BOOK XXI.
Origin of the second Punic war. Hannibal's character. In violation of a treaty, he passes the Iberus. Besieges Saguntum, and at length takes it. The Romans send ambassadors to Carthage; declare war. Hannibal crosses the Pyrenees: makes his way through Gaul; then crosses the Alps; defeats the Romans at the Ticinus. The Romans again defeated at the Trebia. Cneius Cornelius Scipio defeats the Carthaginians in Spain, and takes Hanno, their general, prisoner.1. I MAY be permitted to premise at this division of my work, what most historians1 have professed at the beginning of their whole undertaking; that I am about to relate the most memorable of all wars that were ever waged: the war which the Carthaginians, under the conduct of Hannibal, maintained with the Roman people. [2] For never did any states and nations more efficient in their resources engage in contest; nor had they themselves at any other period so great a degree of power and energy. They brought into action too no arts of war unknown to each other, but those which had been tried in the first Punic war; and so various was the fortune of the conflict, and so doubtful the victory, that they who conquered were more exposed to danger. [3] The hatred with which they fought also was almost greater than their resources; the Romans being indignant that the conquered aggressively took up arms against their victors; the Carthaginians, because they considered that in their subjection it had been lorded over them with haughtiness and avarice. [4] There is besides a story, that Hannibal, when about nine years old, while he boyishly coaxed his father Hamilcar that he might be taken to Spain, (at the time when the African war was completed, and he was employed in sacrificing previously to transporting his army thither,) was conducted to the altar; [p. 701]and, having laid his hand on the offerings, was bound by an oath to prove himself, as soon as he could, an enemy to the Roman people. [5] The loss of Sicily and Sardinia grieved the high spirit of Hamilcar: for he deemed that Sicily had been given up through a premature despair of their affairs; and that Sardinia, during the disturbances in Africa, had been treacherously taken by the Romans, while, in addition, the payment of a tribute had been imposed. 2. Being disturbed with these anxieties, he so conducted himself for five years in the African war, which commenced shortly after the peace with Rome, and then through nine years employed in augmenting the Carthaginian empire in Spain, that it was obvious that he was revolving in his mind a greater war than he was then engaged in; and that if he had lived longer, the Carthaginians under Hamilcar would have carried the war into Italy, which, under the command of Hannibal, they afterwards did. [2] The timely death of Hamilcar and the youth of Hannibal occasioned its delay. Hasdrubal, intervening between the father and the son, held the command for about eight years. [3] He was first endeared to Hamilcar, as they say, on account of his youthful beauty, and then adopted by him, when advanced in age, as his son-in-law, on account of his eminent abilities; and, because he was his son-in-law, he obtained the supreme authority, against the wishes of the nobles, by the influence of the Barcine faction,2 which was very powerful with the military and the populace. Prosecuting his designs rather by stratagem than force, by entertaining the princes, and by means of the friendship of their leaders, gaining the [5] favour of unknown nations, he aggrandized the Carthaginian power, more than by arms and battles. Yet peace proved no greater security to himself. A barbarian, in resentment of his master's having been put to death by him, publicly murdered him; and, having been seized by the bystanders, he exhibited the same countenance as if he had escaped; nay, even when he was lacerated by tortures, he [6] preserved such an expression of face, that he presented the appearance of one who smiled, his joy getting the better of his pains. With this Hasdrubal, because he possessed such wonderful skill in gaining over the nations and adding them [p. 702]to his empire, the Roman people had renewed the treaty,3 on the terms, that the river Iberus should be the boundary of both empires; and that to the Saguntines, who lay between the territories of the two states, their liberty should be preserved. 3. There was no doubt that in appointing a successor to Hasdrubal, the approbation of the commons would follow the military prerogative, by which the young Hannibal had been immediately carried to the praetorium, and hailed as general, amid the loud shouts and acquiescence of all. [2] Hasdrubal had sent for him by letter, when scarce yet arrived at manhood; and the matter had even been discussed in the senate, the Barcine faction using all their efforts, that Hannibal might be trained to military service and succeed to his father's command. [3] Hanno, the leader of the opposite faction, said, “Hasdrubal seems indeed to ask what is reasonable, but I, nevertheless, do not think his request ought to be granted.” [4] When he had attracted to himself the attention of all, through surprise at this ambiguous opinion, he proceeded: “Hasdrubal thinks that the flower of youth which he gave to the enjoyment of Hannibal's father, may justly be expected by himself in return from the son: but it would little become us to accustom our youth, in place of a military education, to the lustful ambition of the generals. [5] Are we afraid that the son of Hamilcar should be too late in seeing the immoderate power and splendour of his father's sovereignty? or that we shall not soon enough become slaves to the son of him, to whose son-in-law our armies were bequeathed as an hereditary right? [6] I am of opinion, that this youth should be kept at home, and taught, under the restraint of the laws and the authority of magistrates, to live on an equal footing with the rest of the citizens, lest at some time or other this small fire should kindle a vast conflagration.” 4. A few, and nearly every one of the highest merit, concurred with Hanno; but, as usually happens, the more numerous party prevailed over the better. Hannibal, having [p. 703]been sent into Spain, from his very first arrival drew the eyes of the whole army upon him. [2] The veteran soldiers imagined that Hamilcar, in his youth, was restored to them; they remarked the same vigour in his looks and animation in his eye, the same features and expression of countenance; and then, in a short time, he took care that his father should be of the least powerful consideration in conciliating their esteem. [3] There never was a genius more fitted for the two most opposite duties of obeying and commanding; so that you could not easily decide whether he were dearer to the general or the army: [4] and neither did Hasdrubal prefer giving the command to any other, when any thing was to be done with courage and activity; nor did the soldiers feel more confidence and boldness under any other leader. [5] His fearlessness in encountering dangers, and his prudence when in the midst of them, were extreme. His body could not be exhausted, nor his mind subdued, by any toil. He could alike endure either heat or cold. [6] The quantity of his food and drink was determined by the wants of nature, and not by pleasure. The seasons of his sleeping and waking were distinguished neither by day nor night. [7] The time that remained after the transaction of business was given to repose; but that repose was neither invited by a soft bed nor by quiet. Many have seen him wrapped in a military cloak, lying on the ground amid the watches and outposts of the soldiers. [8] His dress was not at all superior to that of his equals: his arms and his horses were conspicuous. He was at once by far the first of the cavalry and infantry; and, foremost to advance to the charge, was last to leave the engagement. [9] Excessive vices counterbalanced these high virtues of the hero; inhuman cruelty, more than Punic perfidy, no truth, no reverence for things sacred, no fear of the gods, no respect for oaths, no sense of religion. [10] With a character thus made up of virtue and vices, he served for three years under the command of Hasdrubal, without neglecting any thing which ought to be done or seen by one who was to become a great general. 5. But from the day on which he was declared general, as if Italy had been decreed to him as his province, and the war with Rome committed to [2??] him, thinking there should be no delay, lest, while he procrastinated, some unexpected accident might defeat him, as had happened to his father, Hamilcar, [p. 704]and afterwards to Hasdrubal, he resolved to make war on the Saguntines. [3] As there could be no doubt that by attacking them the Romans would be excited to arms, he first led his army into the territory of the Olcades, a people beyond the Iberus, rather within the boundaries than under the dominion of the Carthaginians, so that he might not seem to have had the Saguntines for his object, but to have been drawn on to the war by the course of events; after the adjoining nations had been subdued, and by the progressive annexation of conquered territory. [4] He storms and plunders Carteia, a wealthy city, the capital of that nation; at which the smaller states being dismayed, submitted to his commands and to the imposition of a tribute. His army, triumphant and enriched with booty, was led into winter-quarters to New Carthage. [5] Having there confirmed the attachment of all his countrymen and allies by a liberal division of the plunder, and by faithfully discharging the arrears of pay, the war was extended, in the beginning of spring, to the Vaccaei. [6] The cities Hermandica and Arbocala were taken by storm. Arbocala was defended for a long time by the valour and number of its inhabitants. [7] Those who escaped from Hermandica joining themselves to the exiles of the Olcades, a nation subdued the preceding summer, excite the Carpetani to arms; [8] and having attacked Hannibal near the river Tagus, on his return from the Vaccaei, they threw into disorder his army encumbered with spoil. [9] Hannibal avoided an engagement, and having pitched his camp on the bank, as soon as quiet and silence prevailed among the enemy, forded the river; and having removed his rampart so far that the enemy might have room to pass over, resolved to attack them in their passage. He commanded the cavalry to charge as soon as they should see them advanced into the water. [10] He drew up the line of his infantry on the bank with forty elephants in front. [11] The Carpetani, with the addition of the Olcades and Vaccaei, amounted to a hundred thousand, an invincible army, were the fight to take place in the open plain. [12] Being therefore both naturally ferocious and confiding in their numbers; and since they believed that the enemy had retired through fear, thinking that victory was only delayed by the intervention of the river, they raise a shout, and in every direction, without the command of any one, dash into the stream, each where it [p. 705]was nearest to him. [13] At the same time, a heavy force of cavalry poured into the river from its opposite bank, and the engagement commenced in the middle of the channel on very unequal terms; [14] for there the foot-soldier, having no secure footing, and scarcely trusting to the ford, could be borne down even by an unarmed horseman, by the mere shock of his horse urged at random; while the horseman, with the command of his body and his weapons, his horse moving steadily even through the middle of the eddies, could maintain the fight either at close quarters or at a distance. [15] A great number were swallowed up by the current; some being carried by the whirlpools of the stream to the side of the enemy, were trodden down by the elephants; [16] and whilst the last, for whom it was more safe to retreat to their own bank, were collecting together after their various alarms, Hannibal, before they could regain courage after such excessive consternation, having entered the river with his army in a close square, forced them to fly from the bank. Having then laid waste their territory, he received the submission of the Carpetani also within a few days. [17] And now all the country beyond the Iberus, excepting that of the Saguntines, was under the power of the Carthaginians. 6. As yet there was no war with the Saguntines, but already, in order to a war, the seeds of dissension were sown between them and their [2??] neighbours, particularly the Turdetani, with whom when the same person sided who had originated the quarrel, and it was evident, not that a trial of the question of right, but violence, was his object, ambassadors were sent by the Saguntines to Rome to implore assistance in the war which now evidently threatened them. [3] The consuls then at Rome were Publius Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who, after the ambassadors were introduced into the senate, having made a motion on the state of public affairs, it was resolved that envoys should be sent into Spain to inspect the circumstances of the allies; [4] and if they saw good reason, both to warn Hannibal that he should refrain from the Saguntines, the allies of the Roman people, and to pass over into Africa to Carthage, and report the complaints of the allies of the Roman people. [5] This embassy having been decreed but not yet despatched, the news arrived, more quickly than any one expected, that Saguntum [p. 706]was besieged. The business was then referred anew to the senate. [6] And some, decreeing Spain and Africa as provinces for the consuls, thought the war should be maintained both by sea and land, while others wished to direct the whole hostilities against Spain and Hannibal. [7] There were others again, who thought that an affair of such importance should not be entered on rashly; and that the return of the ambassadors from Spain ought to be awaited. [8] This opinion, which seemed the safest, prevailed; and Publius Valerius Flaccus, and Quintus Baebius Tamphilus, were, on that account, the more quickly despatched as ambassadors to Hannibal at Saguntum, and from thence to Carthage, if he did not desist from the war, to demand the general himself in atonement for the violation of the treaty. 7. While the Romans thus prepare and deliberate, Saguntum was already besieged with the utmost vigour. [2] That city, situated about a mile from the sea, was by far the most opulent beyond the Iberus. Its inhabitants are said to have been sprung from the island Zacynthus, and some of the Rutulian race from Ardea to have been also mixed with them; [3] but they had risen in a short time to great wealth, either by their gains from the sea or the land, or by the increase of their numbers, or the integrity of their principles, by which they maintained [4??] their faith with their allies, even to their own destruction. Hannibal having entered their territory with a hostile army, and laid waste the country in every direction, attacks the city in three different quarters. [5] There was an angle of the wall sloping down into a more level and open valley than the other space around; [6] against this he resolved to move the vineae, by means of which the battering-ram might be brought up to the wall. [7] But though the ground at a distance from the wall was sufficiently level for working the vineae, yet their undertakings by no means favourably succeeded, when they came to effect their object. Both a huge tower overlooked it, and the wall, as in a suspected place, was raised higher than in any other part; and a chosen band of youths presented a more vigorous resistance, where the greatest danger and labour were indicated. [8] At first they repelled the enemy with missile weapons, and suffered no place to be sufficiently secure for those engaged in the works; [9] afterwards, not only did they brandish their weapons in defence of the walls [p. 707]and tower, but they had courage to make sallies on the posts and works of the enemy; in which tumultuary engagements, scarcely more Saguntines than Carthaginians were slain. [10] But when Hannibal himself, while he too incautiously approached the wall, fell severely wounded in the thigh by a javelin, such flight and dismay spread around, that the works and vineae had nearly been abandoned. 8. For a few days after, while the general's wound was being cured, there was rather a blockade than a siege: during which time, though there was a respite from fighting, yet there was no intermission in the preparation of works and fortifications. [2] Hostilities, therefore, broke out afresh with greater fury, and in more places, in some even where the ground scarcely admitted of the works, the vineae began to be moved forward, and the battering-ram to be advanced to the walls. [3] The Carthaginian abounded in the numbers of his troops; for there is sufficient reason to believe that he had as many as a hundred and fifty thousand in arms. [4] The townsmen began to be embarrassed, by having their attention multifariously divided, in order to maintain their several defences, and look to every thing; [5] nor were they equal to the task, for the walls were now battered by the rams, and many parts of them were shattered. [6] One part by continuous ruins left the city exposed; three successive towers and all the wall between them had fallen down with an immense crash, and the Carthaginians believed the town taken by that breach; through which, as if the wall had alike protected both, there was a rush from each side to the battle. [7] There was nothing resembling the disorderly fighting which, in the storming of towns, is wont to be engaged in, on the opportunities of either party; but regular lines, as in an open plain, stood arrayed between the ruins of the walls and the buildings of the city, which lay but a slight distance from the walls. [8] On the one side hope, on the other despair, inflamed their courage; the Carthaginian believing that, if a little additional effort were used, the city was his; the Saguntines opposing their bodies in defence of their native city deprived of its walls, and not a man retiring a step, lest he might admit the enemy into the place he deserted. [9] The more keenly and closely, therefore, they fought on both sides, the more, on that account, were wounded, no weapon falling without effect amidst their [p. 708]arms and persons. [10] There was used by the Saguntines a missile weapon, called falarica, with the shaft of fir, and round in other parts except towards the point, whence the iron projected: this part, which was square, as in the pilum, they bound around with tow, and besmeared with pitch. [11] It had an iron head three feet in length, so that it could pierce through the body with the armour. [12] But what caused the greatest fear was, that this weapon, even though it stuck in the shield and did not penetrate into the body, when it was discharged with the middle part on fire, and bore along a much greater flame, produced by the mere motion, obliged the armour to be thrown down, and exposed the soldier to succeeding blows. 