Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 44
Alfred C. Schlesinger, Ph.D., Ed.

Book XLIV

1. AT the beginning of the spring following the¹ winter campaigns just mentioned, Quintus Marcius Philippus² the consul left Rome and reached Brundisium with five thousand³ men whom he planned to take over with him as reinforcements for the [2] legions. The ex-consul Marcus Popilius⁴ and some young men of equally high birth accompanied the consul as tribunes of the soldiers⁵ in the legions for Macedonia. About the same time Gaius Marcius Figulus⁶ the praetor, who had been assigned [3??] to the fleet, arrived in Brundisium, and the two commanders left Italy together, reached Corcyra the next day, and made port at Actium, the harbour of Acarnania, on the day [4] after. Thence the consul disembarked at Ambracia and marched overland to Thessaly; the praetor rounded Cape Leucas, entered the Gulf of Corinth and, leaving his ships at Creusa, also took to the land and made for the fleet at Chalcis through the midst of Boeotia-one day's rapid journey.

[5] At this time Aulus Hostilius had his camp in Thessaly near Old Pharsalus, having on the one hand performed no military feat worth mentioning, but on [p. 93]the other hand having accustomed the soldiery to⁷ strict military discipline in place of uncontrolled laxness and having loyally furthered the interests of the allies and protected them from any kind of harm. On hearing of his successor's approach, he carefully inspected his men, their arms, and their horses, and with his army in parade order went to meet the approaching [6] consul. Not only was the first meeting of the commanders in accord with the high station both of the men themselves and of the Roman name, but the utmost harmony prevailed in their subsequent operations, for the proconsul remained with the [7] army.

A few days later the consul addressed a meeting of his [8] soldiers. Beginning with the unnatural crimes of Perseus committed against his brother and planned against his [9??] father,⁸ he went on to mention the acquisition of the throne by crime, the subsequent poisonings and slaughter, the attack by scoundrelly bandits on Eumenes, the wrongs committed by Perseus against the Roman people, and the plunderings of cities allied to them, contrary to [10] treaty.

“How hateful all these actions are to the gods also,” said the consul, “Perseus will discover in the outcome of his enterprises; for the gods support the cause of duty and faithfulness, the qualities by which the Roman people has climbed to so great an [11] eminence.” The consul then compared the strength of the Roman people, who now controlled the whole earth, with that of Macedonia, and the military [12??] forces of the one with the other, and asked how much greater were the resources of Philip and Antiochus, which had been shattered by forces no greater than this Roman army?

[p. 95] 2. After the consul had aroused the ardour of⁹ the soldiers by a speech to this effect, he began to hold councils on strategy. Gaius Marcius the praetor, after picking up the fleet at Chalcis, arrived in camp. [2] It was decided not to waste more time by lingering in Thessaly, but to break camp at once and proceed thence into Macedonia, while [3??] the praetor was to make sure that the fleet should simultaneously attack the hostile coast-line.

[4] After the praetor's departure, the consul ordered his soldiers to take with them grain for a month and broke camp nine days after having assumed command; [5] after a day's march, he summoned the guides for various routes, bade each explain before the council the route by which he would guide them, and then, after dismissing the guides, laid before the council the question of which route to choose. [6] Some preferred the road via Pythoüs; others the one over the Cambunian Mountains used the preceding year by the consul Hostilius; others, a route past Lake Ascuris.¹⁰ [7] For a certain distance yet there was no divergence in the routes; therefore the discussion as to this choice was postponed until they should encamp near the point of separation of the roads. [8] Thence the consul led his army into Perrhaebia and settled down between Azorus and Doliche¹¹ for further conference as to the road to take. [9] During the same time Perseus, knowing that the enemy was [p. 97]approaching, but unaware which route he would choose,¹² decided to occupy all the passes with forces. [10] To the summit of the Cambunian Mountains (which the Macedonians themselves call Volustana) he sent ten thousand light-armed young men¹³ under the command of Asclepiodotus; near the fort above Lake Ascuris —Lapathus is the name of the place —Hippias [11] was ordered to hold the pass with a force of twelve thousand Macedonians.¹⁴ [12] The king himself with the rest of his forces remained in camp near Dium; later, so planlessly that he seemed to have lost his mind, he would dash with some unencumbered cavalry along the shore, now to Heracleum, now to Phila, returning without halt to Dium.¹⁵

3. Meanwhile the consul had settled on the plan of proceeding by the pass where the king's officer was encamped near Ottolobus.¹⁶ [2] It was decided, however, to send ahead four thousand men to seize valuable advance positions; the commanders of this force were Marcus Claudius and Quintus Marcius, the son of the consul. [3] Immediately the whole Roman army followed. However, so steep, rough, and rugged was the road that the advance forces, travelling light, barely completed a two days' march of fifteen miles [p. 99]before pitching camp. The place they occupied is¹⁷ called Dierus. [4] Thence on the following day they advanced seven miles, seized a hill not far from the enemy's camp, and reported by messenger to the consul that they were in contact with the enemy, that they had occupied a place safe and suitable for all purposes, and that he should follow them as rapidly as he could march. [5] While the consul was worrying both over the difficulty of the journey upon which he had entered and over the fate of the small force which he had sent ahead into the midst of hostile garrisons, he was met by the messenger near Lake Ascuris. [6] The consul thereupon gained confidence, and after joining the advance force encamped beneath the hill which had been seized, in the place best adapted through the nature of the terrain. [7] Not only the enemy camp, a little over a mile away, but the whole region to Dium, Phila, and the seashore was before their eyes in the extensive view from so lofty a ridge. [8] This sight roused the spirits of the soldiery, after they had a birds eye view of the whole campaign including all the king's forces and the land of the enemy, from so near by. [9] Although the soldiers, made eager by this sight, urged the consul to lead them at once to the enemy's camp, one day's rest was given them, since they were weary from the toil of the march. [10] Next day, the consul, leaving part of his forces to guard the camp, advanced against the enemy.

4. Hippias had recently been sent by the king to guard the pass; as soon as he saw the Roman camp on its hill, he roused the spirits of his men to combat; and now he marched out against the oncoming column of the consul. [2] The Romans had come out [p. 101]unencumbered for battle and the enemy were light troops, a¹⁸ type very ready to stir up combat. [3] Therefore immediately on meeting they discharged their weapons; many wounds were both received and inflicted by either side in the hasty encounter; small numbers of both forces were killed. [4] Now that their spirits had been roused for the succeeding day, a more stubborn clash of larger forces occurred; and the decisive battle of the war would have been fought if there had been room enough to deploy the battle line; but the ridge of the mountain running up to a narrow peak barely allowed for a front of three files. [5] And so while a few fought, the large remainder, especially the heavy-armed, stood by as onlookers of the battle. [6] Light forces were also able to charge forward over the rolling slopes of the ridge and engage the opposing light forces in flanking attacks over terrain favourable and unfavourable. More had been wounded than killed that day when the battle was broken off at nightfall.

[7] On the third day the Roman commander was at a loss; for he could neither remain on the ridge without supplies nor retire without disgrace and even danger, if the enemy pursued his retreat from the higher ground. There remained indeed no alternative to amending a bold undertaking by persistent boldness, which is occasionally wise in the long run. [8] In fact, the position was such that, had the consul confronted an enemy like to the old-time kings of Macedonia, he [p. 103]might have suffered a great disaster.¹⁹ [9] But though²⁰ the king was scouring the shore near Dium with cavalry, and at a distance of twelve miles could almost hear the shouts and din of the fighting men, he neither added to his forces by reinforcing his weary men with fresh troops, nor did he himself appear on the battle-field —a matter of greatest moment —although the Roman commander, aged over sixty and overburdened with flesh, performed vigorously in person all the duties of a soldier. [10] Magnificently he pursued his bold undertaking to the end; [11] he left Popilius to guard the ridge during his advance over pathless ground, sent ahead men to clear out a road, and ordered Attalus and Misagenes, each with the auxiliaries of his own nation, to act as guard for the men clearing the pass. [12] The consul himself sent the cavalry and baggage ahead of him and brought up the rear with the legions.

5. The toil of the descent and the damage to baggage-animals and their loads cannot be put into words. After they had advanced a mere four miles, they would have given anything to return as they had come, if they but could. [2] The confusion of an attack by an enemy was caused by the elephants, which on arriving at the pathless places cast off their mahouts and with horrible trumpetings caused a great panic, especially among the horses, until a plan was devised for getting them through. [3] On the steep hillside the slope was marked off, and at the lower end two long strong posts were set in the ground, separated by a distance slightly greater than the width of one of the beasts; [4] on a cross-beam laid [p. 105]upon these posts, planks, each thirty feet long, were²¹ fastened together to form a runway, and earth thrown on top of them.²² [5] Next, at a slight interval below, a second runway of the same sort was built, then a third, and others one after the other, where the cliffs were sheer. [6] From firm ground an elephant would advance on to the runway; before he could proceed to its end, the posts were cut and the tilting of the runway forced the animal to slide gently to the head of the next runway. [7] Some of the elephants would slide standing erect, others would squat on their haunches. Whenever they were met with the level expanse of another runway, they were again carried down by a like collapse of the lower structure, until they arrived at the more passable valley.

[8] The Romans advanced on that day hardly more than seven miles. Very little of the journey did they accomplish on their feet. Usually they advanced by casting themselves down, arms, baggage, and all, while meeting with every kind of difficulty, so that even the leader who had chosen the route could not deny that a small force could have destroyed the whole army. [9] By nightfall they reached a scant level area, nor did men who had unexpectedly at long last found a place which offered sure footing, have the leisure to observe the unfriendly nature of the place, hemmed in as it was on all sides. [10] For the next day as well they were compelled to wait in the depths of this valley for Popilius and the troops left behind [p. 107]with him. These troops too, though threatened from²³ no direction by the enemy, were harassed as by an enemy by the ruggedness of the terrain. [11] On the third day, they proceeded with the united forces through the pass called Callipeuce²⁴ by the natives. [12] On the fourth day, they descended through country as pathless as before, but their skill was greater through practice, and their morale was higher, since the enemy had not showed himself anywhere and they were reaching the sea. On reaching the plains between Heracleum and Libethrum they pitched a camp, most of which occupied hills. [13] This was the infantry camp; they embraced part of the plain too within the rampart, where the cavalry might encamp.

6. The king was in his bath, they say, when the presence of the enemy was announced. At this message he leapt in terror from his tub and dashed out crying that he had been beaten without a battle. [2] And thereafter, as his terror drove him to a succession of fear-struck plans and orders, he sent out two of his friends, one to Pella to cast into the sea the money stored in Phacus,²⁵ the other to Thessalonica to burn the dockyards. He recalled Asclepiodotus and Hippias and their forces from outpost duty and opened every approach for attack. [3] The king ran off with all the gilded statues at Dium, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, and compelled the inhabitants of that region to move to Pydna. Thereby [p. 109]what might have seemed the rashness of the consul²⁶ in advancing to a position from which he could not retire without the consent of the enemy, was turned by the king into well-calculated boldness. [4] For the Romans had two passes by which they could extricate themselves: one through Tempe into Thessaly, the other into Macedonia past Dium. [5] Both of the passes were being held by the king's forces; [6] therefore if the king, by fearlessly holding his own, had resisted the first false appearance of approaching danger, he would have left the Romans no retreat through Tempe to Thessaly, nor any route for bringing up provisions from that direction.²⁷ [7] For even without the opposition of an enemy Tempe is a defile difficult of passage; for besides five miles of narrows through which the road is cramped for a loaded animal, the cliffs on either side are so sheer that one can hardly look down without some dizziness of eye and brain. [8] An additional source of fear is the roar and depth of the Peneüs River flowing through the midst of the canyon. This place, so unfriendly by its very nature, was blocked at four separate points by the king's garrisons. [9] One was at the very entrance near Gonnus, the second at Condylus, an impregnable fort, the third in the vicinity of Lapathus, which they call the Palisade, the fourth set by the road itself where the canyon, in the middle of its course, is at its narrowest. [10] where it can easily be defended by no more than ten soldiers. [11] If the Romans' access to [p. 111]supplies through Tempe, as well as their line of²⁸ retreat, had been cut off, they would have had to return to the mountains through which they had descended. [12] As they had deceived the enemy in this by stealth, they could not duplicate the feat without concealment and while the enemy were in possession of the higher summits; and the difficulty they had undergone would have laid low all hope. [13] There was no alternative left in this rash enterprise but to get out into Macedonia past Dium in the teeth of the enemy, and this undertaking, had not the gods deprived the king of his wits, would itself have been of the utmost difficulty. [14] For between the foothills of Mount Olympus and the sea lies an interval of a little more than a mile, half of which space is taken up with the broad estuary of the Baphyrus River, while part of the plain is obstructed by either the temple of Jupiter²⁹ or the town. [15] The very small remainder could have been barred off by a ditch of no extravagant size and a palisade, and there was such an abundance of stone and of forest timber at hand that even a wall could have been thrown up and towers erected. [16] Since none of these possibilities revealed themselves to a mind blinded by sudden panic, the king stripped away all his defences and opened every approach to assault [17??] before taking refuge in Pydna.

