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Albert Sidney Johnston (search for this): chapter 23
comparison drawn by Mr. Davis between General A. S. Johnston and Marshal Turenne. VII. General Bea country to the brink of despair, and led General Johnston to believe that he had lost the confidency was by no means assured at the hour of General Johnston's death. All that can be said is, that o found: General Beauregard had told General Johnston that morning, as he rode off, that if it n Colonel W. P. Johnston's Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, but it had been determined, aftere; and that, to his question addressed to General Johnston as to whether the War Department sanctionommand-in-chief, which was offered him by General Johnston, he had also, at the request of the latteauregard to his troops were to be sent to General Johnston's army. When, at the suggestion of Genion that it was afternoon before you and General Johnston reached the ridge where the front line wa of the general in chief. Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, p. 569. He had arrived there on h[9 more...]
Badeau (search for this): chapter 23
ed by us, nor does it, in any way, impair the force of what is said in Van Horne's History of the Army of the Cumberland. The discussion of this point has made it clear that not only Sherman's division, but the entire Federal army, was taken by surprise. That General Sherman should deny it to-day, with such bitterness of feeling towards those who prefer the testimony of facts to his unsubstantiated assertions, seems the result of an after-thought, which involves him in inconsistency. In Badeau's Military History of U. S. Grant we read as follows: Vol. i. pp. 71, 72. . . . On the 4th (April) the enemy felt Sherman's front in force, but nothing serious came of it, and the opinion of that commander was decided that no probability of an immediate engagement existed. Grant rode out on the day after (the 5th) to Sherman's lines, and concurred with him in this judgment. They were both mistaken, for the skirmish was the reconnoissance of the enemy, preliminary to the battle of
U. S. Grant (search for this): chapter 23
e had not yet received any intimation that General Grant was in danger, or that he (Buell) should h31st of March. received an intimation that General Grant was in any danger, or that there was need to the probability of an early attack upon General Grant, hurried through the place for rest and trLanding was distinctly heard at Savannah. General Grant supposed that it indicated an attack upon l Buell] subsequently received a note from General Grant, addressed to the commanding officer, advathe severity of the blows he inflicts. If General Grant really believed that his enemy was as stro non-aggressive adversary to resist. If General Grant had had time to carry out his intention, Gcording to Sherman's Memoirs, Page 245. General Grant's own forces, on the 7th, amounted to neartillery, on the left, with which to oppose General Grant's force of more than twenty thousand men. what would have been the consequences had General Grant carried out his intention—according to a s[17 more...]
H. W. Halleck (search for this): chapter 23
commanding officers surprised by Beauregard's foolish attack. Generals Halleck, Grant, and Buell seem to have been equally unprepared for hiss march on the 31st, intending—having obtained the approval of General Halleck—to stop for cleaning up and rest at Waynesboro; he had not yetin good shape to meet a comrade army, obtained permission from General Halleck to stop for rest at Waynesboro. The army commander had also uuced than this project of stopping at Waynesboro, that neither General Halleck nor General Buell, at this time, thought that there was anythi . . A variety of facts support the assumption that neither General Halleck, General Grant, nor the division commanders on the field beyonemy would advance in offence from Corinth with full strength. General Halleck proposed to command the united armies in their advance upon Cois letter See Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid, p. 30. to General Halleck, sent from Savannah, April 5th, he said: General Nelson'
McCook (search for this): chapter 23
0 A. M.), only about five thousand men with whom to confront General Grant's forces, and he was reinforced during the day by only two straggling regiments under General J. K. Jackson, and by a small disjointed brigade under Colonel Pond, at about 1 P. M. With those forces General Bragg not only held at bay those opposed to him, but took the offensive several times, and, on the arrival of Cheatham's division in its proper place, compelled Wallace, Sherman, and McClernand to call earnestly on McCook, of Buell's army, for support. General Beauregard, therefore, felt not much concerned about his left; and he directed all his attention and most of his available troops to holding in check or driving back, at times, Buell's forces, which showed considerable boldness, and seemed to be well handled. The result of that day's battle shows conclusively what would have been the consequences had General Grant carried out his intention—according to a statement to that effect in General Sherman's
