the enemy over the
Rapidan, and subsequently followed with his whole force, occupying
Culpepper and the regions between the
Rappahannock and the
Rapidan, the latter river now becoming the
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dividing line between the opposing armies.
As the position held by
Lee on the south bank of the
Rapidan was a very advantageous one,
Meade's projects of advance turned towards a flanking movement; but just at the time he had matured a plan of operations, he was informed from
Washington that it was found necessary to still further weaken the Army of the Potomac by the withdrawal of two corps to forward to
Tennessee, in which section of the theatre of war the military situation had been seriously compromised by
Rosecrans' defeat at
Chickamauga—a defeat to which the force sent from
Virginia under
Longstreet had in no small degree contributed.
The corps taken were the Eleventh and Twelfth, and they were put under the command of
General Hooker.
This, in turn, reduced
Meade to a strict defensive; for though he received some accessions to his numbers from the draft, yet these added little to his real strength, the conscripts being raw and unreliable, and large numbers deserted at the first opportunity.
It was evident, therefore, that he could undertake no considerable operation until the return of the troops sent to New York.
But when, towards the middle of October, these finally came back, and
General Meade was about to initiate an offensive movement, he found himself suddenly thrown once more on the defensive by the bold initiative of
Lee, in an operation the events of which I shall now relate.
Ii.
The flank march on Centreville.
Made aware of the heavy deduction of force from the Army of the Potomac, but exaggerating probably its extent,
Lee early in October determined on an offensive movement that should have the effect of driving
Meade back from the line of the
Rapidan.
With this object he resolved to move around his opponent's right flank, and endeavor to interpose
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between him and
Washington.
4 He counted that if he should be able in this situation to seriously cripple
Meade, it would exhaust the season of active operations and detain the Army of the Potomac on the frontier for the winter, during which time it would be possible for
Lee to still further reen-force from his own command the heavily pressed Confederate Army of the West.
In execution of this plan,
Lee crossed the
Rapidan on Friday, October 9th, and taking ‘circuitous and concealed roads,’
5 passed by way of Madison Courthouse quite to
Meade's right.
Stuart, with
Hampton's cavalry division, moved on the right of the column, while
Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry division, with a detachment of infantry, was left to hold the lines south of the
Rapidan and mask the turning movement.
The first positive intimation which
General Meade had of
Lee's intention was an attack made upon his advance posts on the right at
James City, held by a portion of
Kilpatrick's cavalry division and some infantry of the Third Corps.
This force was driven in by
Stuart on the 10th, and fell back on
Culpepper; and it being then clear to
Meade that his right was already turned, he that night sent back his trains, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 11th, began a retrograde movement across the
Rappahannock.
The march was accomplished during that night, and the bridge at Rappahannock Station blown up.
Lee with his main body reached
Culpepper on the 11th to find that the whole army had moved behind the
Rappahannock some hours before.
He then halted during the rest of the 11th at
Culpepper, while
Stuart pressed the rear of
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Meade's column, which was covered by the cavalry under
Pleasonton.
Buford's division of troopers had crossed the
Rapidan at Germanna Ford on the night of the 10th, after the
Confederates had begun their movement, but was met on the morning of the 11th by
Fitz Hugh Lee's horsemen; whereupon
Buford, falling back over the
Rapidan, united at
Brandy Station with
Pleasonton's main body of cavalry, and then followed the army across the
Rappahannock.
On the following morning, Monday, October 12th,
Lee advanced from
Culpepper; but finding that
Meade had been too quick for him, and that his first turning movement had failed, owing to the rapid retreat of his opponent, he determined, instead of following up
Meade by the direct line of his retreat, to make a new flank movement by routes to the west, ‘with the design,’ as he says in his report, ‘of reaching the Orange and Alexandria railroad north of the
Rappahannock, and interrupting the retreat of the enemy.’
This operation had very near been successful, owing to the uncertainty of
General Meade as to his antagonist's real purpose, and the false movements resulting therefrom.
Having put the
Rappahannock between himself and
Lee,
Meade conceived that his retreat might have been premature, especially as he became aware on the morning of the 12th that
Lee had halted at
Culpepper, and it was uncertain whether he intended to do more.
Accordingly, that afternoon the main body of the army, consisting of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, with
Buford's cavalry division, was countermarched to the south bank of the
Rappahannock to proceed back towards
Culpepper.
General Meade designed to give battle if
Lee was really there.
But, as has been seen, the latter had that morning left
Culpepper to plant himself by a circuitous turning movement on
Meade's line of retreat towards
Washington.
Thus was presented the curious
contretemps, that while on the 12th the main body of the army was marching southward to meet
Lee at
Culpepper,
Lee was moving rapidly northward on parallel roads to lay hold of
Meade's communications
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But of this mistake, which if prolonged much longer might have proved fatal to
Meade, he had that afternoon convincing proof in an event which fell out in this wise.
