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Browsing named entities in a specific section of The Photographic History of The Civil War: in ten volumes, Thousands of Scenes Photographed 1861-65, with Text by many Special Authorities, Volume 1: The Opening Battles. (ed. Francis Trevelyan Miller). Search the whole document.

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Napoleon (Ohio, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
s not. He might easily have had our Civil War in his mind. In 1861, the art of war had been greatly complicated by pedantic study, principally by officers of the French school, in attempting to reduce it to an exact science. The true lesson of Napoleon's Defense of Washington. Only once were the elaborate fortifications about Washington seriously threatened. That was when the Confederate General Jubal A. Early, with a force of 10,000 men, marched against the Federal capital in July,y across the Potomac River, in good order and without loss, in the presence of a powerful hostile army. His use of the ground to compensate for inferior numbers and to hide his movements from the Federals shows how clearly he saw the secrets of Napoleon's generalship, while his battles in the woods were entirely original and his use of entrenchments was effective. The power of the modern fire-arm in the hands of his opponents forced him to accept less decisive results than great soldiers who p
Savannah (Georgia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
ces a novel element into the question, for Sherman abandoned Hood's army as a first objective, and chose Lee's army instead. It will be remembered that Sherman had difficulty in getting consent from Grant, who wanted him to ruin Hood's army first. As it turned out, Sherman marched one thousand miles and was several hundred miles from Lee at the end of the campaign. If Lee's army had been his real objective there were other ways of reaching it: first, by sending his army by sea north from Savannah, as was suggested by Grant, which would have taken two months, say until the end of February, 1865; second, by sending the troops by rail, as Schofield was moved with fifteen thousand men and as Hooker was moved with twenty-three thousand men, and, third, by marching on Sherman's famous feint. Railroad Bridge over the Chattahoochee, 1863 In the foreground we see the formidable defenses behind which Johnston held the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee against the advance of Sherma
Alleghany Mountains (United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
o a great extent are to be noticed. In Virginia, numerous rivers, running parallel to the direct line of advance, form good lines for defense and also obstacles to an advance. Several mountain valleys leading north at the eastern ranges of the Alleghanies gave opportunities for leading large forces safely into Pennsylvania from Virginia, or vice versa. Within the mountain district, a railroad from Lynchburg, Virginia, to Chattanooga, in Tennessee, about four hundred miles long, gave an opporing him across the Potomac, Jackson saved Richmond from McClellan in 1862. Up the Valley came Lee the following year, striking terror to the North by the invasion that was only checked at Gettysburg. This eastern gap, provided by nature in the Alleghanies, became a veritable gateway of terror to the Federals, for through it lay open the path for sudden approach upon Washington on the part of the Confederates. characteristics of raw troops, but the generals in their early movements do not ap
Washington (United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
testimony. In the East the regions between Washington and Richmond were traversed by streams, smalt lay open the path for sudden approach upon Washington on the part of the Confederates. characterlonger effective against Richmond and Washington. In these two pictures appear the two cap on both sides. The Confederates threatened Washington at the outset of the war, and realizing the true lesson of Napoleon's Defense of Washington. Only once were the elaborate fortifications about Washington seriously threatened. That was when the Confederate General Jubal A. Early, wihe beginning of the war if the troops around Washington had been added to it. Grant demonstrated thetachments from the Veteran Reserve to defend Washington. He then outnumbered Lee in the field. And men away from McClellan; Early's march on Washington, and many cavalry raids. The result of a e him inherited a ready-made army, Lee, like Washington, made his own army. He fought soldiers of t[8 more...]