9. When the contest had for a long time continued doubtful, and the courage of the Saguntines had increased, because they had succeeded in their resistance beyond their hopes, while the Carthaginian, because he had not conquered, felt as vanquished, the townsmen suddenly set up a shout, and drive their enemies to the ruins of the wall; [2] thence they force them, while embarrassed and disordered; and lastly, drove them back, routed and put to flight, to their camp. [3] In the mean time it was announced that ambassadors had arrived from Rome; to meet whom messengers were sent to the sea-side by Hannibal, to tell them that they could not safely come to him through so many armed bands of savage tribes, and that Hannibal at such an important conjuncture had not leisure to listen to embassies. [4] It was obvious that, if not admitted, they would immediately repair to Carthage: he therefore sends letters and messengers beforehand to the leaders of the Barcine faction, to prepare the minds of their partisans, so that the other party might not be able in any thing to give an advantage to the Romans. 10. That embassy, therefore, excepting that the ambassadors were admitted and heard, proved likewise vain and fruitless. [2] Hanno alone, in opposition to the rest of the senate, pleaded the cause of the treaty, amidst deep silence on account of his authority, and not from the approbation of the audience. He said: that he had admonished and forewarned them by the gods, the arbiters and witnesses of treaties, that they should not send the son of Hamilcar to the army; [3] that the manes, that the offspring of that man could not rest in [p. 709]peace, nor ever, while any one of the Barcine name and blood survived, would the Roman treaties continue undisturbed. [4] “You, supplying as it were fuel to the flame, have sent to your armies a youth burning with the desire of sovereign power, and seeing but one road to his object, if by exciting war after war, he may live surrounded by arms and legions. You have therefore fostered this fire, in which you now burn. [5] Your armies invest Saguntum, whence they are forbidden by the treaty: ere long the Roman legions will invest Carthage, under the guidance of those gods through whose aid they revenged in the former war the infraction of the treaty. Are you unacquainted with the enemy, or with yourselves, or with the fortune of either nation? [6] Your good general refused to admit into his camp ambassadors coming from allies and in behalf of allies, and set at nought the law of nations. They, however, after being there repulsed, where not even the ambassadors of enemies are prohibited admittance, come to you: they require restitution according to the treaty: let not guilt attach to the state, they demand to have delivered up to them the author of the transgression, the person who is chargeable with this offence. [7] The more gently they proceed, —the slower they are to begin, the more unrelentingly, I fear, when they have once commenced, will they indulge resentment. Set before your eyes the islands Aegates and Eryx, all that for twenty-four years ye have suffered by land and sea. [8] Nor was this boy the leader, but his father Hamilcar himself, a second Mars, as these people would have it: but we had not refrained from Tarentum, that is, from Italy, according to the treaty; as now we do not refrain from Saguntum. [9] The gods and men have, therefore, prevailed over us; and as to that about which there was a dispute in words, whether of the two nations had infringed the treaty, the issue of the war, like an equitable judge, hath awarded the victory to the party on whose side justice stood. It is against Carthage that Hannibal is now moving his vineae and towers: it is the wall of Carthage that he is shaking with his battering-ram. [10] The ruins of Saguntum (oh that I may prove a false prophet!) will fall on our heads; and the war commenced against the Saguntines must be continued against the Romans. Shall we, therefore, some one will say, deliver up Hannibal? [11] In what relates to him I am aware that my authority is of little weight, on ac- [p. 710]count of my enmity with his father. But I both rejoice that Hamilcar perished, for this reason, that, had he lived, we should have now been engaged in a war with the Romans; and this youth, as the fury and firebrand of this war, I hate and detest. [12] Nor ought he only to be given up in atonement for the violated treaty; but even though no one demanded him, he ought to be transported to the extremest shores of earth or sea, and banished to a distance, whence neither his name nor any tidings of him can reach us, and he be unable to disturb the peace of a tranquil state. [13] I therefore give my opinion, that ambassadors be sent immediately to Rome to satisfy the senate; others to tell Hannibal to lead away his army from Saguntum, and to deliver up Hannibal himself, according to the treaty to the Romans; and I propose a third embassy, to make restitution to the Saguntines.” 11. When Hanno had concluded, there was no occasion for any one to contend with him in debate, to such a degree were almost all the senators devoted to Hannibal; and they accused Hanno of having spoken with more malignity than Flaccus Valerius, the Roman ambassador. [2] It was then said, in answer to the Roman ambassadors, “that the war had been commenced by the Saguntines, not by Hannibal; and that the Roman people acted unjustly if they preferred the Saguntines to the most ancient4 alliance of the Carthaginians.” [3] Whilst the Romans waste time in sending embassies, Hannibal, because his soldiers were fatigued with the battles and the works, allowed them rest for a few days, parties being stationed to guard the vineae and other works. In the mean time he inflames their minds, now by inciting their anger against the enemy, now with the hope of reward. [4] But when he declared before the assembled army, that the plunder of the captured city should be given to the soldiers, to such a degree were they all excited, that if the signal had been immediately given, it appeared that they could not have been resisted by any force. [5] The Saguntines, as they had a respite from fighting, neither for some days attacking nor attacked, so they had not, by night or day, ever ceased from toiling, that they might repair anew the wall in the quarter where the town had been exposed by the breach. A still more desperate [p. 711]storming than the former then assailed them; nor whilst all quarters resounded with various clamours, could they satisfactorily know where first or principally they should lend assistance. [6] Hannibal, as an encouragement, was present in person, where a movable tower, exceeding in height all the fortifications of the city, was urged forward. When being brought up it had cleared the walls of their defenders by means of the catapultae and ballistae ranged through all its stories, then Hannibal, thinking it a favourable opportunity, sends about five hundred Africans with pickaxes to undermine the wall: nor was the work difficult, since the unhewn stones were not fastened with lime, but filled in their interstices with clay, after the manner of ancient building. [7] It fell, therefore, more extensively than it was struck, and through the open spaces of the ruins troops of armed men rushed into the city. [8] They also obtain possession of a rising ground; and having collected thither catapulted and ballistae, so that they might have a fort in the city itself, commanding it like a citadel, they surround it with a wall: and the Saguntines raise an inner wall before the part of the city which was not yet taken. [9] On both sides they exert the utmost vigour in fortifying and fighting: but the Saguntines, by erecting these inner defences, diminish daily the size of their city. [10] At the same time, the want of all supplies increased through the length of the siege, and the expectation of foreign aid diminished, since the Romans, their only hope, were at such a distance, and all the country round was in the power of the enemy. [11] The sudden departure of Hannibal against the Oretani and Carpetani5 revived for a little their drooping spirits; which two nations, though, exasperated by the severity of the levy, they had occasioned, by detaining the commissaries, the fear of a revolt, having been suddenly checked by the quickness of Hannibal, laid down the arms they had taken up. 12. Nor was the siege of Saguntum, in the mean time, less [p. 712]vigorously maintained; Maharbal, the son of Himilco, whom Hannibal had set over the army, carrying on operations so actively that neither the townsmen nor their enemies perceived that the general was away. [2] He both engaged in several successful battles, and with three battering-rams overthrew a portion of the wall; and showed to Hannibal, on his arrival, the ground all covered with fresh ruins. [3] The army was therefore immediately led against the citadel itself, and a desperate combat was commenced with much slaughter on both sides, and part of the citadel was taken. The slight chance of a peace was then tried by two persons; Alcon a Saguntine, and Alorcus a Spaniard. [4] Alcon, thinking he could effect something by entreaties, having passed over, without the knowledge of the Saguntines, to Hannibal by night, when his tears produced no effect, and harsh conditions were offered as from an exasperated conqueror, becoming a deserter instead of an advocate, remained with the enemy; affirming that the man would be put to death who should treat for peace on such terms. [5] For it was required that they should make restitution to the Turdetani; and after delivering up all their gold and silver, departing from the city each with a single garment, should take up their dwelling where the Carthaginian should direct. [6] Alcon having denied that the Saguntines would accept such terms of peace, Alorcus, asserting that when all else is subdued, the mind becomes subdued, offers himself as the proposer of that peace. Now at that time he was a soldier of Hannibal's, but publicly the friend and host of the Saguntines. [7] Having openly delivered his weapon to the guards of the enemy and passed the fortifications, he was conducted, as he had himself requested, to the Saguntine praetor; [8] whither when there was immediately a general rush of every description of people, the rest of the multitude being removed, an audience of the senate is given to Alorcus; whose speech was to the following effect: 13. “If your citizen Alcon, as he came to implore a peace from Hannibal, had in like manner brought back to you the terms of peace proposed by Hannibal, this journey of mine would have been unnecessary; by which circumstance I should not have had to come to you as the legate of Hannibal nor as a deserter. [2] Since he has remained with your [p. 713]enemies, either through your fault or his own, (through his own, if he counterfeited fear; through yours, if among you there be danger to those who tell the truth,) that you may not be ignorant that there are some terms of safety and peace for you, I have come to you in consideration of the ancient ties of hospitality which subsist between us. [3] But that I speak what I address to you for your sake and that of no other, let even this be the proof: that neither while you resisted with your own strength, nor while you expected assistance from the Romans, did I ever make any mention of peace to you. [4] But now, after you have neither any hope from the Romans, nor your own arms nor walls sufficiently defend you, I bring to you a peace rather necessary than just: [5] of effecting which there is thus some hope, if, as Hannibal offers it in the spirit of a conqueror, you listen to it as vanquished; if you will consider not what is taken from you as loss, (since all belongs to the conqueror,) but whatever is left as a gift. [6] He takes away from you your city, which, already for the greater part in ruins, he has almost wholly in his possession; he leaves you your territory, intending to mark out a place in which you may build a new town; he commands that all the gold and silver, both public and private, shall be brought to him; [7] he preserves inviolate your persons and those of your wives and children, provided you are willing to depart from Saguntum, unarmed, each with two garments. [8] These terms a victorious enemy dictates. These, though harsh and grievous, your condition commends to you. Indeed I do not despair, when the power of every thing is given him, that he will remit something from these terms. [9] But even these I think you ought rather to endure, than suffer, by the rights of war, yourselves to be slaughtered, your wives and children to be ravished and dragged into captivity before your faces.” 14. When an assembly of the people, by the gradual crowding round of the multitude, had mingled with the senate to hear these proposals, the chief men suddenly withdrawing before an answer was returned, and throwing all the gold and silver collected, both from public and private stores, into a fire hastily kindled for that purpose, the greater part flung themselves also into it. [2] When the dismay and agitation produced by this deed had pervaded the whole city, another noise was heard in addition from the citadel. A tower, long bat- [p. 714]tered, had fallen down; and when a Carthaginian cohort, rushing through the breach, had made a signal to the general that the city was destitute of the usual outposts and guards, Hannibal, thinking that [3??] there ought to be no delay at such an opportunity, having attacked the city with his whole forces, took it in a moment, command being given that all the adults should be put to death; which command, though cruel, was proved in the issue to have been almost necessary. [4] For to whom of those men could mercy have been shown, who, either shut up with their wives and children, burned their houses over their own heads, or abroad in arms made no end of fighting, except in death. 15. The town was taken, with immense spoil. Though the greater part of the goods had been purposely damaged by their owners, and resentment had made scarce any distinction of age in the massacre, and the captives were the booty of the soldiers; [2] still it appears that some money was raised from the price of the effects that were sold, and that much costly furniture and garments were sent to Carthage. [3] Some have written that Saguntum was taken in the eighth month after it began to be besieged; that Hannibal then retired to New Carthage, into winter quarters; and that in the fifth month after he had set out from Carthage he arrived in Italy. [4] If this be so, it was impossible that Publius Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius could have been consuls, to whom both at the beginning of the siege the Saguntine ambassadors were despatched, and who, during their office, fought with Hannibal; the one at the river Ticinus, and both some time after at the Trebia. [5] Either all these events took place in a somewhat shorter period, or Saguntum was not begun to be besieged, but taken at the beginning of the year in which Publius Cornelius and Tiberius Sempronius were consuls. [6] For the battle at Trebia could not have been so late as the year of Cneius Servilius and Caius Flaminius, since Flaminius entered on the office at Ariminum, having been created by the consul Tiberius Sempronius; who, having repaired to Rome after the battle at Trebia for the purpose of creating consuls, returned when the election was finished to the army into winter quarters. 16. Nearly about the same time, both the ambassadors who had returned from Carthage brought intelligence to Rome that all appearances were hostile, and the destruction of Sa- [p. 715]guntum was announced. [2] Then such grief, and pity for allies so undeservingly destroyed, and shame that aid was withheld, and rage against the Carthaginians, and fear for the issue of events, as if the enemy were already at the gates, took at once possession of the senators, that their minds, disturbed by so many simultaneous emotions, trembled with fear rather than deliberated. [3] For they considered that neither had a more spirited or warlike enemy ever encountered them, nor had the Roman state been ever so sunk in sloth, and unfit for war: that the Sardinians, the Corsicans, the Istrians, and the Illyrians, had rather kept in a state of excitement than exercised the Roman arms; [4] and with the Gauls it had been more properly a tumult than a war. [5] That the Carthaginian, a veteran enemy, ever victorious during the hardest service for twenty-three years among the tribes of Spain, first trained to war under Hamilcar, then Hasdrubal, now Hannibal, a most active leader, and fresh from the destruction of a most opulent city, was passing the Iberus; [6] that along with them he was bringing the numerous tribes of Spain, already aroused, and was about to excite the nations of Gaul, ever desirous of war; and that a war against the world was to be maintained in Italy and before the walls of Rome. 17. The provinces had already been previously named for the consuls; and having been now ordered to cast lots for them, Spain fell to Cornelius, and Africa with Sicily to Sempronius. [2] Six legions were decreed for that year, and as many of the allies as should seem good to the consuls, and as great a fleet as could be equipped. [3] Twenty-four thousand Roman infantry were levied, and one thousand eight hundred horse: forty thousand infantry of the allies, and four thousand four hundred horse: two hundred and twenty ships of five banks of oars, and twenty light galleys, were launched. [4] It was then proposed to the people, “whether they willed and commanded that war should be declared against the people of Carthage;” and for the sake of that war a supplication was made through the city, and the gods were implored that the war which the Roman people had decreed might have a prosperous and fortunate issue. [5] The forces were thus divided between the consuls. To Sempronius two legions were given, (each of these consisted of four thousand infantry and three hundred horse,) and sixteen thousand of the infantry of the [p. 716]allies, and one thousand eight hundred horse: one hundred and sixty ships of war, and twelve light galleys. [6] With these land and sea forces Tiberius Sempronius was despatched to Sicily, in order to transport his army to Africa if the other consul should be able to prevent the Carthaginian from invading Italy. [7] Fewer troops were given to Cornelius, because Lucius Manlius, the praetor, also had been sent with no weak force into Gaul. [8] The number of ships in particular was reduced to Cornelius. Sixty of five banks of oars were assigned to him, (for they did not believe that the enemy would come by sea, or would fight after that mode of warfare,) and two Roman legions with their regular cavalry, and fourteen thousand of the infantry of the allies, with one thousand six hundred horse. [9] The province of Gaul being not as yet exposed to the Carthaginian invasion, had, in the same year, two Roman legions, ten thousand allied infantry, one thousand allied cavalry, and six hundred Roman. 