While the three corps named had been sent on the countermarch towards
Culpepper, the Third Corps under
General French had been left to guard the line of the
Rappahannock, and took position at Freeman's Ford, while the cavalry division of
General Gregg watched the passage of the
Upper Rappahannock at Sulphur or Warrenton Springs.
Now
Lee, continuing his northward march, on the afternoon of the 12th struck
Sulphur Springs, and there crossed his columns to the north bank of the
Rappahannock; so that
Gregg found himself assailed by the van of the enemy advancing towards
Warrenton, and was driven off after having been somewhat severely handled.
Of course, on receiving this intelligence from
Gregg, the real nature of
Lee's movement was instantly disclosed to
Meade, who sent an immediate order recalling the three corps from their untimely move on
Culpepper.
This order found these corps in bivouac on the road to
Culpepper, and reached them towards midnight of Monday, when they at once began a rapid retrograde movement to the north of the
Rappahannock.
It is easy to see that from this misunderstanding not only was the general retrograde movement to meet the
Confederate advance seriously compromised, but the Third Corps, remaining alone on the north bank of the
Rappahannock, was thrown quite out of position and exposed to destruction by an overwhelming force.
But
Lee, unaware of the true state of affairs, did not turn aside to molest that isolated force, but continued his northward movement, and by a night march of the three corps, the different corps of the Army of the Potomac were, on the morning of Tuesday the 13th, again concentrated on the north bank of the
Rappahannock.
As on the morning of the 13th the opposing forces were both on the north side of the
Rappahannock, there ensued between the two armies a close race—Lee aiming, by a flank march, to strike in on
Meade's line of retreat by the
Orange
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and Alexandria Railroad, and
Meade determined to checkmate him by a rapid retrograde movement.
The latter, during that day, fell back along the line of the railroad, and
Lee, continuing his advance from
Sulphur Springs by parallel routes to the west, struck
Warrenton in the afternoon.
Here he halted during the rest of that day to supply the troops with provisions.
6
Lee's plan now was to advance from
Warrenton in two columns—the left column (the corps of
Hill) to move northward by the
Warrenton turnpike to New Baltimore, and then strike due eastward to lay hold of the railroad at Bristoe Station; the right column (the corps of
Ewell) to advance by roads to the east of the route of
Hill, passing by
Auburn and
Greenwich, and uniting with
Hill at Bristoe Station.
This project was put in execution on the morning of the 14th; but whether
Lee would be able to make good his intent of reaching
Bristoe before his antagonist, would, of course, depend on the activity of the latter.
Meade, with the uncertainty of what
Lee was about, had the interior line;
Lee, with a definite purpose and clear line of conduct, had the exterior and longer route to pursue.
Anticipating the sequel so far as to say that
Meade beat
Lee in the race, passing
Bristoe with nearly his whole force before
Hill and
Ewell were able to strike his line of retreat at that point, it remains to describe some interesting complications that arose out of the proximity in which the two armies were manoeuvring.
In the retrograde movement of the
Union army, on the 13th, it was appointed that the Second Corps under
General Warren should, after halting at
Fayetteville until the Third Corps under
General French was withdrawn, cover the rear of the army; and its route was directed to be by way of
Auburn to Catlett's Station, and thence northward along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
In this duty,
Kilpatrick's division of cavalry was to co-operate.
Now, on the evening of the 13th, when
Lee reached
Warrenton,
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Warren reached
Auburn, distant only five miles to the east, and there he bivouacked with his corps on the south side of
Cedar Run.
To cover his rear from attack from the direction of
Warrenton, where
Lee was that night (unknown to, but not unsuspected by
Warren),
Caldwell's division with three batteries
7 was placed on the heights of
Cedar Run.
Before dawn of the 14th, while the head of
Warren's column was under way crossing
Cedar Run,
Caldwell's troops lit camp fires on the hill-top to cook breakfast; and in this duty they were engaged when most unexpectedly a battery opened upon them from their rear and directly on the road prescribed for the movement of
Warren's column towards Catlett's Station.
8 This attack, sufficiently bewildering to those upon whom it fell, will readily be understood in the light of the following rather amusing incident.
Stuart with the Confederate cavalry had the day previous met the head of
French's column, and, being forced back, retired towards Catlett's Station.
But on
Sykes' corps moving up the railroad,
Stuart found himself corralled between the two main Union columns, and bivouacked within two miles of
General Meade's headquarters and not more than four hundred yards from where
Caldwell's division was encamped, sending messengers through the
Union lines to notify his friends of his situation.
When
Caldwell's men lit their fires,
Stuart opened on them.
Unseen himself in the valley, veiled by mist and the gray morning light, he had yet a plain view of the
Union force on the illuminated hill-tops, and for a few minutes, till the troops could be moved to the opposite side of the hill under cover, the fire from the Confederate battery told with fatal effect.