City Point (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
the Peninsula and of Meade in Military commerce. This view of the magazine wharf at City Point in 1864 reveals the immensity of the transportation problem that was solved by the North in su army in the field near by. When Grant finally settled down to the siege of Petersburg, and City Point became the army base, the little village was turned temporarily into a great town. Winter quaforwarding of troops and stores. The supply base longest occupied by the Army of the Potomac, City Point, grew up almost in a night. With the coming of peace the importance of the post vanished, and with it soon after the evidences of its aggrandizement. The magazine wharf at City Point in 1864 City Point, Virginia, July, 1864 ø the operations of October, 1863, had only partial success. City Point, Virginia, July, 1864 ø the operations of October, 1863, had only partial success. Near the end of the war Thomas' pursuit of Hood, after Nashville, showed a much higher efficiency than had yet been reached, and the Appomattox campaign gives the only entirely successful instance in
North Anna (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
of firearms taught the commanders in the Civil War the habit of greatly strengthening every new position occupied with earthworks as formidable as possible. The works in the first picture were thrown up in a night by the Federals near North Anna River, Virginia, in 1864. It is apparent how they would strengthen the resistance of a small force to larger numbers who might advance across the open upon the position. In the second picture we see the salient of Fort Hell, with its ditch and abattitack. This was one of the fortifications about Petersburg, where the construction of fieldworks was developed to the highest point of efficiency. Formidable fieldworks in an advance: works thrown up in a night by the Federals near North Anna River, Virginia, in 186 Salient of Fort Hell will be replaced by the safe leader who is never brilliant, but makes no mistakes and at the same time commands the heaviest battalions. The absence of a broad and comprehensive plan of operations w
France (France) (search for this): chapter 2.8
campaigns of Napoleon, and these young men of royal blood expected at no distant day to be the leaders of a war of their own to recover the lost Bourbon throne of France. The three distinguished guests of the Army of the Potomac seated at the farther end of the Camp dinner-table are, from right to left, the Prince de Joinville, sified that ever in the thick of things they performed their duties to his entire satisfaction. At the close of the Peninsula Campaign the royal party returned to France, but watched the war with great interest to its close. It was not so vulnerable to attack as the railroad. All navigable rivers within the area of operations Army of the Potomac on its Peninsula Campaign. In the center of the group of Englishmen stands the Prince de Joinville. From the observations of these men both France and England were to learn many military lessons from a new conflict on the soil over which the soldiers of both nations had fought in a former generation. The ar
Kentucky (Kentucky, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
two hundred miles wide, over which communication was difficult. The eastern section of the country beyond the range was about one hundred miles wide and the western section was about four hundred miles wide. In Maryland, northwestern Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri sentiment was divided between the Union and the Confederacy. The Mississippi River separated three of the seceding States from the remaining eight. The immense amount of supplies needed for a great army caused military operation army of one hundred and twenty thousand men was large enough for his purposes, but he found it was a mistake. Equally fallacious with the importance given to strategic points was that ascribed to the occupation of territory. The control of Kentucky and Tennessee was given by Grant's Fort Donelson campaign, but the injury inflicted on the Confederate army by the large capture of men at Donelson and Island Number10 was the real and vital result. The control of territory that was not accompa
West Point (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
lay open the path for sudden approach upon Washington on the part of the Confederates. characteristics of raw troops, but the generals in their early movements do not appear much better than the troops. Every man who had been graduated from West Point was regarded as a trained soldier, which was a mistake, because West Point was a preparatory school, and such men as had studied the art of high command had done so by themselves. The trade of the general was new to all, and had to be learned West Point was a preparatory school, and such men as had studied the art of high command had done so by themselves. The trade of the general was new to all, and had to be learned in the hard school of experience. In four of the early campaigns in which the Federal troops were practically unopposed, they marched on an average of less than seven miles per day, while, in case of opposition by a greatly inferior force, the average was down to a mile a day, as in the Peninsula campaign and the advance on Corinth. The plans for the early battles were complicated in the extreme, perhaps due to the study of Napoleon and his perfect army opposed by poor generals. Bull Run,
Gaines Mill (Virginia, United States) (search for this): chapter 2.8
in which the Federal troops were practically unopposed, they marched on an average of less than seven miles per day, while, in case of opposition by a greatly inferior force, the average was down to a mile a day, as in the Peninsula campaign and the advance on Corinth. The plans for the early battles were complicated in the extreme, perhaps due to the study of Napoleon and his perfect army opposed by poor generals. Bull Run, Wilson's Creek, Seven Pines, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Shiloh, Gaines' Mill were of this kind, and failed. Even at Gettysburg, July 2, 1863, Lee's failure to execute his echelon attacks showed that his army was not yet ready to perform such a delicate refinement of war. As an example of improvement, however, take Jackson's march of fourteen miles on a country road and the battle fought on May 2, 1863, all between daylight and dark of one day. In battles, also, we notice the fine play of early campaigns replaced by a savage directness and simplicity at a later
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