7. The consul sighted much security as well as hope in the folly and inaction of the king; he sent back a message to Spurius Lucretius³⁰ at Larisa to seize the forts abandoned by the enemy in the region of Tempe, and sending Popilius to reconnoitre the crossings around Dium, arrived at that city in two days' march, since he learned that everything lay open in all directions. [2] He ordered his camp to be [p. 113]pitched next to the temple itself, so that no sacrilege³¹ against the sacred precinct might be committed. [3] On personally inspecting the city which, though not large, was adorned with public installations and an abundance of statues³² and was magnificently fortified, the consul could hardly convince himself that no ruse lurked in the unreasonable abandonment of such remarkable objects. [4] After a day's delay for general reconnaissance all around, he advanced, and being convinced that there would be abundant grain in Pieria, he proceeded on that day to a river named Mitys. [5] Continuing on the following day, he accepted the surrender of the city of Agassae by its inhabitants; and to win over the hearts of the other Macedonians, he contented himself with hostages and promised to leave the city to its people without garrison, and to accord them autonomy and freedom from tribute. Advancing thence a day's journey, he encamped by the Ascordus River. [6] Because he felt more strongly the want of every sort of supplies the further he advanced from Thessaly, he retired to Dium, thereby demonstrating beyond a doubt to everyone what he would have suffered had he been cut off from Thessaly, since he found it unsafe to advance far from there.

[7] After Perseus had assembled all his forces and officers, he blamed the commanders of his outposts, above all Asclepiodotus and Hippias; [8] they, he said, had surrendered the keys to Macedonia to the Romans —a crime for which no one would have been more justly prosecuted than himself.

[9] After the sight of the Roman fleet at sea had brought to the consul hope that the ships were bringing provisions —for [10] there was a great scarcity of grain and almost a famine —he heard from the men just [p. 115]come into port that the freight ships had been left³³ in Magnesia. [11] As the consul was debating what should be done —so completely was his struggle directed against the mere difficulty of the situation, without the slightest effort on the part of the enemy to make matters worse —in [12] the nick of time a despatch arrived from Spurius Lucretius that he was in possession of the forts above Tempe and around Phila, and that he had found a supply of grain and other useful materials in them.

8. Greatly pleased by this news, the consul moved from Dium to Phila, both to strengthen its garrison and to distribute to the soldiers the grain, transportation of which was slow. [2] This march started unpleasant rumours; for some put it that he had retired from before the enemy out of fear, because he would have had to fight a battle if he had remained in Pieria, while others said that [3??] in his ignorance of the daily fluctuations in the fortunes of war, and as if events were awaiting his signal, he had dropped from his grasp advantages which presently could not be recovered. [4] For at one move he had lost his grip on Dium and had stirred up the enemy to perceiving at long last that he must recover what previously he had shamefully lost. [5] For on hearing of the departure of the consul, the king returned to Dium, rebuilt what had been cast down and despoiled by the Romans, replaced the battlements knocked off the walls, and strengthened the walls all around. Then he placed his camp five miles from the city on the nearer bank of the Elpeüs River, intending to use the river itself as a fortification since it was very hard to cross. [6] It flows from a ravine of Mount Olympus, is scanty in summer, but again in [p. 117]winter is swollen by rains; it forms great rapids³⁴ above its boulders, and below, by carrying off the eroded earth to the sea, produces great abysses and banks sheer on either side above a deeply-hollowed channel. [7] Thinking that the enemy's advance was barred by this river, the king intended to use up the rest of the summer.

[8] Meanwhile the consul sent Popilius with two thousand soldiers from Phila to Heracleum. [9] This is about five miles from Phila, on a cliff overhanging the river midway between Dium and Tempe.

9. Before Popilius brought his men against the walls, he sent envoys to persuade the magistrates and chief citizens to prefer making trial of the good faith and mildness of the Romans rather than of their force. [2] This advice availed nothing, because the fires of the king's camp at the Elpeüs were in sight. Then the siege began, both with assaults and with field-works and engines, both from land and sea, for the fleet, too, had arrived and occupied the shore side.

[3] The younger Romans even captured the lowest part of the wall by turning to military use a performance of the arena. [4] It was the custom then, before there had been introduced the present extravagance³⁵ of cramming the arena with animals from all over the earth, to hunt out various sorts of spectacles, for one race with four-horse chariots and one with bareback riders hardly occupied the space of an hour for the two events. [5] As one of these performances, groups of about sixty³⁶ youths (occasionally more at more [p. 119]elaborate games) entered under arms. Their entrance³⁷ was in some respects an imitation of military manoeuvres, but in other respects was of a style more showy than the military and more akin to the fashion of gladiatorial combats. [6] After passing through various evolutions in this manoeuvre, they would form in ranks, with shields close-set over their heads, the front rank erect, the second somewhat stooped, the third and fourth more so, and the rear rank down on their knees, so that they would form a “tortoise” sloped like the roof of a house. [7] Next two armed men, separated by an interval of some fifty feet, would rush out, feint at each other, and mount from bottom to top of the “tortoise” over the close-set shields. They would then act as if skirmishing at the outer edges of the “tortoise,” now clash with each other in the centre, and leap about just as if they were on solid ground.

A “tortoise” like this was brought up to the lowest part of the wall. [8] When soldiers on top came up to the wall, they were at their highest elevation level with the defenders of the wall; the defenders were routed and the soldiers of two maniples³⁸ crossed into the city. [9] The only difference from the show was that the front rank and those exposed on the flanks did not raise their shields over their heads, but held them out in the usual position for battle in order not to expose their bodies. In this way the missiles hurled from the wall did not injure the men as they approached and those cast on the “tortoise” [p. 121]slid harmlessly like rain down to the bottom of the³⁹ slippery slope.

[10] On capturing Heracleum, the consul advanced his camp there, as if he were going to advance to Dium and thence, after dislodging the king, into Pieria as well. [11] But as he was already making ready for wintering, he ordered the roads from Thessaly to be repaired for the transport of provisions and suitable sites for granaries to be chosen and houses built where those transporting the provisions could lodge.

10. Perseus at length recovered his courage from the panic which had struck him down. and would have preferred that his commands had not been obeyed when he ordered the treasure at Pella to be cast into the sea and the dockyards at Thessalonica to be burned. [2] Andronicus, the envoy to Thessalonica, had killed time to allow for the very thing which happened, a change of mind.⁴⁰ [3] Nicias at Pella was less wary in casting away part of [4??] the money which was in Phacus, but he seemed to have made his mistake in a manner not irreparable, since almost all the money was brought up by divers. So great was the king's shame at this panic of his that he ordered the divers secretly to be put to death, and after them Andronicus and Nicias, too, so that there should be no one having knowledge of so crazy an order.

[5] Meanwhile, Gaius Marcius set out with the fleet from Heracleum for Thessalonica, ravaged the countryside far and wide by setting ashore forces at several points, and in several successful battles drove back those who sallied from the city headlong within their walls. [6] He was striking terror into the city itself, when [p. 123]from the engines of all types which were distributed⁴¹ about, stones shot by machine struck down not only the skirmishers about the walls who rashly approached, but even the men in the ships. [7] Recalling the soldiers to the ships and abandoning the siege of Thessalonica, they made thence for Aenea. This city is fifteen miles away, set opposite Pydna in fertile land. [8] After devastating its territory they followed the shore and arrived at Antigonea. There they disembarked and for a time both ravaged the fields round about and carried some booty off to their ships. [9] Then the Macedonians, cavalry and infantry together, attacked the scattered raiders and pursuing as they fled in disorder, killed about five hundred and captured as many. [10] Nothing but utter necessity, when they were kept from finding safety in their ships, aroused the spirits of the Roman soldiers, both by despair of other means of safety and by indignation. The fight was renewed on the shore; those aboard the ships came to the rescue. [11] Here about two hundred of the Macedonians were slain and an equal number captured. From Antigonea the fleet sailed to the peninsula of Pallene and landed troops to ravage it. This land belonged to the territory of Cassandrea⁴² and was by far the most fertile of all the coast they had passed. [12] Here they were met by King Eumenes, who had set out from Elaea⁴³ with twenty decked⁴⁴ ships, as well as by five decked ships sent by King Prusias.⁴⁵

11. With this accession of strength, the praetor's spirits rose to the point of attacking Cassandrea. [2] [p. 125]This was founded by King Cassander precisely in the⁴⁶ narrows which connect the peninsula of Pallene with the rest of Macedonia and are bounded on the one side by the Gulf of Macedonia, and on the other by that of Torone. [3] For the peninsula on which this city is situated rises high and projects into the sea quite as far as Mount Athos, which is noted for its size; it forms, opposite to the district of Magnesia, two unequal promontories, the larger named Posideum and the smaller Canastraeum.⁴⁷

[4] The siege was begun in separate divisions. The Roman commander constructed works, including chevaux-de-frise, extending from the Macedonian to the Toronaic gulf, in the quarter called Clitae, in order to cut off the highway. On the other side is a narrow strait⁴⁸ ; there Eumenes was attacking. [5] The Romans found that their greatest task was filling the moat which Perseus had lately built as a defence. When the praetor inquired why there were no mounds to be seen, where the earth dug from the moat would be, he was shown certain arches.⁴⁹ These, he heard, were built up not to the same strength as the old wall, but only to the thickness of a single brick. He therefore adopted the plan of opening a path into the city by piercing the brickwork. [6] He further expected to effect surprise in this move if he attacked the walls elsewhere with scaling ladders and, by raising confusion, drew off the defenders of the city to the protection of this second spot.

[7] [p. 127] In the garrison of Cassandrea there were, besides⁵⁰ a respectable contingent of young citizens, eight hundred Agrianes⁵¹ and two thousand Illyrian Penestae⁵² sent from their home by Pleuratus —both peoples being good fighters. They were defending the walls as the Romans struggled with the utmost energy to mount them, when the piercing of the brickwork of the arches in the twinkling of an eye, laid open the city. [8] If men had been there to dash in armed, they would have taken the town at once. [9] When the accomplishment of this breakthrough was reported to the Roman soldiers, they at once eagerly raised a shout of joy, expecting to burst into the city at several points.

12. The enemy were first struck with wonder as to the meaning of this sudden uproar. [2] After the commanders of the garrison, Pytho and Philip, had been informed that the city lay open, they considered that the work had been done for the benefit of the side first to press the attack, and made a sally with a strong force of Agrianes and Illyrians. [3] The Romans, who were coming up and being summoned from various points to advance into the city, were routed in their scattered and unorganized state and chased to the moat, into which they were driven and which they filled with the fallen. About six hundred were killed there and almost to a man those caught between the wall and the moat were wounded. [4] The praetor, being so grievously dashed by his own undertaking, had become less eager to form other plans. Not even Eumenes, who was attacking both by sea [p. 129]and land, gained any worth-while advantage. [5] Both⁵³ commanders therefore determined to strengthen the forces on guard, so that no reinforcement from Macedonia might be sent in, and since open assault was unsuccessful, to attack the fortifications with siege-works. [6] During the preparation of these works, ten Macedonian scout-ships, sent from Thessalonica with picked Gallic auxiliaries, saw that the besieging ships were anchored out to sea, and in the dead of night, in single column, hugging the shore as closely as possible, entered the city. Report of this new defence force compelled both the Romans and the king to abandon the siege. [7] They sailed around the cape and put in near Torone. [8] After attempting to besiege this city too, and observing that it was defended by a strong force, they gave up their undertaking, and made for Demetrias. On approaching it they saw the walls filled with armed men, and sailed past to make a landing at Iolcus, planning to ravage the fields and then attack Demetrias too.