Robert T. Wood (search for this): chapter 23
To a careless or superficial reader, this comparison, coming from such a source, might have a certain weight, but when sifted and closely analyzed, it is seen to be the far-fetched and idle fancy of prejudice. VII. General Beauregard says that the hardest fighting the Confederates encountered on the 7th was with Buell's splendidly organized and well-disciplined divisions, numbering at least twenty thousand History of the Army of the Cumberland, vol. i. p. 115. before the arrival of Wood's two brigades in the afternoon of that day. According to Sherman's Memoirs, Page 245. General Grant's own forces, on the 7th, amounted to nearly twenty-five thousand men (including Lew. Wallace's division of fresh troops), but they did not fight with the animation and spirit of the preceding day. Until about 10.30 A. M., General Beauregard had, in the centre and on the right, as stated in the narrative of the battle, only about ten thousand infantry and artillery, under Generals Breckinri
Boynton (search for this): chapter 23
ht the advance of Beauregard's army, and that he was advancing on us. General Sherman remarked, It could not be possible; Beauregard was not such a fool as to leave his base of operations to attack us in ours—mere reconnoissance in force. See Boynton's Sherman's Historical Raid, pp. 33, 84, for further extracts from official records. But Generals Sherman and Prentiss were not the only commanding officers surprised by Beauregard's foolish attack. Generals Halleck, Grant, and Buell seem tnce—only twenty-two miles? Was he not to blame for leaving his entire front unprotected by field-works, and for neglecting to throw out all the cavalry at his disposal, as far in his front and on his flanks as possible? But in his letter See Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid, p. 30. to General Halleck, sent from Savannah, April 5th, he said: General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two of General Buell's column will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to
Gustavus W. Smith (search for this): chapter 23
reserves passed Headquarters No. 1, where he had been left by General Johnston, he again mounted his horse and followed them to the front, where he remained as long as the battle raged, devoting his whole energy to the movements of our left and centre, while General Johnston was directing the attack on our right. This is conclusively established by the report of General Beauregard himself, and by those of Colonels Thompson, Augustin, Brent, Major Waddell, and Captains Ferguson, Chisolm, and Smith, who were General Beauregard's aids, or acting aids, at the time. See their reports, in Appendix to Chapter XX. Reverting now to what Mr. Davis insinuates was General Beauregard's attitude when informed of General Johnston's death, we have only to say, that the very source whence Colonel Johnston and Mr. Davis seem to have derived their information—namely, Governor Harris, in his letter of April 13th, 1880, already referred to—in nowise confirms what is said to have been his language
Hare (search for this): chapter 23
ublic credulity, their eradication is an arduous and unpleasant task. The experience of life teaches this lesson to most men. And it often happens that even the fair-minded are slow to discard a conviction which has grown upon them and is strengthened by the assertions of those who are, or have been, high in authority. There seems to be a fatal attraction about the propagation of evil reports, which the preponderance of truth itself but tardily counterbalances and destroys. Listeners, says Hare, do seldom refrain from evil hearing. This applies to the unaccountable and malicious story, to which additional notoriety has recently been given, that General Beauregard, during the first day of the battle of Shiloh, up to the time when he was informed of General Johnston's death, was lying in his ambulance, taking no part whatever in the fight, and, that even after the fall of the commanding general, he quietly remained where he was, waiting the issue of events. To listen to such a s
Thomas Worthington (search for this): chapter 23
orth along my whole front. This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men were so posted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side. In his testimony at the trial of Colonel Worthington, an officer of his command, in August, 1862, he said: And here I mention, for future history, that our right flank was well guarded by Owl and Snake Creeks, our left by Lick Creek, leaving us simply to guard our front. No stronger Confederates numbered not quite forty thousand men, and about one third of this force was composed of newly formed regiments, very recently armed. of the South with their best leaders. On Friday the 4th, nor officer, nor soldier, not even Colonel Worthington, looked for an attack, as I can prove. Now, what forces had he and General Prentiss with which to hold and defend their impregnable positions? Sherman had three of his brigades of infantry, three batteries of six pieces each, and some
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