18. These preparations having been thus made, in order that every thing that was proper might be done before they commenced war, they send Quintus Fabius, Marcus Livius, Lucius Aemilius, Caius Licinius, and Quintus Baebius, men of advanced years, as ambassadors into Africa, to inquire of the Carthaginians if Hannibal had laid siege to Saguntum by public authority; [2] and if they should confess it, as it seemed probable they would, and defend it as done by public authority, to declare war against the people of Carthage. [3] After the Romans arrived at Carthage, when an audience of the senate was given them, and Quintus Fabius had addressed no further inquiry than the one with which they had been charged, then one of the Carthaginians replied: [4] “Even your former embassy, O Romans, was precipitate, when you demanded Hannibal to be given up, as attacking Saguntum on his own authority: but your present embassy, though so far milder in words, is in fact more severe. [5] For then Hannibal was both accused, and required to be delivered up: now both a confession of wrong is exacted from us, and, as though we had confessed, restitution is immediately demanded. [6] But I think that the question is not, whether Saguntum was attacked by private or public authority, but whether it was with right or wrong. [7] For in the case of our citizen, the right of inquiry, whether he has acted by his own [p. 717]pleasure or ours, and the punishment also, belongs to us. [8] The only dispute with you is, whether it was allowed to be done by the treaty. Since, therefore, it pleases you that a distinction should be made between what commanders do by public authority, and what on their own suggestion, there was a treaty between us made by the consul Lutatius; [9] in which, though provision was made for the allies of both, there is no provision made for the Saguntines, for they were not as yet your allies. [10] But in that treaty which was made with Hasdrubal, the Saguntines are excepted; against which I am going to say nothing but what I have learned from you. For you denied that you were bound by the treaty which Caius Lutatius the consul first made with us, because that it had neither been made by the authority of the senate nor the command of the people; and another treaty was therefore concluded anew by public authority. [11] If your treaties do not bind you unless they are made by your authority and your commands, neither can the treaty of Hasdrubal, which he made without our knowledge, be binding on us. [12] Cease, therefore, to make mention of Saguntum and the Iberus, and let your mind at length bring forth that with which it has long been in labour.” [13] Then the Roman, having formed a fold in his robe, said, “Here we bring to you peace and war; take which you please.” [14] On this speech they exclaimed no less fiercely in reply: “he might give which he chose;” and when he again, unfolding his robe, said “he gave war,” they all answered that “they accepted it, and would maintain it with the same spirit with which they accepted it.” 19. This direct inquiry and denunciation of war seemed more consistent with the dignity of the Roman people, both before and now, especially when Saguntum was destroyed, than to cavil in words about the obligation of treaties. [2] For if it was a subject for a controversy of words, in what was the treaty of Hasdrubal to be compared with the former treaty of Lutatius, which was altered? [3] Since in the treaty of Lutatius, it was expressly added, "that it should only be held good if the people sanctioned it; but in the treaty of Hasdrubal, neither was there any such exception; and that treaty during his life had been so established by the silence of so many years, that not even after the death of its author was any change made in it. [4] Although even were they to abide by the former [p. 718]treaty, there had been sufficient provision made for the Saguntines by excepting the allies of both states; for neither was it added, “those who then were,” nor “those who should afterwards be admitted:” and since it is allowable to admit new allies, who could think it proper, either that no people should be received for any services into friendship? [5] or that, being received under protection, they should not be defended? It was only stipulated, that the allies of the Carthaginians should not be excited to revolt, nor, revolting of their own accord, be received. [6] The Roman ambassadors, according as they had been commanded at Rome, passed over from Carthage into Spain, in order to visit the nations, and either to allure them into an alliance, or dissuade them from joining the Carthaginians. [7] They came first to the Bargusii, by whom having been received with welcome, because they were weary of the Carthaginian government, they excited many of the states beyond the Iberus to the desire of a revolution. [8] Thence they came to the Volciani, whose reply being celebrated through Spain, dissuaded the other states from an alliance with the Romans; for thus the oldest member in their council made answer: [9] “What sense of shame have ye, Romans, to ask of us that we should prefer your friendship to that of the Carthaginians, when you, their allies, betrayed the Saguntines with greater cruelty than that with which the Carthaginians, their enemies, destroyed them? There, methinks, you should look for allies, where the massacre of Saguntum is unknown. [10] The ruins of Saguntum will remain a warning as melancholy as memorable to the states of Spain, that no one should confide in the faith or alliance of Rome.” [11] Having been then commanded to depart immediately from the territory of the Volciani, they afterwards received no kinder words from any of the councils of Spain: they therefore pass into Gaul, after having gone about through Spain to no purpose. 20. Among the Gauls a new and alarming spectacle was seen, by reason of their coming (such is the custom of the nation) in arms to the assembly. [2] When, extolling in their discourse the renown and valour of the Roman people, and the wide extent of their empire, they had requested that they would refuse a passage through their territory and cities to the Carthaginian invading Italy; [3] such laughter and yelling is [p. 719]said to have arisen, that the youths were with difficulty composed to order by the magistrates and old men. [4] So absurd and shameless did the request seem, to propose that the Gauls, rather than suffer the war to pass on to Italy, should turn it upon themselves and expose their own lands to be laid waste instead of those of others. [5] When the tumult was at length allayed, answer was returned to the ambassadors, “that they had neither experienced good from the Romans, nor wrong from the Carthaginians, on account of which they should either take up arms in behalf of the Romans, or against the Carthaginians. [6] On the contrary, they had heard that men of their nation had been driven from the lands and confines of Italy by the Roman people, that they had to pay a tribute, and suffered other indignities.” [7] Nearly the same was said and heard in the other assemblies of Gaul; nor did they hear any thing friendly or pacific before they came to Marseilles. [8] There, every thing found out by the care and fidelity of the allies was made known to them —“that the minds of the Gauls had been already prepossessed by Hannibal, but that not even by him would that nation be found very tractable, (so fierce and untameable are their dispositions,) unless the affections of the chiefs should every now and then be conciliated with gold, of which that people are most covetous.” [9] Having thus gone round through the tribes of Spain and Gaul, the ambassadors return to Rome not long after the consuls had set out for their provinces. They found the whole city on tiptoe in expectation of war, the report being sufficiently confirmed, that the Carthaginians had already passed the Iberus. 21. Hannibal, after the taking of Saguntum, had retired to New Carthage into winter quarters; and there, having heard what had been done and decreed at Rome and Carthage, and that he was not only the leader, but also the cause [2??] of the war, after having divided and sold the remains of the plunder, thinking there ought to be no longer delay, he calls together and thus addresses his soldiers of the Spanish race: [3] “I believe, allies, that even you yourselves perceive that, all the tribes of Spain having been reduced to peace, we must either conclude our campaigns and disband our armies, or transfer the war into other regions: [4] for thus these nations will flourish amid the blessings not only of peace, but also of victory, if we seek from other countries spoils and renown. [5] Since, therefore, [p. 720]a campaign far from home soon awaits you, and it is uncertain when you shall again see your homes, and all that is there dear to you, if any one of you wishes to visit his friends, I grant him leave of absence. [6] I give you orders to be here at the beginning of spring, that, with the good assistance of the gods, we may enter on a war which will prove one of great glory and spoil.” [7] This power of visiting their homes, voluntarily offered, was acceptable to almost all, already longing to see their friends, and foreseeing in future a still longer absence. [8] Repose through the whole season of winter, between toils already undergone and those that were soon to be endured, repaired the vigour of their bodies and minds to encounter all difficulties afresh. [9] At the beginning of spring they assembled according to command. Hannibal, when he had reviewed the auxiliaries of all the nations, having gone to Gades, performs his vows to Hercules; and binds himself by new vows, provided his other projects should have a prosperous issue. [10] Then dividing his care at the same time between the offensive and defensive operations of the war, lest while he was advancing on Italy by a land journey through Spain and Gaul, Africa should be unprotected and exposed to the Romans from Sicily, he resolved to strengthen it with a powerful force. [11] For this purpose he requested a reinforcement from Africa, chiefly of light-armed spearmen, in order that the Africans might serve in Spain, and the Spaniards in Africa, each likely to be a better soldier at a distance from home, as if bound by mutual pledges. [12] He sent into Africa thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty targetteers, eight hundred and seventy Balearic slingers, and one thousand two hundred horsemen, composed of various nations. [13] He orders these forces partly to be used as a garrison for Carthage, and partly to be distributed through Africa: at the same time having sent commissaries into the different states, he orders four thousand chosen youth whom they had levied to be conducted to Carthage, both as a garrison and as hostages. 22. Thinking also that Spain ought not to be neglected, (and the less because he was aware that it had been traversed by the Roman ambassadors, to influence the minds of the chiefs,) he assigns that [2??] province to his brother Hasdrubal, a man of active spirit, and strengthens him chiefly with African troops: eleven thousand eight hundred and fifty African [p. 721]infantry, three hundred Ligurians, and five hundred Balearians. [3] To these forces of infantry were added four hundred horsemen of the Libyphœnicians, a mixed race of Carthaginians and Africans; of the Numidians and Moors, who border on the ocean, to the number of one thousand eight hundred, and a small band of Ilergetes from Spain, amounting to two hundred horse: and, that no description of land force might be wanting, fourteen elephants. [4] A fleet was given him besides to defend the sea-coast, (because it might be supposed that the Romans would then fight in the same mode of warfare by which they had formerly prevailed,) fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, five triremes: but only thirty-two quinqueremes and five triremes were properly fitted out and manned with rowers. From Gades he returned to the winter quarters of the army at Carthage; and thence setting out, he led his forces by the city Etovissa to the Iberus and the seacoast. [5] There, it is reported, a youth of divine aspect was seen by him [6??] in his sleep, who said, “that he was sent by Jupiter as the guide of Hannibal into Italy, and that he should, therefore, follow him, nor in any direction turn his eyes away from him.” [7] At first he followed in terror, looking no where, either around or behind: afterwards, through the curiosity of the human mind, when he revolved in his mind what that could be on which he was forbidden to look back, he could not restrain his eyes; [8] then he beheld behind him a serpent of wonderful size moving along with an immense destruction of trees and bushes, and after it a cloud following with thunderings from the skies; and that then inquiring “what was that great commotion, and what the cause of the prodigy,” he heard in reply: [9] “That it was the devastation of Italy: that he should continue to advance forward, nor inquire further, but suffer the fates to remain in obscurity.” 23. Cheered by this vision, he transported his forces in three divisions across the Iberus, having sent emissaries before him to conciliate by gifts the minds of the Gauls, in the quarter through which his army was to be led, and to examine the passes of the Alps. [2] He led ninety thousand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry across the Iberus. He then subdued the Ilergetes, the Bargusii, the Ausetani, and that part of Lacetania which lies at the foot of the Pyrenaean mountains; and he placed Hanno in command over all this [p. 722]district, that the narrow gorges which connect Spain with Gaul might be under his power. [3] Ten thousand infantry, and a thousand cavalry, were given to Hanno for the defence of the country he was to occupy. [4] After the army began to march through the passes of the Pyrenees, and a more certain rumour of the Roman war spread through the barbarians, three thousand of the Carpetanian infantry turned back: it clearly appeared that they were not so much swayed by the prospect of the war as by the length of the journey and the insuperable passage of the Alps. [5] Hannibal, because it was hazardous to recall or detain them by force, lest the fierce minds of the rest might [6??] also be irritated, sent home above seven thousand men, whom also he had observed to be annoyed with the service, pretending that the Carpetani had also been dismissed by him. 24. Then, lest delay and ease might unsettle their minds, he crosses the Pyrenees with the rest of his forces, and pitches his camp at the town Illiberis. [2] The Gauls, though they had heard that the war was directed against Italy, yet because there was a report that the Spaniards on the other side of the Pyrenees had been reduced by force, and that strong forces had been imposed on them, being roused to arms through the fear of slavery, assembled certain tribes at Ruscino. [3] When this was announced to Hannibal, he, having more fear of the delay than of the war, sent envoys to say to their princes, “that he wished to confer with them; and that they should either come nearer to Illiberis, or that he would proceed to Ruscino, that their meeting might be facilitated by vicinity: [4] for that he would either be happy to receive them into his camp, or would himself without hesitation come to them: since he had entered Gaul as a friend, and not as an enemy, and would not draw the sword, if the Gauls did not force him, before he came to Italy.” [5] These proposals, indeed, were made by his messengers. But when the princes of the Gauls, having immediately moved their camp to Illiberis, came without reluctance to the Carthaginian, being won by his presents, they suffered his army to pass through their territories, by the town of Ruscino, without any molestation. 25. In the mean time no further intelligence had been brought into Italy to Rome by the ambassadors of Marseilles, than that Hannibal had passed the Iberus; [2] when the Boii, as [p. 723]if he had already passed the Alps, revolted after instigating the Insubrians; not so much through their ancient resentment towards the Roman people, as on account of their having felt aggrieved that the colonies of Placentia and Cremona had been lately planted in the Gallic territory about the Po. Having, therefore, [3??] suddenly taken up arms, and made an attack on that very territory, they created so much of terror and tumult, that not only the rustic population, but even the Roman triumvirs, Caius Lutatius, Caius Servilius, and Titus Annius, who had come to assign the lands, distrusting the walls of Placentia, fled to Mutina. [4] About the name of Lutatius there is no doubt: in place of Caius Servilius and Titus Annius, some annals have Quintus Acilius and Caius Herennius; others, Publius Cornelius Asina and Caius Papirius Maso. This point is also uncertain, whether the ambassadors sent to expostulate to the Boii suffered violence, or whether an attack was made on the triumvirs while measuring out the lands. [5] While they were shut up in Mutina, and a people unskilled in the arts of besieging towns, and, [6??] at the same time, most sluggish at military operations, lay inactive before the walls, which they had not touched, pretended proposals for a peace were set on foot; [7] and the ambassadors, being invited out to a conference by the chiefs of the Gauls, are seized, not only contrary to the law of nations, but in violation of the faith which was pledged on that very occasion; the Gauls denying that they would set them free unless their hostages were restored to them. [8] When this intelligence respecting the ambassadors was announced, and that Mutina and its garrison were in danger, Lucius Manlius, the praetor, inflamed with rage, led his army in haste to Mutina. There were then woods on both sides of the road, most of the country being uncultivated. [9] There, having advanced without previously exploring his route, he fell suddenly into an ambuscade; and after much slaughter of his men, with difficulty made his way into the open plains. [10] Here a camp was fortified, and because confidence was wanting to the Gauls to attack it, the spirit of the soldiers revived, although it was sufficiently evident that their strength was much clipped. [11] The journey was then commenced anew; nor while the army was led in march through the open tracts did the enemy appear: [12] but, when the woods were again entered, then attacking the rear, amid great con- [p. 724]fusion and alarm of all, they slew eight hundred soldiers, and took six standards. [13] There was an end to the Gauls of creating, and to the Romans of experiencing terror, when they escaped from the pathless and entangled thicket; then easily defending their march through the open ground, the Romans directed their course to Tanetum, a village near the Po; where, by a temporary fortification, and the [14??] supplies conveyed by the river, and also by the aid of the Brixian Gauls, they defended themselves against the daily increasing multitude of their enemies. 