9 Having thus paid his compliments, the rollicsome
sabreur escaped by moving to the rear around the
Union rear-guard.
But no sooner had
Caldwell moved to cover on the opposite
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side of the hill than his command was opened on from that side also, the fire coming from the direction of the
Warrenton road.
The source of this new attack will be readily understood from the already mentioned intentions of
Lee; for it has been seen that from
Warrenton Ewell's column was to proceed by way of
Auburn on
Greenwich, and having moved very early in the morning, it was his advance that struck
Warren's force.
10 The moment was now a critical one for
Warren, for his advance division under
General Hays, which had crossed to the north side of
Cedar Run, found itself opposed by a hostile force at the same time that
Caldwell's division, on the south side, was fired upon, and the corps appeared to be surrounded and its retreat cut off.
11 But the actual condition of things was not as bad as appeared.
Little more than the mere van of
Ewell's column, and that mainly cavalry, had yet come up: the crossing of
Cedar Run was not interrupted;
Hays, who was on the north side, having thrown out a couple of regiments, repulsed the enemy, and cleared the route over which the corps was to advance;
12 and finally, when the head of
Ewell's main column came up, it was held in check by skilful deployments of cavalry and infantry and the practice of the batteries, till the rest of
Warren's
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force had crossed
Cedar Run, when he continued his prescribed march—
Caldwell's division covering the retreat, and closely skirmishing with the enemy.
13 Ewell did not follow up directly on the rear of
Warren's column, for his prescribed course took him to the left to move by
Greenwich and join
Hill.
14
Meantime, the whole army was pressing on along the railroad towards
Centreville, the point of concentration, where
General Meade had resolved to halt and give battle.
Warren, as has been seen, brought up the rear.
As
Lee's purpose was to strike Bristoe Station before
Meade should have passed that point, he pressed the advance of
Hill and
Ewell.
When Hill, however, after moving eastward from New Baltimore, in the afternoon approached
Bristoe, the whole army, with the exception of
Warren's corps, had got beyond that point, and as the head of his column came up, the Fifth Corps, under
General Sykes, had just crossed
Broad Run.
On seeing this,
Hill threw out a line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when suddenly he found his attention called off by the apparition at that movement of
Warren, who, after engaging
Ewell at
Auburn in the manner indicated, had advanced rapidly along the railroad, and reached Bristoe Station only to encounter
Hill.
Warren's position was again a critical one; for, instead of finding Bristoe Station held by the Fifth Corps, as had been
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indicated to him in
General Meade's orders, he discovered that he was there alone, in the immediate vicinity of the whole army of
Lee, and found himself suddenly assailed while marching by the flank.
But
Warren was equal to the occasion, and by a remarkable vigor of action not only extricated his command from a perilous situation, but inflicted a severe blow to the
Confederates.
This action, known as the battle of
Bristoe, I shall briefly detail.
As the head of the column of the Second Corps approached,
Hill threw forward a line of battle towards the railroad; but
Warren knew the locality with the critical knowledge of an engineer, and forming
Webb's division on the right along the embankment near
Broad Run, he ordered
Hays' division to run for the railroad cut, invisible from the position of both opposing generals.
This it quickly did, and the point was reached just in time to meet
Hill's advancing line of battle, which, receiving a severe fire from the troops covered by the cut and embankment, and raked by the fire of
Ricketts' battery, fell back with heavy loss.
Warren immediately advanced a thin line in pursuit, and secured four hundred and fifty prisoners, two standards, and five pieces of artillery.
The attack fell mainly on the First and Third brigades of
General Webb's division—the former commanded by
Colonel Heath, and the latter by
General Mallon, an accomplished and patriotic officer who was killed in the action—and on the Third Brigade of
General Hays' divis on, commanded by
General Owen.
The division of
General Caldwell, which had formed the rear-guard, came up for a mile or two on the run, and took position on the left of
Hays; but the action had already been decided.
Warren's loss was comparatively slight.
Effectual as was the check which
Warren had given
Hill, the position of the former was not one in which he could remain, while, at the same time, it was difficult to withdraw.
And now his situation became more dangerous; for just as towards sunset the combat closed,
Ewell's corps, which had
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pursued by-roads between the columns of
Warren and
Hill, came up, and this brought the entire force of
Lee in front of the Second Corps.
Nevertheless, before
Lee could make dispositions for attack, night came on, and, under its friendly cover,
Warren retired, and next morning joined the main body of the army massed at
Centreville.
15
Meade was now strongly posted on the heights of
Centreville, and if compelled to fall back from there, would do so into the fortifications of
Washington.
As no additional turning movement could be of any avail,
Lee pushed his advance no further.
His intention had been to gain
Meade's rear, and as this was now completely foiled, he was not minded to essay assault on the army in position.
Resolving, however, not to have made an utterly useless campaign, he threw forward a thin line as far as
Bull Run, and thus masking his design, he proceeded to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from that point southward to the
Rappahannock.
