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John A. Wharton (search for this): chapter 37
ragg's line at about eight hundred yards' distance. Breckinridge's reserve was composed of Trabue's, Bowen's, and Statham's brigades, with a total infantry and artillery of 6,439. The cavalry, about 4,300 strong, guarded the flanks, or was detached on outpost duty; but, both from the newness and imperfections of their organization, equipment, and drill, and from the rough and wooded character of the ground, they did little service that day. The part taken by Morgan's, Forrest's, and Wharton's (Eighth Texas), will be given in its proper place. The army, exclusive of its cavalry, was between 35,000 and 36,000 strong. Jordan, in an official report, made in July, 1862, to the writer, then on inspection-duty, gave the effective total of all arms at 38,773, who marched April 3d. In his Life of Forrest he makes it 39,630. Hodge, in his sketch of the First Kentucky Brigade, with a different distribution of troops, puts the total at 39,695, which he says he made up from the retu
. Sherman's historical raid, by Boynton, p. 29. Therefore, on Friday, two days before the battle, when Colonel Worthington was so apprehensive, I knew there was no hostile party in six miles, Hardee was not more than two miles distant. though there was reason to expect an attack. I suppose Colonel McDowell and myself had become tired of his constant prognostications, and paid no attention to him, especially when we were positively informed by men like Buckland, Kilby Smith, and Major Ricker, who went to the front to look for enemies, instead of going to the landing ... On Friday, the 4th, nor officer, nor soldier, looked for an attack, as I can prove. . . . For weeks and months we had heard all sorts of reports, just as we do now. For weeks old women had reported that Beauregard was coming, sometimes with 100,000, sometimes with 800,000, when, in fact, he did not leave Corinth until after even Colonel Worthington had been alarmed for safety. Sherman says, further on,
but it was impossible to move in the pitch-darkness, over flooded roads and swollen streams, with the cold, driving rain beating upon them. With almost criminal recklessness, many of the soldiers discharged their small-arms, to find out the condition of the cartridges. General Johnston, as he rode along the lines on the 5th, tried to prevent the recurrence of this. Bragg alludes to it with great severity. Colonel E. L. Drake, of Fayetteville, Tennessee, who was at that time serving in Bate's Second Tennessee Regiment, of which he has furnished a valuable memoir to the writer, gives the following statement. His regiment was in Cleburne's brigade, and on the extreme left of Hardee's line. He says: The wishes of General Johnston to move quietly were not generally regarded; and, at one point on the march, the presence of a wild deer, which ran along the lines, evoked a yell among Hardee's men which could have been heard for miles. Hard showers fell. There was great uneasi
Edward W. Munford (search for this): chapter 37
with Bragg, Breckinridge, and other officers. He halted that night at Monterey. He handed to Munford and some others of his staff a small roll of papers, containing his maps and the plan of battletents, that he might be able to use their services to the best advantage on the day of battle. Munford says: We were to attack his army in their encampments between these creeks and that riverhing seemed to be going on, which was really, however, the random firing already mentioned. Munford tells as follows of how the morning passed: Everything had been calculated with the utmos I was riding with him along the line of battle, which was being formed about 12 M. Colonel Munford thinks the hour was earlier. on Saturday, when one of our scouts intercepted us, and made ad special instructions given to the corps commanders for the engagement in the morning. Colonel Munford, in his address at Memphis, has supplied the following interesting particulars of a convers
from Bragg's line; and Breckinridge, to the right of that road, was to give support, wherever it should become necessary. Polk's corps, 9,136 strong in infantry and artillery, was composed of two divisions, Cheatham's on the left, made up of B. R. Johnson's and Stephens's brigades, and Clark's on his right, formed of A. P. Stewart's and Russell's brigades. It followed Bragg's line at about eight hundred yards' distance. Breckinridge's reserve was composed of Trabue's, Bowen's, and Statham's brigades, with a total infantry and artillery of 6,439. The cavalry, about 4,300 strong, guarded the flanks, or was detached on outpost duty; but, both from the newness and imperfections of their organization, equipment, and drill, and from the rough and wooded character of the ground, they did little service that day. The part taken by Morgan's, Forrest's, and Wharton's (Eighth Texas), will be given in its proper place. The army, exclusive of its cavalry, was between 35,000 and 3