26. When the account of this sudden disturbance was brought to Rome, and the senators heard that the Punic had also been increased by a Gallic war, [2??] they order Caius Atilius, the praetor, to carry assistance to Manlius with one Roman legion and five thousand of the allies, enrolled in the late levy by the consul: who, without any contest, for the enemy had retired through fear, arrived at Tanetum. [3] At the same time Publius Cornelius, a new legion having been levied in the room of that which was sent with the praetor, setting out from the city with sixty ships of war, by the coast of Etruria and Liguria, and then the mountains of the Salyes, arrived [4??] at Marseilles, and pitched his camp at the nearest mouth of the Rhone, (for the stream flows down to the sea divided into several channels,) scarcely as yet well believing that Hannibal had crossed the Pyrenaean mountains; [5] whom when he ascertained to be also meditating the passage of the Rhone, uncertain in what place he might meet him, his soldiers not yet being sufficiently recovered from the tossing of the sea, he sends forward, in the mean time, three hundred chosen horses, with Massilian guides and Gallic auxiliaries, to explore all the country, and observe the enemy from a safe distance. [6] Hannibal, the other states being pacified by fear or bribes, had now come into the territory of the Volcae, a powerful nation. They, indeed, dwell on both sides of the Rhone: but doubting that the Carthaginian could be driven from the hither bank, in order that they might have the river as a defence, having transported almost all their effects across the Rhone, occupied in arms the farther bank of the river. [7] Hannibal, by means of presents, persuades the other inhabitants of the river-side, and some even of the Volcae themselves, whom their homes had detained, to collect from every quarter and build ships; and [p. 725]they at the same time themselves desired that the army should be transported, and their country relieved, as soon as possible, from the vast multitude of men that burthened it. [8] A great number, therefore, of ships and boats rudely formed for the neighbouring passages, were collected together; and the Gauls, first beginning the plan, hollowed out some new ones from single trees; [9] and then the soldiers themselves, at once induced by the plenty of materials and the easiness of the work, hastily formed shapeless hulks, in which they could transport themselves and their baggage, caring about nothing else, provided they could float and contain their burthen. 27. And now, when all things were sufficiently prepared for crossing, the enemy over against them occupying the whole bank, horse and foot, deterred them. [2] In order to dislodge them, Hannibal orders Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, at the first watch of the night, to proceed with a part of the forces, principally Spanish, one day's journey up the river; [3] and having crossed it where he might first be able, as secretly as possible, to lead round his forces, that when the occasion required he might attack the enemy in the rear. [4] The Gauls, given him as guides for the purpose, inform him that about twenty-five miles from thence, the river spreading round a small island, broader where it was divided, and therefore with a shallower channel, presented a passage. At this place timber was quickly cut down and rafts formed, on which men, horses, and other burthens might be conveyed over. [5] The Spaniards, without making any difficulty, having put their clothes in bags of leather, and themselves leaning on their bucklers placed beneath them, swam across the river. [6] And the rest of the army, after passing on the rafts joined together, and pitching their camp near the river, being fatigued by the journey of the night and the labour of the work, are refreshed by the rest of one day, their leader being anxious to execute his design at a proper season. [7] Setting out next day from this place, they signify by raising a smoke that they had crossed, and were not far distant; which when Hannibal understood, that he might not be wanting on the opportunity, he gives the signal for passing. [8] The infantry already had the boats prepared and fitted; a line of ships higher up transporting the horsemen for the most part near their horses swimming beside them, in order to break the force of the [p. 726]current, rendered the water smooth to the boats crossing below. [9] A great part of the horses were led across swimming, held by bridles from the stern, except those which they put on board saddled and bridled, in order that they might be ready to be used by the rider the moment he disembarked on the strand. 28. The Gauls run down to the bank to meet them with various whoopings and songs, according to their custom, shaking their shields above their heads, and brandishing their weapons [2??] in their right hands, although such a multitude of ships in front of them alarmed them, together with the loud roaring of the river, and the mingled clamours of the sailors and soldiers, both those who were striving to break through the force of the current, and those who from the other bank were encouraging their comrades on their passage. [3] While sufficiently dismayed by this tumult in front, more terrifying shouts from behind assailed them, their camp having been taken by Hanno; presently he himself came up, and a twofold terror encompassed them, both such a multitude of armed men landing from the ships, and this unexpected army pressing on their rear. [4] When the Gauls, having made a prompt and bold effort to force the enemy, were themselves repulsed, they break through where a way seemed most open, and fly in consternation to their villages around. Hannibal, now despising these tumultuary onsets of the Gauls, having transported the rest of his forces at leisure, pitches his camp. I believe that there were various plans for transporting the elephants; at least there are various accounts of the way in which it was done. [5] Some relate, that after the elephants were assembled together on the bank, the fiercest of them being provoked by his keeper, pursued him as he swam across the water, to which he had run for refuge, and drew after him the rest of the herd; the mere force of the stream hurrying them to the other bank, when the bottom had failed each, fearful of the depth. [6] But there is more reason to believe that they were conveyed across on rafts; which plan, as it must have appeared the safer before execution, is after it the more entitled to credit. [7] They extended from the bank into the river one raft two hundred feet long and fifty broad, which, fastened higher up by several strong cables to the bank, that it might not be carried down by the stream, [p. 727]they covered, like a bridge, with earth thrown upon it, so that the beasts might tread upon it without fear, as over solid ground. [8] Another raft equally broad and a hundred feet long, fit for crossing the river, was joined to this first; and when the elephants, driven along the stationary raft as along a road, had passed, the females leading the way, on to the smaller raft which was joined to it, the lashings, by which it was slightly fastened, being immediately let go, it was drawn by some light boats to the opposite side. [9] The first having been thus landed, the rest were then returned for and carried across. [10] They gave no signs of alarm whatever while they were driven along as it were on a continuous bridge. The first fear was, when, the raft being loosed from the rest, they were hurried into the deep. [11] Then pressing together, as those at the edges drew back from the water, they produced some disorder, till mere terror, when they saw water all around, produced quiet. [12] Some, indeed, becoming infuriated, fell into the river; but, steadied by their own weight, having thrown off their riders, and seeking step by step the shallows, they escaped to the shore. 29. Whilst the elephants were conveyed over, Hannibal, in the mean time, had sent five hundred Numidian horsemen towards the camp of the Romans, to observe where and how numerous their forces were, and what they were designing. [2] The three hundred Roman horsemen sent, as was before said, from the mouth of the Rhone, meet this band of cavalry; and a more furious engagement than could be expected from the number of the combatants takes place. [3] For, besides many wounds, the loss on both sides was also nearly equal: and the flight and dismay of the Numidians gave victory to the Romans, now exceedingly fatigued. There fell of the conquerors one hundred and sixty, not all Romans, but partly Gauls: of the vanquished more than two hundred. [4] This commencement, and at the same time omen of the war, as it portended to the Romans a prosperous issue of the whole, so did it also the success of a doubtful and by no means bloodless contest. [5] When, after the action had thus occurred, his own men returned to each general, Scipio could adopt no fixed plan of proceeding, except that he should form his measures from the plans and undertakings of the enemy: [6] and Hannibal, uncertain whether he should pursue the march he had commenced [p. 728]into Italy, or fight with the Roman army which had first presented itself, the arrival of ambassadors from the Boii, and of a petty prince called Magalus, diverted from an immediate engagement; who, declaring that they would be the guides of his journey and the companions of his dangers, gave it as their opinion, that Italy ought to be attacked with the entire force of the war, his strength having been no where previously impaired. [7] The troops indeed feared the enemy, the remembrance of the former war not being yet obliterated; but much more did they dread the immense journey and the Alps, a thing formidable by report, particularly to the inexperienced. 30. Hannibal, therefore, when his own resolution was fixed to proceed in his course and advance on Italy, having summoned an assembly, works upon the minds of the soldiers in various ways, by reproof and exhortation. [2] He said, that “he wondered what sudden fear had seized breasts ever before undismayed: that through so many years they had made their campaigns with conquest; nor had departed from Spain before all the nations and countries which two opposite seas embrace, were subjected to the Carthaginians. [3] That then, indignant that the Romans demanded those, whosoever had besieged Saguntum, to be delivered up to them, as on account of a crime, they had passed the Iberus to blot out the name of the Romans, and to emancipate the world. [4] That then the way seemed long to no one, though they were pursuing it from the setting to the rising of the sun. [5] That now, when they saw by far the greater part of their journey accomplished, the passes of the Pyrenees surmounted, amid the most ferocious nations, the Rhone, that mighty river, crossed, in spite of the opposition of so many thousand Gauls, the fury of the river itself having been overcome, when they had the Alps in sight, the other side of which was Italy, should they halt through weariness at [6??] the very gates of the enemy, imagining the Alps to be —what else than lofty mountains? [7] That supposing them to be higher than the summits of the Pyrenees, assuredly no part of the earth reached the sky, nor was insurmountable by mankind. The Alps in fact were inhabited and cultivated; —produced and supported living beings. [8] Were they passable by a few men and impassable to armies? That those very ambassadors whom they saw before them had not crossed the Alps borne aloft through the air on wings; neither [p. 729]were their ancestors indeed natives of the soil, but settling in Italy from foreign countries, had often as emigrants safely crossed these very Alps in immense bodies, with their wives and children. [9] To the armed soldier, carrying nothing with him but the instruments of war, what in reality was impervious or insurmountable? That Saguntum might be taken, what dangers, what toils were for eight months undergone! [10] Now, when their aim was Rome, the capital of the world, could any thing appear so dangerous or difficult as to delay their undertaking? [11] That the Gauls had formerly gained possession of that very country which the Carthaginian despairs of being able to approach. That they must, therefore, either yield in spirit and valour to that nation which they had so often during those times overcome; or look forward, as the end of their journey, to the plain which spreads between the Tiber and the walls of Rome.” 31. He orders them, roused by these exhortations, to refresh themselves and prepare for the journey. [2] Next day, proceeding upward along the bank of the Rhone, he makes for the inland part of Gaul: not because it was the more direct route to the Alps, but believing that the farther he retired from the sea, the Romans would be less in his way; [3] with whom, before he arrived in Italy, he had no intention of engaging. After four days' march he came to the Island: [4] there the streams of the Arar and the Rhone, flowing down from different branches of the Alps, after embracing a pretty large tract of country, flow into one. The name of the Island is given to the plains that lie between them. [5] The Allobroges dwell near, a nation even in those days inferior to none in Gaul in power and fame. They were at that time at variance. Two brothers were contending for the sovereignty. [6] The elder, named Brancus, who had before been king, was driven out by his younger brother and a party of the younger men, who, inferior in right, had more of power. [7] When the decision of this quarrel was most opportunely referred to Hannibal, being appointed arbitrator of the kingdom, he restored the sovereignty to the elder, because such had been the opinion of the senate and the chief men. [8] In return for this service, he was assisted with a supply of provisions, and plenty of all necessaries, particularly clothing, which the Alps, notorious for extreme cold, rendered necessary to be [p. 730]prepared. [9] After composing the dissensions of the Allobroges, when he now was proceeding to the Alps, he directed his course thither, not by the straight road, but turned to the left into the country of the Tricastini, thence by the extreme boundary of the territory of the Vocontii he proceeded to the Tricorii; his way not being any where obstructed till he came to the river Druentia. [10] This stream, also arising amid the Alps, is by far the most difficult to pass of all the rivers in Gaul; for though it rolls down an immense body of water, yet it does not admit of ships; [11] because, being restrained by no banks, and flowing in several and not always the same channels, and continually forming new shallows and new whirlpools, (on which account the passage is also uncertain to a person on foot,) and rolling down besides gravelly stones, it affords no firm or safe passage to those who enter it; [12] and having been at that time swollen by showers, it created great disorder among the soldiers as they crossed, when, in addition to other difficulties, they were of themselves confused by their own hurry and uncertain shouts. 32. Publius Cornelius the consul, about three days after Hannibal moved from the bank of the Rhone, had come to the camp of the enemy, with his army drawn up in square, intending to make no delay in fighting: [2] but when he saw the fortifications deserted, and that he could not easily come up with them so far in advance before him, he returned to the sea and his fleet, in order more easily and safely to encounter Hannibal when descending from the Alps. [3] But that Spain, the province which he had obtained by lot, might not be destitute of Roman auxiliaries, he sent his brother Cneius Scipio with the principal part of his forces against [4??] Hasdrubal, not only to defend the old allies and conciliate new, but also to drive Hasdrubal out of Spain. [5] He himself, with a very small force, returned to Genoa, intending to defend Italy with the army which was around the Po. From the Druentia, by a road [6??] that lay principally through plains, Hannibal arrived at the Alps without molestation from the Gauls that inhabit those regions. [7] Then, though the scene had been previously anticipated from report, (by which uncertainties are wont to be exaggerated,) yet the height of the mountains when viewed so near, and the snows almost mingling with the sky, the shapeless huts situated on the cliffs, the cattle and beasts of [p. 731]burden withered by the cold, the men unshorn and wildly dressed, all things, animate and inanimate, stiffened with frost, and other objects more terrible to be seen than described, renewed their alarm. [8] To them, marching up the first acclivities, the mountaineers appeared occupying the heights over head; who, if they had occupied the more concealed valleys, might, by rushing out suddenly to the attack, have occasioned great flight and havoc. [9] Hannibal orders them to halt, and having sent forward Gauls to view the ground, when he found there was no passage that way, he pitches his camp in the widest valley he could find, among places all rugged and precipitous. Then, having learned from the same Gauls, when they had mixed in conversation with the mountaineers, from whom they differed little in [10??] language and manners, that the pass was only beset during the day, and that at night each withdrew to his own dwelling, he advanced at the dawn to the heights, as if designing openly and by day to force his way through the defile. [11] The day then being passed in feigning a different attempt from that which was in preparation, when they had fortified the camp in the same place where they had halted, as soon as he perceived that the mountaineers had descended from the heights, and that the guards were withdrawn, having [12??] lighted for show a greater number of fires than was proportioned to the number that remained, and having left the baggage in the camp, with the cavalry and the principal part of the infantry, he himself with a party of light-armed, [13??] consisting of all the most courageous of his troops, rapidly cleared the defile, and took post on those very heights which the enemy had occupied. 