13. Meanwhile the consul, for his part, in order not merely to remain sluggishly idle in hostile territory, sent Marcus Popilius with five thousand soldiers to assail the city of Meliboea. [2] This is situated in the foothills of Mount Ossa, on the side sloping toward Thessaly, and conveniently threatening Demetrias.⁵⁴ [3] The first arrival of the enemy dismayed the inhabitants of the place; then, after rallying their spirits from the unexpected fright, they ran under arms to their posts at gates and wall, where the expected lines of attack were, and at once dispelled the hope that the town could be taken at the first rush. [4] Preparations for a siege were therefore made and the construction of works for the assault was begun.

[p. 131] When Perseus heard that Meliboea was being⁵⁵ attacked by the consul's army at the same time that the fleet was anchored at Iolcus, in order to attack Demetrias from there, he sent a certain Euphranor, one of his officers, with two thousand picked soldiers to Meliboea. [5] Euphranor's orders were that if he dislodged the Romans from Meliboea, he was to enter Demetrias unobserved before the Romans brought their camp up to the city from Iolcus. [6] The besiegers of Meliboea, in great panic when Euphranor suddenly made his appearance on higher ground, abandoned their works and set them afire. So the siege of Meliboea was given up. [7] After freeing one city from siege, Euphranor at once advanced to Demetrias. He entered the walls by night and gave the inhabitants such confidence that they felt sure of their ability not only to defend their walls, but to protect their land from raids. Sallies were made against the scattered ravagers, not without casualties to the enemy. [8] However, the praetor and the king rode around the walls, reconnoitring the situation of the city, in case they could attempt an assault by works or by main force at any point. [9] There was a rumour that Cydas the Cretan⁵⁶ and Antimachus, the commander in Demetrias, were agents in discussing terms of friendship between Eumenes and Perseus. At any rate, the Romans departed from Demetrias. [10] Eumenes sailed to the consul, and after offering congratulations on his successful entrance into Macedonia, left for Pergamum in his own kingdom. [11] The praetor Marcius Figulus sent part of his fleet into winter quarters at Sciathus, and made for Oreüs in [p. 133]Euboea with the rest of his ships, thinking that this⁵⁷ city was most suitable for the forwarding of supplies to the armies in Macedonia and Thessaly.

The historians give highly different accounts of King Eumenes. [12] If you trust Valerius Antias,⁵⁸ his account is that although the praetor summoned the king with frequent despatches, he did not even receive naval assistance from him, nor did Eumenes on his way to Asia part on good terms with the consul, being indignant because he was not permitted to encamp in the Roman area; [13] Eumenes, says Valerius, could not even be persuaded to leave behind the Galatian cavalry he had brought with him. [14] His brother Attalus, continues Valerius, not only remained with the consul, but displayed genuine and unwavering good faith and notable exploits in this campaign.

14. While the war was continuing in Macedonia, envoys from across the Alps from a Gallic chieftain —his name is given as Balanos, but there is no record of his tribe —came to Rome promising aid for the Macedonian campaign. [2] Thanks were expressed by the senate and gifts sent the envoys, a twisted necklace of two pounds of gold and golden bowls of four pounds, a horse with ornamental trappings, and cavalry weapons. [3] After the Gauls, Pamphylian⁵⁹ envoys presented in the senate-house a gold crown made of twenty thousand philips⁶⁰ and their request was [p. 135]granted that they be permitted to deposit this⁶¹ present in the temple of Jupiter, Greatest and Best, and to offer sacrifice on the Capitol; [4] a gracious answer was given to the envoys' request for a renewal of the state of friendship, and a gift of two thousand asses apiece was sent them.

[5] Next, an audience was given to envoys from King Prusias, and shortly thereafter to those from the Rhodians, who made a very different presentation of the same request. [6] Both embassies treated of making terms again with King Perseus. Prusias' attitude was more that of entreaty than demand, for he declared that up to this time he had taken the part of the Romans, and would so continue as long as the war lasted; [7] however, inasmuch as envoys from Perseus had come to him to discuss ending the war with the Romans, he had promised to plead Perseus' cause before the senate; he requested that if they could bring themselves to do so, they would put an end to their wrath, and would accord him, too, their thanks for the restoration of peace. So spoke the king's envoys. [8] The Rhodians haughtily reviewed their services to the Roman people, and claimed for themselves almost the greater part of the victories, especially over King Antiochus; they then added that while peace had existed between the Macedonians and Romans, they had entered upon friendship with King Perseus; [9] this they had broken off against their will and on account of no fault of his toward them, but because it had seemed good to the Romans to draw them into participation in the war. [10] [p. 137]For the third year, they said, they were feeling many⁶² inconveniences from this war because of the interruption of commerce; their island was poor, and could not be inhabited without the assistance of sea-borne supplies. [11] Since therefore they could no longer endure this privation, they had sent other envoys to Perseus in Macedonia, to inform him that it was the Rhodians' wish that he should arrange a peace with the Romans, and that they had sent a similar announcement to Rome. [12] If either party was responsible for preventing the ending of the war, the Rhodians would deliberate as to what action they ought to take against this party.

[13] I feel sure that even now these statements cannot be read or heard without indignation; from this one can judge what the senate's state of mind was as they listened.⁶³

15. Claudius has it that the senate returned no answer, but only had read its decree that the Roman people gave the Carians and Lycians their freedom⁶⁴ and that despatches should be immediately sent to both peoples, on hearing which the [2??] chief of the [p. 139]Rhodian embassy, for whose proud language the⁶⁵ senate-house had but a moment before seemed too small, now suffered deflation. [3] Other historians record the following answer:

“At the outset of this war the Roman people were informed by no trifling sources that the Rhodians had entered upon secret plots with King Perseus against the Roman state,⁶⁶ but even had this been doubtful before, the words of the embassy just uttered have made the matter certain. [4] Frequently treachery unmasks itself, even if it is more wary at first. And now the Rhodians pass judgment throughout the world as to peace and war! [5] At the beck and call of the Rhodians will the Romans take up and lay down their arms! Now we are no longer to call upon the gods to witness treaties, but rather the Rhodians! [6] Unless obedience is rendered them, and our armies are removed from Macedonia, the Rhodians will see, will they, what they must do? [7] What the Rhodians will see, they themselves know. But surely the Roman people, after their conquest of Perseus, which they hope will take place any day, will see that they repay a suitable reward for the actions of each state during the war.” [8] Nevertheless, a present of two thousand sesterces apiece was sent to the envoys, which they refused.

16. Thereafter despatches from Quintus Marcius the consul were read, describing his crossing over into Macedonia, by forcing the pass; [2] in Macedonia he had procured supplies in advance of winter from [p. 141]various localities, and in particular had received⁶⁷ twenty thousand bushels of wheat and ten thousand of barley from the Epirotes, so that payment for this grain should be arranged with their envoys at Rome. [3] Clothes, said the consul, should be sent to the army from Rome; there was need for about two hundred horses, especially Numidians, and he had no supply of them where he was. A decree of the senate was passed to carry out these requests of the consul. [4] Gaius Sulpicius the praetor⁶⁸ let a contract for transporting to Macedonia six thousand togas,⁶⁹ thirty thousand tunics, and two hundred horses, and for depositing them where the consul chose. Sulpicius also paid the envoys of the Epirotes the price of the grain, and brought before the senate Onesimus, son of Pytho, a Macedonian noble. [5] He had always been a proponent of peace to the king, and had advised him to adopt frequently, if not regularly, the practice which his father Philip had begun and continued to the last day of his life —namely, that of reading through twice daily the treaty he had made with the Romans. After Onesimus had been unable to discourage the king from war, Onesimus began at first to withdraw on one excuse or another, so as not to be associated with projects of which he disapproved. [6] Finally, when he saw that he was an object of suspicion and that occasionally he was being charged by innuendo with treachery, he deserted to the Romans and made himself very useful to the consul. [7] On being introduced to the senate, he recited these facts, and the senate ordered that he be enrolled in the category of allies, that a residence and entertainment [p. 143]be provided for him, that two hundred acres of the⁷⁰ public land of the Roman people in the district of Tarentum be given him, and that a house be bought for him at Tarentum.⁷¹ Gaius Decimius the praetor⁷² was entrusted with the execution of these orders.

[8] The censors conducted the census on the thirteenth of December more strictly than before. Many were deprived of their rank of knights, among them Publius Rutilius who as tribune of the commons had violently assailed the censors; he was also removed from his tribe and disenfranchised.⁷³ [9] As half the revenues of the year had by decree of the senate been assigned by the quaestors to the censors for the construction of public works, Titus Sempronius, out of the funds assigned to him, bought for the [10??] state the house of Publius Africanus behind the Old Shops in the direction of the statue of Vortumnus, as well as the butcher's stalls and the shops adjacent, and saw to the construction of the basilica which afterward received the name of Sempronian.⁷⁴

[11] 17. The year was drawing to its close, and because of concern, especially for the war with Macedonia, men were discussing what consuls they should elect for this year, to bring this war at last to an end. [2] A resolution of the senate was therefore passed, that Gnaeus Servilius should come as promptly [p. 145]as possible to hold the elections. [3] The praetor⁷⁵ Sulpicius forwarded the resolution to the consul, and read to the senate a few days later the return despatch from that officer. In this, he set the day for the elections as . . ., and announced his return to the city previous to that time. The consul made haste, and the elections were completed on the day set. [4] There were elected as consuls Lucius Aemilius Paulus for the second time, in the fourteenth year after his first term, and Gaius Licinius Crassus. [5] On the following day, there were elected to the praetorship Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus, Lucius Anicius Gallus, Gnaeus Octavius, Publius Fonteius Balbus, Marcus Aebutius Helva, and Gaius Papirius Carbo. Concern for the war with Macedonia induced the speeding up of the whole procedure. [6] Therefore it was voted that these magistrates-elect should be allotted their fields of operation immediately, so that when it was [7??] known which consul had received Macedonia and which praetor the fleet, the designated men might begin their plans and preparations of the supplies necessary for war and might consult the senate if there was need for consultation on any subject. [8] It was determined to hold the Latin Festival as soon as was possible on religious grounds after the entrance upon office of the magistrates, to avoid any delay to the consul who was to set out for Macedonia. [9] In these decrees, the fields of operation for the consuls were designated as Macedonia and Italy; those for the praetors were, besides the two jurisdictions in the city, the fleet, Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia. [p. 147]Macedonia fell to the lot of the consul Aemilius,⁷⁶ Italy to⁷⁷ Licinius. [10] Of the praetors, Gnaeus Baebius received the jurisdiction over citizens, Lucius Anicius was given that over aliens and was placed at the disposal of the senate, Gnaeus Octavius received the fleet, Publius Fonteius Spain, Marcus Aebutius Sicily, and Gaius Papirius Sardinia.

18. It was at once obvious to everyone that Lucius Aemilius was going to prosecute this war in no sluggish fashion, not only because he was a warlike man, but also because without relaxing by day or night he turned over in his mind nothing but what concerned this war. [2] First of all he requested the senate to send envoys to Macedonia to inspect the armies and the fleet and to report their findings as to what was needed by way of forces on land or sea; [3] moreover, they were to collect information as far as possible about the king's forces and about the terrain under our control and under that of the enemy. [4] They were to investigate the following: whether the Romans were encamped among the mountains or whether all the narrows had been passed and the plains reached; which of the allies were loyal to us, which were wavering and of a loyalty dependent on fortune, and which seemed definitely hostile; how large a supply of provisions had been prepared and whence they could be brought, by a land route or by ships, respectively; what had been achieved on land and sea during this summer. [5] From good information on these points sure decisions might be made for the [p. 149]future, said Aemilius. The senate gave the consul⁷⁸ Gnaeus Servilius the task of choosing three men satisfactory to Lucius Aemilius as envoys to Macedonia. Two days later the envoys set out —Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, Aulus Licinius Nerva, and Lucius Baebius.

[6] Report was made of two showers of stones near the end of this year, one on Roman land, one on that of Veii. On both occasions a nine-day rite was performed. [7] The priests who died during this year were Publius Quinctilius Varus, the flamen of Mars,⁷⁹ and Marcus Claudius Marcellus of the Board of Ten. Gnaeus Octavius replaced the latter. [8] Display being now on the increase, it is recorded that at the games in the arena by the curule aediles Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica and Publius Lentulus, sixty-three leopards and forty bears and elephants participated.