Having effectually accomplished that object,
16 he, on the 18th, began a retrograde movement.
Meade commenced pursuit on the following day,
17 but without overtaking
Lee; and in this movement there occurred no rencounter of a more serious character than the wonted indecisive cavalry combats.
Stuart, with his two divisions of horse, covered the retrograde movement, and during the entire march was constantly engaged in skirmishes with the
Union cavalry.
One of these affairs was of some importance.
While on the advance towards
Warrenton, on the 19th,
Kilpatrick's division skirmished warmly with
Hampton's
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division up to Buckland Mills, at the crossing of
Broad Run, on the south bank of which
Hampton took post, under the personal direction of
Stuart, who here planned a skilful manoeuvre to defeat his opponent.
Kilpatrick having forced the crossing by turning the flank of
Hampton,
Stuart fell back slowly towards
Warrenton with the view of permitting
Fitz Lee's cavalry division to come up from
Auburn and attack the
Union cavalry in flank and rear.
This plan was carried out with some success.
Fitz Lee arriving just below
Buckland surprised
Kilpatrick's force on the flank, and
Stuart, hearing
Fitz Lee's guns, pressed vigorously in front with
Hampton's division.
A stubborn resistance was offered, but a charge
au fond finally forced
Kilpatrick's command to give way, and he retreated in some confusion.
18 Lee retired behind the
Rappahannock.
The Army of the Potomac being pushed forward as far as
Warrenton,
General Meade was compelled to halt there to await the repairing of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
This work, undertaken with much energy, was accomplished early in November; and on the 7th, the whole army continued the advance towards the
Rappahannock in two columns.
General French had command of the left wing, composed of the First, Second, and Third corps, and
General Sedgwick had command of the right wing, composed of the Fifth and Sixth corps.
The left column was directed to cross the
Rappahannock at
Kelly's Ford, and the right column at Rappahannock Station.
Lee held position south of the
Rappahannock, in the vicinity of
Culpepper, with outposts at
Kelly's Ford on the south bank, and at Rappahannock Station on the north bank.
The Third Corps under
Birney had the advance on
Kelly's Ford, and on reaching that point,
Birney crossed over a division by wading, without waiting for the laying of the pontonbridges, and advancing an attacking party, composed of
Berdan's
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Sharp-shooters, the Fortieth New York, the First and Twentieth Indiana, the Third and Fifth Michigan, and the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania regiments, carried the rifle-pits and captured five hundred prisoners.
The enemy was prevented from strengthening the force in the works by the fire of batteries on the heights on the north side, which swept the plain on the southern bank.
Birney's loss was trivial.
While the left column was thus passing at
Kelly's Ford, the right wing was forcing a crossing against more formidable obstacles.
The Confederates occupied a series of works on the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station, which had been built some time before by the
Union troops, and consisted of a fort, two redoubts, and several lines of rifle-trenches.
These works were held by two thousand men belonging to
Early's division of
Ewell's corps.
Commanding positions to the rear of the fort having been gained, heavy batteries were planted thereon, and a fierce cannonade opened between the opposing forces.
Just before dark, a storming party was formed of
Russell's and
Upton's brigades of the Sixth Corps, and the works were carried by a very brilliant
coup de main. Over fifteen hundred prisoners, four guns, and eight standards were here taken.
Sedgwick's loss was about three hundred in killed and wounded.
This brilliant opening of the campaign should have insured a decisive operation; and it is probable that, if a rapid advance had been made either towards
Culpepper or to the south of it by
Stevensburg, the Confederate army, which lay in winter-quarters in
echelon from
Kelly's Ford to the west of
Culpepper, might have been cut in two.
But the army having crossed on the night of the 7th and morning of the 8th, the whole of that day was wasted in useless and uncertain movements,
19 and
Lee, not courting battle, availed himself of the opportunity that night to withdraw again across the
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Rapidan.
Meade then advanced and took up position between the
Rappahannock and the
Rapidan, which was nearly the same ground he held before his retreat.
This campaign may be regarded from two points of view, and from each is susceptible of a different critique.
Considered as a movement to meet
Lee's advance, it was perfectly successful, and its conduct highly creditable.
Lee's line of manoeuvre was, it is true, exterior to that of
Meade, and as it was necessary for him to pursue circuitous routes in order to effect his turning movements, this imposed on the former considerably greater marching.
Yet he had a clear object in view, whereas his antagonist was necessarily delayed by ignorance of his opponent's real design.
The very success of
Lee's plan depended on being pushed impetuously.
Nevertheless, he delayed at Madison Courthouse, which thwarted the success of his first flank movement; and he delayed again at
Warrenton, which baulked that of his second.
But even in view of these halts, which
General Lee partly explains on the ground that they were necessary in order to supply the troops, the operations of the 14th were not conducted with much vigor.