33. At dawn of light the next day the camp broke up, and the rest of the army began to move forward. [2] The mountaineers, on a signal being given, were now assembling from their forts to their usual station, when they suddenly behold part of the enemy over-hanging them from above, in possession of their former position, and the others passing along the road. [3] Both these objects, presented at the same time to the eye and the mind, made them stand motionless for a little while; [4] but when they afterwards saw the confusion in the pass, and that the marching body was thrown into disorder by the tumult which itself created, principally from the horses being terrified, thinking that whatever terror they added would suffice for the [p. 732]destruction of the enemy, they scramble along the dangerous rocks, as being accustomed alike to pathless and circuitous ways. [5] Then indeed the Carthaginians were opposed at once by the enemy and by the difficulties of the ground; and each striving to escape first from the danger, there was more fighting among themselves than with their opponents. [6] The horses in particular created danger in the lines, which, being terrified by the discordant clamours which the groves and reechoing valleys augmented, fell into confusion; and if by chance struck or wounded, they were so dismayed that they occasioned a great loss both of men and baggage of every description: [7] and as the pass on both sides was broken and precipitous, this tumult threw many down to an immense depth, some even of the armed men; but the beasts of burden, with their loads, were rolled down like the fall of some vast fabric. [8] Though these disasters were shocking to view, Hannibal however kept his place for a little, and kept his men together, lest he might augment the tumult and disorder; [9] but afterwards, when he saw the line broken, and that there was danger that he should bring over his army, preserved to no purpose if deprived of their baggage, he hastened down from the higher ground; and though he had routed the enemy by the first onset alone, he at the same time increased the disorder in his own army: [10] but that tumult was composed in a moment, after the roads were cleared by the flight of the mountaineers; and presently the whole army was conducted through, not only without being disturbed, but almost in silence. [11] He then took a fortified place, which was the capital of that district, and the little villages that lay around it, and fed his army for three days with the corn and cattle he had taken; and during these three days, as the soldiers were neither obstructed by the mountaineers, who had been daunted by the first engagement, nor yet much by the ground, he made considerable way. 34. He then came to another state, abounding, for a mountainous country, with inhabitants; where he was nearly overcome, not by open war, but by his own arts of treachery and ambuscade. [2] Some old men, governors of forts, came as deputies to the Carthaginian, professing, “that having been warned by the useful example of the calamities of others, they wished rather to experience the friendship than the hostilities of the Carthaginians: [3] they would, therefore, obediently execute his [p. 733]commands, and begged that he would accept of a supply of provisions, guides of his march, and hostages for the sincerity of their promises.” [4] Hannibal, when he had answered them in a friendly manner, thinking that they should neither be rashly trusted nor yet rejected, lest if repulsed they might openly become enemies, having received the hostages whom they proffered, and made use of the provisions which they of their own accord brought down to the road, follows their guides, by no means as among a people with whom he was at peace, but with his line of march in close order. [5] The elephants and cavalry formed the van of the marching body; he himself, examining every thing around, and intent on every circumstance, followed with the choicest of the infantry. [6] When they came into a narrower pass, lying on one side beneath an overhanging eminence, the barbarians, rising at once on all sides from their ambush, assail them in front and rear, both at close quarters and from a distance, and roll down huge stones on the army. [7] The most numerous body of men pressed on the rear; against whom the infantry, facing about and directing their attack, made it very obvious, that had not the rear of the army been well supported, a great loss must have been sustained in that pass. [8] Even as it was they came to the extremity of danger, and almost to destruction: for while Hannibal hesitates to lead down his division into the defile, because, though he himself was a protection to the cavalry, he had not in the same way left any aid to the infantry in the rear; [9] the mountaineers, charging obliquely, and on having broken through the middle of the army, took possession of the road; and one night was spent by Hannibal without his cavalry and baggage. 35. Next day, the barbarians running in to the attack between (the two divisions) less vigorously, the forces were re-united, and the defile passed, not without loss, but yet with a greater destruction of beasts of burden than of men. [2] From that time the mountaineers fell upon them in smaller parties, more like an attack of robbers than war, sometimes on the van, sometimes on the rear, according as the ground afforded them advantage, or stragglers advancing or loitering gave them an opportunity. [3] Though the elephants were driven through steep and narrow roads with great loss of time, yet wherever they went they rendered the army safe from the [p. 734]enemy, because men unacquainted with such animals were afraid of approaching too nearly. [4] On the ninth day they came to a summit of the Alps, chiefly through places trackless; and after many mistakes of their way, which were caused either by the treachery of the guides, or, when they were not trusted, by entering valleys at random, on their own conjectures of the route. [5] For two days they remained encamped on the summit; and rest was given to the soldiers, exhausted with toil and fighting: and several beasts of burden, which had fallen down among the rocks, by following the track of the army arrived at the camp. [6] A fall of snow, it being now the season of the setting of the constellation of the Pleiades, caused great fear to the soldiers, already worn out with weariness of so many hardships. [7] On the standards being moved forward at day-break, when the army proceeded slowly over all places entirely blocked up with snow, and languor and [8??] despair strongly appeared in the countenances of all, Hannibal, having advanced before the standards, and ordered the soldiers to halt on a certain eminence, whence there was a prospect far and wide, points out to them Italy and the plains of the Po, extending themselves beneath the Alpine mountains; and said “that they were now surmounting not only the ramparts of Italy, but also of the city of Rome; [9] that the rest of the journey would be smooth and down-hill; that after one, or, at most, a second battle, they would have the citadel and capital of Italy in their power and possession.” [10] The army then began to advance, the enemy now making no attempts beyond petty thefts, as opportunity offered. [11] But the journey proved much more difficult than it had been in the ascent, as the declivity of the Alps being generally shorter on the side of Italy is consequently steeper; [12] for nearly all the road was precipitous, narrow, and slippery, so that neither those who made the least stumble could prevent themselves from falling, nor, when fallen, remain in the same place, but rolled, both men and beasts of burden, one upon another. 36. They then came to a rock much more narrow, and formed of such perpendicular ledges, that a light-armed soldier, carefully making the attempt, and clinging with his hands to the bushes and roots around, could with difficulty lower himself down. [2] The ground, even before very steep by nature, had been broken by a recent falling away of the earth [p. 735]into a precipice of nearly a thousand feet in depth. [3] Here when the cavalry had halted, as if at the end of their journey, it is announced to Hannibal, wondering what obstructed the march, that the rock was impassable. [4] Having then gone himself to view the place, it seemed clear to him that he must lead his army round it, by however great a circuit, through the pathless and untrodden regions around. But this route also proved impracticable; [5] for while the new snow of a moderate depth remained on the old, which had not been removed, their footsteps were planted with ease as they walked upon the new snow, which was soft and not too deep; [6] but when it was dissolved by the trampling of so many men and beasts of burden, they then walked on the bare ice below, and through the dirty fluid formed by the melting snow. [7] Here there was a wretched struggle, both on account of the slippery ice not affording any hold to the step, and giving way beneath the foot more readily by reason of the slope; and whether they assisted themselves in rising by their hands or their knees, their supports themselves giving way, they would tumble again; nor were there any stumps or roots near, by pressing against which, one might with hand or foot support himself; so that they only floundered on the smooth ice and amid the melted snow. [8] The beasts of burden sometimes also cut into this lower ice by merely treading upon it, at others they broke it completely through, by the violence with which they struck in their hoofs in their struggling, so that most of them, as if taken in a trap, stuck in the hardened and deeply frozen ice. 37. At length, after the men and beasts of burden had been fatigued to no purpose, the camp was pitched on the summit, the ground being cleared for that purpose with great difficulty, so much snow was there to be dug out and carried away. [2] The soldiers being then set to make a way down the cliff, by which alone a passage could be effected, and it being necessary that they should cut through the rocks, having felled and lopped a number of large trees which grew around, they make a huge pile of timber; and as soon as a strong wind fit for exciting the flames arose, they set fire to it, and, pouring vinegar on the heated stones, they render them soft and crumbling. [3] They then open a way with iron instruments through the rock thus heated by the fire, and soften its de- [p. 736]clivities by gentle windings, so that not only the beasts of burden, but also the elephants could be led down it. [4] Four days were spent about this rock, the beasts nearly perishing through hunger: for the summits of the mountains are for the most part bare, and if there is any pasture the snows bury it. [5] The lower parts contain valleys, and some sunny hills, and rivulets flowing beside woods, and scenes more worthy of the abode of man. [6] There the beasts of burden were sent out to pasture, and rest given for three days to the men, fatigued with forming the passage: they then descended into the plains, the country and the dispositions of the inhabitants being now less rugged. 38. In this manner chiefly they came to Italy in the fifth month (as some authors relate) after leaving New Carthage, having crossed the Alps in fifteen days. [2] What number of forces Hannibal had when he had passed into Italy is by no means agreed upon by authors. Those who state them at the highest, make mention of a hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse; those who state them at the lowest, of twenty thousand foot and six thousand horse. [3] Lucius Cincius Alimentus, who relates that he was made prisoner by Hannibal, would influence me most as an authority, did he not confound the number by adding the Gauls and Ligurians. [4] Including these, (who, it is more probable, flocked to him afterwards, and so some authors assert,) he says, that eighty thousand foot and ten thousand horse were brought into Italy; [5] and that he had heard from Hannibal himself, that after crossing the Rhone he had lost thirty-six thousand men, and an immense number of horses, and other beasts of burden, among the Taurini, the next nation to the Gauls, as he descended into Italy. [6] As this circumstance is agreed on by all, I am the more surprised that it should be doubtful by what road he crossed the Alps; and that it should commonly be believed that he passed over the Pennine mountain, and that thence6 the name was given to that ridge of the Alps. [7] Cœlius says, that he passed over the top of Mount Cremo; both which passes would have brought him, not to the Taurini, but through the Salassian mountaineers to the Libuan Gauls. [8] Neither is it probable that these roads into Gaul were then open, especially [p. 737]since those which lead to the Pennine mountain would have been blocked up by nations half German; [9] nor by Hercules (if this argument has weight with any one) do the Veragri, the inhabitants of this ridge, know of the name being given to these mountains from the passage of the Carthaginians, but from the divinity, whom the mountaineers style Penninus, worshipped on the highest summit. 39. Very opportunely for the commencement of his operations, a war had broken out with the Taurini, the nearest nation, against the Insubrians; but Hannibal could not put his troops under arms to assist either party, as they now chiefly felt the disorders they had before contracted, in remedying them; [2] for ease after toil, plenty after want, and attention to their persons after dirt and filth, had variously affected their squalid and almost savage-looking bodies. [3] This was the reason that Publius Cornelius, the consul, when he had arrived at Pisa with his fleet, hastened to the Po, though the troops he received from Manlius and Atilius were raw and disheartened by their late disgraces, in order that he might engage the enemy when not yet recruited. [4] But when the consul came to Placentia, Hannibal had already moved from his quarters, and had taken by storm one city of the Taurini, the capital of the nation, because they did not come willingly into his alliance; [5] and he would have gained over to him, not only from fear, but also from inclination, the Gauls who dwell beside the Po, had not the arrival of the consul suddenly checked them while watching for an opportunity of revolt. [6] Hannibal at the same time moved from the Taurini, thinking that the Gauls, uncertain which side to choose, would follow him if present among them. [7] The armies were now almost in sight of each other, and their leaders, though not at present sufficiently acquainted, yet met each other with a certain feeling of mutual admiration. [8] For the name of Hannibal, even before the destruction of Saguntum, was very celebrated among the Romans; and Hannibal believed Scipio to be a superior man, from the very circumstance of his having been especially chosen to act as commander against himself. [9] They had increased too their estimation of each other; Scipio, because, being left behind in Gaul, he had met Hannibal when he had crossed into Italy; Hannibal, by his daring attempt of passing the Alps and by its accomplishment. [10] Scipio, however, [p. 738]was the first to cross the Po, and having pitched his camp at the river Ticinus, he delivered the following oration for the sake of encouraging his soldiers before he led them out to form for battle: 40. "If, soldiers, I were leading out that army to battle which I had with me in Gaul, I should have thought it superfluous to address you; [2] for of what use would it be to exhort either those horsemen who so gloriously vanquished the cavalry of the enemy at the river Rhone, or those legions with whom, pursuing this very enemy flying before us, I obtained, in lieu of victory, a confession of superiority, shown by his retreat and refusal to fight? [3] Now because that army, levied for the province of Spain, maintains the war under my auspices,7 and the command of my brother Cneius Scipio, in the country where the senate and people of Rome wished him to serve; [4] and since I, that you might have a consul for your leader against Hannibal and the Carthaginians, have offered myself voluntarily for this contest, few words are required to be addressed from a new commander to soldiers unacquainted with him. [5] That you may not be ignorant of the nature of the war nor of the enemy, you have to fight, soldiers, with those whom in the former war you conquered both by land and sea; from whom you have exacted tribute for twenty years; from whom you hold Sicily and Sardinia, taken as the prizes of victory. [6] In the present contest, therefore, you and they will have those feelings which are wont to belong to the victors and the vanquished. Nor are they now about to fight because they are daring, but because it is unavoidable; [7] except you can believe that they who declined the engagement when their forces were entire, should have now gained more confidence when two-thirds of their infantry and cavalry have been lost in the passage of the Alps, and when almost greater numbers have perished than survive. [8] Yes, they are few indeed, (some may say,) but they are vigorous in mind and body; men whose strength and power scarce any force may withstand. [9] On the contrary, they are but the resemblances, nay, are rather the shadows of men; being worn out with hunger, cold, dirt, and filth, and bruised and enfeebled among stones and rocks. Besides all this, their joints are frost-bitten, their sinews stiffened [p. 739]with the snow, their limbs withered up by the frost, their armour battered and shivered, their horses lame and powerless. [10] With such cavalry, with such infantry, you have to fight: you will not have enemies in reality, but rather their last remains. And I fear nothing more than that when you have fought Hannibal, the Alps may appear to have conquered him. [11] But perhaps it was fitting that the gods themselves should, without any human aid, commence and carry forward a war with a leader and a people that violate the faith of treaties; and that we, who next to the gods have been injured, should finish the contest thus commenced and nearly completed. 41. “I do not fear lest any one should think that I say this ostentatiously for the sake of encouraging you, while in my own mind I am differently affected. [2] I was at liberty to go with my army into Spain, my own province, whither I had already set out; where I should have had a brother as the sharer of my councils and my dangers, and Hasdrubal, instead of Hannibal, for my antagonist, and without question a less laborious war: [3] nevertheless, as I sailed along the coast of Gaul, having landed on hearing of this enemy, and having sent forward the cavalry, I moved my camp to the Rhone. [4] In a battle of cavalry, with which part of my forces the opportunity of engaging was afforded, I routed the enemy; and because I could not overtake by land his army of infantry, which was rapidly hurried away, as if in flight, having returned to the ships with all the speed I could, after compassing such an extent of sea and land, I have met him at the foot of the Alps. [5] Whether do I appear, while declining the contest, to have fallen in unexpectedly with this dreaded foe, or to encounter him in his track? to challenge him and drag him out to decide the contest? [6] I am anxious to try whether the earth has suddenly, in these twenty years, sent forth a new race of Carthaginians, or whether these are the same who fought at the islands Aegates, and whom you permitted to depart from Eryx, valued at eighteen denarii a head; [7] and whether this Hannibal be, as he himself gives out, the rival of the expeditions of Hercules, or one left by his father the tributary and taxed subject and slave of the Roman people; [8] who, did not his guilt at Saguntum drive him to frenzy, would certainly reflect, if not upon his conquered country, at least [p. 740]on his family, and his father, and the treaties written by the hand of Hamilcar; [9] who, at the command of our consul, withdrew the garrison from Eryx; who, indignant and grieving, submitted to the harsh conditions imposed on the conquered Carthaginians; who agreed to depart from Sicily, and pay 'tribute to the Roman people. [10] I would, therefore, have you fight, soldiers, not only with that spirit with which you are wont to encounter other enemies, but with a certain indignation and resentment, as if you saw your slaves suddenly taking up arms against you. [11] We might have killed them when shut up in Eryx by hunger, the most dreadful of human tortures; we might have carried over our victorious fleet to Africa, and in a few days have destroyed Carthage without any opposition. [12] We granted pardon to their prayers; we released them from the blockade; we made peace with them when conquered; and we afterwards considered them under our protection when they were oppressed by the African war. [13] In return for these benefits, they come under the conduct of a furious youth to attack our country. [14] And I wish that the contest on your side was for glory, and not for safety: it is not about the possession of Sicily and Sardinia, concerning which the dispute was formerly, but for Italy, that you must fight: [15] nor is there another army behind, which, if we should not conquer, can resist the enemy; nor are there other Alps, during the passage of which fresh forces may be procured: here, soldiers, we must make our stand, as if we fought before the walls of Rome. [16] Let every one consider that he defends with his arms not only his own person, but his wife and young children: nor let him only entertain domestic cares and anxieties, but at the same time let him revolve in his mind, that the senate and people of Rome now anxiously regard our efforts; [17] and that according as our strength and valour shall be, such henceforward will be the fortune of that city and of the Roman empire.” 