19. In the consulship of Lucius Aemilius Paulus⁸⁰ and Gaius Licinius, on the fifteenth of March, at the beginning of the new year, the senators were on the qui vive, especially as to what the consul in charge of Macedonia would bring before them about his field of operations. [2] But Paulus said that he had nothing to present until the envoys returned, but that the envoys were now at Brundisium, after having been blown back twice to Dyrrachium on their voyage. [3] As soon as he acquired the information which was the first necessity, he would lay matters before the senate, and this would take place within a very few days. [4] In order to avoid any delay to his [p. 151]settingout, said Paulus, the day for the Latin Festival had⁸¹ been set at April twelfth⁸² ; after the proper performance of the sacrifice, if the senate concurred, he and Gnaeus Octavius would both set out. [5] His colleague Gaius Licinius would take care, in his absence, to get ready and send out what should be made ready and sent to the war; meanwhile, said Paulus, the embassies of foreign nations might be given audience.

[6] First the envoys from King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra at Alexandria were announced. [7] Grimy,⁸³ with untrimmed beard and hair, they entered the senate-house bearing olive-branches, and prostrated themselves; their speech was more pitiable than their array. [8] Antiochus, the king of Syria, who had been a hostage at Rome, under the decent pretext of restoring the elder Ptolemy to his throne, was waging war against the younger brother, who was then in possession of Alexandria.⁸⁴ [9] Antiochus had won a naval battle at Pelusium and, after leading his forces across the Nile on a hastily-constructed bridge, was overawing Alexandria with his siege and seemed to be on the very point of laying his hands on a very rich kingdom. Complaining of this attack, the envoys begged the senate to come to the rescue of a kingdom and a royal pair who were friends of Roman rule. [10] Such, they argued, were the benefits conferred on Antiochus by the [11??] Roman people, and such their influence with all kings and nations that, if they sent [p. 153]envoys to declare to Antiochus that the senate did not⁸⁵ wish war to be made on kings allied to it, Antiochus would at once depart from the walls of Alexandria and would lead his army back into Syria. [12] If they hesitated to do this, shortly Ptolemy and Cleopatra, robbed of their kingdom, would arrive in Rome, somewhat to the shame of the Roman people, because they had offered no aid in the final crisis of their fortunes. [13] The senators, stirred by the entreaties of the Alexandrines, at once⁸⁶ sent Gaius Popilius Laenas, Gaius Decimius, and Gaius Hostilius as envoys to bring an end to the war between the kings. [14] They were instructed to approach first Antiochus and then Ptolemy, and to proclaim that if war was not concluded, the party constituting the obstacle would not be considered either a friend or an ally to the Romans.

20. This embassy left within three days along with the envoys from Alexandria. The mission from Macedonia arrived on the last day of the Quinquatrus⁸⁷ amid such eagerness that, had it not been evening, the consuls would have summoned the senate at once. [2] Next day the session was held and the envoys were heard. They reported as follows: “The army has been led into Macedonia by trackless passes at a risk disproportionate to the gain. [3] Pieria, which the army has reached, is in the hands of the king; the encampments are so nearly in contact that hardly more than the Elpeüs River separates them. [4] The king does not offer battle, and our forces have [p. 155]not the strength to compel him to do so. Also the⁸⁸ winter is an added obstacle to an active campaign. The soldiers are being supported in idleness and have grain for no more than six days. [5] The Macedonian forces are said to number thirty thousand. If Appius Claudius⁸⁹ had sufficient strength in the region of Lychnidus, he could have distracted the king with a second front; as it is, Appius and the force with him are in the greatest danger unless either a full-fledged army is quickly sent him or his present force is extricated. [6] As to the fleet, we heard after we left the camp that some of the sailors have been lost by disease, and some, especially the Sicilians, have gone home, so that the ships lack crews. Those who are there have not received their pay and are insufficiently clothed. [7] Eumenes and his fleet have come and gone for no good reason, as if his ships were drifting before the wind; and there is no good evidence that the spirit of this king is unwavering.”⁹⁰ The envoys reported that Attalus was as gallantly unswerving as Eumenes was entirely undependable.

21. After hearing the envoys, Lucius Aemilius laid before the senate the question of the conduct of the war. [2] The senate decreed that the consuls and the people should each choose half of the tribunes for [p. 157]eight legions; however, it was voted that no one who⁹¹ had not held office should be chosen that year.⁹² [3] Then from among the tribunes Lucius Aemilius was to choose whomever he preferred for the two legions for Macedonia. It was further voted that after the completion of the Latin Festival, the consul Lucius Aemilius and Gnaeus Octavius, the praetor to whom the fleet had been allotted, should depart for their field of operations. [4] To them was added the praetor Lucius Anicius, whose post was the court for aliens; it was voted that he should succeed Appius Claudius in the Illyrian theatre near Lychnidus. [5] Charge over the levy was given to the consul Gaius Licinius. He was instructed to enroll seven thousand Roman citizens and two hundred horsemen and to demand of the allies of the Latin Name seven thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry, and [6??] he was to send a despatch to [7??] Gnaeus Servilius the commander in the province of Gaul, instructing him to enroll six hundred cavalry. [8] This force Licinius was ordered to send as promptly as possible to his colleague in Macedonia; a limit of two legions was placed on the army on that front, and each legion was to be reinforced till it contained six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; the surplus infantry and cavalry were to be distributed as garrisons. [9] Men unfit for military service were to be discharged. An added levy was imposed on the allies of ten thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry. [10] This force was given to Anicius besides the [p. 159]two legions which he was ordered to transport to⁹³ Macedonia, each legion having five thousand two hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry. Moreover, five thousand sailors were enrolled for the fleet. [11] Licinius the consul was ordered to hold his area with two legions, and to add to them ten thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry of the allies.

22. When the senate had finished its voting, the consul Lucius Aemilius went from the senate-house to a public meeting and made the following speech: [2] “I seem to have noticed, fellow-citizens, that greater congratulations were offered me when I was allotted Macedonia as my field of operations than when my election as consul was announced, or on the day when I entered upon office. The reason for this was none other, I believe, than that you regard me as capable of bringing the long-drawn-out war in Macedonia to an end worthy of the high position of the Roman people. [3] The gods too, I hope, approve this fall of the lot and will likewise be at my side in action. [4] So far I can partly prophesy, and partly hope; another matter I dare to assert as sure namely, that I will strive with every effort that the hope you have conceived for me shall not be vain. [5] What is required for the war has been voted by the senate, and since it is determined that I shall set out at once, for which I am not reluctant, the preparations will be made by that excellent man, my colleague Gaius Licinius, as vigorously as if he were going to conduct the campaign. [6] For your part, see to it that you have confidence only in the reports I make to the senate and to you, and beware of nourishing by your credulity the gossip for which no sponsor will appear. [7] For I have noticed that, as is commonly the case, so [p. 161]now especially in this war no one is so scornful of⁹⁴ rumour that his spirit cannot be weakened. [8] In all the clubs and even —God save us! —at dinner-tables there are experts who lead armies to Macedonia, who know where camp should be pitched, what places should be held with garrisons, when or by what pass Macedonia should be invaded, where granaries should be set up, by what routes on land or sea provisions should be supplied, when we must join battle with the enemy and when it is better to remain inactive. [9] Not only do they decide what should be done, but when anything is done contrary to their opinion, they accuse the consul as if he were in the dock. Such behaviour is a great obstacle to the men in the field. [10] For not everyone is as unwavering and as steadfast of spirit against hostile gossip as was Quintus Fabius, who preferred to have his independence of command lessened by popular folly rather than to neglect the best interests of the state for the sake of acclaim. [11] I am not, fellow-citizens, one who believes that no advice may be given to leaders; nay rather I judge him to be not a sage, but haughty, who conducts everything according to his own opinion alone. What therefore is my conclusion? [12] Generals should receive advice, in the first place from the experts who are both specially skilled in military matters and have learned from experience; secondly, from those who are on the scene of action, who see the terrain, the enemy, the fitness of the occasion, who are sharers in the danger, as it were aboard the same vessel. [13] Thus, if there is anyone who is confident that he can advise me as to the best advantage of the state in this campaign which I am about to conduct, let him not refuse his services to [p. 163]the state, but come with me into Macedonia. I will⁹⁵ furnish him with his sea-passage, with a horse, a tent, and even travel-funds. If anyone is reluctant to do this and prefers the leisure of the city to the hardships of campaigning, let him not steer the ship from on shore. [14] The city itself provides enough subjects for conversation; let him confine his garrulity to these; and let him be aware that I shall be satisfied with the advice originating in camp.”⁹⁶

[15] After this address and the due completion of the sacrifice at the Latin Festival, [16??] which was held on March 31⁹⁷ on the Alban Mount, both the consul and the praetor Gnaeus Octavius immediately set out for Macedonia. [17] History records that the consul was escorted by an unusually great throng of persons paying their respects to him, and that men prophesied with almost sure expectation that the Macedonian war would come to an end, and that the return of the consul would be prompt and in great triumph.

23. While these events were occurring in Italy, Perseus decided that since he had discovered that the Romans had entered the pass and that the final crisis of the war impended, he must no longer postpone the project which he could not bring himself to complete because expenditure of money was required-namely, gaining the adherence of Gentius, king of Illyria. [2] Inasmuch as Perseus had agreed through his envoy Hippias⁹⁸ on a payment of three [p. 165]hundred talents of silver, on condition of an exchange⁹⁹ of hostages, he sent Pantauchus, one of his most trusty friends, to complete the agreement. [3] At Meteon in the region of Labeatis, Pantauchus met the Illyrian king; there he received the king's oath and his hostages. Gentius too sent an envoy named Olympio to require the oath and the hostages of Perseus.' [4] Others were sent with him to receive the money; and, at Pantauchus' suggestion, Parmenio and Morcus were named as envoys to go with the Macedonians to Rhodes. [5] To them instructions were given to set out for Rhodes only after the oath, the hostages, and the money had been received; it was thought that by the prestige of two kings at once the Rhodians could be induced to war with the Romans, and that once the kings were joined by the state to which [6??] belonged a unique reputation for sea-power, no hope on land or sea would be left the Romans.

[7] On the arrival of the Illyrians, Perseus left his camp at the Elpeüs River with all his cavalry and met them at Dium. [8] There the terms agreed upon were executed in the presence of the surrounding column of cavalry, whom the king wished to be present at the ratification of the alliance with Gentius, thinking that it would somewhat raise their spirits. [9] The hostages were also given and received in the sight of all, those who were to receive the money were sent to the royal treasury at Pella and those who were to accompany the Illyrian envoys to Rhodes were ordered to take ship at Thessalonica. [10] Metrodorus¹⁰⁰ was at that port, a recent arrival from Rhodes, who stated, on the authority of Dinon and Polyaratus, the [p. 167]heads of the state,¹⁰¹ that the Rhodians were ready for¹⁰² war. Metrodorus was assigned as the leader of the combined embassy with the Illyrians.

24. At the same time, identical messages, suggested by the state of affairs, were sent both to Eumenes and to Antiochus, as follows: by nature a free state and a king were things hostile to each other; the Roman people attacked kings one by one, and —an unjust state of affairs —assailed kings with the help of kings; [2] Perseus' father had been overcome with the aid of Attalus; [3] with Eumenes helping, and to a certain extent Perseus' father Philip as well, Antiochus had been assailed¹⁰³ ; now both Eumenes and Prusias were in arms against Perseus; [4] if the kingdom of Macedonia were out of the way, next would come Asia Minor, which the Romans had already made their own to some extent under pretext of freeing communities, and after Asia Minor, Syria. [5] Already Prusias was being given a position above Eumenes, already Antiochus, though victorious, was being barred from Egypt, his prize of war. [6] Perseus bade each king, on considering these facts, to take such steps that either he might force the Romans to make peace with Perseus, or if Rome persevered in an unjust war might regard the Romans as the common enemy of all kings.