Ewell allowed himself to be detained by the rear-guard, at
Auburn, from early in the morning till noon; and from
Greenwich he took a blind track across the fields, which he found very difficult, and which gave him much delay, thus preventing his junction with
Hill at
Bristoe until too late.
Nor was
Hill's march made with much more expedition; for notwithstanding that his route to
Bristoe was but four miles longer than that of
Warren, and that the latter was delayed for several hours by his rencounter with
Ewell at
Auburn, he reached the decisive point as soon as
Hill.
Warren's conduct throughout these operations was excellent, and a model of the execution of the duties of a rear-guard.
But if, on the other hand, we look upon
General Meade's line of duty as calling essentially for offensive action, his course in this retrograde movement is open to another order of criticism.
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It is due to observe that
General Meade not only did not wish to avoid battle, but he was really anxious to precipitate decisive action, provided, always, he could fight on advantageous terms.
Yet he appears to have overpassed several excellent openings for a bold initiative.
It would have been interesting to see the result of a determination that, overleaping a too pedantic view of the nature and uses of lines of communication, would have tried the experiment of holding the army in a favorable position and allowed
Lee to continue his turning movements.
There is little doubt that if
Meade had held fast either at
Culpepper or at
Warrenton,
Lee would not have ventured beyond those points, for his opponent would then have been on
his communications, to whose endangered safety he would have presently been recalled.
Lee's conduct throughout shows how diffident he was in regard to this point—feeling his way, and afraid to move until he had first started
Meade, which was the very way of defeating the object he had in view, if he really wished to interpose between the Army of the Potomac and
Washington—a purpose which, under the circumstances, was only to be accomplished by the utmost audacity of movement.
There is another opportunity of which
General Meade might have availed himself, and which I shall point out. When, on the 12th, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps had been sent back across the
Rappahannock under a false lead, these corps were in position, by a move to the right, to fall upon the rear of
Lee's column in crossing at
Sulphur Springs.
This would have been a bold move, and would have been as effective as a retrograde movement in relieving French on the north bank of the
Rappahannock.
But it would have been somewhat hazardous; for
Lee might have disputed, with a part of his force, the passage of the
Aestham fork of the
Rappahannock, and moved with the rest to overwhelm the Third Corps at Freeman's Ford.
It is quite likely that
General Meade, who was exceedingly anxious to bring on a battle, would have made some of the moves indicated, had he received prompter intelligence of his opponent's movements.
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But he was excessively ill-informed by his cavalry, and in each case learned the enemy's position only when it had already become too late to act upon it.
The line of manoeuvre adopted by
General Lee in this campaign was the same as that used by him in the previous summer against
Pope's army.
But the result was very different: and this arose from two causes.
Lee had now neither a lieutenant capable of making such a flank march as that of
Jackson on
Manassas, nor such an opponent as
Pope; for, if
Meade's action was not brilliant, he at least did not lose his head.
As a whole, the campaign added no laurels to either army; yet it was none the less attended with much toil and suffering—sleepless nights and severe marches and manifold trying exposures.
But this is a part of the history of the army, of which those who did not bear the heat and burden of the day can never know much.
Judging from the experience of such military operations as had been attempted during previous years at the season now reached, it might have been inferred that the army could do nothing better than go into winter-quarters and await the coming spring before entering upon a new campaign.
But General felt that the condition of the public mind would hardly brook delay; and being himself very eager for action, he anxiously watched a favorable opportunity to deliver battle.
Such an opportunity he thought he saw towards the end of November; and he then planned an operation known as the ‘
Mine Run move’—an operation which deserved better success than it met.
It was ascertained that
Lee, while resting the right of his
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army on the
Rapidan near Morton's Ford, had left the lower fords of the river at
Ely's, Culpepper Mine, Germanna and
Jacobs' mills uncovered, and depended for the defence of that flank upon a line of intrenchments which he had constructed perpendicular to the river and extending along the left bank of a small tributary of the
Rapidan named
Mine Run, which flows almost at right angles with the former stream, and empties into it at Morton's Ford.
Relying for the security of his right upon that line,
Lee had placed his force in cantonments covering a wide extent of country; so that while
Ewell's corps held position from Morton's Ford to Orange Courthouse,
Hill's corps was distributed from south of that point along the railroad to near
Charlottesville, with an interval of several miles between the two corps.
This wide separation of his opponent's forces gave
Meade the hope that, by crossing the
Rapidan at the lower fords, turning the
Confederate right, and advancing quickly towards Orange Courthouse by the plank and turnpike roads that connect that place with
Fredericksburg, he might be able to interpose between the two hostile bodies under
Ewell and
Hill, and destroy them in detail.
This plan, different from the kind of operations ordinarily attempted in
Virginia, was well suited to the circumstances.