42. Thus the consul addressed the Romans. Hannibal, thinking that his soldiers ought to be roused by deeds rather than by words, having drawn his army around for the spectacle, placed in their midst the captive mountaineers in fetters; and after Gallic arms had been thrown at their feet, he ordered the interpreter to ask, “whether any among them, on condition of being released from chains, and receiving, if [p. 741]victorious, armour and a horse, was willing to combat with the sword?” [2] When they all, to a man, demanded the combat and the sword, and lots were cast into the urn for that purpose, each wished himself the person whom fortune might select for the contest. [3] As the lot of each man came out, eager and exulting with joy amidst the congratulations of his comrades, and dancing after the national custom, he hastily snatched up the arms: [4] but when they fought, such was the state of feeling, not only among their companions in the same circumstances, but among the spectators in general, that the fortune of those who conquered was not praised more than that of those who died bravely. 43. When he had dismissed the soldiers, thus affected after viewing several pairs of combatants, having then summoned an assembly, he is said to have addressed them in these terms: "If, soldiers, you shall by and by, in judging of your own fortune, preserve the same feelings which you experienced a little before in the example of the fate of others, we have already conquered; [2] for neither was that merely a spectacle, but as it were a certain representation of your condition. [3] And I know not whether fortune has not thrown around you still stronger chains and more urgent necessities than around your captives. [4] On the right and left two seas enclose you, without your possessing a single ship even for escape. The river Po around you, the Po larger and more impetuous than the Rhone, the Alps behind, scarcely passed by you when fresh and vigorous, hem you in. [5] Here, soldiers, where you have first met the enemy, you must conquer or die; and the same fortune which has imposed the necessity of fighting, holds out to you, if victorious, rewards, than which men are not wont to desire greater, even from the immortal gods. [6] If we were only about to recover by our valour Sicily and Sardinia, wrested from our fathers, the recompence would be sufficiently ample; but whatever, acquired and amassed by so many triumphs, the Romans possess, all, with its masters themselves, will become yours. To gain this rich reward, hasten, then, and seize your arms with the favour of the gods. [7] Long enough in pursuing cattle among the desert mountains of Lusitania8 and Celtiberia, you have seen no emolument from so many toils and dangers: [8] it is time to [p. 742]make rich and profitable campaigns, and to gain the great reward of your labours, after having accomplished such a length of journey over so many mountains and rivers, and so many nations in arms. [9] Here fortune has granted you the termination of your labours; here she will bestow a reward worthy of the service you have undergone. [10] Nor, in proportion as the war is great in name, ought you to consider that the victory will be difficult. [11] A despised enemy has often maintained a sanguinary contest, and renowned states and kings been conquered by a very slight effort. For, setting aside only the splendour of the Roman name, what remains in which they can be compared to you? [12] To pass over in silence your service for twenty years, distinguished by such valour and success, you have made your way to this place from the pillars of Hercules,9 from the ocean, and the remotest limits of the world, advancing victorious through so many of the fiercest nations [14] of Gaul and Spain: you will fight with a raw army, which this very summer was beaten, conquered, and surrounded by the Gauls, as yet unknown to its general, and ignorant of him. Shall I compare myself, almost born, and certainly bred in the tent of my father, that most illustrious commander, myself the [15] subjugator of Spain and Gaul, the conqueror too not only of the Alpine nations, but what is much more, of the Alps themselves, with this six months' general, the deserter of [16] his army? To whom, if any one, having taken away their standards, should show to-day the Carthaginians and Romans, I am sure that he would not know of which army he was consul. I do not regard it, soldiers, as of small account, that there is not a man among you before whose eyes I [17] have not often achieved some military exploit; and to whom, in like manner, I the spectator and witness of his valour, could not recount his own gallant deeds, particularized by time and place. With soldiers who have a thousand times received [18] my praises and gifts, I, who was the pupil of you all before I became your commander, will march out in battle-array against those who are unknown to and ignorant of each other. 44. “On whatever side I turn my eyes I see nothing but what is full of courage and energy; a veteran infantry; [2] [p. 743]cavalry, both those with and those without the bridle, com- posed of the most gallant nations, you our most faithful and valiant allies, you Carthaginians, who are about to fight as well for the sake of your country as from the justest resentment. [3] We are the assailants in the war, and descend into Italy with hostile standards, about to engage so much more boldly and bravely than the foe, as the confidence and courage of the assailant are greater than those of him who is defensive. [4] Besides suffering, injury and indignity inflame and excite our minds: they first demanded me your leader for punishment, and then all of you who had laid siege to Saguntum; and had we been given up they would have visited us with the severest tortures. [5] That most cruel and haughty nation considers every thing its own, and at its own disposal; it thinks it right that it should regulate with whom we are to have war, with whom peace: [6] it circumscribes and shuts us up by the boundaries of mountains and rivers, which we must not pass; and then does not adhere to those boundaries which it appointed. [7] Pass not the Iberus; have nothing to do with the Saguntines. Saguntum is on the Iberus; you must not move a step in any direction. Is it a small thing that you take away my most ancient provinces Sicily and Sardinia? will you take Spain also? and should I withdraw thence, you will cross over into Africa —will cross, did I say? [8] they have sent the two consuls of this year one to Africa, the other to Spain: there is nothing left to us in any quarter, except what we can assert to ourselves by arms. Those may be cowards and dastards who have something to look back upon; whom, flying through safe and unmolested roads, their own lands and their own country will receive: there is a necessity for you to be brave; and since all between victory and death is broken off from you by inevitable despair, either to conquer, or, if fortune should waver, to meet death rather in battle than flight. [9] If this be well fixed and determined in the minds of you all, I will repeat, you have already conquered: no stronger incentive to victory has been given to man by the immortal gods.” 45. When the minds of the soldiers on both sides had been animated to the contest by these exhortations, the Romans throw a bridge over the Ticinus, and, for the sake of defending the bridge, erect a fort on it. [2] The Carthaginian, while the Romans were engaged in this work, sends Maharbal with a [p. 744]squadron of five hundred Numidian horse, to lay waste the territories of the allies of the Roman people. [3] He orders that the Gauls should be spared as much as possible, and the minds of their chiefs be instigated to a revolt. When the bridge was finished, the Roman army being led across into the territory of the Insubrians, took up its station five miles from Victumviae. [4] At this place Hannibal lay encamped; and having quickly recalled Maharbal and the cavalry, when he perceived that a battle was approaching, thinking that in exhorting the soldiers enough could never be spoken or addressed by way of admonition, he announces to them, when summoned to an assembly, stated rewards, in expectation of which they might fight. [5] He promised, “that he would give them land in Italy, Africa, Spain, where each man might choose, exempt from all burdens to the person who received it, and to his children: if any one preferred money to land, he would satisfy him in silver; [6] if any of the allies wished to become citizens of Carthage, he would grant them permission; if others chose rather to return home, he would lend his endeavours that they should not wish the situation of any one of their countrymen exchanged for their own.” [7] To the slaves also who followed their masters he promised freedom, and that he would give two slaves in place of each of them to their masters. [8] And that they might know that these promises were certain, holding in his left hand a lamb, and in his right a flint, having prayed to Jupiter and the other gods, that, if he was false to his word, they would thus slay him as he slew the lamb; after the prayer he broke the skull of the sheep with the stone. [9] Then in truth all, receiving as it were the gods as sureties, each for the fulfilment of his own hopes, and thinking that the only delay in obtaining the object of their wishes arose from their not yet being engaged, with one mind and one voice demanded the battle. 46. By no means so great an alacrity prevailed among the Romans, who, in addition to other causes, were also alarmed by recent prodigies; [2] for both a wolf had entered the camp, and having torn those who met him, had escaped unhurt; and a swarm of bees had settled on a tree overhanging the general's tent. [3] After these prodigies were expiated, Scipio having set out with his cavalry and light-armed spearmen towards the camp of the enemy, to observe from a near point [p. 745]their forces, how numerous, and of what description they were, falls in with Hannibal, who had himself also advanced with his cavalry to explore the circumjacent country: neither at first perceived the other, but the dust arising from the trampling of so many men and horses soon gave the signal of approaching enemies. [4] Both armies halted, and were preparing themselves for battle. Scipio places his spearmen and Gallic cavalry in front; the Romans and what force of allies he had with him, in reserve. [5] Hannibal receives the horsemen who rode with the rein in the centre, and strengthens his wings with Numidians. [6] When the shout was scarcely raised, the spearmen fled among the reserve to the second line: there was then a contest of the cavalry, for some time doubtful; but afterwards, on account of the foot soldiers, who were intermingled, causing confusion among the horses, many of the riders falling off from their horses, or leaping down where they saw their friends surrounded and hard pressed, the battle for the most part came to be fought on foot; until the Numidians, who were in the wings, having made a small circuit, showed themselves on the rear. [7] That alarm dismayed the Romans, and the wound of the consul, and the danger to his life, warded off by the interposition of his son, then just arriving at the age of puberty, augmented their fears. [8] This youth will be found to be the same to whom the glory of finishing this war belongs, and to whom the name of Africanus was given, on account of his splendid victory over Hannibal and the Carthaginians. [9] The flight, however, of the spearmen, whom the Numidians attacked first, was the most disorderly. The rest of the cavalry, in a close body, protecting, not only with their arms, but also with their bodies, the consul, whom they had received into the midst of them, brought him back to the camp without any where giving way in disorder or precipitation. [10] Cœlius attributes the honour of saving the consul to a slave, by nation a Ligurian. I indeed should rather wish that the account about the son was true, which also most authors have transmitted, and the report of which has generally obtained credit. 47. This was the first battle with Hannibal; from which it clearly appeared that the Carthaginian was superior in cavalry; and on that account, that open plains, such as lie between the Po and the Alps, were not suited to the Romans [p. 746]for carrying on the war. [2] On the following night, therefore, the soldiers being ordered to prepare their baggage in silence, the camp broke up from the Ticinus, and they hastened to the Po, in order that the rafts by which the consul had formed a bridge over the river, being not yet loosened, he might lead his forces across without disturbance or pursuit of the enemy. [3] They arrived at Placentia before Hannibal had ascertained that they had set out from the Ticinus. He took, however, six hundred of those who loitered on the farther bank, who were slowly unfastening the raft; but he was not able to pass the bridge, as the whole raft floated down the stream as soon as the ends were unfastened. [4] Cœlius relates that Mago, with the cavalry and Spanish infantry, immediately swam the river; and that Hannibal himself led the army across by fords higher up the Po, the elephants being opposed to the stream in a line to break the force of the current. [5] These accounts can scarcely gain credit with those who are acquainted with that river; for it is neither probable that the cavalry could bear up against the great violence of the stream, without losing their arms or horses, even supposing that inflated bags of leather had transported all the Spaniards; and the fords of the Po, by which an army encumbered with baggage could pass, must have been sought by a circuit of many days' march. [6] Those authors are more credited by me, who relate that in the course of two days a place was with difficulty found fit for forming a bridge of rafts across the river, and that by this way the light-armed Spanish cavalry was sent forward with Mago. [7] Whilst Hannibal, delaying beside the river to give audience to the embassies of the Gauls, conveys over the heavy-armed forces of infantry, in the mean time Mago and the cavalry proceed towards the enemy at Placentia one day's journey after crossing the river. [8] Hannibal, a few days after, fortified his camp six miles from Placentia, and on the following day, having drawn up his line of battle in sight of the enemy, gave them an opportunity of fighting. 48. On the following night a slaughter was made in the Roman camp by the auxiliary Gauls, which appeared greater from the tumult than it proved in reality. [2] Two thousand infantry and two hundred horse, having killed the guards at the gates, desert to Hannibal; whom the Carthaginians having addressed kindly, and excited by the hope of great rewards, sent each to [p. 747]several states to gain over the minds of their countrymen. [3] Scipio, thinking that that slaughter was a signal for the revolt of all the Gauls, and that, contaminated with the guilt of that affair, they would rush to arms as if a frenzy had been sent among them, though he was still suffering severely from [4??] his wound, yet setting out for the river Trebia at the fourth watch of the following night with his army in silence, he removes his camp to higher ground and hills more embarrassing to the cavalry. [5] He escaped observation less than at the Ticinus; and Hannibal, having despatched first the Numidians and then all the cavalry, would have thrown the rear at least into great confusion, had not the Numidians, through anxiety for booty, turned aside into the deserted Roman camp. [6] There whilst, closely examining every part of the camp, they waste time, with no sufficient reward for the delay, the enemy escaped out of their hands; and when they saw the Romans already across the Trebia, and measuring out their camp, they kill a few of the loiterers intercepted on that side of the river. [7] Scipio being unable to endure any longer the irritation of his wound, caused by the roughness of the road, and thinking that he ought to wait for his colleague, (for he had now heard that he was recalled from Sicily,) fortified a space of chosen ground, which, adjoining the river, seemed safest for a stationary camp. [8] When Hannibal had encamped not far from thence, being as much elated with the victory of his cavalry, as anxious on account of the scarcity which every day assailed him more severely, marching as he did through the territory of the enemy, and supplies being no where provided, he sends to the village of Clastidium, where the Romans had collected a great stock of corn. [9] There, whilst they were preparing for an assault, a hope of the town being betrayed to them was held out: Dasius, a Brundusian, the governor of the garrison, having been corrupted for four hundred pieces of gold, (no great bribe truly,) Clastidium is surrendered to Hannibal. It served as a granary for the Carthaginians while they lay at the Trebia. [10] No cruelty was used towards the prisoners of the surrendered garrison, in order that a character for clemency might be acquired at the commencement of his proceedings. 