[7] The message to Antiochus was open; to Eumenes the envoy was sent under guise of ransoming prisoners, but in fact certain more secret matters were under discussion, which for the time being embarrassed Eumenes, who was already an object of [p. 169]hatred and suspicion to the Romans, with false and more serious charges; [8] for he was already regarded as a traitor and almost an enemy, while the two kings with grasping hands vied with each other in guile and greed.¹⁰⁴ [9] There was a Cretan, Cydas, one of Eumenes' henchmen. He had held conversations, first at Amphipolis with a certain Chimarus, a fellow-countryman who was serving in Perseus' army, then later at Demetrias, beneath the very walls of the city, once with a certain Menecrates and again with Antimachus, both of whom were officers of the king.¹⁰⁵ [10] Herophon also, who was then sent by Perseus, had similarly undertaken two previous missions to Eumenes. [11] These conversations were secret, and the missions caused bad rumours, but there was no knowledge of what had been discussed or upon what the kings had agreed. The actual state of affairs, however, was as follows.

25. Eumenes did not want a victory for Perseus, nor did he intend to assist him in winning one by military means, not so much because of the mutual hostility of their fathers, as because of the hatred engendered between himself and Perseus.¹⁰⁶ [2] The jealousy of kings is such that Eumenes would not have viewed with calmness the attainment by Perseus of such great strength and prestige as awaited him if he defeated the Romans. [3] Eumenes also perceived that from the very outset of the war Perseus had nurtured the hope of peace in every way¹⁰⁷ and as [p. 171]time went on had come more and more, as the threat¹⁰⁸ came closer, to treat and think of nothing else. [4] Since the war was dragging on longer than the Romans had hoped, they too, their commanders, and their senate would not be averse, so Eumenes thought, to ending so disturbing and difficult a war. [5] Having ascertained this willingness on either side, Eumenes was eager to put on sale his good offices in an effort to negotiate the peace which he thought might even come about automatically through the weariness of the stronger and the fears of the weaker side. [6] Therefore Eumenes tried to negotiate for a reward, now for not aiding the Romans' military effort on land or sea, now for securing peace with the Romans; for his abstention from war, his price was a thousand talents,¹⁰⁹ for negotiating peace, fifteen hundred. [7] He showed himself always ready not only to pledge his word to either course of action, but even to give hostages.

Perseus was very ready to undertake the attempt under pressure of fear, and as [8??] to the acceptance of hostages the discussion proceeded without delay, and it was agreed that, when accepted, the hostages should be sent to Crete. [9] When the subject of money came up, there Perseus hesitated, and said that especially for the first alternative the payment of money was dishonourable and base for kings of so high a reputation, not only for the giver, but even more for the recipient; [10] for the hope of peace with the Romans, he would not refuse an expenditure, but he would pay on the completion of the enterprise, and meanwhile would deposit the funds in the temple on Samothrace. [11] Since this island was in Perseus' realm, Eumenes saw that it made no difference [p. 173]whether the money was there or at Pella; he¹¹⁰ attempted to secure some sort of down payment. [12] And so having tried vainly to overreach each other, the kings got themselves nothing but a bad reputation.

26. This was not the only failure incurred by Perseus because of miserliness, when by payment of money he could either through Eumenes' efforts have secured peace. which he should have bought even at the price of part of his kingdom, or had he been deceived, he could have exposed his enemy with the booty on him and aroused just hostility toward him on the part of the Romans. [2] But a previous parallel case was that of the alliance with King Gentius, ready for the taking; and at this same time Perseus lost through miserliness the tremendous assistance of the Gauls who were scattered through the region of Illyria.¹¹¹ [3] There were on their way ten thousand cavalry and an equal number of infantry who matched their pace to that of the horses, and in turn seized the riderless horses of fallen cavalrymen for further fighting. [4] These men had been pledged a cash payment of ten gold pieces per cavalryman, five per infantryman, and a thousand for their leader. [5] When they approached, Perseus went to meet them from his camp at the Elpeüs with half of his forces and began to give orders throughout the villages and cities near the road to bring out provisions so that there would be plenty of grain, wine, and animals. [6] He [p. 175]himself brought horses, breast-ornaments, and capes¹¹² as presents for the chief men, and a small amount of gold to distribute among a few, supposing that the rank and file could be led along by expectations. [7] He reached the city of Almana and pitched camp on the banks of the Axius River. The force of Gauls halted near Desudaba in Maedica,¹¹³ waiting for their promised pay. [8] Thither Perseus sent Antigonus, one of the wearers of the purple, to order the rank and file of the Gauls to shift camp to Bylazora (this is a place in Paeonia) and the leaders to come in a body to him. The Gauls were seventy-five miles from the Axius River and the king's camp. [9] Antigonus carried this message to them and added an account of the abundance of all supplies prepared through the thoughtfulness of the king, through which they would travel, and of the gifts of garments, silver, and horses with which the king proposed to greet their leaders on their arrival. [10] The Gauls replied that they would certainly find out about these matters from personal observation, but they asked about what had been promised for immediate delivery —whether he had brought with him the gold which was to be distributed among the individual horsemen and footmen. [11] When they received no reply on this point, Clondicus, their chieftain, declared: “Go back then and report to the king that the Gauls will not move a step farther unless they receive the gold and hostages.”

[12] When this message was reported to the king, he summoned his council, but when it became clear what everyone would advise, the king, a trustier guardian of his cash than of his kingdom, began to discourse on the treachery and savagery of the Gauls, which had been demonstrated long since by disasters [p. 177]to many people; [13] it was dangerous, he said, to receive¹¹⁴ such large numbers into Macedonia, for fear that they would find the Gauls more deadly as allies than the Romans were as enemies; a force of five thousand cavalry was sufficient, for these they could use for military [14??] purposes and would not themselves be overawed by their numbers.

27. It was obvious to everyone that he was troubled about the pay and nothing else; but as no one dared to give him the advice he asked for, Antigonus was sent back to announce that the king could use the services of five thousand cavalry only, and would not keep the rest of the host. [2] When the barbarians heard this, there was an indignant outcry from the remainder that they had been to no purpose lured away from their homes. [3] Clondicus again asked whether he would pay what had been agreed upon to these five thousand; and when he saw that to this, too, a devious reply was being concocted, the Gauls returned to the Danube, without injury to the messenger who had tricked them (a fate he had hardly hoped could befall him), but plundering that part of Thrace which adjoined their route. [4] This force of Gauls, even had the king remained inactive at the Elpeüs before the Romans, could if brought into Thessaly through the pass of Perrhaebia have not only stripped the fields by their ravages, so that the Romans could have looked for no provisions from there, but could even have stormed cities as long as Perseus held the Romans [5??] at the Elpeüs, in order to prevent their rescuing the cities of their allies. [6] The Romans would have had to consider their own plight, since they could neither remain if Thessaly, the army's source of supplies, were lost, nor could they advance [p. 179]while the camp of the Macedonians lay before them.¹¹⁵ [7] By losing this added strength, Perseus weakened to no small degree the morale of the Macedonians, who had been depending on this source of hope.

[8] The same miserliness caused a rift with Gentius. For when Perseus had counted out three hundred talents for the envoys sent by Gentius to Pella, he permitted them to affix their seal to the money; then he sent ten talents to Pantauchus and ordered this paid at once to the king. [9] His own people were transporting the rest of the money marked with the seal of the [10??] Illyrians, and he ordered them to convey it by short stages, and then when the Macedonian frontier was reached, to halt there and wait for messengers from him. [11] After Gentius had received a scant portion of the money, he was continually spurred on by Pantauchus to assail the Romans with an act of hostility, and so he threw into prison Marcus Perpenna and Lucius Petilius, the ambassadors who happened to reach him at this time.¹¹⁶ [12] On hearing of this Perseus thought that Gentius had committed himself to fight the Romans in any case, and sent a recall to the one conveying the money, as if his only concern was to save as much booty as possible for the Romans after his own defeat.

Herophon also returned from the court of Eumenes, the secret negotiations being still unrevealed. [13] The Macedonians spread the word that discussion about prisoners had taken place, and Eumenes, to avoid suspicion, informed the consul to this same effect.

28. After the disappointment of Herophon's return from the court of Eumenes, Perseus sent Antenor and Callippus, his naval commanders, with [p. 181]forty scout-ships —there were five cutters¹¹⁷ added to¹¹⁸ this number —to [2] Tenedos, in order to protect from that base the ships scattered through the Cyclades islands on their way to Macedonia with grain. [3] The ships were launched at Cassandrea, and after crossing first to the harbours under Mount Athos and thence on a calm sea to Tenedos, they sent away unharmed and even with kind addresses some undecked Rhodian ships which were at the port with Eudamus their commander. [4] Then Antenor discovered that on the other side of the island fifty of their freight ships were blockaded by warships of Eumenes, under command of Damius, which were stationed at the mouth of the harbour. [5] Antenor promptly sailed around and by threat caused the enemy ships to retreat; the freight ships were sent to Macedonia under convoy of ten scout-ships, which were instructed to return to Tenedos after seeing them safe. [6] On the ninth day thereafter they returned to the fleet, which was now anchored at Sigeum. Thence they crossed to Subota, an island lying between Elaea and Chios. [7] On the day after the arrival of the fleet at Subota, thirty-five of the ships called horse-transports, setting out from Elaea with Galatian cavalry and their mounts, were making for Phanae, a cape of Chios, from which they could cross to Macedonia. They were being sent to Attalus by Eumenes. [8] When a signal reached Antenor from a lookout post that these ships were at sea, he started from Subota and met them between the cape of Erythrae and Chios, where [p. 183]the strait is narrowest. [9] Eumenes' officers least of¹¹⁹ all suspected that a Macedonian fleet was at large in that sea; now they thought them to be Romans, now Attalus, or some men sent back by Attalus from the Roman camp and on their way to Pergamum. But when the shape of the approaching scout-ships was unmistakable and the rapid motion of the oars and the pointing of the prows head-on revealed that enemies were approaching, then panic fell upon them. [10] Since there was no hope of resistance, both because of the unwieldly type of vessel and because the Galatians could hardly withstand an undisturbed voyage, [11??] some of them, who were nearer to the mainland, swam ashore at Erythrae and some set sail for Chios, ran their ships aground, and abandoning their horses fled in rout to the city. [12] But as the scoutships put troops ashore nearer the city at a more convenient landing-place, the Macedonians overtook the Galatians and cut them down, partly as they fled along the road and partly when they were shut out of the city gates. [13] For the Chians had closed their gates, not knowing who were fleeing or who pursuing.¹²⁰ About eight hundred of the Galatians were killed and two hundred taken alive; some of the horses were destroyed in the sea as the ships were wrecked, some were hamstrung on shore by the Macedonians. [14] Antenor ordered twenty horses of exceptional beauty, along with the prisoners, to be taken to Thessalonica by the same ten scout-ships he had sent before, which he ordered to return as soon as possible [p. 185]to the fleet; [15] he said he would await them at Phanae.¹²¹ For about three days the fleet anchored before the city. [16] Then they moved on to Phanae, and setting sail on the unexpectedly early arrival of the ten scout-ships, crossed the Aegean Sea to Delos.

29. While these events were taking place, the Roman envoys,¹²² Gaius Popilius, Gaius Decimius, and Gaius Hostilius, set out from Chalcis in three five-banked ships and on arriving at Delos found there forty Macedonian scout-ships and five five-bankers of King Eumenes. [2] The holiness of the temple and the island kept them all from harm. And so the Roman, the Macedonian, and Eumenes' sailors mingled in the temple under the truce provided by the sacredness of the place. [3] Whenever signals came from the lookouts that any freight-ships were passing out at sea, Antenor, Perseus' officer, would himself pursue with some ships, while others of his ships were distributed among the Cyclades, and either sank or plundered every ship not sailing for Macedonia. [4] Popilius would come to the rescue with what ships he had either of his own or Eumenes'; but the Macedonians would evade him by sailing at night mostly in groups of two or three ships.