ay's march nearer to the conjunction with General Grant, to prevent which was the object of his advance. Usually, the indications of approaching battle are so palpable that the men in the ranks, as well as the officers of all grades, foresee the deadly struggle, and nerve themselves to meet it. But in this case the nearness of the enemy in force was not known in the national army, and there was no special preparation for the conflict. In Sherman and his campaigns, by Colonels Bowman and Irwin, it is stated (page 50), There was nothing to indicate a general attack until seven o'clock on Sunday morning, when the advance-guard of Sherman's front was forced in on his main line. Grant and his campaigns, a book compiled by Prof. Coppee, avowedly from Grant's Reports, and very prejudiced in its conclusions in favor of that general, says, At the outset our troops were shamefully surprised and easily overpowered. It is but a poor compliment to the generalship of either Grant or She
d, that he must crush Grant before Buell joined him. This was the purpose, this was the plan of the battle of Shiloh. When night fell, on the eve of battle, the following was the Confederate array: The front line, composed of the Third Corps and Gladden's brigade, was under Hardee, and extended from Owl Creek to Lick Creek, a distance of somewhat over three miles. Cleburne's brigade was on the left, with its flank resting near Owl Creek. Hindman was intrusted with a division, composed of Wood's brigade, and his own under Colonel Shaver. These occupied the centre. The interval, on his right, to Lick Creek, was occupied by Gladden's brigade, detached from Bragg, and put under Hardee's command for the battle. Hardee's three brigades numbered 6,789 effectives, and Gladden added 2,235 more — an effective total in the front line of 9,024. Bragg commanded the second line. Withers's division formed his right wing. Jackson's brigade, 2,208 strong, was drawn up three hundred yards
Jacob Thompson (search for this): chapter 37
r scouts intercepted us, and made a report to the general which indicated the presence of a much larger Federal force than previous information had induced us to expect. For a moment after receiving this report, he appeared to be in profound thought, when he turned to me, saying: I will fight them if there is a million of them! I have as many men as can be well handled on this field, and I can handle as many men as they can. He then proceeded with the inspection of his line. The Hon. Jacob Thompson, Secretary of the Interior under Mr. Buchanan, who was present on the staff of General Beauregard, furnishes the writer with the following notes of an interview which he held with General Johnston on the way to this conference, as he thinks, but which more probably occurred soon after it: General Johnston took my arm, and remarked, I perceive that General Beauregard is averse to bringing on the attack on the enemy in the morning, on the ground that we have lost an opportunity
D. C. Buell (search for this): chapter 37
have the same effect as a defeat. I replied that if Buell should come up in time the odds would be greatly agaorthy of consideration. We have lost a day. We know Buell is marching an army as large as your own to this poiral Johnston's mind, that he must crush Grant before Buell joined him. This was the purpose, this was the plan places their force west at 200,000. One division of Buell's column arrived yesterday. General Buell will be hGeneral Buell will be here himself to-day. Some skirmishing took place between our out-guards and the enemy's yesterday and the day bk us in ours — mere reconnaissance in force. General Buell says that, so far as preparation for battle is cs the Army, of the Tennessee on the 6th of April. Buell's letter, dated January 19, 1865, to United States sch he believed to be still at Purdy. The advance of Buell's army, Nelson's division, had passed through Savannn the morning of the 6th, and the other divisions of Buell's army followed at intervals of about six miles.
t night on the way, he arrived next morning at Mickey's, a house seventeen or eighteen miles, by tha M. on the 4th, but bivouacked that night near Mickey's, in rear of Hardee's corps, with a proper in an interval of half an hour, and to halt near Mickey's. This halt was to allow Bragg's corps, whoseile & Ohio Railroad, and was about as far from Mickey's, the point of concentration, as Corinth was.ave caused the delay. My first division is at Mickey's; and the ignorance of the guide for the secohis route, he could have passed to the left of Mickey's, and deployed without interference or obstrure I can form upon it. I continued: I reached Mickey's at nightfall yesterday, whence I could not m in columns of brigades on the Bark road, near Mickey's; and Breckinridge's on the road from Monterem, did not intervene between Shiloh Church and Mickey's, in front of which Hardee's corps was deployinth, twenty miles away, and only a brigade at Mickey's, when that army was unfolding for an assault[2 more...]
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