49. While the war by land was at a stand beside the Trebia, in the mean time operations went on by land and sea around [p. 748]Sicily and the islands adjacent to Italy, both under Sempronius the consul, and before his arrival. [2] Twenty quinqueremes, with a thousand armed men, having been sent by the Carthaginians to lay waste the coast of Italy, nine reached the Liparae, eight the island of Vulcan, and three the tide drove into the strait. [3] On these being seen from Messana, twelve ships sent out by Hiero king of Syracuse, who then happened to be at Messana, waiting for the Roman consul, brought back into the port of Messana the ships taken without any resistance. [4] It was discovered from the prisoners that, besides the twenty ships, to which fleet they belonged, and which had been despatched against Italy, thirty-five other quinqueremes were directing their course to Sicily, in order to gain over their ancient allies: [5] that their main object was to gain possession of Lilybaeum, and they believed that that fleet had been driven to the islands Aegates by the same storm by which they themselves had been dispersed. [6] The king writes these tidings, according as they had been received, to Marcus Aemilius the praetor, whose province Sicily was, and advises him to occupy Lilybaeum with a strong garrison. [7] Immediately the lieutenants, generals, and tribunes, with the praetor, were despatched to the different states, in order that they might keep their men on vigilant guard; above all things it was commanded, that Lilybaeum should be secured: [8] an edict having been put forth that, in addition to such warlike preparations, the crews should carry down to their ships dressed provisions for ten days, so that no one when the signal was given might delay in embarking; and that those who were stationed along the whole coast should look out from their watch-towers for the approaching fleet of the enemy. [9] The Carthaginians, therefore, though they had purposely slackened the course of their ships, so that they might reach Lilybaeum just before daybreak, were descried before their arrival, because both the moon shone all night, and they came with their sails set up. [10] Immediately the signal was given from the watch-towers, and the summons to arms was shouted through the town, and they embarked in the ships: part of the soldiers were left on the walls and at the stations of the gates, and part went on board the fleet. [11] The Carthaginians, because they perceived that they would not have to do with an unprepared enemy, kept back from the harbour till daylight, that interval being [p. 749]spent in taking down their rigging and getting ready the fleet for action. [12] When the light appeared, they withdrew their fleet into the open sea, that there might be room for the battle, and that the ships of the enemy might have a free egress from the harbour. [13] Nor did the Romans decline the conflict, being emboldened both by the recollection of the exploits they had performed near that very spot, and by the numbers and valour of their soldiers. 50. When they had advanced into the open sea, the Romans wished to come to close fight, and to make a trial of strength hand to hand. [2] The Carthaginians, on the contrary, eluded them, and sought to maintain the fight by art, not by force, and to make it a battle of ships rather than of men and arms: [3] for though they had their fleet abundantly supplied with mariners, yet it was deficient in soldiers; and when a ship was grappled, a very unequal number of armed men fought on board of it. [4] When this was observed, their numbers increased the courage of the Romans, and their inferiority of force diminished that of the others. [5] Seven Carthaginian ships were immediately surrounded; the rest took to flight: one thousand seven hundred soldiers and mariners were captured in the ships, and among them were three noble Carthaginians. The Roman fleet returned without loss to the harbour, only one ship being pierced, and even that also brought back into port. [6] After this engagement, before those at Messana were aware of its occurrence, Titus Sempronius the consul arrived at Messana. [7] As he entered the strait, king Hiero led out a fleet fully equipped to meet him; and having passed from the royal ship into that of the general, he congratulated him on having arrived safe with his army and fleet, and prayed that his expedition to Sicily might be prosperous and successful. [8] He then laid before him the state of the island and the designs of the Carthaginians, and promised that with the same spirit with which he had in his youth assisted the Romans during the former war, he would now assist them in his old age; [9] that he would gratuitously furnish supplies of corn and clothing to the legions and naval crews of the consul; [10] adding, that great danger threatened Lilybaeum and the maritime states, and that a change of affairs would be acceptable to some of them. For these reasons it appeared to the consul that he ought to make no delay, but to repair to Lilybaeum with his fleet. [11] The king and [p. 750]the royal squadron set out along with him, and on their passage they heard that a battle had been fought at Lilybaeum, and that the enemy's ships had been scattered and taken. 51. The consul having dismissed Hiero with the royal fleet, and left the praetor to defend the coast of Sicily, passed over himself from Lilybaeum to the island Melita, which was held in possession by the Carthaginians. [2] On his arrival, Hamilcar, the son of Gisgo, the commander of the garrison, with little less than two thousand soldiers, together with the town and the island, are delivered up to him: thence, after a few days, he returned to Lilybaeum, and the prisoners taken, both by the consul and the praetor, excepting those illustrious for their rank, were publicly sold. When the consul considered that Sicily was sufficiently safe on that side, he crossed over to the islands of Vulcan, because there was a report that the Carthaginian fleet was stationed there: but not one of the enemy was discovered about those islands. [3] They had already, as it happened, passed over to ravage [4??] the coast of Italy, and having laid waste the territory of Vibo, were also threatening the city. [5] The descent made by the enemy on the Vibonensian territory is announced to the consul as he was returning to Sicily: and letters were delivered to him which had been sent by the senate, about the passage of Hannibal into Italy, commanding him as soon as possible to bring assistance to his colleague. [6] Perplexed with having so many anxieties at once, he immediately sent his army, embarked in the fleet, by the upper sea to Ariminum; he assigned the defence of the territory of Vibo, and the sea-coast of Italy, to Sextus Pomponius, his lieutenant-general, with twenty-five ships of war: [7] he made up a fleet of fifty ships for Marcus Aemilius the praetor; and he himself, after the affairs of Sicily were settled, sailing close along the coast of Italy with ten ships, arrived at Ariminum, whence, setting out with his army for the river Trebia, he joined his colleague. 52. Both the consuls and all the strength of Rome being now opposed to Hannibal, made it sufficiently obvious that the Roman empire could either be defended by those forces, or that there was no other hope left. [2] Yet the one consul being dispirited by the battle of the cavalry and his own wound, wished operations to be deferred: the other having his spirits unsubdued, and being therefore the more impetuous, admitted [p. 751]no delay. [3] The tract of country between the Trebia and the Po was then inhabited by the Gauls, who, in this contest of two very powerful states, by a doubtful neutrality, were evidently looking forward to the favour of the conqueror. [4] The Romans submitted to this conduct of the Gauls with tolerable satisfaction, provided they did not take any active part at all; but the Carthaginian bore it with great discontent, giving out that he had come invited by the Gauls to set them at liberty. [5] On account of that resentment, and in order that he might at the same time maintain his troops from the plunder, he ordered two thousand foot and a thousand horse, chiefly Numidians, with some Gauls intermixed, to lay waste all the country straightforward as far as the banks of the Po. The [6??] Gauls, being in want of assistance, though they had up to this time kept their inclinations doubtful, are forced by the authors of the injury to turn to some who would be their supporters; and having sent ambassadors to the consul, they implore the aid of the Romans in behalf of a country which was suffering for the too great fidelity of its inhabitants to the Romans. [7] Neither the cause nor the time of pleading it was satisfactory to Cornelius; and the nation was suspected by him, both on account of many treacherous actions, and though others might have been forgotten through length of time, on account of the recent perfidy of the Boii. [8] Sempronius, on the contrary, thought that it would be the strongest tie upon the fidelity of the allies, if those were defended who first required support. [9] Then, while his colleague hesitated, he sends his own cavalry, with about a thousand spearmen on foot in their company, to protect the Gallic territory beyond the Trebia. [10] These, when they had unexpectedly attacked the enemy while scattered and disordered, and for the most part encumbered with booty, caused great terror, slaughter, and flight, even as far as the camp and outposts of the enemy; whence being repulsed by the numbers that poured out, they again renewed the fight with the assistance of their own party. [11] Then pursuing and retreating in doubtful battle, though they left it at last equal, yet the fame of the victory was more with the Romans than the enemy. 53. But to no one did it appear more important and just than to the consul himself. He was transported with joy “that he had conquered with that part of the forces with [p. 752]which the other consul had been defeated; [2] that the spirits of the soldiers were restored and revived; that there was no one, except his colleague, who would wish an engagement delayed; and that he, suffering more from disease of mind than body, shuddered, through recollection of his wound, at arms and battle. [3] But others ought not to sink into decrepitude together with a sick man. For why should there be any longer protraction or waste of time? What third consul, what other army did they wait for? [4] The camp of the Carthaginians was in Italy, and almost in sight of the city. It was not Sicily and Sardinia, which had been taken from them when vanquished, nor Spain on this side of the Iberus, that was their object, but that the Romans should be driven from the land of their fathers, and the soil in which they were born. [5] How deeply,” he continued, “would our fathers groan, who were wont to wage war around the walls of Carthage, if they should see us their offspring, two consuls and two consular armies, trembling within our camps in the heart of Italy, while a Carthaginian had made himself master of all the country between the Alps and the Apennine!” [6] Such discourses did he hold while sitting beside his sick colleague, and also at the head-quarters, almost in the manner of an harangue. The approaching period of the elections also stimulated him, lest the war should be protracted till the new consuls were chosen, and the opportunity of turning all the glory to himself, while his colleague lay sick. [7] He orders the soldiers, therefore, Cornelius in vain attempting to dissuade him, to get ready for an immediate engagement. Hannibal, as he saw what conduct would be best for the enemy, had scarce at first any hope that the consuls would do any thing rashly or imprudently, but when he discovered [8??] that the disposition of the one, first known from report, and afterwards from experience, was ardent and impetuous, and believed that it had been rendered still more impetuous by the successful engagement with his predatory troops, he did not doubt that an opportunity of action was near at hand. [9] He was anxious and watchful not to omit this opportunity, while the troops of the enemy were raw, while his wound rendered the better of the two commanders useless, and while the spirits of the Gauls were fresh; [10] of whom he knew that a great number would follow him with the greater reluctance the farther they were drawn away from home. [11] When, for [p. 753]these and similar reasons, he hoped that an engagement was near, and desired to make the attack himself, if there should be any delay; and when the Gauls, who were the safer spies to ascertain what he wished, as they served in both camps, had brought intelligence that the Romans were prepared for battle, the Carthaginian began to look about for a place for an ambuscade. 54. Between the armies was a rivulet, bordered on each side with very high banks, and covered around with marshy plants, and with the brushwood and brambles with which uncultivated places are generally overspread; and when, riding around it, he had, with his own eyes, thoroughly reconnoitred a place which was sufficient to afford a covert even for cavalry, he said to Mago his brother: “This will be the place which you must occupy. [2] Choose out of all the infantry and cavalry a hundred men of each, with whom come to me at the first watch. Now is the time to refresh their bodies.” The council was thus dismissed, and in a little time Mago came forward with his chosen men. [3] “I see,” said Hannibal, “the strength of the men; but that you may be strong not only in resolution, but also in number, pick out each from the troops and companies nine men like yourselves: Mago will show you the place where you are to lie in ambush. You will have an enemy who is blind to these arts of war.” [4] A thousand horse and a thousand foot, under the command of Mago, having been thus sent off, Hannibal orders the Numidian cavalry to ride up, after crossing the river Trebia by break of day, to the gates of the enemy, and to draw them out to a battle by discharging their javelins at the guards; and then, when the fight was commenced, by retiring slowly to decoy them across the river. [5] These instructions were given to the Numidians: to the other leaders of the infantry and cavalry it was commanded that they should order all their men to dine; and then, under arms and with their horses equipped, to await the signal. [6] Sempronius, eager for the contest, led out, on the first tumult raised by the Numidians, all the cavalry, being full of confidence in that part of the forces; then six thousand infantry, and lastly all his army, to the place already determined in his plan. [7] It happened to be the winter season and a snowy day, in the region which lies between the Alps and the Apennine, and excessively cold [p. 754]by the proximity of rivers and marshes: [8] besides, there was no heat in the bodies of the men and horses thus hastily led out without having first taken food, or employed any means to keep off the cold; and the nearer they approached to the blasts from the river, a keener degree of cold blew upon them. [9] But when, in pursuit of the flying Numidians, they entered the water, (and it was swollen by rain in the night as high as their breasts,) then in truth the bodies of all, on landing, were so benumbed, that they were scarcely able to hold their arms; and as the day advanced they began to grow faint, both from fatigue and hunger. 55. In the mean time the soldiers of Hannibal, fires having been kindled before the tents, and oil sent through the companies to soften their limbs, and their food having been taken at leisure, as soon as it was announced that the enemy had passed the river, seized their arms with vigour of mind and body, and advanced to the battle. [2] Hannibal placed before the standards the Baliares and the light-armed troops, to the amount of nearly eight thousand men; then the heavier-armed infantry, the chief of his power and strength: on the wings he posted ten thousand horse, and on their extremities stationed the elephants divided into two parts. [3] The consul placed on the flanks of his infantry the cavalry, recalled by the signal for retreat, as in their irregular pursuit of the enemy they were checked, while unprepared, by the Numidians suddenly turning upon them. [4] There were of infantry eighteen thousand Romans, twenty thousand allies of the Latin name, besides the auxiliary forces of the Cenomani, the only Gallic nation that had remained faithful: with these forces they engaged the enemy. [5] The battle was commenced by the Baliares; whom when the legions resisted with superior force, the light-armed troops were hastily drawn off to the wings; which movement caused the Roman cavalry to be immediately overpowered: [6] for when their four thousand already with difficulty withstood by themselves ten thousand of the enemy, the wearied, against men for the most part fresh, they were overwhelmed in addition by a cloud as it were of javelins, discharged by the Baliares; [7] and the elephants besides, which held a prominent position at the extremities of the wings, (the horses being greatly terrified not only at their appearance, but their unusual smell,) occasioned [p. 755]flight to a wide extent. [8] The battle between the infantry was equal rather in courage than strength; for the Carthaginian brought the latter entire to the action, having a little before refreshed themselves, while, on the contrary, the bodies of the Romans, suffering from fasting and fatigue, and stiff with cold, were quite benumbed. They would have made a stand, however, by dint of courage, if they had only had to fight with the infantry. [9] But both the Baliares, having beaten off the cavalry, poured darts on their flanks, and the elephants had already penetrated to the centre of the line of the infantry; while Mago and the Numidians, as soon as the army had passed their place of ambush without observing them, starting up on their rear, occasioned great disorder and alarm. [10] Nevertheless, amid so many surrounding dangers, the line for some time remained unbroken, and, most contrary to the expectation of all, against the elephants. [11] These the light infantry, posted for the purpose, turned back by throwing their spears; and following them up when turned, pierced them under the tail, where they received the wounds in the softest skin. 56. 'Hannibal ordered the elephants, thus thrown into disorder, and almost driven by their terror against their own party, to be led away from the centre of the line to its extremity against the auxiliary Gauls on the left wing. In an instant they occasioned unequivocal flight; and a new alarm was added to the Romans when they saw their auxiliaries routed. [2] About ten thousand men, therefore, as they now were fighting in a circle, the others being unable to escape, broke through the middle of the line of the Africans, which was supported by the Gallic auxiliaries, with immense slaughter of the enemy: [3] and since they neither could return to the camp, being shut out by the river, nor, on account of the heavy rain, satisfactorily determine in what part they should assist their friends, they proceeded by the direct road to Placentia. [4] After this several irruptions were made in all directions; and those who sought the river were either swallowed up in its eddies, or whilst they hesitated to enter it were cut off by the enemy. [5] Some, who had been scattered abroad through the country in their flight, by following the traces of the retreating army, arrived at Placentia; others, whom the fear of the enemy inspired with boldness to enter [p. 756]the river, having crossed it, reached the camp. [6] The rain mixed with snow, and the intolerable severity of the cold, destroyed many men and beasts of burden, and almost all the elephants. [7] The river Trebia was the termination of the Carthaginians' pursuit of the enemy; and they returned to the camp so benumbed with cold, that they could scarcely feel joy for the victory. [8] On the following night, therefore, though the guard of the camp and the principal part of the soldiers that remained passed the Trebia on rafts, they either did not perceive it, on account of the beating of the rain, or being unable to bestir themselves, through their fatigue and wounds, pretended that they did not perceive it; [9] and the Carthaginians remaining quiet, the army was silently led by the consul Scipio to Placentia, thence transported across the Po to Cremona, lest one colony should be too much burdened by the winter quarters of two armies. 