[5] At about this same time, the envoys from Macedonia and Illyria [6??] arrived together at Rhodes, and weight was lent their words not only by the arrival of the scoutships roaming all around the Cyclades and the Aegean Sea, but also by the very fact of the combination between the kings Perseus and Gentius, and the rumour of the arrival of the Gauls in great numbers both of infantry and cavalry. [7] Since, then, the boldness of Dinon and Polyaratus, who sided with [p. 187]Perseus, was on the increase, not only was a cordial¹²³ response given to the kings, but the flat statement was made that the Rhodians would by their influence bring an end to the war, and that therefore the kings [8??] themselves should make up their minds calmly to accept peace.¹²⁴

30. By now spring was beginning¹²⁵ and the new commanders arrived in the field, the consul Aemilius in Macedonia, Octavius with the fleet at Oreüs, and in the region of Illyria, Anicius, whose task was the campaign against Gentius.¹²⁶ [2] This king, the son of Pleuratus, king of the Illyrians, and Eurydice, had two brothers, Plator, a full brother, and Caravantius, born of the same mother. [3] The latter Gentius suspected less because of the obscurity of his father, but the king killed Plator and two friends of his, Ettritus and Epicadus, energetic men, for the greater security of his reign. [4] The rumour was that he envied his brother his betrothal to Etuta, daughter of Monunius the chieftain of the Dardani, since by this marriage Plator would secure the support of the Dardani; and Gentius made this really very probable by marrying the girl after the murder of Plator. [5] Once the fear of his brother was removed, Gentius began to be oppressive to his people, and the violence innate in his character was inflamed by overuse of wine. [6] However, when he had been stirred up to fight the Romans, as has been related above, he collected all his forces at Lissus. These were fifteen thousand men. [7] From there he sent his brother with [p. 189]a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry to subdue the¹²⁷ tribe of the Cavii either by force or threats, while he himself advanced from Lissus five miles to the city of Bassania. [8] The inhabitants were allied to the Romans; and so when overtures were made by messengers sent ahead of Gentius, they preferred to stand siege rather than to surrender. [9] As Caravantius arrived among the Cavii, the town of Durnium received him hospitably; Caravandis, another city, shut him out; and while he was ravaging their territory far and wide, a few scattered soldiers were killed by the rallying farmers. [10] By now Appius Claudius too had added auxiliaries of the Bullini and the citizens of Apollonia and Dyrrachium to the army he had with him, and had set out from winter quarters to a camp by the Genusus River, since he had heard of the treaty between Perseus and Gentius and was incensed by the mistreatment of the molested envoys, so that he was bent on campaigning against Gentius. [11] About this time Anicius the praetor heard at Apollonia of affairs in the region of Illyria, and sending ahead orders to Appius to wait for him at the Genusus, he himself arrived in camp in three days. [12] He added to the auxiliaries he had two thousand infantry and two hundred cavalry of the young men of the Parthini —Epicadus commanded the infantry, Algalsus the cavalry —and made ready to march into the region of Illyria, especially in order to relieve the siege of Bassania. His urgency was restrained by a rumour of scout-ships ravaging the coast. [13] There were eighty of these ships, sent by Gentius at the suggestion of Pantauchus to plunder [p. 191]the territory of Dyrrachium and Apollonia. [14] Then a¹²⁸ fleet at . . .¹²⁹ . . . they surrendered.

[15] 31. Thereafter the cities of the region did the same, the turn of their thoughts being assisted by the mildness and justice of the Roman praetor. [2] Next he arrived at Scodra, the centre of resistance not only because Gentius had appropriated it as the citadel for his whole kingdom, but also because it is the best-fortified town of the Labeate tribe, and is hard to approach. [3] Two rivers surround it, the Clausal flowing by on the side of the city which faces eastward, the Barbanna on the west side, flowing from the Labeate Lake. (These two streams after joining fall into the Oriundes River¹³⁰ which rises on Mount Scordus, is swelled by many other streams, and falls into the Adriatic Sea. [4] Mount Scordus, by far the highest of that region, overlooks Dardania to the eastward, Macedonia to the south, and the Illyrian region to the west.) [5] Although the town was fortified by its surroundings and the whole nation of the Illyrians, as well as their, king, was defending it, nevertheless the Roman praetor decided that since his first moves had met with success, good fortune in the campaign as a whole would follow these beginnings, and that a fast-moving threat would be efficacious; [6] so he advanced to the wall with his army in formation. [7] If well-placed forces had shut the gates and defended the walls and gate-towers, they [p. 193]would have routed the Romans from the wall and¹³¹ made their attempt worthless; as it was, they sallied from the gate and on level ground joined battle with more spirit than they maintained. [8] For they were routed and huddled in flight, while over two hundred fell in the very mouth of the gate, and they [9??] brought in with them such panic that Gentius at once sent representatives named Teuticus and Bellus, leading men of the nation, to the praetor to ask for a truce so that the king might deliberate over his situation. [10] When he was given three days for this purpose, he boarded a ship, since the Roman camp was about half a mile from the city, and sailed up the Barbanna River to Lake Labeate, as if seeking a secluded spot for taking council; actually, as became evident, he was stirred by an unfounded hope that his brother Caravantius¹³² would arrive with many thousands of soldiers gathered in the region to which he had been sent. [11] After the talk about this had evaporated, on the third day he brought the same ship downstream to Scodra. [12] First sending messengers to secure an opportunity for addressing the praetor and on being given the opportunity, he came into camp. At the outset of his speech he began by blaming his own stupidity, and at the end gave himself up to entreaties and a flood of tears, and falling at the praetor's knees, put himself into his hands. [13] Immediately he was bidden to take heart, and after being invited to dinner, returned to his own people in the city. [14] On that day he was banqueted with marks of distinction by the praetor, and then put under the guard of Gaius Cassius, tribune of the soldiers, after [p. 195]having received a mere ten talents, hardly the fee of¹³³ a gladiator, though he [15??] was a king dealing with a king, to induce him to sink to such misfortune.

32. On taking over Scodra, Anicius' very first order was that the ambassadors Petilius and Perpenna should be searched out and brought to him. [2] When they had been restored to a properly dignified state, he immediately sent Perpenna to arrest the friends and relatives of the king. [3] Perpenna set out for Meteon, the city of the Labeate tribe, and brought to camp at Scodra Etleva,¹³⁴ the queen, with her two children, Scerdilaedus and Pleuratus, and Caravantius the king's brother. [4] After completing the Illyrian campaign within thirty days, Anicius sent Perpenna to Rome as messenger of this victory, and a few days later sent on King Gentius himself with his mother, wife, children, and brother, as well as other leading Illyrians. [5] This campaign was unique in that its conclusion was reported at Rome before its beginning.

During the time that this was going on, Perseus also was in great fear because of the arrival not only of Aemilius the new consul, who he heard had come on the scene bringing dire threats, but also of Octavius the praetor. [6] The king was feeling equally keenly the threat from the Roman fleet and the danger to the coastal area. At Thessalonica, Eumenes and Athenagoras were in command with a small garrison of two thousand light infantry.¹³⁵ [7] To that place Perseus sent the officer Androcles also, under orders to encamp right by the dockyards. [8] To Aenea a thousand cavalry under Creon of Antigonea were sent to [p. 197]protect the coastal area, in order to come at once to¹³⁶ the aid of the country folk at any point on the shore where they heard that enemy ships had put in. [9] Five thousand Macedonians were sent to garrison Pythoüs and Petra,¹³⁷ the commanders being Histiaeus, Theogenes, and Midon. [10] When these forces had left, Perseus set himself to fortifying the bank of the Elpeüs, because its dry bed could be crossed. In order that his entire force might be free for this operation, women gathered from the near-by cities brought foodstuffs into camp; [11] the soldiers, under orders, from the woods near by generously . . .¹³⁸

33. ... to gather, and finally he ordered the water-carriers to follow him to the sea, which was less than three-tenths of a mile away, and to dig wells on the beach, some here, some there, at slight intervals. [2] The immense height of the mountains,¹³⁹ especially inasmuch as they produced no visible rivers, gave him the hope that underneath were hidden streams, the veins of which trickled through to the sea and mingled with the salt water. [3] Hardly had the uppermost sand been penetrated when jets of water spurted out, at first muddy and slight, but then proceeding to pour out, as if by a miracle, with clear and copious water. [4] This success too gave the commander no little glory and power of leadership with the soldiers. Then when the soldiers were ordered to put their weapons in condition, the consul with the tribunes and ranking centurions went forward to reconnoitre the crossings, in order to find out where [p. 199]the way down was easy for men under arms and where¹⁴⁰ on the farther bank there was the least unfavourable way up. [5] After gathering sufficient information on these points, he introduced other changes, too; in the first place, he saw to it that everything in the column should take place in good order and without confusion at the beck and call of the commander; [6] when orders were given to the whole army at once and not all were within hearing, he said, some, after receiving an unclear order, made additions of their own and did more than was bidden, while others did less; hence discordant outcries arose everywhere and the enemy found out what was afoot sooner than one's own men. [7] Therefore the consul decided that the tribune of the soldiers should first give an order privately to the chief centurion of the legion, and he and his subordinates in rank should then each tell to the next in rank¹⁴¹ what was to be done, whether the order was to be passed from the head of the column to the rear, or from the last to the first. [8] The consul also made the innovation of forbidding sentries to carry a shield¹⁴² on post; for he said that a sentry is not going into combat to use his weapons, but is to keep on guard so that when he perceives the approach of the enemy, he may retire and rouse the others to arms. [9] Men set the shield before them and stand there, helmet on head; then when they are tired, they lean on the spear, rest the head on the shield-rim, and stand there drowsing, so that with their shining armour they can be detected by the enemy from afar, while they themselves do not see ahead at all. The consul also changed the practice of the outposts. [10] All were used to spending the entire day under arms, cavalry with their horses bridled; when this took [p. 201]place on summer days under an unremitting -and¹⁴³ burning sun, after so many hours of heat and weariness the tired men and horses were often attacked by fresh enemy troops and superior numbers thrown into confusion by even a few. [11] So he gave orders that men on duty in the morning should be relieved at noon by a different afternoon detail; in this way a fresh enemy could never attack tired men.

34. After he had announced to an assembly of the soldiers the decision to adopt these measures, the consul added a speech in the vein of his address in Rome:

[2] “There should be a single general in an army who foresees and plans what should be done, sometimes by himself, sometimes with the advisers he calls into council. Those who are not called into council should not air their own views publicly or privately. [3] A soldier should concern himself with the following: his body, to keep it as strong and as nimble as possible; the good condition of his weapons; and the readiness of his food-supply for unexpected orders. [4] For the rest, he should realize that the immortal gods and his general are taking care of him. In an army in which the soldiers deliberate and the general is led about by the gossip of the rank and file, conditions are utterly unsound. [5] For my part, I shall do the duty of a general —that is, see to it that you have an opportunity for successful action. You ought not to ask what is going to happen, but when the signal is given, then do your duty as soldiers.”

After these instructions, he dismissed the assembly, while throughout the army even the veterans admitted that they, like raw recruits, had for the first time learned how military matters should be handled. [6] [p. 203]Not only did they show by such remarks with how¹⁴⁴ much approval they had heard the words of the consul, but there was also an immediate response in action. [7] Soon you could have seen no one idle in the whole camp; some were sharpening swords, others were polishing helmets and cheek-pieces, still others shields and coats of mail; [8] some were fitting their armour to their bodies and trying the nimbleness of their bodies under arms, others were brandishing spears, others fencing with their swords and inspecting the point¹⁴⁵ ; so that anyone could easily see that as soon as an opportunity of joining battle with the enemy had been [9??] given, they would put an end to the war either by a glorious victory or by a death that would go down in history.

[10] When Perseus, too, noticed that on the arrival of the consul and the beginning of spring everything in the enemy camp was full of noise and bustle as if the war were just beginning, that the camp had been shifted from Phila to the bank opposite the Macedonians, and the hostile commander was now going about to view Perseus' defences, no doubt because he was reconnoitring a passage, now .. .¹⁴⁶ . of the Romans was.

35. This affair raised the spirits of the Romans. It also brought no little panic to the Macedonians and their king. [2] At first he tried to hide the report of the event in secret, by sending men to forbid Pantauchus, who was coming from there, to approach the camp. [3] But now some boys were seen by their relatives being led along with the Illyrian hostages [p. 205]and the more carefully the various details were¹⁴⁷ concealed, the more easily they leaked out through the garrulity of the king's servants.