It was based upon a precise mathematical calculation of the elements of time and space, of the kind for which
Napoleon was so famous, and depended absolutely for its success on a rigorous execution of all the foreordained movements in the foreordained time and way. Thus planning,
Meade attempted the bold
coup d'essaye of cutting entirely loose from his base of supplies, and, providing his troops with ten days rations, he left his trains on the north side of the
Rapidan, relying on the meditated success to open up new lines of communication.
The movement was begun at dawn of the 26th of November, and the order of march was as follows.
The Fifth Corps, followed by the First Corps, was to cross the
Rapidan at Culpepper Mine Ford and proceed to
Parker's Store, on the
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plankroad to Orange Courthouse.
The Second Corps was to cross at Germanna Ford, and proceed out on the turnpike (which runs parallel with the plankroad) to Robertson's Tavern.
To this point also the Third Corps, crossing at Jacobs' Mill
Ford, and followed by the Sixth Corps, was to march by other routes, and there make a junction with the Second Corps.
With the left thus at
Parker's Store and the right at Robertson's Tavern, the army would be in close communication on parallel roads, and by advancing westward towards Orange Courthouse would turn the line of the
Mine Run defences, which it was known did not extend as far south as to cross the turnpike and plankroads.
As the distance of the several corps from their encampments to the assigned points of concentration was under twenty miles,
General Meade reasonably assumed that marching early on the 26th, each corps-commander would be able to make the march inside of thirty-four hours, or, at most, by noon of the 27th.
It remains to relate how this well-devised and meritorious plan was baulked by circumstances that, though seemingly trivial to those uninstructed in war, are yet the very elements that in a large degree assure success or entail failure.
The first of these delays was occasioned by the tardiness of movement of the Third Corps under
General French, which having a greater distance to march than the other corps, yet did not reach its assigned point for the crossing of the
Rapidan until three hours after the other corps had arrived.
This caused a delay to the whole army of the time named; for, not knowing what he should encounter on the other side,
General Meade was unwilling to allow the other corps to cross until the Third was up. A second obstacle was the result of an unpardonable blunder on the part of the engineers in underestimating the width of the
Rapidan, so that the ponton-bridges it was designed to throw across that stream were too short, and trestle-work and temporary means had to be provided to increase their length.
In addition, another cause of delay resulted from the very precipitous
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banks of the
Rapidan, which rendered the passage of the artillery and trains tedious and difficult.
The effect of these several circumstances was that the army, instead of making the passage of the river early in the day, was not across until the following morning.
Twenty-four hours had passed, and only half the distance was made.
Early on the morning of the 27th, the corps were again in motion, and, under imperative orders from
General Meade,
they pushed forward with greater rapidity.
The Second Corps, under
General Warren, reached its designated point at Robertson's Tavern, about one o'clock, and meeting a force of the enemy, immediately began to develop its strength and position by a brisk skirmish fire.
It will be remembered that, according to the plan, this corps was here to have been joined by the Third Corps, and it was not allowed to make a serious attack
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until
General French should arrive.
But that officer had fallen into a series of luckless mishaps, by which it happened that soon after crossing the
Rapidan at Jacobs' Mill, he took the wrong road to reach Robertson's Tavern, falling upon a route too much to the right, which brought it against
Johnson's division of
Ewell's corps.
With this force it had a brisk brush, and by the time it could extricate itself, get on the right road, and open communications with Robertson's Tavern, it was night.
Meanwhile, the intention was fully disclosed, and
Lee, as may be supposed, was not inactive.
Hill's corps, which had been scattered far south of Orange Courthouse, was called up;
Ewell was withdrawn from his advanced position on which he had checked French and confronted
Warren, and the whole Confederate force concentrated on the line of
Mine Run, to bar progress beyond that point.
Had the original intention of march been carried out, this line would not have opposed a barrier to
Meade's advance; for though
Mine Run crosses the two roads on which the army was to advance towards Orange Courthouse, yet its defences did not stretch as far southward as these two roads —the right being, in fact, at Bartlett's Mills, on
Mine Run, and thence up to the
Rapidan.
But, by the disclosure of
Meade's purpose,
Lee was able to extend his line so as to cover these roads, and the nature of the ground and the improvised works that might be thrown up in the course of four-and-twenty hours, would render the position a very powerful one.
The Confederate line was drawn along a prominent ridge or series of heights, extending north and south for six or eight miles. This series of hills formed all the angles of a complete fortification, and comprised the essential elements of a fortress.
The centre of the line presented four or five welldefined facings of unequal length, occupying a space of more than three thousand yards, with such angles of defence that the fire of the enemy was able to enfilade every avenue of approach, while his right and left flanks were not less strongly
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protected.
Stretching immediately in the rear and on the flanks of this position was a dense forest of heavy timber, while some twelve hundred yards in front was
Mine Run— a stream of no great width, but difficult for infantry to cross from the marshy ground and dense undergrowth of stunted timber with which it was frequently flanked on either side, as well as from the abrupt nature of its banks.
