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Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Volume 3., chapter 6.79 (search)
ent up from New Orleans by Butler on receiving the first news of the battle. Being still menaced by Breckin-ridge, the troops took up a new and shorter line, extending from Bayou Grosse by the tannery and penitentiary to the neighborhood of the capitol; at 3 o'clock every morning they stood to arms, and by the 13th Colonel Paine, with characteristic care and energy, had strongly intrenched the arsenal grounds, with 24 guns in position, and with the cooperation of the navy concerted every measure for an effective defense against numbers. By General Butler's orders the library and a statue of Washington, in the capitol, were packed and shipped to New Orleans. On the 20th, by Butler's orders, Baton Rouge was quietly evacuated, and the troops, with all their material, proceeded to Camp Parapet, at Carrollton, just above New Orleans, where they set to work to extend and strengthen the old Confederate lines and put everything in good condition for defense. Breckinridge had fallen bac
Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 1., Chapter 17: events in and near the National Capital. (search)
l garrisoned citadel. Thither stores and munitions of war were carried, and in it howitzers were planted; and behind the massive walls of that magnificent structure, with a few hundred men as defenders, the President and his Cabinet and the archives of the nation would have been safe until the thousands of the men of the loyal North, then aroused and moving, could reach and rescue them. Although the President and his Cabinet were not actually compelled to take refuge in the well-guarded Capitol, yet for several days after the affair in Baltimore, and the interruption of communication with the Free-labor States, they and the General-in-chief were virtually prisoners at the seat of Government. Soldiers from the Gulf States and others below the Roanoke, with those of Virginia, were pressing eagerly toward the Capital, while the Minute-men of Maryland and the secessionists of Washington were barely restrained from action by the Pennsylvanians and the Cassius M. Clay Battalion, until
Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 2., Chapter 5: military and naval operations on the coast of South Carolina.--military operations on the line of the Potomac River. (search)
t a distance, of the muzzles of 1.00-pound Parrott guns. These Quaker guns, like similar ones at Manassas a few months later, had, for six weeks, defied the Army of the Potomac. In a house near the fort (which was soon made into a strong regular work), Brigadier-General James Wadsworth, who was placed in command, there made his Headquarters; and on the roof he caused a signal-station to be erected, from which there was an interchange of intelligence with another station on the dome of the capitol at Washington. There the writer visited General Wadsworth, late in November, 1861, and found that ardent and devoted patriot, who had left all the ease and enjoyments which great wealth and a charming domestic circle bestow, and for the sake of his endangered country was enduring all the privations incident to an arduous camp life. His quarters were humble, and in no respect did his arrangements for comfort differ from those of his brother officers. Quaker gun at Manassas. this is f
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 2: military policy, or the philosophy of war. (search)
their institutions. Besides that, the character of the chief of the State; that of the chiefs of the army, and their military talents; the influence which the cabinet or the councils of war exercise upon the operations, from the distance of the capitol; the system of war which controls in the hostile staff; the difference in the constitutive force of the armies, and in their armament; the geography and the military statistics of the country where one is to penetrate; finally, the resources andeat captain, it is certainly the preferable mode. Before finishing upon these important matters, is remains for me yet to say a few words upon another manner of influencing military operations: it is that of councils of war established in the capitol near the government. Louvois, directed a long time from Paris, the armies of Louis XIV, and did it with success. Carnot directed also from Paris the armies of the Republic; in 1793 he did very well, and saved France; in 1794 he did at first
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 3: strategy. (search)
ll give it a refuge at need. The idea of girding all the frontiers of a State with strong places very near each other, is a calamity; this system has been falsely imputed to Vauban, who, far from approving it, disputed with Louvois upon the great number of useless points which that minister wished to fortify. The maxims of this part of the art may be reduced to the following principles: 1. A State ought to have places disposed in echelon upon three lines from the frontier towards the capitol. The memorable campaign of 1829 has still proved these truths. If the Porte had had good forts in masonry in the defiles of the Balkan, and a fine place near Faki, we should not have arrived at Adrianople, and events might have been complicated. Three places in the first line, as many in the second, and a grand place of arms in the third line, near the centre of the power, form a system nearly complete for each part of the frontiers of a State. If there be four such fronts, that will m
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Chapter 5: of different mixed operations, which participate at the same time of strategy and.of tactics. (search)
oravia, marched upon Bohemia, instead of regaining Silesia. These parallel retreats are often preferable, inasmuch as they turn the enemy from a march upon the capitol of the State and upon the centre of its power; the configuration of the frontiers, the fortresses which are found there, the greater or less space which an army we is equally very proper for this kind of war, especially when there does not exist in the country two political parties which may aspire to the possession of the capitol, and render its occupation decisive for the enemy. If the latter penetrate by the Alps, the French can act upon the Rhone and Saone, turning on the frontier to t of arresting thus its direct march, for it would be necessary always to leave the half of this Austrian army upon the Inn in order to cover the approaches to the capitol; then there would be a fatal division in the forces, and if it were decided to concentrate the whole army in the Tyrol, leaving the route of Vienna open, the plan
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Sketch of the principal maritime expeditions. (search)
occupied by Zimisces, who was worthy of it; instead of ransoming himself like his predecessors, he raises a hundred thousand men, arms a respectable fleet, repulses Swatoslans from Adrianople, obliges him to retire upon Silistria, and causes the capitol of the Bulgarians to be re-taken by assault. The Russian prince marches to meet the enemy, gives him battle not far from Silistria, but is forced to re-enter into the place, where he sustained one of the most memorable seiges of which history mnst the capital of the United States of America. There was seen, to the astonishment of the world, ahandful of seven or eight thousand English, descend in the midst of a State of ten millions of souls, to penetrate sufficiently far to seize the capitol, and to destroy thereat all the public establishments — results for which one seeks in vain another example in history. One would be tempted to reproach for it the republican and anti-military spirit of the inhabitants of those provinces, if we
Baron de Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, or a New Analytical Compend of the Principle Combinations of Strategy, of Grand Tactics and of Military Policy. (ed. Major O. F. Winship , Assistant Adjutant General , U. S. A., Lieut. E. E. McLean , 1st Infantry, U. S. A.), Note on intrenched camps. (search)
quite another object. If those works be considered as made for resisting a regular siege, it is certain that they would be very defective. Bat, considered as an intrenched camp, for giving a refuge and an outlet upon the two banks of the Danube to a considerable army, it is certain also that they would fulfill sufficiently well this design, and that they would be of great importance in case of a war like that of 1809. If they had existed at this epoch, they would probably have saved the capitol. In order to complete a great system, it would have been better, perhaps, to surround Linz with a regular bastioned line, then to establish a line of from seven to eight towers between the eastern salient of the place and the mouth of the Traun, in a direct extent of four thousand yards only, to the end of reserving as an intrenched camp only the great bend formed by the Danube between Linz and the Traun. There would thus be had the double advantage of a fortress of the first rank, and
H. Wager Halleck , A. M. , Lieut. of Engineers, U. S. Army ., Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactis of Battles &c., Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery and Engineers. Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia., Chapter 7: sea-coast defences..—Brief description of our maritime fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have taken place between ships and forts, including the attack on San Juan d'ulloa, and on St. Jean d'acre (search)
and this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks. Even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? We allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the British fleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been completed. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carr
re completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of a defeated and dispirited foe. The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the American Revolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his surprise and defeat in the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of New York, had never taken place. The efficient employment of a few good squadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at Bladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in 1814. In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war. To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with the two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should make himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry Tactics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with Major Cooper's abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system of Cavalry Tactics, a
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