[4] About the same time envoys from Rhodes came into camp with the same message about peace which had aroused great wrath in the senators at Rome. They received a much less favourable audience from the council in the camp. [5] So while some advised that the envoys be thrown into chains, others that they be driven headlong out of camp without an answer, the consul announced that he would make a reply a fortnight later. Meanwhile, to make it clear how much influence the Rhodian peace-makers had succeeded in exerting, he began to hold consultations as to the plan of campaign. [6] Some, especially the younger, wished to force a way through the bank of the Elpeüs and the fortifications; [7] a solid formation, they said, attacking in single column would be irresistible to the Macedonians, who had the previous year been driven out of so many forts,¹⁴⁸ rather higher and better fortified and held with strong garrisons. [8] Others advised that Octavius with his fleet should make for Thessalonica and by ravaging the coastal area create a diversion of the king's forces, so that on the appearance of another attack in his rear the king would be pulled about to guard the inner part of his kingdom and be compelled to open a crossing somewhere over the Elpeüs. The consul himself regarded the riverbank as impregnable by nature and by fortification and, besides the fact that artillery had been placed everywhere, he had heard that the enemy employed [p. 207]missile weapons better and with more deadly aim.¹⁴⁹ [9] The whole thought of the Roman commander inclined in a different direction; [10] and dismissing his council, he summoned the Perrhaebian merchants Coenus and Menophilus, men already known to him for loyalty and wisdom, and secretly inquired what the passes into Perrhaebia were like. [11] When they said that the terrain was not difficult, but was blocked by the king's guard-forces,¹⁵⁰ the consul conceived the hope that the guards could be dislodged if he attacked suddenly by night with a strong force and surprised them; for, he argued, javelins, arrows, and other missiles are useless in the dark when the target cannot be sighted at a distance; [12] the sword is the weapon used at close quarters in a confused throng, and with that weapon the Roman soldier would win. Planning to use the abovementioned merchants as guides, the consul summoned the praetor Octavius, explained his plans, and ordered him to sail for Heracleum with the fleet and have ten days' cooked rations for a thousand men. [13] For his own part, he sent Publius Scipio Nasica and his own son Quintus Fabius Maximus¹⁵¹ with five thousand picked [14??] men¹⁵² to Heracleum, in order to feign an embarkation for the purpose of the plan mentioned in the council, namely, of ravaging the coastal area of inner Macedonia. Scipio and Fabius were privately [p. 209]informed that food was ready for them at the fleet,¹⁵³ so that they would not be [15] delayed. Next, the guides were instructed to arrange the stages of the journey so that they could attack Pythoüs in the fourth watch of the third day. Next day at dawn the consul himself, in order to keep the king from investigating the other projects, joined battle with the enemy's outposts in the middle of the [16] river-bed. The fight was conducted with light-armed troops on both sides. It was impossible to fight with heavier troops in so rough a stream-bed. The slope of either bank to the bottom was about three hundred paces; between the banks, a space of a little over a mile lay open where the torrent had hollowed it out in varying degrees from place to [17] place. There the fight took place in sight of the watchers from the walls of both camps, the king on one side, the consul and his legions on the [18] other. The king's light troops fought better at long range with missiles; at close quarters the Romans were steadier, and better protected by either the cavalry targe or the Ligurian rectangular [19] shield.¹⁵⁴ About noon the consul ordered the recall to be sounded for his [20] men. So that day the fight was broken off with no small losses to both sides. At sunrise the next day an even sharper fight took place, since their spirits had been roused by the [21] combat. But the Romans received a great many wounds not only from those with whom the fight had been joined, but much more from the large numbers posted on the towers with all sorts of missile weapons and stones. As they came nearer to the enemy's bank, the shots from the engines reached even the rear ranks. After far more severe losses that day, the consul recalled his men somewhat [22] later. On the [p. 211]third day, he desisted from battle and went down to¹⁵⁵ the lower side of the camp as if he were going to attempt the crossing through the spur of the fortifications which ran down to the [23] sea. What was before Perseus' eyes ...¹⁵⁶

36. The season was that immediately following the turn of midsummer¹⁵⁷ ; the time of day was approaching noon; the journey had been made through much dust and an ever-hotter sun. [2] Weariness and thirst now began to make themselves felt, and since it was presently obvious that midday would intensify the blazing heat, the consul decided not to expose men so weakened to a fresh and unwearied enemy; [3] but such zeal was in their hearts for fighting at all costs that the consul needed as much skill to out manoeuvre his own men as the enemy. [4] Since all were not yet in formation, he urged on the tribunes of the soldiers to hasten the deployment; he himself went about the ranks and was engaged in rousing the spirits of the men to battle by exhortation. [5] At this they first kept eagerly calling for the signal; then, in proportion as the heat increased their countenances were less lively and their cries slacker, and some stood lolling on their shields and leaning on their spears. Then the consul proceeded openly to give the order to the ranking centurions to layout the front of the camp and place the baggage.¹⁵⁸ [6] When the soldiers perceived that this was being done, some rejoiced [7??] openly that he had not compelled men wearied by the toil of marching to fight a battle in scorching heat. [8] Surrounding the general were his [p. 213]staff and the foreign commanders, among whom was¹⁵⁹ Attalus, all showing approval as long as they believed the consul was going to fight (for he had not revealed his doubts even to them); then at the sudden change of plan they were all silent except Nasica, [9??] who alone dared to advise the consul not to loose his grasp on an enemy who had baffled previous generals by avoiding an encounter. [10] Nasica feared that if the enemy departed by night, he would have to be pursued with the greatest toil and risk into the interior of Macedonia, and that the summer would be wasted, as under previous leaders,¹⁶⁰ in roaming about the bypaths and passes of the Macedonian mountains; [11] for his own part he strongly urged attack while the consul had the enemy in open country, so as not to lose the opportunity for victory which had been offered. The consul, nothing offended by the outspoken warning from so famous a young man, replied:

[12] “I too have had the spirit which you now have, Nasica, and you will come to have the spirit I now have. From many vicissitudes of war I have learned when to fight and when to refuse battle. [13] There is not time to instruct you while you are standing-to for battle as to the reasons why it is better to be inactive today. You shall ask for my reasoning at another time; now you will be satisfied to take the word of an experienced general.”

[14] The young man held his tongue, thinking that no doubt the consul saw some obstacles to battle which he himself did not envisage.

37. After Paulus saw that the camp had been laid out and the baggage placed, he quietly withdrew the [2??] rear formation first from behind the [p. 215]battle-line, next the chief formation, while the forward¹⁶¹ formation stood its ground at the front of the battle-line, in case the enemy should make a move; last of all he withdrew the forward formation, taking the soldiers of one maniple at a time, starting with the right wing. [3] In this way, while the cavalry and the light-armed troops faced the enemy from in front of the battle-line, the infantry were withdrawn without confusion, and the cavalry were not called away from their posts until the facade of the rampart and the ditch facing the enemy had been completed. [4] Although the king would have been prepared to fight that day without reluctance, he was satisfied to let it be seen that the delay was due to the enemy, and he too withdrew his forces into camp.

[5] After the fortification of the camp was complete, Gaius Sulpicius Gallus,¹⁶² tribune of the soldiers with the second legion, who had been praetor the year before, summoned the soldiers to an assembly, by permission of the consul, and announced that no one should regard it as a bad omen when on the following night an eclipse of [6??] the moon would take place from the second to the fourth hour of the night. [7] Since this occurred in the regular order of nature at certain times, said Sulpicius, it could be calculated ahead of time and foretold. Therefore just as they were not surprised —inasmuch as both the risings and the settings of the sun and moon are well understood —when they saw the moon shining now full, now during its wane with a narrow arc, no more ought they to count it a prodigy that the moon is darkened [p. 217]whenever it is hidden in the shadow of the earth.¹⁶³ [8] On the night preceding the 4th of September, when the moon was eclipsed at the predicted hour, the Roman soldiers regarded the wisdom of Gallus as almost divine; [9] the Macedonians took it as a dire portent, foretelling the downfall of the kingdom and the nation, and no soothsayer shook their conviction. There was uproar and wailing in the Macedonian camp until the moon emerged to shine as usual.

[10] On the following day, so great was the eagerness of both armies for battle that some of their followers blamed both the king and the consul for separating without a fight. [11] The king had a rejoinder ready at hand: not only that the enemy had taken the lead in openly declining battle and leading his men back to camp, but that he had posted his forces in a position to which the phalanx could not be advanced, since even slightly unfavourable terrain makes a phalanx useless. [12] As for the consul, besides his seeming loss of an opportunity for battle on the previous day and his giving the enemy a chance of withdrawing by night if they wished, he seemed on this day too to be wasting time on the pretext of offering sacrifice, although he should have given the signal at dawn and gone out to battle.¹⁶⁴ [13] At the third hour, after due completion of the sacrifice, he at last called a council, and in doing so seemed to some to be expending in talk and untimely advisement the time needed for carrying out action. In reply to such talk the consul delivered the following speech:

38. "That excellent young man, Publius [p. 219]Nasica, alone among all those who favoured fighting¹⁶⁵ yesterday disclosed his opinion to me; he too kept silent later, so that he may have seemed to have exchanged his view for mine. [2] Certain others thought it better to criticize their general behind his back rather than to advise him openly. [3] Both to you, Publius Nasica, and to any others who less openly shared your opinion, I shall not hesitate to give an accounting for having postponed the battle. [4] For I am so far from regretting our inactivity yesterday that I believe I saved the army by so planning. That none of you may believe me to hold this opinion groundlessly, come let each, if he please, review with me how many factors weighed for the enemy and against us. First of all, of their great superiority in numbers I am sure that you were all previously aware, and that you took notice of it on seeing the battle-line drawn up yesterday. [5] Out of this small force of ours, one-fourth of the men were left to guard the baggage; and you know that the guarding of the packs is not put in the hands of the most cowardly. [6] But suppose we had been united: can we possibly consider it a small advantage that we shall go out, with the good help of the gods,¹⁶⁶ from this camp in which we have spent last night, to do battle either today or at latest tomorrow if we so determine? [7] Does it make no difference whether you bid a soldier take up arms and lead him into battle when he is wearied neither by the toil of a [8??] journey nor by construction on that day, when he is rested and refreshed in his own tent, when he is full of strength and vigorous in body and in spirit? Or whether he [p. 221]is wearied by a long march and tired by his load,¹⁶⁷ dripping with sweat, his throat dry with thirst, his mouth and eyes full of dust, with the midday sun beating down upon him? [9] Will you pit him against an enemy fresh and rested, who brings into battle a strength unsapped by previous exertion? Who, by the gods' good faith, when he is thus matched, sluggish though he be and unwarlike, will not overcome the bravest fighter?

[10] "What of the fact that the enemy had drawn up their line completely at leisure, had made ready their spirits, were standing each [11??] at his post in the ranks, while we at that time had to incur the hasty turmoil of drawing up our line and had to enter battle in disorder? 39. Oh yes, you say, we should have had a battle-line undeployed and disorderly; but our camp was fortified, our water-supply found, the way to it secured by placing guards, and reconnaissance made all around. [2] Or did our men have nothing but the bare ground on which to fight . . .? Your ancestors regarded a fortified camp as a haven against all the mischances of an army, whence they might go out to fight, and whither they might find shelter from the storm of battle. [3] Therefore when they had walled in their camp with fortifications, they used also to strengthen it with a powerful garrison, because one who had been stripped of his camp, even though he had won the battle, would be considered the loser. Camp is the shelter of the conqueror, the refuge of the conquered. [4] How many armies meeting with none too favourable fortune in battle, after being driven within their rampart, have in their own good time, sometimes after only a moment, sallied forth and routed the victorious enemy? [5] This abode is a second [p. 223]home for the soldier, its rampart takes the place of¹⁶⁸ city walls and his own tent is the soldier's dwelling and hearthside. Should we have fought like nomads with no abode, so that, whether conquered or conquerors, we might return —where?

[6] "To this statement of the difficulties and hindrances to battle, here is the rejoinder: what if the enemy had departed during the interval of last night? How much toil would we have had to expend in the renewed pursuit far into the utmost end of Macedonia? [7] For my part I am sure that he would never have remained here or led his forces out into battle-line had he decided to retreat from here. For how much easier it would have been to depart while we were at a distance than now when we are on his neck and he cannot trick us by leaving either by night or day? [8] What more can we wish than to attack our enemy in open country from the rear of his retreating and dispersed column after he has left his fortifications, instead of attacking, as we have attempted to do, his camp protected by the lofty bank of a river, and barricaded as well with a rampart and plenty of towers?

“These were my reasons for postponing battle from yesterday to today. [9] For I too prefer to fight; and therefore since the way to the enemy was barred by the Elpeüs River, I have opened a new road by expelling the enemy's guards from a different pass, and I will not turn back till I have fought to a finish.”