In addition to these natural defences, the enemy quickly felled in front of a large extent of his position a thick growth of pine as an abatis, and hastily constructed trenches and breastworks for infantry.
The position was, in fact, exceedingly formidable.
This is what the army presently found out, when, being at length concentrated, it pushed forward on the following morning, the 28th—the enemy having during the night abandoned his advanced position—and after a short march of two or three miles found itself brought up against the line of
Mine Run.
Upon reaching this point the troops were immediately put into position, and reconnoissances were made with the view of ascertaining a point of attack.
20 At the same time that these reconnoissances were made,
General Warren, with the Second Corps, strengthened by a division of the Sixth Corps, was sent to move upon the enemy's right; find out how far south his line extended, and, if possible, outflank and turn him. In these tentative efforts passed the 28th of November.
Next day,
Warren, having moved southward to the
Catharpin Road, completed his observation of the
Confederate right, and announced the conditions as favorable for an attack from that point.
At the same time,
Sedgwick, having carefully examined the
Confederate left, reported that there was a point there which he thought weak and assailable.
General
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Meade accordingly resolved to make attack on both wings, and for the purpose of strengthening the force with which
Warren was to operate on the left, he detached from the corps of
French two divisions which were sent to the former, which made
Warren's force some twenty-six thousand men.
Sedgwick, with his Sixth Corps, supported by the Fifth, would operate on the right.
French, with the remaining division of his command and two divisions of the First Corps, under
Newton, would hold an interval of four miles between the right and left; and as this centre would be weak, it was assigned a
role of simple observation.
Dispositions in accordance with this plan were not completed until late on Sunday, the 29th; so it was resolved to make the attack next morning, and it was appointed that after a heavy artillery fire,
Warren, on the left, should open the attack at eight o'clock, and that an hour after he was engaged,
Sedgwick should assault on the right.
21
Early on Monday morning the army was under arms, impatiently awaiting the signal-gun.
At last, the sound of
Sedgwick's cannon came rolling along the line, when the entire artillery of the right and centre opened upon the works of the enemy.
But not an echo from
Warren on the left!
The explanation of this silence soon came in intelligence brought by an aid-de-camp.
A close observation of the enemy's position by dawn revealed a very different state of facts than was presented the previous evening.
22 The presence of
Warren's troops had attracted
Lee's attention to his right, and during the night he had powerfully strengthened that flank by artillery in position and by infantry behind breastworks and abatis.
Looking at the position with the critical eye of an engineer, but not without those lofty inspirations of courage
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that o'erleap the cold dictates of mathematical calculation,
Warren saw that the task was hopeless; and so seeing, he resolved to sacrifice himself rather than his command.
He assumed the responsibility of suspending the attack.
His verdict was that of his soldiers—a verdict pronounced not in spoken words, but in a circumstance more potent than words, and full of a touching pathos.
The time has not been seen when the Army of the Potomac shrank from any call of duty; but an unparalleled experience in war, joined to a great intelligence in the rank and file, had taught these men what, by heroic courage, might be done, and what was beyond the bounds of human possibility.
Recognizing that the task now before them was of the character of a forlorn hope, knowing well that no man could here count on escaping death, the soldiers, without sign of shrinking from the sacrifice, were seen quietly pinning on the breast of their blouses of blue, slips of paper on which each had written his
name
That this judgment of
General Warren and of his troops was correct,
General Meade became himself convinced on riding over to the left and viewing the position.
It was, in fact, even more formidable than the line of the
Rapidan, which it had been considered impracticable to assail by a front attack.
The only possible opportunity of now continuing the enterprise was by moving still further to the left, and by manoeuvring on
Lee's right, endeavor to force him out of his intrenched line.
But, under the circumstances, with the uncertainties of a Virginia December, this was hardly to be seriously considered.
The entire plan had been conditioned on a quick operation that would uncover direct communications with the
Rapidan.
The trains, therefore, had been left on the north bank, and the troops furnished with a limited number of rations, now nearly exhausted.
In this state of facts, grievous and galling though it was to permit the campaign to come to such abortive issue,
General Meade felt there was no alternative.
He, therefore, during the following night,
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withdrew the army across the
Rapidan, and it resumed its old camps.
23 Lee did not follow up in the least.
Iv.
The army in winter quarters.
The movement on
Mine Run terminated for the season grand military operations in
Virginia, and the army established itself in winter cantonments for the next three months. During this period the dignity of dulness was disturbed only by one or two cavalry expeditions, planned with the ambitious aim of capturing
Richmond by a sudden dash.
The first of these schemes, which had the merit of boldness in conception if not in execution, was devised by
General Butler, then commanding the Department of Virginia and North Carolina.
Believing that
Richmond had been stripped of its garrison for the purpose of strengthening the
Confederate force operating in
North Carolina under
General Pickett,
General Butler formed the design of swooping down on the
Confederate capital with a cavalry raid by way of New Kent Courthouse on the
Peninsula.
