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The Annals of the Civil War Written by Leading Participants North and South (ed. Alexander Kelly McClure), Van Dorn, the hero of Mississippi. (search)
d him at the Hatchie bridge, while Rosecrans, with twenty thousand men, was attacking his rear at the Tuscumbia bridge, only five miles off. the whole road between was occupied by a train of near four hundred wagons, and a defeated army of about eleven thousand muskets. But Van Dorn was never, for a moment, dismayed. He repulsed Ord, and punished him severely; while he checked Rosecrans at the Tuscumbia until he could turn his train and army short to the left, and cross the Hatchie by the Boneyard road, without the loss of a wagon. By ten P. M. his whole army and train were safely over the Hatchie, and with a full moon to light us on our way we briskly marched for Ripley, where we drew up in line of battle and awaited the enemy; but he not advancing, we marched to Holly Springs. When, in November, Van Dorn checked Grant's advance, he then occupied the works on the Tallahatchie, which he held for a month — Grant's force was sixty thousand, Van Dorn's was sixteen thousand. He the
map. Hamilton on the right, Davidson the centre, McKean on the left, with an advance of three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery under Colonel Oliver on the Chewalla road, at or near Alexander's, beyond the rebel breastworks. The cavalry were disposed as follows: (See map accompanying Colonel Wiezner's report.) A battalion at Burnsville, one at Roney's Mill on the Jacinto and Corinth road. Colonel Lee, with the Seventh Kansas and a part of the Seventh Illinois at Kossuth and Boneyard, watching the rebels' right flank; Colonel Hatch and Captain Wilcox on the east and north fronts, covering and reconnoitring. The reasons for these dispositions flow obviously from the foregoing explanations of our ignorance of the north-westerly approach, and of the possibility that the rebels might threaten us on the Chewalla and attack us by the Smith's Bridge road on our left, or go round and try us with his main force on the Purdy, or even Pittsburgh Landing road. The general pla
map. Hamilton on the right, Davidson the centre, McKean on the left, with an advance of three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery under Colonel Oliver on the Chewalla road, at or near Alexander's, beyond the rebel breastworks. The cavalry were disposed as follows: (See map accompanying Colonel Wiezner's report.) A battalion at Burnsville, one at Roney's Mill on the Jacinto and Corinth road. Colonel Lee, with the Seventh Kansas and a part of the Seventh Illinois at Kossuth and Boneyard, watching the rebels' right flank; Colonel Hatch and Captain Wilcox on the east and north fronts, covering and reconnoitring. The reasons for these dispositions flow obviously from the foregoing explanations of our ignorance of the north-westerly approach, and of the possibility that the rebels might threaten us on the Chewalla and attack us by the Smith's Bridge road on our left, or go round and try us with his main force on the Purdy, or even Pittsburgh Landing road. The general pla
and Tuscumbia. Colonel Hawkins' regiment of infantry, and Captain Dawson's battery of artillery, were also left in the Boneyard road, in easy supporting distance of the bridge. The army bivouacked at Chewalla, after the driving in of some pickets pushed on with the intention of engaging the enemy until I could get my train and reserve artillery unparked and on the Boneyard road to the crossing at Crumb's Mills (this road branches off south from the State-line road, about two and a half miles its appearance on our right flank and rear. The trains and reserve artillery were therefore immediately ordered on the Boneyard road, and orders were sent to Armstrong and Jackson to change their direction, and cover the front and flank of the trait, under their gallant leader, General Price, until orders were sent to fall back and take up their line of march on the Boneyard road, in rear of the whole train. At one time, fearing that the enemy, superior in numbers to the whole force I had in
him at the Hatchie Bridge; while Rosecrans, with twenty thousand men, was attacking his rear at the Tuscumbia Bridge, only five miles off. The whole road between was occupied by a train of nearly four hundred wagons, and a defeated army of about eleven thousand muskets. But Van Dorn was never for a moment dismayed. He repulsed Ord, and punished him severely; while he checked Rosecrans at the Tuscumbia, until he could turn his train and army short to the left, and cross the Hatchie by the Boneyard road, without the loss of a wagon. He then moved near Holly Springs, Mississippi, to await further developments. In the meantime General Grant massed a heavy force, estimated at eighty thousand men, at various points on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Thence he moved south, through the interior of Mississippi, until he encamped near Water Valley. The country was teeming with great quantities of breadstuffs and forage, and he accumulated an immense depot of supplies at Holly Spri