57. Such terror on account of this disaster was carried to Rome, that they believed that the enemy was already approaching the city with hostile standards, and that they had neither hope nor aid by which they might repel his attack from the gates and walls. [2] One consul having been defeated at the Ticinus, the other having been recalled from Sicily, and now both consuls and their two consular armies having been vanquished, what other commanders, what other legions were there to be sent for? [3] The consul Sempronius came to them whilst thus dismayed, having passed at great risk through the cavalry of the enemy, scattered in every direction in search of plunder, with courage, rather than with any plan or hope of escaping, or of making resistance if he should not escape it. [4] Having held the assembly for the election of the consuls, the only thing which was particularly wanting at present, he returned to the winter quarters. Cneius Servilius and Caius Flaminius were elected consuls. [5] But not even the winter quarters of the Romans were undisturbed, the Numidian horse ranging at large, and where the ground was impracticable for these, the Celtiberians and Lusitanians. All supplies, therefore, from every quarter, were cut off, except such as the ships conveyed by the Po. There was a magazine near Placentia, both fortified with great care and secured by a strong garrison. [6] In the hope of taking this fort, Hannibal having set out with the cavalry and the light-armed [p. 757]horse, and having attacked it by night, as he rested his main hope of effecting his enterprise on keeping it concealed, did not escape the notice of the guards. Such a clamour was immediately raised, that it was heard even at Placentia. [7] The consul, therefore, came up with the cavalry about daybreak, having commanded the legions to follow in a square band. [8] In the mean time an engagement of cavalry commenced, in which the enemy being dismayed because Hannibal retired wounded from the fight, the fortress was admirably defended. After this, having taken rest for a few days, and before his wound was hardly as [9??] yet sufficiently healed, he sets out to lay siege to Victumviae. This magazine had been fortified by the Romans in the Gallic war; [10] afterwards a mixture of inhabitants from the neighbouring states around had made the place populous; and at this time the terror created by the devastation of the enemy had driven together to it numbers from the country. [11] A multitude of this description, excited by the report of the brave defence of the fortress near Placentia, having snatched up their arms, went out to meet Hannibal. [12] They engaged on the road rather like armies in order of march than in line of battle; and since on the one side there was nothing but a disorderly crowd, and on the other a general confident in his soldiers, and soldiers in their general, as many as thirty-five thousand men were routed by a few. [13] On the following day, a surrender having been made, they received a garrison within their walls; and being ordered to deliver up their arms, as soon as they had obeyed the command, a signal is suddenly given to the victors to pillage the city, as if it had been taken by storm; nor was any outrage, which in such cases is wont to appear to writers worthy of relation, left unperpetrated; [14] such a specimen of every kind of lust, barbarity, and inhuman insolence was exhibited towards that unhappy people. Such were the expeditions of Hannibal during the winter. 58. For a short time after, while the cold continued intolerable, rest was given to the soldiers; [2] and having set out from his winter quarters on the first and uncertain indications of spring, he leads them into Etruria, intending to gain that nation to his side, like the Gauls and Ligurians, either by force or favour. [3] As he was crossing the Apennines, so furious a storm attacked him, that it almost surpassed the horrors of the [p. 758]Alps. When the rain and wind together were driven directly against their faces, they at first halted, because their arms must either be cast away, or striving to advance against the storm they were whirled round by the hurricane, and dashed to the ground: [4] afterwards, when it now stopped their breath, nor suffered them to respire, they sat down for a little, with their backs to the wind. [5] Then indeed the sky resounded with loud thunder, and the lightnings flashed between its terrific peals; all, bereft of sight and hearing, stood torpid with fear. [6] At length, when the rain had spent itself, and the fury of the wind was on that account the more increased, it seemed necessary to pitch the camp in that very place where they had been overtaken by the storm. [7] But this was the beginning of their labours, as it were, afresh; for neither could they spread out nor fix any tent, nor did that which perchance had been put up remain, the wind tearing through and sweeping every thing away: [8] and soon after, when the water raised aloft by the wind had been frozen above the cold summits of the mountains, it poured down such a torrent of snowy hail, that the men, casting away every thing, fell down upon their faces, rather buried under than sheltered by their coverings; [9] and so extreme an intensity of cold succeeded, that when each wished to raise and lift himself from that wretched heap of men and beasts of burden, he was for a long time unable, because their sinews being stiffened by the cold, they had great difficulty in bending their joints. [10] Afterwards, when, by continually moving themselves to and fro, they succeeded in recovering the power of motion, and regained their spirits, and fires began to be kindled in a few places, every helpless man had recourse to the aid of others. [11] They remained as if blockaded for two days in that place. Many men and beasts of burden, and also seven elephants, of those which had remained from the battle fought at the Trebia, were destroyed. 59. Having descended from the Apennines, he moved his camp back towards Placentia, and having proceeded as far as ten miles, took up his station. On the following day he leads out twelve thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry against the enemy. [2] Nor did Sempronius the consul (for he had now returned from Rome) decline the engagement; and during that day three miles intervened between the two camps. [3] On the following day they fought with amazing courage and [p. 759]various success. At the first onset the Roman power was so superior, that they not only conquered the enemy in the regular battle, but pursued them when driven back quite into their camp, and soon after also assaulted it. [4] Hannibal, having stationed a few to defend the rampart and the gates, and having admitted the rest in close array into the middle of the camp, orders them to watch attentively the signal for sallying out. [5] It was now about the ninth hour of the day when the Roman, having fatigued his soldiers to no purpose, after there was no hope of gaining possession of the camp, gave the signal for retreat; [6] which when Hannibal heard, and saw that the attack was slackened, and that they were retreating from the camp, instantly having sent out the cavalry on the right and left against the enemy, he himself in the middle with the main force of the infantry rushed out from the camp. [7] Seldom has there been a combat more furious, and few would have been more remarkable for the loss on both sides, if the day had suffered it to continue for a longer time. [8] Night broke off the battle when raging most from the determined spirit of the combatants. The conflict therefore was more severe than the slaughter: and as it was pretty much a drawn battle, they separated with equal loss. On neither side fell more than six hundred infantry, and half that number of cavalry. [9] But the loss of the Romans was more severe than proportionate to the number that fell, because several of equestrian rank, and five tribunes of the soldiers, and three prefects of the allies were slain. [10] After this battle Hannibal retired to the territory of the Ligurians, and Sempronius to Luca. Two Roman quaestors, Caius Fulvius and Lucius Lucretius, who had been treacherously intercepted, with two military tribunes and five of the equestrian order, mostly sons of senators, are delivered up to Hannibal when coming among the Ligurians, in order that he might feel more convinced that the peace and alliance with them would be binding. 60. While these things are transacting in Italy, Cneius Cornelius Scipio having been sent into Spain with a fleet and army, when, setting out from the [2??] mouth of the Rhone, and sailing past the Pyrenaean mountains, he had moored his fleet at Emporiae, having [3??] there landed his army, and beginning with the Lacetani, he brought the whole coast, as far as the river Iberus, under the Roman dominion, partly by renewing [p. 760]the old, and partly by forming new alliances. [4] The reputation for clemency, acquired by these means, had influence not only with the maritime states, but now also with the more savage tribes in the inland and mountainous districts; nor was peace only effected with them, but also an alliance of arms, and several fine cohorts of auxiliaries were levied from their numbers. The country on this side of the Iberus was the province of Hanno, whom Hannibal had left to defend that region. [5] He, therefore, judging that he ought to make opposition, before every thing was alienated from him, having pitched his camp in sight of the enemy, led out his forces in battle-array; [6] nor did it appear to the Roman, that the engagement ought to be deferred, as he knew that he must fight with Hanno and Hasdrubal, and wished rather to contend against each of them separately, than against both together. [7] The conflict did not prove one of great difficulty; six thousand of the enemy were slain, and two thousand made prisoners, together with the guard of the camp; for both the camp was stormed, and the general himself, with several of the chief officers, taken; and Scissis, a town near the camp, was also carried by assault. [8] But the spoil of this town consisted of things of small value, such as the household furniture used by barbarians and slaves that were worth little. [9] The camp enriched the soldiers; almost all the valuable effects, not only of that army which was conquered, but of that which was serving with Hannibal in Italy, having been left on this side the Pyrenees, that the baggage might not be cumbrous to those who conveyed it. 61. Before any certain news of this disaster arrived, Hasdrubal, having passed the Iberus with eight thousand foot and a thousand horse, intending to meet the Romans on their first approach, after he heard of the ruin of their affairs at Scissis, and the loss of the camp, turned his route towards the sea. [2] Not far from Tarraco, having despatched his cavalry in various directions, he drove to their ships, with great slaughter, and greater route, the soldiers belonging to the fleet and the mariners, while scattered and wandering through the fields (for it is usually the case that success produces negligence); but not daring to remain longer in that quarter, [3??] lest he should be surprised by Scipio, he withdrew to the other side of the Iberus. [4] And Scipio, having quickly brought up his army on the report of fresh enemies, after punishing a few captains of [p. 761]ships, and leaving a moderate garrison at Tarraco, returned with his fleet to Emporia. [5] He had scarcely departed, when Hasdrubal came up, and having instigated to a revolt the state of the Ilergetes, which had given hostages to Scipio, he lays waste, with the youth of that very people, the lands of the faithful allies of the Romans. [6] Scipio being thereupon roused from his winter quarters, Hasdrubal again retires from all the country on this side the Iberus. Scipio, when with a hostile army he had invaded the state of the Ilergetes, forsaken by the author of their revolt, and having driven them all into Athanagia, which was the capital of that nation, laid siege to the city; [7] and within a few days, having imposed the delivery of more hostages than before, and also fined the Ilergetes in a sum of money, he received them back into his authority and dominion. [8] He then proceeded against the Ausetani near the Iberus, who were also the allies of the Carthaginians; and having laid siege to their city, he cut off by an ambuscade the Lacetani, while bringing assistance by night to their neighbours, having attacked them at a small distance from the city, as they were designing to enter it. [9] As many as twelve thousand were slain; the rest, nearly all without their arms, escaped home, by dispersing through the country in every direction. Nor did any thing else but the winter, which was unfavourable to the besiegers, secure the besieged. [10] The blockade continued for thirty days, during which the snow scarce ever lay less deep than four feet; and it had covered to such a degree the sheds and mantelets of the Romans, that it alone served as a defence when fire was frequently thrown on them by the enemy. [11] At last, when Amusitus, their leader, had fled to Hasdrubal, they are surrendered, on condition of paying twenty talents of silver. They then returned into winter quarters at Tarraco. 62. At Rome during this winter many prodigies either occurred about the city, or, as usually happens when the minds of men are once inclined to superstition, many were reported and readily believed; [2] among which it was said that an infant of good family, only six months old, had called out “Io triumphe” in the herb market: [3] that in the cattle market an ox had of his own accord ascended to the third story, and that thence, being frightened by the noise of the inhabitants, had flung himself down; [4] that the appearance of ships had [p. 762]been brightly visible in the sky, and that the temple of Hope in the herb market had been struck by lightning; that the spear at Lanuvium had shaken itself; that a crow had flown down into the temple of Juno and alighted on the very couch; [5] that in the territory of Amiternum figures resembling men dressed in white raiment had been seen in several places at a distance, but had not come close to any one; that in Picenum it had rained stones; that at Caere the tablets for divination had been lessened in size; and that in Gaul a wolf had snatched out the sword from the scabbard of a soldier on guard, and carried it off. [6] On account of the other prodigies the decemvirs were ordered to consult the books; but on account of its having rained stones in Picenum the festival of nine days was proclaimed, and almost all the state was occupied in expiating the rest, from time to time. [7] First of all the city was purified, and victims of the greater kind were sacrificed to those gods to whom they were directed to be offered; [8] and a gift of forty pounds' weight of gold was carried to the temple of Juno at Lanuvium; and the matrons dedicated a brazen statue to Juno on the Aventine; and a lectisternium was ordered at Caere, where the tablets for divination had diminished; [9] and a supplication to Fortune at Algidum; at Rome also a lectisternium was ordered to Youth, and a supplication at the temple of Hercules, first by individuals named, and afterwards by the whole people at all the shrines; [10] five greater victims were offered to Genius; and Caius Atilius Serranus the praetor was ordered to make certain vows if the republic should remain in the same state for ten years. [11] These things, thus expiated and vowed according to the Sibylline books, relieved, in a great degree, the public mind from superstitious fears. 63. Flaminius, one of the consuls elect, to whom the legions which were wintering at Placentia had fallen by lot, sent an edict and letter to the consul, desiring that those forces should be ready in camp at Ariminum on the ides of March. [2] He had a design to enter on the consulship in his province, recollecting his old contests with the fathers, which he had waged with them when tribune of the people, and afterwards when consul, first about his election to the office, which was annulled, and then about a triumph. [3] He was also odious to the fathers on account of a new law which Quintus Claudius, a [p. 763]tribune of the people, had carried against the senate, Caius Flaminius alone of that body assisting him, that no senator, or he who had been father of a senator, should possess a ship fit for sea service, containing more than three hundred amphora. This size was considered sufficient for conveying the produce of their lands: all traffic appeared unbecoming a senator. [4] This contest, maintained with the warmest opposition, procured the hatred of the nobility to Flaminius, the advocate of the law; but the favour of the people, and afterwards a second consulship. [5] For these reasons, thinking that they would detain him in the city by falsifying the auspices, by the delay of the Latin festival, and other hinderances to which a consul was liable, he pretended a journey, and, while yet in a private capacity, departed secretly to his province. This proceeding, when it was made public, excited new and additional anger in the senators, who were before irritated against him. [6] They said, “That Caius Flaminius waged war not only with the senate, but now with the immortal gods; that having been formerly made consul without the proper auspices, he had disobeyed both gods and men recalling him from the very field of battle; [7] and now, through consciousness of their having been dishonoured, he had shunned the Capitol and the customary offering of vows, that he might not on the day of entering his office approach the temple of Jupiter, the best and greatest of gods; [8] that he might not see and consult the senate, himself hated by it, as it was hateful to him alone; that he might not proclaim the Latin festival, or perform on the Alban mount the customary rights to Jupiter Latiaris; [9] that he might not, under the direction of the auspices, go up to the Capitol to offer his vows, and thence, attended by the lictors, proceed to his province in the garb of a general; but that he had set off, like some camp boy, without his insignia, without the lictors, with secrecy and stealth, just as if he had been quitting his country to go into banishment; [10] as if forsooth he would enter on his office more consistently with the dignity of the consulate at Ariminum than Rome, and assume the robe of office in a public inn better than before his own household gods.” [11] — They unanimously resolved that he should be recalled and brought back, and be constrained to perform in person every duty to gods and men before he went to the army and the province. [12] Quintus Terentius and Marcus Antistius having [p. 764]set out on this embassy, (for it was decreed that ambassadors should be sent,) prevailed with him in no degree more than the letter sent by the senate in his former consulship. [13] A few days after he entered on his office, and as he was sacrificing, a calf, after being struck, having broken away from the hands of the ministers, sprinkled several of the bystanders with its blood. [14] Flight and disorder ensued, to a still greater degree at a distance among those who were ignorant what was the cause of the alarm. This circumstance was regarded by most persons as an omen of great terror. [15] Having then received two legions from Sempronius, the consul of the former year, and two from Caius Atilius, the praetor, the army began to be led into Etruria, through the passes of the Apennines.