40. After this speech silence ensued, partly because men had changed over to his opinion, partly because they shrank from offending him to no purpose in a matter which was in any case a lost opportunity and could not be brought back. Nor [p. 225]even on that day did either the consul or the king¹⁶⁹ care to fight, the king because he would have had to attack men no longer weary from travel as on the previous day, nor in turmoil as they marshalled their line of battle and hardly in formation, the consul because neither wood nor fodder had been collected in the new camp and a large number of soldiers had gone out of camp to seek them from the near-by countryside. Without either general wishing it, Fortune, which is stronger than human planning, brought on the battle. There was a stream of no great size nearer the camp of the enemy, from which both the Macedonians and the Romans were drawing water after posting guards on either bank in order to accomplish this mission safely. There were two cohorts on the Roman side, a Marrucinian and a Paelignian, and two troops of Samnite cavalry under the command of the staff-officer Marcus Sergius Silus; another fixed outpost was stationed before the camp under the staff-officer Gaius Cluvius, composed of three cohorts, from Firmum, the Vestini, and Cremona respectively, and two troops of cavalry from Placentia and Aesernia.¹⁷⁰ [2] While there was quiet at the river, since neither side took the offensive, about the ninth hour a baggage-animal shied from the hands of his grooms and escaped toward the other bank.¹⁷¹ While three soldiers were chasing him through the water, which was about knee-deep, two Thracians dragged the animal from mid-stream to their bank; the Romans pursued them, killed one, [p. 227]recaptured the animal, and retired to their post.¹⁷² There was a guard of eight hundred Thracians on the Macedonian bank. At first a few of these, angry at the killing of their fellow-countryman before their eyes, crossed the river in pursuit of the killers, then more went, and finally the whole force, and with the guard . .¹⁷³

41. ... led... the battle. The men were stirred by the prestige of his office, the fame of the man, and above all by his age, for though he was over sixty he kept assuming functions of men in their prime in undergoing an outstanding amount of toil and danger. The legion filled the space between the light infantry and the phalanxes and broke the enemy line. [2] In the rear were the light infantry; the consul faced a unit with metal shields —these were called the Bronze Shields. Lucius Albinus the ex-consul was ordered to lead the second legion against the White Shield phalanx¹⁷⁴ ; this was the centre of the hostile line. [3] On the right wing, where the battle had begun near the river, the consul brought up the elephants and the squadrons of the allies; and from this point the flight of the Macedonians first began. [4] For, as frequently men's new inventions appear strong when described, but in actual trial, when there is need for action rather than a description of how they will act, these inventions disappear without achieving any result, so in this battle the anti-elephant corps was [p. 229]a mere name without practical effect.¹⁷⁵ [5] The charge¹⁷⁶ of the elephants was followed up by the allies of the Latin Name, who routed the left wing. [6] In the centre the charge of the second legion scattered the phalanx. No reason for the victory was more obvious than the fact that there were many scattered engagements which first threw into confusion and then disrupted the wavering phalanx. The power of this formation when closed up and bristling with spears extended is irresistible; [7] but if by attacks at several points you compel them to swing their spears about, unwieldy because of their length and weight, they become tangled in a haphazard mass; and if indeed some sort of uproar is heard on a flank or from the rear, [8] they are involved in utter confusion. Such was the case on this occasion, when the phalanx was compelled to meet the Romans who were attacking in groups, while the Macedonian line was broken at many points. The Romans for their part kept infiltrating their units wherever gaps presented themselves. [9] If they had attacked frontally in solid line against an orderly phalanx, as happened to the Paelignians who at the beginning of the battle recklessly met the light infantry, the Romans would have spitted themselves on the spears and would not have withstood the solid line.¹⁷⁷

42. However, while the infantry were being slaughtered all over the field, except for those who cast away their weapons and fled, the cavalry on the [p. 231]other hand retired from the fight almost unscathed.¹⁷⁸ [2] The king himself was the leader in the flight. Directly from Pydna he set out for Pella with the Sacred Squadrons of cavalry; immediately Cotys and the Odrysan cavalry followed them. [3] The other Macedonian squadrons also continued to retreat in orderly formation because the line of the infantry in between kept the victors busy with slaughter and caused them to forget the pursuit of the cavalry. [4] For a long time the phalanx was cut to pieces from the front, from the flanks, and from the rear. Finally those who slipped through the hands of the Romans fled weaponless to the sea, and some even entered the water and raising their hands to the men on board ship humbly begged for life. [5] When they saw small boats gathering from all around the fleet, they thought that these were coming to pick them up, to take them prisoner rather than to kill them, and so they advanced farther into the water, some even swimming. [6] But when they were mercilessly cut down from the boats, those who could made for shore again by swimming and ran into a more dreadful form of destruction; for the elephants, guided by their mahouts to the shore, trampled and crushed the men coming out of the water.

[7] It is readily agreed that the Romans never killed so many Macedonians in any other single battle. For about twenty thousand men were slain; about six thousand who escaped from the battlefield to Pydna were taken alive, and five thousand stragglers were captured in flight. Of the victors not more than one hundred fell and by far the greater part of them were Paeligni; somewhat more were wounded. If fighting had broken out earlier, so that sufficient [p. 233]daylight would have remained for the victors to¹⁷⁹ pursue, the entire Macedonian force would have been wiped out; as it was, the approach of night both sheltered the fugitives and inspired in the Romans a reluctance to pursue over unknown terrain.

43. Perseus fled to the Pierian Forest along the military road with a large column of cavalry and the royal entourage. [2] As soon as they arrived in the forest, where there were many divergent ways, and night was approaching, the king left the road with a very few of his most trusty men. [3] The cavalry, left without a commander, took various routes in dispersing to their own cities; a very few went on to Pella more rapidly than the king, since they had gone by the direct and clear way. [4] The king was bothered till about midnight by losing his way and by various difficulties of the route. [5] At the palace Perseus was waited upon by the commanders of Pella, Euctus, and Eulaeus,¹⁸⁰ and the royal pages. On the other hand, of his friends who by various haps had come safely from the battle to Pella, not one came to him, though they were summoned many times. [6] There were only three companions in flight with him, Evander the Cretan, Neon the Boeotian, and Archidamus the Aetolian. [7] With these he escaped in the fourth watch, being now afraid that those who refused to come to him would presently venture on a bolder stroke. [8] His escort was composed of about five hundred Cretans. He was making for Amphipolis; but he had left Pella at night because of his anxiety to cross the Axius River before dawn, since he thought that because of the difficulty of crossing this would be the limit of the Roman pursuit.

[p. 235] 44. When the consul returned victorious to¹⁸¹ camp, he was prevented from enjoying an unalloyed delight by the sting of worry over his younger son. [2] This was Publius Scipio, who was also called Africanus later after the destruction of Carthage, born son to the consul Paulus and by adoption grandson of Africanus. [3] This son was then in his seventeenth year, a fact which in itself increased the anxiety for him, and had been carried away in another direction by a crowd while in hot pursuit of the enemy. When he returned very late, then at last on the safe recovery of his son the consul felt the joy of so great a victory.¹⁸²

[4] At Amphipolis the news of the battle had by now arrived; there was a gathering of the matrons in the temple of Diana whom they call Tauropolos, to pray for help. Diodorus, who was in charge of the city, feared that the Thracians, two thousand of whom were in the garrison, would plunder the city during the confusion. Hence he craftily hired a man to play the part of dispatch bearer, from whom he received papers in the middle of the market place. [5] The message in these despatches was that the Roman fleet had put in at Emathia¹⁸³ and was harassing the surrounding countryside, and that the officers in charge of Emathia requested him to send a force against the ravagers. [6] After reading this, he urged the Thracians to start out to defend the coast of Emathia, telling them that they would cause great slaughter and get great booty among the Romans scattered all over the fields. [7] At the same time he minimized the report of the loss of a battle; if this were true, he said, man after man would have been arriving direct from the rout. [8] Having got rid of [p. 237]the Thracians on this pretext, he barred the gates as¹⁸⁴ soon as he saw that they had crossed the Strymon.

45. On the second day after the battle Perseus arrived at Amphipolis. [2] From there he sent ambassadors with the staff of Mercury to Paulus. Meanwhile Hippias, Midon, and Pantauchus, the chief among the king's friends, set out of their own accord from Beroea, where they had taken refuge after the battle, and surrendered to the Romans at the consul's camp. Others too, overcome with fear, were thereafter preparing to do the same. [3] The consul sent as messengers of his victory his son Quintus Fabius, Lucius Lentulus, and Quintus Metellus with despatches to Rome and granted the spoils of the slain enemy to the infantry, [4] and to the cavalry the right to plunder the surrounding territory, provided that they were not absent from camp for more than two nights. He himself moved camp nearer to the sea by Pydna. [5] Beroea first, then Thessalonica and Pella, and then almost all Macedonia was surrendered within two days. [6] The people of Pydna who were nearest had not yet sent envoys; a heterogeneous crowd of numerous nationalities together and the mob which had been amalgamated by flight from the battlefield were standing in the way of planning and agreement among the citizens. The gates were not only closed but built up solid. [7] Midon and Pantauchus were sent up to the walls to confer with Solon, who was in charge of the garrison; through him dismissal of the mob of soldiers was arranged. The city when surrendered was given to the Roman troops to plunder.

[8] After Perseus had tried his only expedient, to get aid from the Bisaltae,¹⁸⁵ to whom he sent envoys [p. 239]without result, he appeared before an assembly bringing¹⁸⁶ his son Philip with him, [9] in order to strengthen by exhortation the spirits of the people of Amphipolis themselves, and of the cavalry and infantry who had either accompanied him or had in their flight reached the same goal. [10] He began to speak several times, but tears choked him, and when he could not open his mouth he instructed Evander the Cretan in the matters which he wished to discuss with the people and went down from the sacred spot.¹⁸⁷ [11] At the sight of the king and his truly pitiable weeping the crowd itself groaned and wept; but with equal readiness they would have none of Evander's speech; and some dared to shout from the midst of the assembly, “Get away from here so that we few survivors may not perish on your account.” The vehemence of these interruptions choked off Evander's speech. [12] Thereafter the king went home, put his money, his gold, and his silver into the scout-ships which were moored in the Strymon and himself went down to the river. [13] The Thracians and the rest of the mob of soldiers, not daring to trust themselves to ships, slipped away to their homes; the Cretans followed Perseus in hopes of cash. Because apportionment would create more hard feelings than gratitude, fifty talents were set out on the river-bank for them to scramble for. [14] When after this scramble they were boarding the ships in riotous fashion, they sank one scout-ship at the mouth of the river by overcrowding it. On that day the party reached Galepsus, on the next Samothrace, their destination; [15] it is said that two thousand talents were brought there.

46. Paulus sent men to take charge of all the [p. 241]surrendered cities, so that no wrong should be done¹⁸⁸ to the conquered in the first days of peace; he kept the king's ambassadors with him and, since he did not know of the king's flight, sent Publius Nasica to Amphipolis with a small force of infantry and cavalry, [2] both to ravage Sintica and to interfere with any moves of the king. [3] Meanwhile Meliboea was captured and plundered by Gnaeus Octavius. At Aeginium, to besiege which the staff-officer Gnaeus Anicius had been sent, two hundred men were lost in a sally from the town because the people of Aeginium did not know that the war was over.

[4] The consul set out from Pydna with his whole army and on the second day reached Pella, pitched camp a mile from there, and remained in this camp for a few days, examining the site of the city from all sides and noticing that it had not been chosen to be the capital without good reason. [5] It is situated on a hill sloping to the south-west; swamps of a depth impenetrable in summer or winter surround it, formed by the ponding of rivers. [6] The citadel Phacus projects like an island from the swamp itself, where it comes nearest the city, and is set on an embankment, a huge construction designed to bear the weight of a wall and remain undamaged by the water of the surrounding swamp. [7] At a distance it appears to be joined to the city wall, but it is separated by a river within the walls and likewise connected by a bridge, so that there is no approach for a besieger from without nor is there any escape for anyone imprisoned by the king within, except over a very easily guarded bridge. [8] The royal treasury was located there; but at that time nothing was found except the three hundred talents which had been sent to King Gentius and then withheld. [p. 243] [9] During the days in camp at Pella, numerous embassies¹⁸⁹ were received which came, especially from Thessaly, to offer congratulations. [10] Then on receiving the news that Perseus had crossed to Samothrace, the consul set out from Pella and arrived at Amphipolis on the fourth day's march. [11] The pouring out of the entire populace to meet him showed to any one that Paulus had not robbed them of a just and good king. . .¹⁹⁰