of Fort Donelson February 12-16. Capture of Fort Donelson February 16. Expedition to Clarksburg, Tenn., February 19-21. Moved to Pittsburg Landing March 5-18. Battle of Shiloh April 6-7. Advance on and siege of Corinth, Miss., April 29-May 30. Pursuit May 31-June 6. Duty at Corinth till October. Expedition to Iuka, Miss., September 18-22. Battle of Iuka September 19. Battle of Corinth October 3-4. Pursuit October 5-7. Moved to Rienzi October 7; thence to Boneyard and duty there till November. Little Bear Creek November 28 and December 12. Duty at Corinth till March, 1863. Expedition against Forest December 18, 1862, to January 3, 1863. Moved to Bethel, Tenn., March 1863, and duty there till June 1. Moved to Corinth June 1; thence to Moscow and duty there till August. At LaGrange till October. March to Pulaski October 30-November 11 and duty there till March, 1864. Veterans on furlough January and February. At Prospect, Ten
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 13. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Recollections of campaign against Grant in North Mississippi in 1862-63. (search)
e destruction of the bridge when he heard the sounds of battle at the Davis's bridge, and with a soldier's instinct understood at once the condition of affairs. He sent a courier to Van Dorn to say that he might turn the train and army into the Boneyard road, and he would have the bridge repaired by the time they would reach it. This was promptly done, and when all were fairly on the new route, Maury was ordered to withdraw from his position and follow the train. By 10 P. M. we were all safelyly escape than did Van Dorn's from the forks of the Hatchie. Before Ord's guns had ceased firing on our advance Rosecrantz had attacked our rear at the Tuscumbia. They could each hear the other's artillery; and ignorant of the existence of the Boneyard road, they seemed to have felt secure of their prey and indisposed to press an enemy at bay, whose prowess they had such good reason to respect After this they made no energetic pursuit, and we continued on our march towards Holly Springs withou
Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 19. (ed. Reverend J. William Jones), Recollections of General Earl Van Dorn. (search)
aded him at the Hatchie bridge, while Rosecrans, with twenty thousand men, was attacking his rear at the Tuscumbia bridge, only five miles off. The whole road between was occupied by a train of near four hundred wagons and a defeated army of about eleven thousand muskets. But Van Dorn was never for a moment dismayed. He repulsed Ord and punished him severely, while he checked Rosecrans at the Tuscumbia until he could turn his train and army short to the left, and cross the Hatchie by the Boneyard road, without the loss of a wagon. By 10 P. M. his whole army and train were safely over the Hatchie, and with a full moon to light us on our way we briskly marched for Ripley, where we drew up in line of battle and awaited the enemy, but he not advancing we marched to Holly Springs. When in November Van Dorn checked Grant's advance, he then occupied the works on the Tallahatchie, which he held for a month; Grant's force was sixty thousand, Van Dorn's was sixteen thousand. He then reti
Comte de Paris, History of the Civil War in America. Vol. 2. (ed. Henry Coppee , LL.D.), Book IV:—Kentucky (search)
e direction of Crum's Mill; but this long, heavy column could not reach the point designated very speedily, for the crossing of the defile formed by the causeway and bridges, amid the swamps adjoining the river, would consume much time. In order to accomplish this movement, it was necessary to detain Hurlbut at Davies' Bridge, and prevent him from ascending the left bank of the Hatchie to seize Crum's Mill, or from crossing to the right bank to menace the road followed by the convoy toward Boneyard. This was the most pressing, for Rosecrans' attack was as yet but a remote peril. Consequently, after Price's two divisions had become engaged Lovell was also sent with two brigades to continue the struggle against Hurlbut. The four thousand soldiers of the latter were naturally unable to break the lines of such numerous adversaries. But these adversaries were not seeking to achieve a victory; as soon as Van Dorn saw his convoy sufficiently advanced on the road to Crum's Mill, he took