As a ‘diversion’ in favor of this enterprise, the Army of the Potomac was to make a demonstration across the
Rapidan.
The raiding column, under command of
Brigadier-General Wistar, left New Kent Courthouse on the 5th of February, and reached the
Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge
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on the following day. The 7th, in obedience to orders from
Washington,
General Sedgwick, temporarily commanding the Army of the Potomac in the absence of
General Meade, threw
Kilpatrick's cavalry division across the
Rapidan at Ely's Ford, and
Merritt's division at Barnett's Ford, while, at a point between, two divisions of the Second Corps made the passage at Germanna Ford by wading.
The Confederates held their positions, and considerable skirmishing took place during the day. The troops remained on the south bank until the time fixed for the termination of
General Butler's movement, when they were withdrawn.
The raiding scheme resulted in nothing.
General Wistar found Bottom's Bridge blockaded, and after reconnoitring the position, he returned.
He does not appear to have lost any thing; but the troops of the Army of the Potomac, that had the luck to be engaged in the ‘diversion,’ suffered a sacrifice of two hundred and fifty men.
A few weeks later a bold expedition was fitted out with the view of releasing the large body of Union prisoners held at
Richmond, the accounts of whose ill-treatment had excited profound sympathy throughout the
North.
This enterprise was under command of
General Kilpatrick, with some threat or four thousand cavalry, seconded by
Colonel Dahlgren, a young officer of extraordinary dash and daring.
It set out on the 28th of February, after
Sedgwick's corps and
Custer's cavalry had made a demonstration on
Lee's left.
Crossing the
Rapidan at Ely's Ford, beyond the
Confederate right flank, the force marched thence to Spottsylvania Courthouse.
Here
Colonel Dahlgren, with five hundred picked men, assuming the most daring part of the expedition, diverged from the main body and pushed forward by way of Frederickshall towards the
James River.
The column under
General Kilpatrick at the same time moved rapidly southward, and on the following night, the 29th, struck the Virginia Central Railroad at
Beaver Dam Station, whence parties were sent out to damage the road.
While engaged in this work, a train of troops arrived from the direction of
Richmond; but
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after some skirmishing these retired.
Another party was dispatched to destroy the bridge of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad across the
South Anna—a purpose that was foiled by the presence of a small observing force.
The main column then advanced with insignificant opposition, and on the forenoon of the following day, March 1st, reined up before the fortifications of
Richmond.
The swoop had been so sudden that the troopers passed unopposed within the outer line of redoubts; but the
Confederates having, meanwhile, brought up some forces,
Kilpatrick found himself arrested before the second line by opposition he could not break through.
In the mean time,
Colonel Dahlgren, with his isolated party, had moved southward from Frederickshall, after destroying the depot, till he struck the
James River, where he did considerable damage to the canal, etc. A native of the country had undertaken to lead the party to a ford not far from
Richmond, but through ignorance or treachery he missed his way, and conducted the column to near Goochland Courthouse, a full day's march from the intended point.
The guide was hanged on the nearest tree, and
Dahlgren moved down the course of the river towards
Richmond, in front of which he arrived late on March 1st.
But in the interim,
General Kilpatrick, having been estopped in front of the fortifications, and hearing nothing of
Dahlgren's column, became fearful as to his safety, and decided to fall back down the
Peninsula, which he did in face of considerable opposition.
Dahlgren was thus completely isolated from the main body, while the country around him, now thoroughly aroused, was alive with parties of armed citizens and militia.
During the night of the 3d, while on the retreat,
Colonel Dahlgren, with a hundred horsemen, became separated from the rest of his command, and falling into an ambush, he was killed, with some of his men, the rest surrendering.
The other portion succeeded in making a junction with
Kilpatrick's column, which returned to the Army of the Potomac by way of
Fortress Monroe.
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These outlying operations, which were indeed of a rather Quixotic character, very slightly affected the main current of the war, whose issue, it was clearly seen, must await new and weightier trials of strength by the two great armies.
As all the grounds of inference led to the belief that the spring campaign must be decisive of the war, both armies, as by consent, settled down in winter cantonments, to recuperate from the wear and tear of the trying season of 1863, and renew their strength for the impending shock of arms.
Lee held the south bank of the
Rapidan, his forces being distributed from the river along the railroad to Orange Courthouse and
Gordonsville.
The Army of the Potomac established itself along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from the
Rapidan back to the
Rappahannock.
The ranks of both armies were replenished by conscripts, and drills, inspections, and reviews were energetically pushed forward within the opposing camps.
Thus the months of winter glided by, till vernal grasses and flowers came to festoon the graves on battle-fields over which the contending hosts had wrestled for three years.
Then, upstarting, the armies faced each other along the lines of the
Rapidan.
